Turan Research Center

After Turkey signed several long-term contracts for U.S. liquid natural gas (LNG) imports, Reuters reported that Russia and Iran’s share of Turkey’s gas market is increasingly at risk – especially as Ankara’s gas purchase contracts from the Blue Stream pipeline in Russia are set to expire within months, while its 20-year gas import deal with Iran will end by mid-next year.

Turkey’s energy sector now stands at a pivotal crossroads as the country seeks to diversify its gas supply and reduce its historical dependence on Russian and Iranian imports, which have long dominated the market. Over the next three years, Turkey aims to meet half of its natural gas demand through a mix of domestic production and U.S. LNG imports.

If realized, this strategy would mark a major shift — at least on paper — away from reliance on Russian and Iranian gas. Just a decade ago, the two countries accounted for as much as 73 percent of Turkey’s gas imports a decade ago. Today, that figure has fallen to around 55 percent.

Turkey’s gas import sources:

Source: The Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA)

Over the past decade, Turkey’s domestic gas consumption has increased by 15 billion cubic meters, yet forecasts indicate that growth over the next ten years will not exceed this level. Much of this additional demand is expected to be offset by the country’s expanding domestic production, driven by new developments such as Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea.

Currently, Turkey’s electricity generation mix remains heavily dependent on gas-fired power plants, which account for 22 percent of installed capacity, while solar and wind account for 18 percent. As part of its long-term energy transition strategy, Turkey plans to expand renewable capacity from 32 gigawatts today to 120 gigawatts by 2035. Meanwhile, the first reactor of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is scheduled to come online this year. Turkey’s total nuclear capacity is projected to reach 7.4 gigawatts by 2035. This equals to the annual consumption of approximately 15 billion cubic meters of gas in the thermal power generation.

Domestic gas output is also set to double next year with the continued development of the Sakarya field, reaching over 14 billion cubic meters by 2028 — four times the current production capacity. The project underscores Turkey’s strategic shift toward greater energy self-sufficiency.

Together with the new U.S. LNG import contracts and long-term gas purchase agreements with Azerbaijan (effective at least through 2033), Turkey’s reliance on Russian and Iranian gas is expected to decline, at least officially. LNG imports offer flexibility, enabling Ankara to volumes based on seasonal demand and reduce reliance on fixed pipeline gas supplies. However, LNG typically comes at a higher cost than pipeline gas, and long-term contracts often include fixed pricing clauses, which could weigh on the overall economics of the Turkish gas market.

Beyond price and supply considerations, Turkey’s diversification strategy is also shaped by broader geopolitical and regulatory constraints. Both Russia and Iran are simultaneously under U.S. and EU sanctions, and continued trade with them carries technical, economic, and geopolitical risks — from insurance complications to restructions on financial transactions. Turkey’s Halkbank, for example, has been entangled in U.S. courts for nearly two decades over its financial dealings with Iran.

Turkey’s existing LNG import capacity already matches its total domestic gas consumption, reflecting significant investment in gas terminals across multiple routes and regions over the past decade.

At the same time, energy exports remain a strategic priority for the United States, and Ankara’s growing purchase of U.S. LNG are as much a political statement as an economic decision – intended to signal its commitment to reducing dependence on Russian gas.

Still, while Russian pipeline gas remains cheaper than LNG, Moscow currently sells the same gas to China with an additional 27 percent discount. In other words, Russia offers Turkey no meaningful price advantage that would justify maintaining its current 40 percent reliance on Russian imports. Moreover, Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use gas supplies as a political weapon in times of crisis. — including against Turkey.

Russia’s track record in Europe illustrates this pattern clearly. In November 2021 — months before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine — Moscow began sharply reducing gas deliveries through Nord Stream 1 and Ukrainian transit lines from 155 bbc in 2021 to just 39 bcm in 2022 - — a drop of 75 percent. After the invasion, exports were halted entirely. The resulting supply shock sent Title Transfer Facility (TTF) — Europe’s largest gas market and the benchmark for prices across the continent — market prices soaring from €40–50 per Megawatt-hour (MWh) in the summer of 2021 to a record €342 per MWh in August 2022 —a 60 percent surge that triggered an energy crisis in EU.

