Turan Research Center

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an attempt to reassert dominance over a post-Soviet space that had been steadily asserting greater independence. Ironically, by becoming bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow has created an opening for other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to distance themselves further from Russian influence. As the war drags on, the Turkic states on Russia’s periphery have taken advantage of this new freedom to maneuver.

For these countries, the goal is not to sever all ties with Russia — it remains a powerful neighbor and vital trading partner — but to redefine relations on the basis of mutual respect as well as to carve out their own space in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment. Many are wary of the paternalistic and often tense relationship with a Russia that continues to see them as part of its dominion.

To achieve this new balance, some states in the region are pursuing two complementary strategies: deepening engagement with the United States and expanding regional cooperation through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) — an intergovernmental forum linking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers.

Russian narratives about its “Near Abroad” vary by country but share recurring themes. Chief among them is the belief that these states should remain within Moscow’s sphere of influence and comply with its strategic interests. Those that do not are quickly branded as “ungrateful” or even as “threats.” Russia perceives itself as entitled not only to shape its neighbors’ foreign policies but also to influence their domestic affairs — frequently criticizing efforts to promote national languages over Russian or to revise history curricula in ways that challenge Moscow’s preferred narratives.

This persistent sense of entitlement has defined Russia’s relations with much of the post-Soviet world for decades. Yet as Moscow’s coercive tactics grow more visible — from meddling in internal politics to outright military aggression — its neighbors have become increasingly determined to assert autonomy and recalibrate their ties with the Kremlin.

Seeking Deeper Cooperation with the United States

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have remained peripheral to U.S. foreign policy. Washington’s focus on the Middle East, Afghanistan, China, Russia, and Europe consistently overshadowed the non-European CIS. However, growing U.S. interest in alternative transit routes such as the Middle Corridor  —and in access to rare earth elements (REEs) and critical minerals — has recently brought renewed attention to the region.

For regional governments long frustrated by Washington’s moralizing tone on democracy and human rights, former President Donald Trump’s transactional, business-first approach offered a refreshing change.

Azerbaijan, in particular, has long faced image problems in Washington, largely due to its wars with Armenia and lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora. Despite cooperation during the war in Afghanistan, the United States often found itself preferring to partner with Armenia. But following Baku’s victory in Karabakh and its serious peace talks with Yerevan, a new opportunity for rapprochement has emerged. For Washington, Azerbaijan could become a key partner along the Middle Corridor — a strategic bridge between Europe and Central Asia. Its close ties with U.S. allies Turkey and Israel coupled with its complicated relations with both Russia and Iran, strengthen that case.

A breakthrough came with the August 8 peace agreement, signed in Washington, where Azerbaijan and Armenia chose the United States — not Russia — as mediator. The accords dovetailed neatly with Trump’s emphasis on “ending wars” and signaled Baku’s growing preference for partnership with Washington.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also sought to capture Washington’s attention. In the early months of Trump’s second term, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reportedly financed a special flight to repatriate Central Asian nationals living illegally in the United States — a goodwill gesture toward Washington. At the UN General Assembly, Trump announced major business deals: a $4 billion locomotive contract with Kazakhstan and an $8 billion Boeing agreement with Uzbekistan.

As Carnegie analyst Temur Umarov observed, “only Washington can serve as a sufficient counterweight to both Moscow and Beijing.” Yet, for Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, fostering regional cohesion has been another essential path toward greater independence.

The Rise of the Organization of Turkic States

Situated between Russia, China, and Iran, the Turkic states have long pursued a “multi-vector” foreign policy — balancing relations among competing powers. Yet since independence, many Turkic leaders have also emphasized unity as a safeguard of sovereignty.

Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev, and Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akayev all championed the idea of Turkic solidarity. Only Uzbekistan’s former leader Islam Karimov resisted, fearing that pan-Turkic sentiment might undermine his domestic authority.

This vision culminated in the founding of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2009. Initially dismissed as a symbolic project, the OTS has gained new momentum in recent years — spurred by Russia’s military quagmire in Ukraine and Iran’s growing weakness. That vacuum has enabled Turkish and Azerbaijani influence to surge.

Indeed, Baku has spearheaded efforts to promote Turkic cohesion. At the October OTS Summit in Gabala, President Aliyev declared, “It is very important for the Turkic States to act as a single power center.” He highlighted military cooperation as a key element of integration, arguing that “in today’s world, military power is the fundamental guarantee of territorial integrity and independence.”

Aliyev has backed his words with action — participating in trilateral summits with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, offering to quadruple Kazakh oil exports via Azerbaijan (at Russia’s expense), and joining the ‘Unity 2025’ military exercises in Samarkand involving Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

For its part, Turkey has reinforced this momentum by becoming one of the region’s primary arms suppliers, promoting the Middle Corridor, and easing labor rules for Turkic citizens to work and do business in Turkey without special permits or visas.

