Turan Research Center

Kyrgyzstan enters 2026 with the uneasy calm that follows a storm. The parliamentary elections of November 2025 passed almost unnoticed: streets that once boiled with protest are now empty of opposition rallies, and media outlets – pressured by new laws – prefer cautious, sanitized headlines. This quiet marks the culmination of five years since Sadyr Japarov’s inauguration in January 2021 and the April referendum that year on the so-called “Khanstitution” – a constitution that promised stability but, according to critics, returned the country to Central Asia’s authoritarian traditions.

Japarov rose to power on a wave of popular anger. The parliamentary elections of October 2020, marred by widespread allegations of vote-buying and fraud, triggered unrest that toppled then-President Sooronbay Jeenbekov. Freed from prison by a crowd, Japarov – a nationalist previously convicted over the kidnapping of a regional official during protests against foreign mining interests – quickly seized the prime minister’s post and went on to win the presidency. The referendum on the new constitution, dubbed the “Khanstitution” for its heavy presidential bias, was held amid low turnout and allegations of violations, transferring power from parliament into the hands of a single individual: Japarov.

Read the full article on The Diplomat.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The Ukraine War has turned Kyrgyzstan into a key intermediary for Russian imports, but economic growth is unevenly shared.

In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan—a mountainous, landlocked country of 7 million people—has long relied on remittances and gold exports to sustain its economy. In recent years, however, the country has experienced an unexpected surge in economic growth. Preliminary figures indicate GDP growth of 10.2 percent during the first 11 months of 2025, while year-end projections from the World Bank and the IMF range from approximately 6.8 percent to 8.5 percent. These figures place Kyrgyzstan among the fastest-growing economies in the region. If current growth rates continue, Kyrgyzstan could begin to close the gap with Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita within the next five years.

A significant share of this growth is directly linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Western sanctions that followed. As sanctions restricted Russia’s access to Western markets, Moscow increasingly turned to Bishkek as a convenient intermediary. 

Re-exports of machinery, electronics, and goods with potential dual-use applications—many originating in China or the European Union—flowed through Kyrgyzstan alongside remittances, infrastructure financing, and cryptocurrency transactions that help sustain Russia’s wartime economy. Russia has relied not only on Kyrgyzstan’s financial system but also, to varying degrees, on Armenia and smaller volumes routed through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Why the Elections Came Early

On November 30, 2025, Kyrgyzstan held snap parliamentary elections nearly a year ahead of schedule, following the September self-dissolution of the Supreme Council, also known as the Jogorku Kenesh. Officially, the move aimed to avoid overlapping with the 2027 presidential election, align the political calendar with recent institutional reforms, and implement the shift to a majoritarian system without party lists. The timing also followed the March border deal with Tajikistan and came amid an increasingly constrained political environment.

According to final results, candidates aligned with President Sadyr Japarov secured 83 of 90 seats, deepening executive consolidation in a country long regarded as Central Asia’s most politically pluralistic. Turnout reached 36.9 percentcompared to the average past turnout of 57.8 percent, indicating widespread disengagement. Reports of pre-election arrests — including opposition activists and journalists — reflected efforts to preemptively prevent dissent. On December 1, the day after the vote, Japarov announced a substantial government reshuffle with notable changes in security and regional governance.

The early election has strengthened the incumbent administration but also surfaced emerging pressure — within government networks, in fragile north-south relations, and around the Japarov-Tashiev partnership — that could shape Kyrgyzstan’s trajectory ahead of 2027. Evolving power structures under Japarov, shifts within the new parliament, and changes in Japarov-Tashiev tandem dynamics are now central factors influencing Kyrgyzstan’s stability and external orientation.

Japarov’s Rise: From Upheaval to Consolidation

Sadyr Japarov's ascent began during the political turbulence of October 2020, when post-election protests toppled the government of President Sooronbay Jeenbekov. Released from prison during the unrest, Japarov quickly moved into the roles of prime minister and acting president, drawing on a combination of nationalist messaging, grassroots mobilization, and elite alliances. He won the January 2021 election with over 79% of the vote, alongside a referendum shifting the political system from parliamentary to presidential — significantly curbing legislative oversite.

His administration has since advanced a series of assertive policies, including the nationalization of the Kumtor gold mine — one of Central Asia’s largest gold deposits previously operated by Canada’s Centerra Gold — and new legislation restricting media, NGOs, and civil society. International observers have noted a trend toward more centralized, competitive-authoritarian governance.