Turkey has faced comparable pressure: Russia has repeatedly reduced or halted gas supplies under various pretexts — completely halting deliveries to Ukraine for six days in a gas dispute in January 2009 — affecting transit to Turkey and others, slashing exports by 10 percent in 2016 after Turkey shot down a Russian jet, and cutting volumes sevenfold in 2020 during the pandemic. These recurring disruptions underscore the political leverage Moscow continues to wield through its energy exports.

Why “At Least on Paper”? The Limits of Diversification

Although renewable energy capacity is expanding rapidly, Turkey continues to invest in conventional power generation. This year, Ankara is commissioning a new 1,000 MW gas-fired power plant, underscoring the role of natural gas in its energy mix. Coal remains another major component, accounting for 22 percent of electricity generation and roughly one-quarter of total final energy consumption. Achieving greenhouse gas reduction targets will therefore depend on gradually replacing coal with cleaner alternatives, including natural gas. In other words, despite rapid renewable expansion, gas will remain a cornerstone of Turkey’s energy transition.

Natural gas also vital for industrial and household energy consumption, representing about 24 percent of industrial final energy use and 53 percent of household energy consumption. Both sectors are expected to experience steady demand growth driven by industrialization, urban expansion, and population increases. This sustained reliance highlights the importance of maintaining a diversified and resilient supply portfolio to ensure energy security while managing cost and environmental impacts.

Turkey’s strategic role as an energy transit hub adds another layer of complexity. The country currently imports around 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas annually via the Blue Stream pipeline, which is set to expire in a few months, with no public indication of renewal. Additional volumes arrive through TurkStream, which has an annual capacity of 31.5 bcm. While part of this gas meets domestic demand, the remainder is  re-exported to Europe – more than1 bcm per month in the first half of this year alone.

As EU member states aim to phase out Russian gas imports by the end of 2026, Turkey could exploit its position by increasing Russian imports for domestic use while exporting an equivalent volume of domestically produced gas to Europe. However, using TurkStream for Turkey’s own exports would require complex legal and contractual arrangements. Alternative routes, including the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) may offer additional capacity for exporting Turkish gas to European markets. Such a strategy would enhance Ankara’s ability to optimize its energy portfolio, balancing domestic supply, import costs, and export revenues.

The Future of Iran’s Gas Exports

Despite worsening domestic gas shortages, Iran continues to prioritize exports to Turkey because of the significant revenue generated from these sales. Eastern Turkey remains heavily dependent on Iranian gas, complicating any near-term effort to phase out imports. However, Azerbaijan could partially offset a reduction in Iranian gas supply, while alternative sources, like increasing the volume of Turkmen gas imported through swap deals via Iran, are also available.

Iran’s 20-year gas export contract to Turkey is scheduled to expire in mid-2026 and even in the best-case scenario, the renewal would likely be limited to about 5 bcm per year, half of the current contractual level. Should no renewal occur, Iran risks losing direct access to the Turkish gas market, though it could still participate indirectly through swap agreements with Turkmenistan.

Since March, Turkey has started receiving Turkmen gas via a swap mechanism with Iran. The initial volume is set at 2 bcm annually, but could increase to 10 bcm, effectively replacing Iranian gas in Turkey’s supply mix.

A Balancing Act in a Fragmented Energy Landscape

Turkey’s gas market is in the midst of a profound transformation, shaped by rising domestic production, growing LNG imports, rapid renewable energy expansion, and the launch of nuclear generation. Although Russia and Iran have historically dominated Turkey’s gas imports, their share is expected to decline steadily over the next decade, particularly in direct pipeline deliveries.

Yet, for both countries, complete disengagement remains unlikely. Technical, contractual, and geopolitical realities — ranging from energy security needs and EU import policies to regional interdependencies — ensure their continued, albeit diminished role.

Ultimately, Turkey’s evolving gas strategy reflects a balanced and pragmatic approach: diversifying supply, boosting self-sufficiency, expanding renewables, and leveraging its strategic transit position to manage domestic demand while enhancing export capacity. The interplay of these trends will define Turkey’s gas market structure and its regional energy influence through 2035.