This growing cooperation has strengthened the hand of Baku and Central Asia in negotiations with Moscow. Previously, Russia may have attempted to break up such cooperation — but it no longer can. Following a ten-month rift over Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft in December 2024, Vladimir Putin was compelled to personally apologize to Aliyev during a CIS summit in Dushanbe. As regional expert Arkadiy Dubnov told Novaya Gazeta, “Russia was forced to accept Azerbaijan as practically an equal partner.”

Russian Narratives on OTS Ambitions

Moscow, meanwhile, has watched the growing cohesion among Turkic states with mounting unease. Pro-Kremlin commentators and media outlets increasingly portray the OTS as a geopolitical project designed to erode Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The tone of Russian coverage has shifted from condescension to alarm, with some voices warning that Ankara and Baku are building a “proxy NATO” on Russia’s southern flank.

Aliyev’s calls for joint OTS military exercises appear to validate those fears. Pro-Kremlin outlets accused Turkey of using the OTS to establish military and political dominance over fellow members, while mocking the bloc as a “Turkic sultanate” driven by “empty declarations and inflated ambitions.” Nezavisimaya Gazetacolumnist Viktoria Panfilova went further, alleging that Ankara was “usurping” the foreign-policy agenda of Central Asian governments under the banner of Turkic unity.

Benearth the ridicule, however, lies genuine anxiety. The pro-Kremlin website PolitNavigator linked Putin’s recent visit to Tajikistan — home to Russia’s 201st Military Base — to the perceived rise of a “military-political bloc under Turkish and NATO auspices.” The article depicted Dushanbe as Moscow’s last reliable foothold in Central Asia, vital for countering “non-aligned” forces and preventing what they called Western-backed encroachment.

Similar rhetoric has circulated on Telegram channels aligned with the Kremlin, which described Tajikistan as a “forward outpost” to contain the “Turkic unification project” allegedly orchestrated by the United States and United Kingdom. Pro-Russian Central Asian expert Igor Shestakov even warned that proposals for regular OTS intelligence and security summits signaled “genuine bloc formation” and the gradual emergence of a “Turan army.”

These narratives are exaggerated and conspiratorial — reflecting a Kremlin that perceives threats and plots in every assertion of national identity or foreign policy moves not involving it. But more importantly, they show that Moscow now views the OTS not merely as an economic experiment but as a strategic challenge.

Yet pro-Russian commentators rarely acknowledge the obvious: the OTS’s rising influence is partly a direct consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian officials are well aware of this. A leaked internal presentation in a strategy session led by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin last year, attended by senior Kremlin figures and advisers such as Alexander Dugin and Sergei Karaganov, outlined how Western pressure and economic incentives had eroded Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. The presentation specifically mentioned that the region was taking advantage of Moscow’s “vulnerability” to “integrate without Russia” through groups such as the OTS. It highlighted that these countries were “changing their worldview” through “rethinking our collective history,” promoting English instead of Russian as a second language, adopting Western educational standards, and sending the children of elites to be schooled in the West. It concluded that the countries would have to “make a decision on their stance towards Russia” without further detail.

The irony is clear: Moscow’s colonial mindset of the region as a wayward colony is precisely what pushes these countries away from it. If Russia wants to maintain influence, it must treat Central Asia and the Caucasus as partners, not subordinates — refraining from interfering in domestic affairs, including language policy, minority rights, and education, as Moscow has often done in the past.

Central Asia’s Cautious Calculus

Putin’s apology underscored Azerbaijan’s elevated regional standing. Having regained Karabakh, strengthened alliances with Turkey and Israel, expanded its role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, and hosted major international negotiations, Baku has emerged as a significant power in the post-Soviet space.

Central Asia, by contrast, remains more cautious. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are deepening regional integration but avoid open confrontation with Moscow. Both maintained neutrality during the Azerbaijan–Russia dispute. However, in recent months, both have drawn increasingly closer to Baku. In July, during the pinnacle of the rift, Mirziyoyev said, “never in history have our relations been at such a high level as today.” Likewise, Tokayev recently said that increasing ties with Azerbaijan was a “top priority.” Their statements reflect unprecedented cooperation: both countries have boosted transit through Azerbaijan, expanded trade, and intensified coordination across transport, logistics, and energy.

Meanwhile, tensions with Russia often persist. Kazakhstan continues to face threats of destabilization in its ethnic-Russian north. Uzbekistan has clashed diplomatically with Moscow over language policy such as promoting Uzbek and using English as a second language over Russian. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, both have learned that Russia is an unreliable partner — sanctions have disrupted trade routes and energy exports, and domestic anger has grown as Moscow deports Central Asian migrants and xenophobia rises in Russia.