A central pillar to Japarov's rule is his alliance with Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). Their "tandem" reflects a long interplay of northern and southern elite networks in Kyrgyz politics. Japarov is rooted in northern constituencies, while Tashiev draws from southern power bases. Their partnership blends executive authority with security-sector influence, and although it has provided short-term stability, it also raises questions about longer-term elite cohesion.

The New Parliament: A Loyal Supermajority with Regional Balance

The November 30 elections returned 90 deputies under a majoritarian system. The pro-government bloc's 83-seat result consolidates executive influence over lawmaking. Within the bloc, regional affiliations reflect a near-even split: roughly 41 MPs are tied to Japarov's northern networks and 42 to Tashiev's southern networks. Only seven MPs can be reasonably categorized as opposition representing parties such as Butun Kyrgyzstan or Social Democrats.

Incumbents were highly successful in the elections. Approximately 50 members of the outgoing convocation retained their seats, demonstrating continuity within the pro-government elite. Under the 2021 constitution, the Jogorku Kenesh’s institutional capacity to check the presidency is limited; the new parliament therefore appears likely to facilitate, rather than constrain, executive initiatives in areas such as the economy, security policy, and conservative social measures.

The composition streamlines policy execution but also risks widening the gap between state institutions and citizens if economic grievances and public expectations are not addressed. The near-even north-south distribution within the pro-government majority functions as a concession to regional dynamics, yet it also codifies the dependence of national governance on elite bargaining rather than on programmatic party competition.

The North-South Balancing Act

Regional cleavages have shaped Kyrgyz politics since independence, reflecting differences in history, settlement patterns, economic structures, and clan networks. The South — centered on Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken — has long been more sedentary, shaped by centuries of interaction with Uzbeks and Tajiks under the Kokand Khanate. These influences contributed to linguistic and cultural blending, denser patronage systems, and a more visible Islamic presence in public life. The north, stretching across Bishkek, Chuy, Issyk-kul, and Naryn, historically retained more nomadic social structures, stronger Soviet-era Russification, and comparatively secular political currents.

Ethnic composition reinforces these distinctions. The south hosts substantial Uzbek and Tajik communities with deep cross-border economic ties, while northern regions include larger Russian and Dungan populations. Geography addas another layer: only two usable mountain passes link north and south, and the journey from Bishkek to Osh still requires a full day by road. Seasonal closures exacerbate regional separation, reducing integration and elevating the importance of regional intermediaries.

These structural differences have repeatedly shaped political transitions. Northern leaders such as former presidents Askar Akaev and Almazbek Atambayev both struggled to manage tensions with the south, often facing resistance from southern business networks and elites. Conversely, southern leaders like President Kurmanbek Bakiyev encountered northern pushback when governance became heavily concentrated in southern hands. The collapse of the Bakiyev administration in the 2010 revolution, driven in part by perceived regional favoritism and uneven resource distribution, demonstrated how quickly imbalances can lead to national confrontation. Earlier attempts at cross-regional balancing, such as Bakiyev’s alliance with northern politician Feliks Kulov, helped stabilize the system temporarily but proved highly sensitive to shifts in political and economic leverage. To be sure, despite cultural-historical differences, the rivalry is largely for power and resources, not differing visions of the country, although southern conservatism occasionally clashes with northern secularism.

Within this context, the Japarov-Tashiev partnership serves as a contemporary mechanism for managing long-standing regional expectations. Tashiev’s anchoring in the security apparatus and close relations with southern clan networks provides a counterweight for Japarov’s core support in the north. Their cooperation has been central to maintaining elite coordination since 2020, pairing executive authority with security control.

The 2025 snap elections offered a test to this equilibrium. Although political competition narrowed significantly — with pre-election detentions of figures such as Social Democrats leader Temirlan Sultanbekov and allies of Atambayev for allegedly planning “mass unrest”— regional representation within the pro-government majority remained carefully balanced. The near-equal split between deputies linked to the northern and southern networks suggests a deliberate effort to preserve stability through proportionality.

At the same time, the diminished role of national parties under the new majoritarian system has reduced cross-regional political mediation. With fewer institutional mechanisms capable of integrating diverse constituencies, the durability of stability increasingly depends on the strength of personal networks under the tandem. This creates both resilience — through coordinated elite bargaining — and vulnerability, should economic pressures or leadership ambitions challenge the current balance

Pressure and Rumors: The Tandem Under Strain

Since their joint rise during the 2020 unrest, the Japarov-Tashiev tandem has remained the central axis of Kyrgyz politics. While publicly cohesive and collaborating on initiatives such as the March 2025 border deal with Tajikistan, developments in late 2025 highlighted subtle signs of internal strain. Tashiev — often described as the "people's general" for his nationalist appeals and control over the GKNB — has increased his visibility, sometimes eclipsing Japarov in public perception, most notably through his lead role in border negotiations and anti-corruption raids. The snap parliamentary elections further consolidated executive-aligned networks, but the near-even north-south split among pro-government deputes (41 pro-Japarov, 42-pro Tashiev) could amplify regional clan tensions if economic pressures mount.