Dalga Khatinoglu is an expert on Iran’s energy and macroeconomics, and a researcher on energy in Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Arab countries.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an attempt to reassert dominance over a post-Soviet space that had been steadily asserting greater independence. Ironically, by becoming bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow has created an opening for other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to distance themselves further from Russian influence. As the war drags on, the Turkic states on Russia’s periphery have taken advantage of this new freedom to maneuver.

For these countries, the goal is not to sever all ties with Russia — it remains a powerful neighbor and vital trading partner — but to redefine relations on the basis of mutual respect as well as to carve out their own space in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment. Many are wary of the paternalistic and often tense relationship with a Russia that continues to see them as part of its dominion.

To achieve this new balance, some states in the region are pursuing two complementary strategies: deepening engagement with the United States and expanding regional cooperation through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) — an intergovernmental forum linking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers.

Russian narratives about its “Near Abroad” vary by country but share recurring themes. Chief among them is the belief that these states should remain within Moscow’s sphere of influence and comply with its strategic interests. Those that do not are quickly branded as “ungrateful” or even as “threats.” Russia perceives itself as entitled not only to shape its neighbors’ foreign policies but also to influence their domestic affairs — frequently criticizing efforts to promote national languages over Russian or to revise history curricula in ways that challenge Moscow’s preferred narratives.

This persistent sense of entitlement has defined Russia’s relations with much of the post-Soviet world for decades. Yet as Moscow’s coercive tactics grow more visible — from meddling in internal politics to outright military aggression — its neighbors have become increasingly determined to assert autonomy and recalibrate their ties with the Kremlin.

Seeking Deeper Cooperation with the United States

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have remained peripheral to U.S. foreign policy. Washington’s focus on the Middle East, Afghanistan, China, Russia, and Europe consistently overshadowed the non-European CIS. However, growing U.S. interest in alternative transit routes such as the Middle Corridor  —and in access to rare earth elements (REEs) and critical minerals — has recently brought renewed attention to the region.

For regional governments long frustrated by Washington’s moralizing tone on democracy and human rights, former President Donald Trump’s transactional, business-first approach offered a refreshing change.

Azerbaijan, in particular, has long faced image problems in Washington, largely due to its wars with Armenia and lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora. Despite cooperation during the war in Afghanistan, the United States often found itself preferring to partner with Armenia. But following Baku’s victory in Karabakh and its serious peace talks with Yerevan, a new opportunity for rapprochement has emerged. For Washington, Azerbaijan could become a key partner along the Middle Corridor — a strategic bridge between Europe and Central Asia. Its close ties with U.S. allies Turkey and Israel coupled with its complicated relations with both Russia and Iran, strengthen that case.

A breakthrough came with the August 8 peace agreement, signed in Washington, where Azerbaijan and Armenia chose the United States — not Russia — as mediator. The accords dovetailed neatly with Trump’s emphasis on “ending wars” and signaled Baku’s growing preference for partnership with Washington.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also sought to capture Washington’s attention. In the early months of Trump’s second term, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reportedly financed a special flight to repatriate Central Asian nationals living illegally in the United States — a goodwill gesture toward Washington. At the UN General Assembly, Trump announced major business deals: a $4 billion locomotive contract with Kazakhstan and an $8 billion Boeing agreement with Uzbekistan.

As Carnegie analyst Temur Umarov observed, “only Washington can serve as a sufficient counterweight to both Moscow and Beijing.” Yet, for Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, fostering regional cohesion has been another essential path toward greater independence.

The Rise of the Organization of Turkic States

Situated between Russia, China, and Iran, the Turkic states have long pursued a “multi-vector” foreign policy — balancing relations among competing powers. Yet since independence, many Turkic leaders have also emphasized unity as a safeguard of sovereignty.

Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev, and Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akayev all championed the idea of Turkic solidarity. Only Uzbekistan’s former leader Islam Karimov resisted, fearing that pan-Turkic sentiment might undermine his domestic authority.