Over the long term, Moscow’s tendency to treat its neighbors as vassal states rather than sovereign partners will only drive them further away — especially as the war in Ukraine drains Russia’s economic and political capacity. The Kremlin’s ten-month rift with Azerbaijan should serve as a warning: the region’s patience is finite. Today, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have alternatives. China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are investing billions across the region, giving local governments unprecedented leverage and options. While the region still currently relies on Russia, this dependence may diminish as these alternatives expand. If Russia wishes to preserve influence, it must learn to engage as a respectful partner — not an overbearing patron.

As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon pointedly told Putin in 2022, “we respect the interests of our largest strategic partner — but we also want to be respected.”

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Following the widely publicized meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Washington D.C. facilitated by President Trump, momentum is building along the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. While challenges remain and the path forward is far from smooth, recent developments suggest a renewed sense of possibility.

After decades of stalled efforts, the prospect of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey appears to be accelerating. Though the current process began, it was an August summit in Washington D.C. between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev facilitated by U.S. President Donald Trump that appears to have injected new momentum. Turkey was neither present nor directly mentioned at the meeting, yet its long-standing alignment with Azerbaijan indicates that progress between Ankara and Baku is a prerequisite for reconciliation between Yerevan and Baku.

This interdependence has long shaped the regional dynamic.

It was precisely this linkage that derailed the 2009 attempt to normalize Armenia-Turkey relations when two protocols signed in Zurich were never ratified and eventually canceled in 2018.

Today, however, the stakes are higher. Russia’s waning influence in the South Caucasus, coupled with deteriorating relations between Moscow and both Yerevan and Baku, has created a new sense of urgency. While normalization is far from guaranteed, it is now believed to be within reach.

A breakthrough occurred in September, when Serdar Kilic, Turkey’s special envoy for normalization, traveled to Armenia to meet his counterpart, Deputy Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly, Ruben Rubinyan. Their previous meeting last year had taken place near the border; but this visit in the Armenian capital of Yerevan was unprecedented.

Although former Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Yerevan in 2008 to attend a World Cup qualifying match despite the absence of diplomatic relations, many Armenians remain skeptical of a breakthrough. Civil society voices have grown wary, especially after the failure to partially open one of the two border crossings between Armenia and Turkey for third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders – an agreed step that remains unfulfilled, likely out of deference to Azerbaijan.

The unofficial linkage between Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan dates back to 1993, when Armenian forces occupied Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar region. Since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Baku has regained its territory and both Azerbaijan and Turkey appear determined to take no chances.

Previous attempts to bring the two sides together have failed. In 2001, the controversial U.S.-facilitated Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission collapsed under nationalist opposition in Armenia. Following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Turkey proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform for the region, which also failed to materialize. The Zurich Protocols of 2009 – signed by Armenia and Turkey to establish diplomatic relations– were formally withdrawn by then-President Serzh Sargsyan in 2015 and annulled in 2018 due to Azerbaijan’s objections over the Karabakh conflict.

After the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Ankara and Baku again coordinated two ostensibly separate tracks – one concerning Armenia’s normalization with Azerbaijan and one with Turkey. There has been no breakthrough in unblocking economic and trade connections in the region, particularly the proposed Zangezur Corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenian territory. The August summit in Washington D.C. introduced a new term for this route in Armenia: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The route would also connect Turkey with Central Asia.

Yet signs of gradual progress have emerged over the past several years.

In 2022, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan attended the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey. Rubinyan followed suit last year. Also in 2022, Pashinyan – having signaled recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity – met with the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the presence of Aliyev. In 2023, Pashinyan attended Erdogan’s re-inauguration ceremony in Ankara.

Humanitarian gestures have also helped: the Armenia-Turkish border briefly opened for earthquake relief in 2023, and Armenian aid similarly passed through Turkey en route to Syria earlier this year. In June, Pashinyan’s visit to Istanbul included talks with Erdogan on potential energy cooperation. And although it has yet to function, an embargo on direct cargo flights between Yerevan and Istanbul was lifted in early 2023. However, overland routes through Georgia still remain a more economical form of transit.

Most importantly, disputed terminologies and symbols continue to shape the narrative. On April 24, 2024, Armenia’s official remembrance day for the 1915 mass killings and deportations of as many as 1.5 million ethnic Armenians by Ottoman Turks, Pashinyan notably used the Armenian term Meds Yeghern (“Great Calamity”) more frequently than the word “genocide.” Earlier, senior Member of Parliament Andranik Kocharyan had sparked controversy in Armenia and its diaspora by suggesting the need to ascertain the precise number of victims – a stance many Armenians view as a dangerous concession. Pashinyan echoed similar comments during a meeting with Swiss Armenians in January, prompting accusations that his government was making unilateral concessions to normalize relations with Turkey, just as critics allege he is doing with Azerbaijan.

To be sure, Turkey had in the past insisted on reexamining the events of 1915 during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan has also demanded Armenia adopt a “realistic roadmap,” warning that the “doors of opportunity” will not remain open indefinitely.