A recent reshuffle reinforced these dynamics. Key dismissals, including Security Council Secretary Baktybek Bekbolotov, and promotions, such as Tashiev-loyalist Rustam Mamasadykov from GKNB deputy to secretary, signaled efforts to reward southern networks while removing potential weak links. Other appointments, including Kurvanbek Avazov(GKNB First Deputy) and Arslan Koichiev (State Secretary), maintained a formal balance. These personnel changes also reflect internal jockeying—perhaps to placate Tashiev amid rumors of an emerging power struggle within the Japarov-Tashiev tandem. Analysts and media reports suggest that, ahead of the 2027 presidential race, Japarov may bemaneuvering to curb Tashiev's growing influence over security, anti-corruption drives, and southern patronage networks. While the duo maintains a public facade of unity, promotions like Mamasadykov’s and dismissals of potential rivals are seen as gestures to ease tensions and balance the internal power dynamics.

Parallel to personnel moves, law-enforcement actions emphasized loyalty and discipline within the state. Earlier internal GKNB purges removed 12 employees for violations, and post-election firings of three civil servants for campaigning breaches signaled selective accountability. On the rewards front, Japarov's August 2025 moratorium on state honorscurtailed proliferation, though targeted exceptions — including October awards to South Korean electoral tech partnersand November recognitions for cultural workers in southern regions reinforced loyalty networks. Other measures, such as the November 25 arrest of a Chinese mining executive over environmental violations, served both regulatory and political signaling purposes.

Together, these moves have strengthened Japarov ahead of 2027 re-election, neutralizing threats and projecting anti-corruption resolve amid economic growth. At the same time, they highlight vulnerabilities: sustained suppression of dissent and mediate restrictions — evidenced by bans on outlets such as Kloop — have pushed Kyrgyzstan to 144th in the 2025 Press Freedom Index, heightening public dissatisfaction. The tandem’s stability remains contingent on mutual dependence; any perceived marginalization of southern networks or mismanagement of elite expectations could expose fault lines and provoke factional tensions.

Why the “Land of Revolutions” Stayed Quiet This Time

Kyrgyzstan’s history of political upheaval — the revolutions of 2005, 2010, and 2020 — has earned it the moniker “land of revolutions.” Each prior wave of unrest emerged from a combination of economic distress, electoral controversy, and elite mismanagement, often culminating in the abrupt removal of presidents and wholesale government resets.

The absence of similar upheaval in 2025 reflects a different mix of conditions. First, the economy is in a much better place comparative to past revolutions. Double-digit GDP growth in 2024–2025, the full nationalization of the Kumtor gold mine, visible salary increases for teachers and doctors, and an unprecedented road-construction boom have given ordinary people tangible, if modest, improvements. Remittances from Russia continue to support households across rural and urban areas, offering an additional buffer against economic shocks.

Second, the state preemptively constrained organizational capacity for mobilization. Legal and regulatory measures targeting media, civil-society organizations, and NGOs such as foreign agent laws, combined with security sector discipline and internal purges, limited the ability of potential opposition actors to coordinate large-scale protests. The consolidation of control over both political and security networks reduced the likelihood of spontaneous, cross-region uprisings.

Third, there is no single, unifying grievance that the population can rally around. The 2020 revolution was largely caused because COVID had crushed incomes and vote-buying was grotesque; in 2025 the vote was engineered quietly, and the border victory with Tajikistan gave the government a political victory.

Public sentiment reflects this new reality. Japarov still enjoys solid support, especially in the rural south, among pensioners who remember the chaos of previous revolutions, and among nationalists who applaud the “return” of Kumtorand the tough stance against foreign mining companies. Construction workers, teachers, and miners see new roads, higher wages, and state-funded projects and often credit the administration.

External Backing and Geopolitical Context

Kyrgyzstan’s domestic political resilience is closely tied to its external environment. Moscow and Beijing provide significant economic and strategic support, shaping the administration’s options and constraints. Russia remains the primary security guarantor and destination for migrant labor, while China is the principal creditor and investor, particularly in infrastructure, mining, and border-area development. Both powers prioritize stability and predictable governance over political liberalization, creating a regional context in which elite consolidation can proceed with minimal external interference.