This vision culminated in the founding of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2009. Initially dismissed as a symbolic project, the OTS has gained new momentum in recent years — spurred by Russia’s military quagmire in Ukraine and Iran’s growing weakness. That vacuum has enabled Turkish and Azerbaijani influence to surge.

Indeed, Baku has spearheaded efforts to promote Turkic cohesion. At the October OTS Summit in Gabala, President Aliyev declared, “It is very important for the Turkic States to act as a single power center.” He highlighted military cooperation as a key element of integration, arguing that “in today’s world, military power is the fundamental guarantee of territorial integrity and independence.”

Aliyev has backed his words with action — participating in trilateral summits with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, offering to quadruple Kazakh oil exports via Azerbaijan (at Russia’s expense), and joining the ‘Unity 2025’ military exercises in Samarkand involving Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

For its part, Turkey has reinforced this momentum by becoming one of the region’s primary arms suppliers, promoting the Middle Corridor, and easing labor rules for Turkic citizens to work and do business in Turkey without special permits or visas.

This growing cooperation has strengthened the hand of Baku and Central Asia in negotiations with Moscow. Previously, Russia may have attempted to break up such cooperation — but it no longer can. Following a ten-month rift over Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft in December 2024, Vladimir Putin was compelled to personally apologize to Aliyev during a CIS summit in Dushanbe. As regional expert Arkadiy Dubnov told Novaya Gazeta, “Russia was forced to accept Azerbaijan as practically an equal partner.”

Russian Narratives on OTS Ambitions

Moscow, meanwhile, has watched the growing cohesion among Turkic states with mounting unease. Pro-Kremlin commentators and media outlets increasingly portray the OTS as a geopolitical project designed to erode Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The tone of Russian coverage has shifted from condescension to alarm, with some voices warning that Ankara and Baku are building a “proxy NATO” on Russia’s southern flank.

Aliyev’s calls for joint OTS military exercises appear to validate those fears. Pro-Kremlin outlets accused Turkey of using the OTS to establish military and political dominance over fellow members, while mocking the bloc as a “Turkic sultanate” driven by “empty declarations and inflated ambitions.” Nezavisimaya Gazetacolumnist Viktoria Panfilova went further, alleging that Ankara was “usurping” the foreign-policy agenda of Central Asian governments under the banner of Turkic unity.

Benearth the ridicule, however, lies genuine anxiety. The pro-Kremlin website PolitNavigator linked Putin’s recent visit to Tajikistan — home to Russia’s 201st Military Base — to the perceived rise of a “military-political bloc under Turkish and NATO auspices.” The article depicted Dushanbe as Moscow’s last reliable foothold in Central Asia, vital for countering “non-aligned” forces and preventing what they called Western-backed encroachment.

Similar rhetoric has circulated on Telegram channels aligned with the Kremlin, which described Tajikistan as a “forward outpost” to contain the “Turkic unification project” allegedly orchestrated by the United States and United Kingdom. Pro-Russian Central Asian expert Igor Shestakov even warned that proposals for regular OTS intelligence and security summits signaled “genuine bloc formation” and the gradual emergence of a “Turan army.”

These narratives are exaggerated and conspiratorial — reflecting a Kremlin that perceives threats and plots in every assertion of national identity or foreign policy moves not involving it. But more importantly, they show that Moscow now views the OTS not merely as an economic experiment but as a strategic challenge.

Yet pro-Russian commentators rarely acknowledge the obvious: the OTS’s rising influence is partly a direct consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian officials are well aware of this. A leaked internal presentation in a strategy session led by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin last year, attended by senior Kremlin figures and advisers such as Alexander Dugin and Sergei Karaganov, outlined how Western pressure and economic incentives had eroded Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. The presentation specifically mentioned that the region was taking advantage of Moscow’s “vulnerability” to “integrate without Russia” through groups such as the OTS. It highlighted that these countries were “changing their worldview” through “rethinking our collective history,” promoting English instead of Russian as a second language, adopting Western educational standards, and sending the children of elites to be schooled in the West. It concluded that the countries would have to “make a decision on their stance towards Russia” without further detail.