The joint statements following the latest meeting of the special envoys echoed familiar themes: opening the border for diplomats and third-country nationals; restoring the long-dormant Kars–Gyumri railway; expanding cooperation in education, aviation and other sectors. Yet one symbolic move stood out. On the eve of the meeting, Yerevan announced that beginning November 1, Armenian passport stamps would no longer feature Mount Ararat -- a potent national symbol located just across the borderin Turkey, where it is known as Mount Agri. That decision has been widely interpreted as a gesture to Ankara, signally that Armenia harbors no territorial claims in Eastern Turkey.

In early September, during an official visit to China for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey made a rare public gesture of unity: their spouses posed together for photographs and shared them on social media. Just this month, press reports added substance to this gesture of unity, revealing that Turkish Airlines -- the country’s national carrier -- plans to launch flights to Armenia. No dates were announced.

While smaller airlines have operated flights between the two nations since the mid-1990s, Turkish Airlines has avoided the route. According to Armenian sources, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had long prohibited the government-linked airline from doing so until Armenia and Azerbaijan resolved their bilateral disputes. Back in 2009, the International Crisis Group noted that such a move by Turkish Airlines would signal a breakthrough in regional diplomacy.

Now, with Yerevan and Baku widely believed to be on the cusp of signing a long-overdue peace treaty, the airline’s announcement takes on added significance.

Yet, to Yerevan’s chagrin, normalization with Ankara remains contingent on progress with Baku. Azerbaijan continues to insist on the removal of a controversial preamble in Armenia’s constitution, which refers to the “reunification of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh,” which Baku sees as making territorial claims on Azerbaijan. Aliyev has also criticized a reference to “achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia” as a territorial claim against Turkey. Pashinyan has pledged to hold a referendum on a full constitutional change following next year’s June parliamentary elections.

For Pashinyan, whose political fortunes hinges on his “peace agenda,” normalization with both Azerbaijan and Turkey is central to his electoral strategy. He sees it as a gamble fraught with risk, but rich in opportunities. For the European Union and United States, it also offers an opportunity to reduce Russian and Chinese influence in the South Caucasus and further connect the West to Central Asia beyond existing routes through Georgia.

As Baku and Yerevan inch closer to reconciliation, the prospect of Armenian- Turkish normalization no longer feels remote.

Whether it materializes remains uncertain. Much will depend on electoral cycles, the ability to counter entrenched narratives and sustained international interest to preserve the fragile momentum achieved so far. For now, Yerevan remains optimistic, suggesting that major breakthroughs could be achieved within months. Yet, as is often the case, no concrete details have been disclosed.

Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, analyst, and consultant from the United Kingdom based in Tbilisi, Georgia, since 2012. From 1998 until then he was based in Yerevan, Armenia, covering issues related to democracy, society, and conflict. In 1994 he first visited Karabakh as a journalist and photographer, also covered the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, and consulted for intergovernmental organisations on countering violent extremism. He writes news and analysis for international media and various analytical publications. He can be followed on X at @onewmphoto.

The Azerbaijan-UAE strategic partnership agreement aligns with Baku's broader outreach to the Gulf region and reinforces its long-standing multi-alignment policy. More importantly, it signals a shifting geopolitical landscape – one in which Russia's traditional dominance in the South Caucasus is waning, while the region itself becomes increasingly connected with the Middle East.

Last month, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (known as MBZ), President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), undertook an official visit to Azerbaijan, making a significant moment in the deepening relationship between the two nations. The high-level meeting was held in the city of Shusha in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. The visit resulted in the signing of 14 bilateral agreements, poised to inject fresh momentum into an already expanding strategic partnership.

Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and the UAE were first established in 1992. But President Ilham Aliyev’s first official visit to the UAE in 2006 marked a turning point in bilateral relations, ushering in a new era of cooperation. Since then, Aliyev has made six more visits to the UAE, with reciprocal high-level exchanges further solidifying ties. In 2024, MBZ became the first UAE leader to visit Azerbaijan. This momentum between the two nations culminated in July 2025, when the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed during Aliyev’s visit to the UAE – an accord that laid the foundation for a new phase of economic and strategic collaboration. The agreement aims at boosting bilateral trade which still largely remains untapped.

A testament to the burgeoning bilateral partnership is the scale of mutual investment. Between 1995 and 2024 ,the UAE infused $3.4 billion in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijani investments in the UAE reached $1.1 billion. A major driver for this expansion was the establishment in late 2023 of a $1 billion Joint Investment Fund between the Azerbaijan Investment Holding and the Abu Dhabi Investment Holding Company. The Azerbaijan Trade Representative Office was established in Dubai in 2017, followed by the opening of the Azerbaijan Trade House in 2019. The latter plays a key role in promoting the “Made in Azerbaijan” brand across the UAE and the broader Persian Gulf region. Currently, more than 350 commercial enterprises with UAE capital are registered in Azerbaijan.