This dual umbrella reduces the likelihood of Western leverage and strengthens the administration’s capacity to maintain order. Predictable external support also enhances the tandem’s ability to manage domestic elite bargaining, as financial and infrastructural inflows provide both resources and political cover for internal maneuvers.

Outlook: Stability with Qualifications

The 2025 parliamentary elections and subsequent reshuffle reinforced a political configuration built on executive dominance, regional balancing, and security sector control. In the short term, the system is likely to endure, provided that three conditions are met” sustained external support and remittances, continued cooperation between northern and southern elites, and loyalty within the security apparatus.

Yet vulnerabilities persist. Inflationary pressures, energy shortages, and youth unemployment continue to pose challenges to public confidence. The tandem’s stability hinges on maintaining internal cohesion; any fracture in elite coordination or perception of southern marginalization could trigger factional disputes. Historical north–south divisions remain latent but potent, ready to reemerge should the tandem fail to manage competition over resources and influence.

For external partners and domestic actors, the key question is whether the current equilibrium can be institutionalized rather than sustained purely through personal networks. Achieving durable governance will require a careful balance: supporting economic and infrastructure initiatives while gradually creating channels for cross-regional dialogue and political integration, without reinforcing patronage structures that perpetuate elite dependency.

The streets that remained quiet in 2025 reflect the administration’s temporary success in combining selective economic gains, elite accommodation, and security-sector discipline. Whether this quiet signals genuine consolidation or merely a pause before renewed contestation will depend on how long the current arrangement can absorb economic and political pressures without provoking elite fractures or public discontent.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist and researcher specializing in Central Asia. She covers press freedom, human rights, and China’s regional influence, with work published in The Guardian, The Diplomat, Reuters, and Eurasianet. A Rumsfeld Fellow, she also contributes to the AFPC’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

Given that Kazakhstan had normalised relations with Israel decades before this month, its entry into the Abraham Accords is a “politically meaningful and strategically useful, but largely symbolic” development that will come with “targeted practical gains in specific areas such as technology, defence, and critical minerals,” explained Aigerim Turgunbaeva, a Bishkek-based journalist and research fellow at the Turan Center, in an interview with The New Arab.

Astana’s official entry into the Abraham Accords “mainly elevates the visibility of bilateral ties, provides a recognised political framework for new commercial and technological partnerships, and reduces perceived risks for US and Israeli investors operating in Kazakhstan,” she noted, while adding that the Central Asian state’s foreign policy will retain its “multi-vector” nature that avoids placing Astana in alignment with any specific geopolitical bloc.

“The move therefore broadens Kazakhstan’s diplomatic toolkit rather than transforming the nature of its ties with Israel,” stated Turgunbaeva.

Israel’s Bukharan Jewish community plays a central role in shaping Israeli-Uzbek relations. Reflecting on this community’s history, Bruce Pannier, a fellow at the Turan Research Centre and board member of the Caspian Policy Centre, noted that the Bukharan Jewish population in what is now Uzbekistan numbered around 40,000 at the time of the Soviet Union’s implosion.

“The community had been in the Bukhara area for thousands of years. Most have left in the time since Uzbekistan became independent, and there are now possibly less than 1,000 still living in the Bukhara area. Most of those who left went to the United States, but several thousand went to Israel with significant help from the Israeli government,” he noted.

“The Bukharan Jews in Israel and those still remaining in Uzbekistan continue to connect the two countries.”

Pannier believes that Kyrgyzstan would likely join after Uzbekistan. “Kyrgyz-Israeli diplomatic relations also date back to early 1992. Kyrgyzstan’s situation vis-à-vis Israel is similar to Kazakhstan’s in that there’s really nothing to lose in joining the Accords,” he told TNA.

Read the full article on the New Arab.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow and Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Central Asian states continue to send Tehran the same message they voiced in the 1990s: They want nothing to do with the Islamic Republic’s political model. In other words, from a political standpoint, they view Iran as anything but a partner of choice. However, Central Asian states still desire to work with Iran as a potential transit country for shipping goods between East and West. In this respect, these former Soviet republics are likely closer to Tehran today than at any previous point, according to Bruce Pannier, a Turan Research Center fellow and board member of the Caspian Policy Center.

Ultimately, while Central Asian republics value Iran as a trade corridor and seek to have problem-free relationships with Tehran, these ex-Soviet states do not want the conflicts between the Islamic Republic and the American-Israeli alliance to play out on their soil. 

Central Asian states “don’t want to have anything to do with Iran’s political take on the world, or side with them in any of the disputes that Iran has with other countries in the world,” Pannier told this author. 