The irony is clear: Moscow’s colonial mindset of the region as a wayward colony is precisely what pushes these countries away from it. If Russia wants to maintain influence, it must treat Central Asia and the Caucasus as partners, not subordinates — refraining from interfering in domestic affairs, including language policy, minority rights, and education, as Moscow has often done in the past.

Central Asia’s Cautious Calculus

Putin’s apology underscored Azerbaijan’s elevated regional standing. Having regained Karabakh, strengthened alliances with Turkey and Israel, expanded its role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, and hosted major international negotiations, Baku has emerged as a significant power in the post-Soviet space.

Central Asia, by contrast, remains more cautious. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are deepening regional integration but avoid open confrontation with Moscow. Both maintained neutrality during the Azerbaijan–Russia dispute. However, in recent months, both have drawn increasingly closer to Baku. In July, during the pinnacle of the rift, Mirziyoyev said, “never in history have our relations been at such a high level as today.” Likewise, Tokayev recently said that increasing ties with Azerbaijan was a “top priority.” Their statements reflect unprecedented cooperation: both countries have boosted transit through Azerbaijan, expanded trade, and intensified coordination across transport, logistics, and energy.

Meanwhile, tensions with Russia often persist. Kazakhstan continues to face threats of destabilization in its ethnic-Russian north. Uzbekistan has clashed diplomatically with Moscow over language policy such as promoting Uzbek and using English as a second language over Russian. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, both have learned that Russia is an unreliable partner — sanctions have disrupted trade routes and energy exports, and domestic anger has grown as Moscow deports Central Asian migrants and xenophobia rises in Russia.

Over the long term, Moscow’s tendency to treat its neighbors as vassal states rather than sovereign partners will only drive them further away — especially as the war in Ukraine drains Russia’s economic and political capacity. The Kremlin’s ten-month rift with Azerbaijan should serve as a warning: the region’s patience is finite. Today, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have alternatives. China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are investing billions across the region, giving local governments unprecedented leverage and options. While the region still currently relies on Russia, this dependence may diminish as these alternatives expand. If Russia wishes to preserve influence, it must learn to engage as a respectful partner — not an overbearing patron.

As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon pointedly told Putin in 2022, “we respect the interests of our largest strategic partner — but we also want to be respected.”

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Following the widely publicized meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Washington D.C. facilitated by President Trump, momentum is building along the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. While challenges remain and the path forward is far from smooth, recent developments suggest a renewed sense of possibility.

After decades of stalled efforts, the prospect of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey appears to be accelerating. Though the current process began, it was an August summit in Washington D.C. between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev facilitated by U.S. President Donald Trump that appears to have injected new momentum. Turkey was neither present nor directly mentioned at the meeting, yet its long-standing alignment with Azerbaijan indicates that progress between Ankara and Baku is a prerequisite for reconciliation between Yerevan and Baku.

This interdependence has long shaped the regional dynamic.

It was precisely this linkage that derailed the 2009 attempt to normalize Armenia-Turkey relations when two protocols signed in Zurich were never ratified and eventually canceled in 2018.

Today, however, the stakes are higher. Russia’s waning influence in the South Caucasus, coupled with deteriorating relations between Moscow and both Yerevan and Baku, has created a new sense of urgency. While normalization is far from guaranteed, it is now believed to be within reach.

A breakthrough occurred in September, when Serdar Kilic, Turkey’s special envoy for normalization, traveled to Armenia to meet his counterpart, Deputy Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly, Ruben Rubinyan. Their previous meeting last year had taken place near the border; but this visit in the Armenian capital of Yerevan was unprecedented.

Although former Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Yerevan in 2008 to attend a World Cup qualifying match despite the absence of diplomatic relations, many Armenians remain skeptical of a breakthrough. Civil society voices have grown wary, especially after the failure to partially open one of the two border crossings between Armenia and Turkey for third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders – an agreed step that remains unfulfilled, likely out of deference to Azerbaijan.

The unofficial linkage between Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan dates back to 1993, when Armenian forces occupied Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar region. Since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Baku has regained its territory and both Azerbaijan and Turkey appear determined to take no chances.