Among the most prominent investments is the UAE’s national oil company, ADNOC, which acquired a 30% stake in Azerbaijan’s Absheron gas field for an unknown amount. Meanwhile, momentum is building in the green energy sector. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power is currently developing a $300 million wind farm in Azerbaijan while Abu Dhabi-backed projects such as the Garadagh Solar Power Plant are helping Baku accelerate its transition toward renewable energy. During the latest high-level visit, both sides signed multiple Memoranda of Understanding aimed at exploring joint opportunities in renewable and clean energy projects. Moreover, a $1 billion joint venture between Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and Azerbaijan Investment Holding further signals a deepening commitment to long-term economic collaboration.

Despite the visible expansion of diplomatic and strategic ties between Azerbaijan and the UAE, bilateral trade still lags behind outwardly developing ties. In 2024 trade reached just $96.8 million – a sharp decline from $1.6 billion the previous year, signaling a major drop in commercial activity. Geography remains a major impediment, compounded by the heavily sanctioned status of Iran which under ideal circumstances would serve as a vital transit hub between the two nations.

However, this dynamic may be poised for change.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – linking Russia’s heartland with Iran and the Indian Ocean – offers both the UAE and Azerbaijan a pathway to a more efficient north-south connectivity. Indeed, the INSTC’s major branch passes through Azerbaijan, and the UAE has recently expanded its ties with Russia, positioning itself to benefit from the corridor’s expansion.  

Yet for the INSTC to fulfill its full potential, sustained investment and robust multilateral cooperation will be essential. Streamlining customs procedures, aligning technical standards, and eliminating logistical bottlenecks must become shared priorities among participating countries. If these challenges are addressed, the INSTC could evolve into a fully optimized, major commercial route for Eurasian commerce. Historical precedent also favors its success; in ancient and medieval times, a similar route along the western Caspian Sea linked the Eurasian steppes with the Middle East.

The UAE president’s recent visit to Azerbaijan reflects Abu-Dhabi’s growing interest in the shifting connectivity landscape of the South Caucasus and the wider Black Sea region. As global trade routes shift in the wake of the war in Ukraine, the importance of alternative transit corridors has become increasingly urgent. The once-dominant northern route through Russia has lost viability, prompting China and the European Union to explore options through the South Caucasus. While the Middle Corridor -- stretching from Turkey across  he Caspian Sea to Central Asia -- may be geographically distant from the UAE, its emerging economic potential is enticing enough to attract Emirati investment. Notably, the UAE president’s mid-September visit to Georgia -- where an Emirati company is building a dry port near Tbilisi – underscores Abu Dhabi’s strategic understanding of the expanding East-West connectivity across the region.

Multi-Alignment Strategy

Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has long been defined by its pursuit of multi-vector diplomacy, and in recent years, a distinct pivot toward the Middle East has become increasingly evident. Since 1990s, Baku has actively cultivated simultaneous relationships across geopolitical divides -- maintaining strong ties with Russia and Turkey, while also deepening commercial and energy partnerships with Western countries. Azerbaijan’s strategic geography, particularly its role alongside Georgia as a key transit link between Central Asia and the EU, has further amplified its relevance on the global stage.

Building on decades of regional engagement, Azerbaijan has recently expanded its partnerships to include the Arab world. In addition to the growing relationship with the UAE, dynamic cooperation is now unfolding with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), spanning such sectors as energy, investment, logistics, and humanitarian affairs. For the GCC – particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia -- enhanced economic and political engagement with Azerbaijan aligns with their broader ambitions to diversify investments and assert long-term influence over the evolving connectivity landscape that links Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

But a deeper geopolitical shift may also be underway – one that helps explain the growing convergence between Azerbaijan and the UAE: the South Caucasus’ gradual shift toward the Middle East. Historically, the formidable Caucasus Mountain range divided the region into northern and southern spheres, with the southern part naturally gravitating toward commercial, political and cultural ties with the Middle East. This pattern was evident throughout ancient and medieval times. However, the rise of the Russian Empire in the 19th century disrupted this dynamic. After defeating the Persian and Ottoman empires, Russia imposed a new order, effectively sealing off the Caucasus from the Middle East and asserting exclusive influence over the region.

That dominance now appears tenuous. Geography, once again, is dictating its logic, pulling the South Caucasus back into the orbit of the Middle East. Russia, long accustomed to near monopoly influence in the region, is facing strained relations not only with Azerbaijan but also with Armenia, traditionally one of its closest allies. This diminution of Russian influence in the South Caucasus is compounded by a broader trend that Moscow itself has championed: the emergence of a multipolar world.