“They don’t want to cancel anybody out. They don’t want to cancel Iran out either. But they’re certainly not going to get closer to Iran knowing that it might in some way inhibit their relationship with other partners, including Western partners who actually have much more money to offer Central Asia than Iran ever will have, so that’s part of the figuring in [Central Asian states’] relations with Iran,” he added.

At the same time, these countries are close to Russia, whose relationship with Iran underpins a role for Tehran in Central Asia. Nonetheless, with Moscow distracted by the Ukraine conflict and challenged by EU and NATO countries in Central Asia, Russia’s influence in this former Soviet space is not as strong as it was years ago. Furthermore, while Iran is not a major player in Central Asia’s security architecture, one exception, noted Pannier, relates to the struggle against Islamic State Khorasan Province in Afghanistan—a group that has its eyes set on Central Asia...

Describing Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Israel as “formal but limited,” Aigerim Turgunbaeva, a Bishkek-based journalist, told this author the Central Asian country strikes a “diplomatic balance, engaging both Israel and Iran while refraining from taking sides.” As she put it, Bishkek’s approach toward Iran and Israel is “guided by pragmatism and the desire to preserve constructive relations with all partners.”

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Bruce Pannier and Aigerim Turgunbaeva are research fellows at the Turan Research Center.

Shavkat, 59, doesn’t see himself as a criminal. Speaking from a small apartment in Russia, where he now lives with his fourth wife, the Uzbek-born trader details with quiet confidence the life that he’s built – a life that, by law, shouldn’t exist.

“My first wife is Tajik, the second is Afghan, and the third Turkish,” he told Qadam. “Now I live in Russia with my fourth wife, a Tatar. My wives all know each other.”

Read the full article on Qadam Magazine.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On September 3, 2025, a grand military parade was held at Tiananmen Square in Beijing to commemorate the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II. Designed to highlight China’s growing military strength, the event was attended by leaders from around two dozen countries, including the presidents of all five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 

The parade followed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, where Chinese President Xi Jinping underscored China’s ambition to reshape the global order and stressed the SCO’s growing role as a driver of international governance reform.

In his speech, Xi Jinping declared:

“We must uphold fairness and justice. We must promote a correct view of World War II history and oppose the Cold War mentality, block confrontation, and bullying.”

He also emphasized the SCO’s growing influence, a message directed in part at the visiting Central Asian leaders: “We have also initiated many new global governance concepts and put them into practice. The SCO has increasingly become a catalyst for the development and reform of the global governance system.”

Ahead of their trip to Beijing, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—Central Asia’s two largest economies—published articles in China Daily, praising China’s achievements and expressing admiration for Xi’s leadership.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev wrote:

"This unprecedented progress in our relations has become possible due to the personal attention and tireless efforts of our dear friend — President Xi Jinping — to further develop and strengthen Uzbek-Chinese comprehensive cooperation.”

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev echoed this sentiment:

“Today's impressive development of China under the visionary leadership of an outstanding politician of the global scale President Xi Jinping brings significant benefits and offers unique opportunities to its immediate neighbors, including Kazakhstan."

Economic Expansion: “Belt and Road” as the Anchor of the New Silk Road

In 2024, trade between China and Central Asia reached $95 billion, with nearly half of that volume attributed to Kazakhstan. At the second China-Central Asia Summit in June 2025, the parties signed 58 agreements worth approximately $25 billion, spanning infrastructure, digital communications, and poverty alleviation. A key focus has been the Middle Corridor — a trade route from East Asia through Central Asia and the Caucasus, bypassing both Russia and Iran.

Kazakhstan has emerged as the region’s primary hub. In July 2025, it secured $24 billion for rail hubs and logistic parks, the development of rail hubs and logistics parks, representing 44 percent of Belt and Road global investments in the first half of 2025. Cargo volumes along the corridor have grown from 4.8 million tons in 2024 and are projected to reach 11 million tons by 2030, with Kazakhstan expecting substantial growth in transit revenues.

However, such investments carry risks. Central Asia’s external debt to China exceeds $15 billion, with Kyrgyzstan owing $4 billion — 45% of external debt — and Tajikistan $3 billion, or 52% of its portfolio. To ease obligations, Tajikistan transferred several mines to Chinese firms in 2024, a move reminiscent of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port deal and often cited as an example of “debt diplomacy.” Due to its debt to China, Kyrgyzstan has had to grant concessions in mining and hydropower. Central Asia is not alone — in just 2025, developing countries owe China $35 billion. However, Beijing has shown some flexibility. To prevent backlash, it has used equity swaps in Kazakhstan and loan restructuring in Kyrgyzstan. 