Previous attempts to bring the two sides together have failed. In 2001, the controversial U.S.-facilitated Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission collapsed under nationalist opposition in Armenia. Following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Turkey proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform for the region, which also failed to materialize. The Zurich Protocols of 2009 – signed by Armenia and Turkey to establish diplomatic relations– were formally withdrawn by then-President Serzh Sargsyan in 2015 and annulled in 2018 due to Azerbaijan’s objections over the Karabakh conflict.

After the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Ankara and Baku again coordinated two ostensibly separate tracks – one concerning Armenia’s normalization with Azerbaijan and one with Turkey. There has been no breakthrough in unblocking economic and trade connections in the region, particularly the proposed Zangezur Corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenian territory. The August summit in Washington D.C. introduced a new term for this route in Armenia: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The route would also connect Turkey with Central Asia.

Yet signs of gradual progress have emerged over the past several years.

In 2022, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan attended the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey. Rubinyan followed suit last year. Also in 2022, Pashinyan – having signaled recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity – met with the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the presence of Aliyev. In 2023, Pashinyan attended Erdogan’s re-inauguration ceremony in Ankara.

Humanitarian gestures have also helped: the Armenia-Turkish border briefly opened for earthquake relief in 2023, and Armenian aid similarly passed through Turkey en route to Syria earlier this year. In June, Pashinyan’s visit to Istanbul included talks with Erdogan on potential energy cooperation. And although it has yet to function, an embargo on direct cargo flights between Yerevan and Istanbul was lifted in early 2023. However, overland routes through Georgia still remain a more economical form of transit.

Most importantly, disputed terminologies and symbols continue to shape the narrative. On April 24, 2024, Armenia’s official remembrance day for the 1915 mass killings and deportations of as many as 1.5 million ethnic Armenians by Ottoman Turks, Pashinyan notably used the Armenian term Meds Yeghern (“Great Calamity”) more frequently than the word “genocide.” Earlier, senior Member of Parliament Andranik Kocharyan had sparked controversy in Armenia and its diaspora by suggesting the need to ascertain the precise number of victims – a stance many Armenians view as a dangerous concession. Pashinyan echoed similar comments during a meeting with Swiss Armenians in January, prompting accusations that his government was making unilateral concessions to normalize relations with Turkey, just as critics allege he is doing with Azerbaijan.

To be sure, Turkey had in the past insisted on reexamining the events of 1915 during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan has also demanded Armenia adopt a “realistic roadmap,” warning that the “doors of opportunity” will not remain open indefinitely.

The joint statements following the latest meeting of the special envoys echoed familiar themes: opening the border for diplomats and third-country nationals; restoring the long-dormant Kars–Gyumri railway; expanding cooperation in education, aviation and other sectors. Yet one symbolic move stood out. On the eve of the meeting, Yerevan announced that beginning November 1, Armenian passport stamps would no longer feature Mount Ararat -- a potent national symbol located just across the borderin Turkey, where it is known as Mount Agri. That decision has been widely interpreted as a gesture to Ankara, signally that Armenia harbors no territorial claims in Eastern Turkey.

In early September, during an official visit to China for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey made a rare public gesture of unity: their spouses posed together for photographs and shared them on social media. Just this month, press reports added substance to this gesture of unity, revealing that Turkish Airlines -- the country’s national carrier -- plans to launch flights to Armenia. No dates were announced.

While smaller airlines have operated flights between the two nations since the mid-1990s, Turkish Airlines has avoided the route. According to Armenian sources, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had long prohibited the government-linked airline from doing so until Armenia and Azerbaijan resolved their bilateral disputes. Back in 2009, the International Crisis Group noted that such a move by Turkish Airlines would signal a breakthrough in regional diplomacy.

Now, with Yerevan and Baku widely believed to be on the cusp of signing a long-overdue peace treaty, the airline’s announcement takes on added significance.