In this new landscape Moscow is increasingly no longer the major actor in South Caucasus affairs, but one among several – including the UAE, Turkey, the US, China and the EU – each vying for strategic footholds in a region whose connectivity and relevance are rapidly expanding.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

On September 3, 2025, a grand military parade was held at Tiananmen Square in Beijing to commemorate the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II. Designed to highlight China’s growing military strength, the event was attended by leaders from around two dozen countries, including the presidents of all five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 

The parade followed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, where Chinese President Xi Jinping underscored China’s ambition to reshape the global order and stressed the SCO’s growing role as a driver of international governance reform.

In his speech, Xi Jinping declared:

“We must uphold fairness and justice. We must promote a correct view of World War II history and oppose the Cold War mentality, block confrontation, and bullying.”

He also emphasized the SCO’s growing influence, a message directed in part at the visiting Central Asian leaders: “We have also initiated many new global governance concepts and put them into practice. The SCO has increasingly become a catalyst for the development and reform of the global governance system.”

Ahead of their trip to Beijing, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—Central Asia’s two largest economies—published articles in China Daily, praising China’s achievements and expressing admiration for Xi’s leadership.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev wrote:

"This unprecedented progress in our relations has become possible due to the personal attention and tireless efforts of our dear friend — President Xi Jinping — to further develop and strengthen Uzbek-Chinese comprehensive cooperation.”

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev echoed this sentiment:

“Today's impressive development of China under the visionary leadership of an outstanding politician of the global scale President Xi Jinping brings significant benefits and offers unique opportunities to its immediate neighbors, including Kazakhstan."

Economic Expansion: “Belt and Road” as the Anchor of the New Silk Road

In 2024, trade between China and Central Asia reached $95 billion, with nearly half of that volume attributed to Kazakhstan. At the second China-Central Asia Summit in June 2025, the parties signed 58 agreements worth approximately $25 billion, spanning infrastructure, digital communications, and poverty alleviation. A key focus has been the Middle Corridor — a trade route from East Asia through Central Asia and the Caucasus, bypassing both Russia and Iran.

Kazakhstan has emerged as the region’s primary hub. In July 2025, it secured $24 billion for rail hubs and logistic parks, the development of rail hubs and logistics parks, representing 44 percent of Belt and Road global investments in the first half of 2025. Cargo volumes along the corridor have grown from 4.8 million tons in 2024 and are projected to reach 11 million tons by 2030, with Kazakhstan expecting substantial growth in transit revenues.

However, such investments carry risks. Central Asia’s external debt to China exceeds $15 billion, with Kyrgyzstan owing $4 billion — 45% of external debt — and Tajikistan $3 billion, or 52% of its portfolio. To ease obligations, Tajikistan transferred several mines to Chinese firms in 2024, a move reminiscent of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port deal and often cited as an example of “debt diplomacy.” Due to its debt to China, Kyrgyzstan has had to grant concessions in mining and hydropower. Central Asia is not alone — in just 2025, developing countries owe China $35 billion. However, Beijing has shown some flexibility. To prevent backlash, it has used equity swaps in Kazakhstan and loan restructuring in Kyrgyzstan. 

This dynamic creates a strategic dilemma: short-term growth versus long-term dependency. If debt burdens mount during global slowdowns, Central Asian states risk becoming economic satellites. Diversification offers a partial hedge, in 2024 Uzbekistan secured $2 billion from Saudi Arabia for renewable energy, reducing reliance on Chinese financing. Still, China's 2025 treaty with the five states institutionalizes BRI, potentially locking in uneven terms unless audited for transparency. Without a united regional response — like Tajikistan’s earlier ceding of 1,158 sq km of territory in 2011 — debt risks turning from a tool of diplomacy into one of control.

Despite BRI’s economic benefits, rising Sinophobic sentiment complicates China’s ambitions in Central Asia. Protests in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, often directed at land leases, mining deals, and debt repayment concessions, reflect fears of Chinese economic domination and local elite corruption. In Kyrgyzstan, demonstrations in 2023 targeted Chinese-run mining operations due to environmental concerns, highlighting local anxieties about ecological impacts. 

The case of Tajik journalist Rukhshona Khakimova illustrates the political sensitivity surrounding these issues. Arrested in July 2024 while investigating public attitudes toward Chinese influence, Khakimova was sentenced to eight years in a closed trial on charges of treason. Her reporting on Chinese mining projects and environmental impact sparked controversy within local communities, while her imprisonment fueled public mistrust toward both Beijing and Dushanbe.

Such tensions undermine Beijing’s “win-win” narrative . Without greater transparency and accountability, grassroots backlash may continue to erode the legitimacy of Chinese projects across the region.