This dynamic creates a strategic dilemma: short-term growth versus long-term dependency. If debt burdens mount during global slowdowns, Central Asian states risk becoming economic satellites. Diversification offers a partial hedge, in 2024 Uzbekistan secured $2 billion from Saudi Arabia for renewable energy, reducing reliance on Chinese financing. Still, China's 2025 treaty with the five states institutionalizes BRI, potentially locking in uneven terms unless audited for transparency. Without a united regional response — like Tajikistan’s earlier ceding of 1,158 sq km of territory in 2011 — debt risks turning from a tool of diplomacy into one of control.

Despite BRI’s economic benefits, rising Sinophobic sentiment complicates China’s ambitions in Central Asia. Protests in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, often directed at land leases, mining deals, and debt repayment concessions, reflect fears of Chinese economic domination and local elite corruption. In Kyrgyzstan, demonstrations in 2023 targeted Chinese-run mining operations due to environmental concerns, highlighting local anxieties about ecological impacts. 

The case of Tajik journalist Rukhshona Khakimova illustrates the political sensitivity surrounding these issues. Arrested in July 2024 while investigating public attitudes toward Chinese influence, Khakimova was sentenced to eight years in a closed trial on charges of treason. Her reporting on Chinese mining projects and environmental impact sparked controversy within local communities, while her imprisonment fueled public mistrust toward both Beijing and Dushanbe.

Such tensions undermine Beijing’s “win-win” narrative . Without greater transparency and accountability, grassroots backlash may continue to erode the legitimacy of Chinese projects across the region.

Energy and Financial Integration: From Pipelines to Power Grids

China is deepening its footprint in Central Asia’s energy sector. At the Astana Summit, leaders agreed to installing 10 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, including a 500 MW solar plant in Uzbekistan and small modular reactors in Kazakhstan. Traditional energy ties remain strong: in the first half of 2025, oil and gas deals totaled $30 billion, already surpassing the $24 billion recorded in all of 2024. Gas exports from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to China reached 55 billion cubic meters.

Financial integration is also accelerating. Kyrgyzstan’s Eldik Bank adopted China’s International Payment System, cutting currency transaction costs by 20%. Yet greater reliance on yuan-based transactions ties local economies to Beijing’s financial ecosystem, raising concerns about reduced access to Western systems such as SWIFT or IMF assistance.

Geopolitical Restructuring: From Coordinator to Conductor

The Tiananmen parade and SCO summit showcased China’s diplomatic primacy in the region. With all five Central Asian presidents in attendance alongside global leaders, Xi pledged $210 million in aid while positioning Beijing as the region’s central broker.

China's ascent in Central Asia comes at the expense of others. Russia’s influence has eroded in the wake of the Ukraine war: its trade share with Central Asia has halved since 2022, ceding space to China and new actors. While Russia and China present a façade of cooperation in technology and security — such as joint ICT projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan —Beijing is steadily outpacing Moscow through infrastructure investments, loans, and financial integration. Unlike open rivalry, the process is gradual and framed within SCO structures, allowing China to expand influence without overt confrontation. 

The United States, meanwhile, remains inconsistent. Its strategy emphasizes diversification but lacks sustained investment, leaving gaps China readily fills — for example, Kazakhstan’s $24 billion in logistics projects. 

To increase its agency, Central Asia has pursued growing ties with middle powers such as Turkey, India, and Gulf states. For example, Kazakhstan’s trade with Turkey grew by 30% in 2024, signaling its diversification efforts. If managed strategically, regional states could benefit from multipolar engagement. But overreliance on any single partner — particularly China — risks reinforcing economic dependency. 

EVs as an Influence Tool

Central Asia’s transition to electric vehicles is accelerating, with Chinese firms at the forefront. In 2024, Uzbekistan imported over 24,000 electric vehicles, 99.5 percent of them from China. Kazakhstan saw Chinese EV sales surge 36-fold year-on-year while Tajikistan doubled imports to 5,266 units worth $76.4 million in the first half of 2024. Kyrgyzstan has carved out a niche as a re-export hub, channeling $219.8 million worth of EVs to Russia, bypassing sanctions.

A centerpiece of this expansion is the Chinese automobile firm BYD’s factory in Jizzakh, Uzbekistan, opened in summer 2024. The plant has already created 1,200 jobs and aims to produce 500,000 vehicles annually following a $25 billion in investment, a fivefold increase.

Soft Power and Cultural Influence

Alongside trade and infrastructure, China is investing heavily in cultural and educational influence in Central Asia. Yet, despite elite endorsements— such as the 2025 op-eds by Presidents Tokayev and Mirziyoyev praising Xi — Beijing faces an enduring image deficit. 