Yet, to Yerevan’s chagrin, normalization with Ankara remains contingent on progress with Baku. Azerbaijan continues to insist on the removal of a controversial preamble in Armenia’s constitution, which refers to the “reunification of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh,” which Baku sees as making territorial claims on Azerbaijan. Aliyev has also criticized a reference to “achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia” as a territorial claim against Turkey. Pashinyan has pledged to hold a referendum on a full constitutional change following next year’s June parliamentary elections.

For Pashinyan, whose political fortunes hinges on his “peace agenda,” normalization with both Azerbaijan and Turkey is central to his electoral strategy. He sees it as a gamble fraught with risk, but rich in opportunities. For the European Union and United States, it also offers an opportunity to reduce Russian and Chinese influence in the South Caucasus and further connect the West to Central Asia beyond existing routes through Georgia.

As Baku and Yerevan inch closer to reconciliation, the prospect of Armenian- Turkish normalization no longer feels remote.

Whether it materializes remains uncertain. Much will depend on electoral cycles, the ability to counter entrenched narratives and sustained international interest to preserve the fragile momentum achieved so far. For now, Yerevan remains optimistic, suggesting that major breakthroughs could be achieved within months. Yet, as is often the case, no concrete details have been disclosed.

Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, analyst, and consultant from the United Kingdom based in Tbilisi, Georgia, since 2012. From 1998 until then he was based in Yerevan, Armenia, covering issues related to democracy, society, and conflict. In 1994 he first visited Karabakh as a journalist and photographer, also covered the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, and consulted for intergovernmental organisations on countering violent extremism. He writes news and analysis for international media and various analytical publications. He can be followed on X at @onewmphoto.

The Azerbaijan-UAE strategic partnership agreement aligns with Baku's broader outreach to the Gulf region and reinforces its long-standing multi-alignment policy. More importantly, it signals a shifting geopolitical landscape – one in which Russia's traditional dominance in the South Caucasus is waning, while the region itself becomes increasingly connected with the Middle East.

Last month, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (known as MBZ), President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), undertook an official visit to Azerbaijan, making a significant moment in the deepening relationship between the two nations. The high-level meeting was held in the city of Shusha in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. The visit resulted in the signing of 14 bilateral agreements, poised to inject fresh momentum into an already expanding strategic partnership.

Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and the UAE were first established in 1992. But President Ilham Aliyev’s first official visit to the UAE in 2006 marked a turning point in bilateral relations, ushering in a new era of cooperation. Since then, Aliyev has made six more visits to the UAE, with reciprocal high-level exchanges further solidifying ties. In 2024, MBZ became the first UAE leader to visit Azerbaijan. This momentum between the two nations culminated in July 2025, when the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed during Aliyev’s visit to the UAE – an accord that laid the foundation for a new phase of economic and strategic collaboration. The agreement aims at boosting bilateral trade which still largely remains untapped.

A testament to the burgeoning bilateral partnership is the scale of mutual investment. Between 1995 and 2024 ,the UAE infused $3.4 billion in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijani investments in the UAE reached $1.1 billion. A major driver for this expansion was the establishment in late 2023 of a $1 billion Joint Investment Fund between the Azerbaijan Investment Holding and the Abu Dhabi Investment Holding Company. The Azerbaijan Trade Representative Office was established in Dubai in 2017, followed by the opening of the Azerbaijan Trade House in 2019. The latter plays a key role in promoting the “Made in Azerbaijan” brand across the UAE and the broader Persian Gulf region. Currently, more than 350 commercial enterprises with UAE capital are registered in Azerbaijan.

Among the most prominent investments is the UAE’s national oil company, ADNOC, which acquired a 30% stake in Azerbaijan’s Absheron gas field for an unknown amount. Meanwhile, momentum is building in the green energy sector. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power is currently developing a $300 million wind farm in Azerbaijan while Abu Dhabi-backed projects such as the Garadagh Solar Power Plant are helping Baku accelerate its transition toward renewable energy. During the latest high-level visit, both sides signed multiple Memoranda of Understanding aimed at exploring joint opportunities in renewable and clean energy projects. Moreover, a $1 billion joint venture between Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and Azerbaijan Investment Holding further signals a deepening commitment to long-term economic collaboration.