Energy and Financial Integration: From Pipelines to Power Grids

China is deepening its footprint in Central Asia’s energy sector. At the Astana Summit, leaders agreed to installing 10 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, including a 500 MW solar plant in Uzbekistan and small modular reactors in Kazakhstan. Traditional energy ties remain strong: in the first half of 2025, oil and gas deals totaled $30 billion, already surpassing the $24 billion recorded in all of 2024. Gas exports from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to China reached 55 billion cubic meters.

Financial integration is also accelerating. Kyrgyzstan’s Eldik Bank adopted China’s International Payment System, cutting currency transaction costs by 20%. Yet greater reliance on yuan-based transactions ties local economies to Beijing’s financial ecosystem, raising concerns about reduced access to Western systems such as SWIFT or IMF assistance.

Geopolitical Restructuring: From Coordinator to Conductor

The Tiananmen parade and SCO summit showcased China’s diplomatic primacy in the region. With all five Central Asian presidents in attendance alongside global leaders, Xi pledged $210 million in aid while positioning Beijing as the region’s central broker.

China's ascent in Central Asia comes at the expense of others. Russia’s influence has eroded in the wake of the Ukraine war: its trade share with Central Asia has halved since 2022, ceding space to China and new actors. While Russia and China present a façade of cooperation in technology and security — such as joint ICT projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan —Beijing is steadily outpacing Moscow through infrastructure investments, loans, and financial integration. Unlike open rivalry, the process is gradual and framed within SCO structures, allowing China to expand influence without overt confrontation. 

The United States, meanwhile, remains inconsistent. Its strategy emphasizes diversification but lacks sustained investment, leaving gaps China readily fills — for example, Kazakhstan’s $24 billion in logistics projects. 

To increase its agency, Central Asia has pursued growing ties with middle powers such as Turkey, India, and Gulf states. For example, Kazakhstan’s trade with Turkey grew by 30% in 2024, signaling its diversification efforts. If managed strategically, regional states could benefit from multipolar engagement. But overreliance on any single partner — particularly China — risks reinforcing economic dependency. 

EVs as an Influence Tool

Central Asia’s transition to electric vehicles is accelerating, with Chinese firms at the forefront. In 2024, Uzbekistan imported over 24,000 electric vehicles, 99.5 percent of them from China. Kazakhstan saw Chinese EV sales surge 36-fold year-on-year while Tajikistan doubled imports to 5,266 units worth $76.4 million in the first half of 2024. Kyrgyzstan has carved out a niche as a re-export hub, channeling $219.8 million worth of EVs to Russia, bypassing sanctions.

A centerpiece of this expansion is the Chinese automobile firm BYD’s factory in Jizzakh, Uzbekistan, opened in summer 2024. The plant has already created 1,200 jobs and aims to produce 500,000 vehicles annually following a $25 billion in investment, a fivefold increase.

Soft Power and Cultural Influence

Alongside trade and infrastructure, China is investing heavily in cultural and educational influence in Central Asia. Yet, despite elite endorsements— such as the 2025 op-eds by Presidents Tokayev and Mirziyoyev praising Xi — Beijing faces an enduring image deficit. 

Surveys show anti-Chinese sentiment peaked around 2020, driven by concerns over the treatment of Uyghurs and COVID-19, and has only modestly improved since. In 2024, China’s favorability in the region stood at just 36 percent, with declines recorded in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Public mistrust manifests in recurring protests against land leases, mining projects, and fears of "sinicization." A notable example was in 2022, Kazakhstan saw protests in Almaty near the Chinese consulate, where demonstrators voiced concerns over human rights and Chinese influence in the country.

The elite-public divide weakens China's soft power. Governments may embrace aid and investment, but locals often see them as vehicles for economic exploitation and cultural erosion, complicating Beijing's "anti-hegemony" narrative.

Visa-Free Initiatives

To improve people-to-people ties, China has expanded visa-free regimes. Beijing introduced 30-day mutual exemptions for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in early 2025, with Kyrgyzstan expected to follow by year’s end. Tajikistan had had a unilateral exemption since 2024, while Turkmenistan remains excluded, maintaining only limited transit privileges. These agreements, covering tourism, business, and family visits, are part of Beijing’s broader visa policy now extending to 76 countries. 

The results, however, are so far mixed. While Uzbek tourist flows to China have increased, polls suggest only marginal improvements in perceptions. Visa easing, paired with EV exports and aid, has been a low-cost soft power tool, but it has yet to dispel deeper cultural suspicions.

Confucius Institutes and Education Diplomacy

Confucius Institutes serve as Beijing’s flagship for cultural exchange, with 13 centers across Central Asia educating roughly 18,000 students annually. They promoting Mandarin, governance models, and ties with China. In Kazakhstan, for example, enrollment in Mandarin courses has risen, with students eyeing greater economic opportunities. 

Surveys in 2024-2025 suggest these initiatives are improving perceptions, particularly among younger generations, though the effect remains modest. Critics view them as instruments of Chinese state influence — echoing global skepticism that has led to closures of Confucius Institutes in the West. In Central Asia, they simultaneously foster people-to-people ties and reinforce suspicions of “soft power engineering.” 