Surveys show anti-Chinese sentiment peaked around 2020, driven by concerns over the treatment of Uyghurs and COVID-19, and has only modestly improved since. In 2024, China’s favorability in the region stood at just 36 percent, with declines recorded in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Public mistrust manifests in recurring protests against land leases, mining projects, and fears of "sinicization." A notable example was in 2022, Kazakhstan saw protests in Almaty near the Chinese consulate, where demonstrators voiced concerns over human rights and Chinese influence in the country.

The elite-public divide weakens China's soft power. Governments may embrace aid and investment, but locals often see them as vehicles for economic exploitation and cultural erosion, complicating Beijing's "anti-hegemony" narrative.

Visa-Free Initiatives

To improve people-to-people ties, China has expanded visa-free regimes. Beijing introduced 30-day mutual exemptions for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in early 2025, with Kyrgyzstan expected to follow by year’s end. Tajikistan had had a unilateral exemption since 2024, while Turkmenistan remains excluded, maintaining only limited transit privileges. These agreements, covering tourism, business, and family visits, are part of Beijing’s broader visa policy now extending to 76 countries. 

The results, however, are so far mixed. While Uzbek tourist flows to China have increased, polls suggest only marginal improvements in perceptions. Visa easing, paired with EV exports and aid, has been a low-cost soft power tool, but it has yet to dispel deeper cultural suspicions.

Confucius Institutes and Education Diplomacy

Confucius Institutes serve as Beijing’s flagship for cultural exchange, with 13 centers across Central Asia educating roughly 18,000 students annually. They promoting Mandarin, governance models, and ties with China. In Kazakhstan, for example, enrollment in Mandarin courses has risen, with students eyeing greater economic opportunities. 

Surveys in 2024-2025 suggest these initiatives are improving perceptions, particularly among younger generations, though the effect remains modest. Critics view them as instruments of Chinese state influence — echoing global skepticism that has led to closures of Confucius Institutes in the West. In Central Asia, they simultaneously foster people-to-people ties and reinforce suspicions of “soft power engineering.” 

China also extends influence through security cooperation and information flows. In Kyrgyzstan, Chinese surveillance technologies are deployed at border crossings, while Beijing’s media influence promote pro-China narratives and normalize its governance model. The efforts, however, intersect with sensitive issues such as Han migration into Central Asia and Beijing’s policies toward Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Both themes carry deep historical and cultural resonance in the region: Han migration stirs anxieties about demographic change and economic displacement, while repression in Xinjiang echoes across borders where Turkic and Muslim communities feel kinship ties. Rather than easing mistrust, these factors often reinforce the very suspicions Beijing’s outreach seeks to dispel.

Between Opportunity and Dependency

China’s reorganization of Central Asia — through $25 billion in Belt and Road investments to CIPS yuan flows— is relentless, displacing Russia, whose trade with the region has plummeted since the invasion of Ukraine, and outpacing a fragmented West. 

The numbers tell a dual story. On the one hand, the $95 billion trade volume and green energy transition promise prosperity. On the other, $15 billion in debt and a growing reliance on China’s financial systems threaten regional autonomy. As Kazakh analyst Dosym Satpayev warned, “We must be a strong player to avoid vassal dependency on major powers, or we risk becoming merely a raw material appendage or logistical route in a patron-client system.”

The path forward lies in diversification. Central Asian states can attract Gulf funds, push for greater BRI transparency, and strengthen Turkic and regional alliances. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already expanded ties with Turkey and India, aiming to grow bilateral trade volumes to over $10 billion.

Without such initiatives, China’s growing influence risks transforming economic leverage over Central Asia from a strategic crossroads into a region heavily reliant on Beijing.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist and researcher specializing in Central Asia. She covers press freedom, human rights, and China’s regional influence, with work published in The Guardian, The Diplomat, Reuters, and Eurasianet. A Rumsfeld Fellow, she also contributes to the AFPC’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

The journey from the weather station to the Kara-Batkak Glacier takes about four hours across rocky terrain and roaring rivers. The glacier sees few tourists, and the existing trails tend to be tracks created by livestock grazing on the slopes in summer. My solo trip took four hours, and just before arriving at the most turbulent river, a shepherd suddenly appeared to help me cross. Once majestic, Kara-Batkak in August is now blackened in places—a jolting sight.