Despite the visible expansion of diplomatic and strategic ties between Azerbaijan and the UAE, bilateral trade still lags behind outwardly developing ties. In 2024 trade reached just $96.8 million – a sharp decline from $1.6 billion the previous year, signaling a major drop in commercial activity. Geography remains a major impediment, compounded by the heavily sanctioned status of Iran which under ideal circumstances would serve as a vital transit hub between the two nations.

However, this dynamic may be poised for change.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – linking Russia’s heartland with Iran and the Indian Ocean – offers both the UAE and Azerbaijan a pathway to a more efficient north-south connectivity. Indeed, the INSTC’s major branch passes through Azerbaijan, and the UAE has recently expanded its ties with Russia, positioning itself to benefit from the corridor’s expansion.  

Yet for the INSTC to fulfill its full potential, sustained investment and robust multilateral cooperation will be essential. Streamlining customs procedures, aligning technical standards, and eliminating logistical bottlenecks must become shared priorities among participating countries. If these challenges are addressed, the INSTC could evolve into a fully optimized, major commercial route for Eurasian commerce. Historical precedent also favors its success; in ancient and medieval times, a similar route along the western Caspian Sea linked the Eurasian steppes with the Middle East.

The UAE president’s recent visit to Azerbaijan reflects Abu-Dhabi’s growing interest in the shifting connectivity landscape of the South Caucasus and the wider Black Sea region. As global trade routes shift in the wake of the war in Ukraine, the importance of alternative transit corridors has become increasingly urgent. The once-dominant northern route through Russia has lost viability, prompting China and the European Union to explore options through the South Caucasus. While the Middle Corridor -- stretching from Turkey across  he Caspian Sea to Central Asia -- may be geographically distant from the UAE, its emerging economic potential is enticing enough to attract Emirati investment. Notably, the UAE president’s mid-September visit to Georgia -- where an Emirati company is building a dry port near Tbilisi – underscores Abu Dhabi’s strategic understanding of the expanding East-West connectivity across the region.

Multi-Alignment Strategy

Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has long been defined by its pursuit of multi-vector diplomacy, and in recent years, a distinct pivot toward the Middle East has become increasingly evident. Since 1990s, Baku has actively cultivated simultaneous relationships across geopolitical divides -- maintaining strong ties with Russia and Turkey, while also deepening commercial and energy partnerships with Western countries. Azerbaijan’s strategic geography, particularly its role alongside Georgia as a key transit link between Central Asia and the EU, has further amplified its relevance on the global stage.

Building on decades of regional engagement, Azerbaijan has recently expanded its partnerships to include the Arab world. In addition to the growing relationship with the UAE, dynamic cooperation is now unfolding with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), spanning such sectors as energy, investment, logistics, and humanitarian affairs. For the GCC – particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia -- enhanced economic and political engagement with Azerbaijan aligns with their broader ambitions to diversify investments and assert long-term influence over the evolving connectivity landscape that links Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

But a deeper geopolitical shift may also be underway – one that helps explain the growing convergence between Azerbaijan and the UAE: the South Caucasus’ gradual shift toward the Middle East. Historically, the formidable Caucasus Mountain range divided the region into northern and southern spheres, with the southern part naturally gravitating toward commercial, political and cultural ties with the Middle East. This pattern was evident throughout ancient and medieval times. However, the rise of the Russian Empire in the 19th century disrupted this dynamic. After defeating the Persian and Ottoman empires, Russia imposed a new order, effectively sealing off the Caucasus from the Middle East and asserting exclusive influence over the region.

That dominance now appears tenuous. Geography, once again, is dictating its logic, pulling the South Caucasus back into the orbit of the Middle East. Russia, long accustomed to near monopoly influence in the region, is facing strained relations not only with Azerbaijan but also with Armenia, traditionally one of its closest allies. This diminution of Russian influence in the South Caucasus is compounded by a broader trend that Moscow itself has championed: the emergence of a multipolar world.

In this new landscape Moscow is increasingly no longer the major actor in South Caucasus affairs, but one among several – including the UAE, Turkey, the US, China and the EU – each vying for strategic footholds in a region whose connectivity and relevance are rapidly expanding.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

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