China also extends influence through security cooperation and information flows. In Kyrgyzstan, Chinese surveillance technologies are deployed at border crossings, while Beijing’s media influence promote pro-China narratives and normalize its governance model. The efforts, however, intersect with sensitive issues such as Han migration into Central Asia and Beijing’s policies toward Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Both themes carry deep historical and cultural resonance in the region: Han migration stirs anxieties about demographic change and economic displacement, while repression in Xinjiang echoes across borders where Turkic and Muslim communities feel kinship ties. Rather than easing mistrust, these factors often reinforce the very suspicions Beijing’s outreach seeks to dispel.

Between Opportunity and Dependency

China’s reorganization of Central Asia — through $25 billion in Belt and Road investments to CIPS yuan flows— is relentless, displacing Russia, whose trade with the region has plummeted since the invasion of Ukraine, and outpacing a fragmented West. 

The numbers tell a dual story. On the one hand, the $95 billion trade volume and green energy transition promise prosperity. On the other, $15 billion in debt and a growing reliance on China’s financial systems threaten regional autonomy. As Kazakh analyst Dosym Satpayev warned, “We must be a strong player to avoid vassal dependency on major powers, or we risk becoming merely a raw material appendage or logistical route in a patron-client system.”

The path forward lies in diversification. Central Asian states can attract Gulf funds, push for greater BRI transparency, and strengthen Turkic and regional alliances. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already expanded ties with Turkey and India, aiming to grow bilateral trade volumes to over $10 billion.

Without such initiatives, China’s growing influence risks transforming economic leverage over Central Asia from a strategic crossroads into a region heavily reliant on Beijing.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist and researcher specializing in Central Asia. She covers press freedom, human rights, and China’s regional influence, with work published in The Guardian, The Diplomat, Reuters, and Eurasianet. A Rumsfeld Fellow, she also contributes to the AFPC’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

Five years after the Abraham Accords reshaped Middle Eastern diplomacy, a new and unexpected player has joined the circle. On Thursday, the White House announced that Kazakhstan, a Muslim-majority nation of twenty million on the Central Asian steppe, will become the first post-Soviet state to join the pact with Israel. The move reinvigorates an initiative that had slowed in recent years—and hints at a broader US strategy linking the Middle East and Eurasia.

US President Donald Trump officially announced the news in a Truth Social post. By joining the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, Kazakhstan is signaling its commitment to the principles of the accords. But it likely won’t be the last to join. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are in talks to join the pact.

The move highlights Central Asia’s somewhat quiet, but unusually strong, diplomatic ties with Israel, which are likely to increase should more regional nations follow in Kazakhstan’s footsteps. While some have dismissed an expansion to Central Asia as “largely symbolic,” this interpretation overlooks deeper implications.

Extending the Abraham Accords into Central Asia marks a new phase—building a coalition of pro-US Muslim nations committed to tolerance and engagement with Israel. Such a coalition strengthens efforts to counter extremism, particularly state-sponsored ideology from Iran, and fosters cooperation among US partners across a region vital to US interests.

Read the full article on Atlantic Council's MENASource.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev will reportedly hold a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to announce Kazakhstan's intention to join, although Astana has already maintained full diplomatic ties with Israel for more than 30 years.

But Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL that while the move by Kazakhstan may appear symbolic, it could hold diplomatic weight moving forward.

“Astana’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marks the beginning of a new phase, transforming the accords from a Middle East peace initiative to a pro-US coalition of moderate Muslim countries devoted to tolerance and prosperity,” Epstein said.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Tajikistan on October 9. Their meeting, after many months of outright hostility, was interpreted by many as a signal of rapprochement, and with some reason. 

Distrust will nevertheless persist — Azerbaijan considers itself a significant regional power better off when it is free of the Kremlin’s policy shackles. And there’s not much Russia can do about it. 

The talks centered on what Putin described as the “most sensitive issue” — the December 2024 shooting down by a Russian missile battery of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190, with the deaths of 38 people. Putin expressed condolences and, in effect, issued an apology by belatedly accepting that the cause of the crash was indeed the Russian military. 

The Russian president has argued that the investigation into the tragedy had concluded, that the incident was triggered by the presence of three Ukrainian drones over Russian territory at the time, and that the missiles did not directly hit the aircraft, but detonated roughly 10 meters (about 30ft) away. He did not mention that this is precisely the aim of many anti-aircraft missiles, and more than enough to inflict catastrophic damage. 

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

"The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor," Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL, referring to the emerging 6,500-kilometer-long trade routethat connects China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus by bypassing Russia.

"Both Beijing and Washington are set to use the pause to create an advantage from their side to have more leverage in the next round of trade tensions," Epstein said. "That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies."

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.