The glacier’s name translates to “Black Mud,” a reference to the moraines that stain the meltwater. Water flowing from the glacier turns from clear blue to murky gray as it passes through layers of rock and sediment, creating the colored streams that locals see in the valleys below. Kara-Batkak is a medium-sized glacier located in the Terskey Ala-Too range of Kyrgyzstan’s Inner Tian Shan, south of Lake Issyk-Kul. It rises to elevations ranging from 3,300 to 4,400 meters. The glacier’s structure is complex, with terminal zones, steep icefalls, flat sections, and three drainage basins, reaching a maximum thickness of 114 meters and holding roughly 0.096 km³ of ice. Kara-Batkak feeds the Kyzyl-Suu River, sustaining agriculture and communities in the Issyk-Kul and Chuy regions.
Read the full article on Eurasianet.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In April 2025, Samarkand, Uzbekistan hosted the inaugural Central Asia–EU Summit. Chaired by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the summit brought together leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and senior EU officials, including the presidents of the European Council and European Commission. The landmark event marked a new phase in EU-Central Asian relations, with energy cooperation at its core. For Central Asian societies, the summit offered prospects for economic growth.

The summit had three key outcomes: a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership, a Declaration on Critical Minerals Cooperation, and a 2025–2026 roadmap targeting energy, transport, digitalization, and green technologies. The EU committed €12 billion through its Global Gateway initiative -- earmarking €3 billion for the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, €2.5 billion for critical raw materials, and €6.4 billion for energy and climate projects (RFI). Europe’s drive for alternative energy sources, accelerated by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has drawn fresh attention to Central Asia’s vast hydrocarbons, renewables, and mineral reserves, strategically situated between Europe, China, Russia, and Afghanistan.

The EU is already Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner. In 2023, Brussels accounted for 22.6% of the region’s trade and over 40% of foreign direct investment. For the EU, this makes Central Asia a pivotal ally. For Central Asians, however, the partnership’s success depends on whether it delivers economic returns.

Central Asia’s Path to Regional Cooperation

After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Central Asia’s five republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—struggled to unite. Rivalries, border disputes, and Tajikistan’s civil war derailed early attempts at cooperation. Simultaneously, Russia maintained influence through security pacts and migration flow, China expanded its footprint through Confucius Institutes, business deals and infrastructure projects that eventually became part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the United States tied its engagement to the war in Afghanistan.

A turning point came in 2016, when Mirziyoyev launched the “Good Neighbor” policy. Since then, the region began annual consultative meetings of leaders, the landmark 2022 Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border agreement, steady progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and a growing web of energy exchanges from Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan electricity swap deals to Turkmenistan’s gas exports. Cooperation has also extended to shared environmental challenges such as managing water scarcity and mitigating the damage caused by the desiccation of the Aral Sea.

Another milestone was achieved in early 2025, when Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resolved their remaining border disputes, paving the way for new land and air routes with Uzbekistan’s mediation. Although Afghanistan’s instability, Russia’s political leverage, and China’s infrastructure dominance continue to affect the region, Central Asia’s pragmatic, sovereignty-first approach is driving trade and connectivity.

Central Asia’s Energy Potential

Central Asia’s energy wealth is diverse and vast. Kazakhstan, the region’s largest oil producer, exports 1.5 million barrels of oil daily through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Turkmenistan, home to some of the world’s largest gas fields, supplies both China and Russia while eyeing potential cooperation with the EU through the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline. Uzbekistan, largely self-sufficient in natural gas, is reforming its energy sector with the goal of becoming a more significant exporter. 

Renewable energy also offers transformative potential. Kazakhstan’s wind capacity is estimated at 929 terawatt-hours, Turkmenistan’s solar capacity of 665 Gigawatts is eight times the region’s current output. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has committed to generating 40% renewable energy by 2030, with 3.65 gigawatts operational by 2025. Kazakhstan holds another strategic position in the green transition – it produces 19 of the 34 critical minerals essential for EU green technologies such as batteries and wind turbines.

Europe’s Strategic Interest

With Europe’s energy crisis intensifying, the EU has turned to liquified natural gas (LNG), coal and nuclear power as short-term alternatives to Russian supplies, while looking to Central Asia for a more durable, long-term solution. The Green Corridor initiative envisions channeling renewable energy to Europe through the Middle Corridor , supported by $1.225 million from the Asian Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The EU’s Sustainable Energy and Climate Connectivity (SECCA) program allocates €700 million for water, energy, and climate projects. At the latest summit, Brussels also endorsed Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s bids to join the World Trade Organization, further strengthening international trade integration.

The EU’s €12 billion Global Gateway initiative goes beyond energy, positioning itself as a direct counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. By investing in projects such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor, which could cut Europe-Asia transit to under 15 days, the EU seeks to reduce Central Asia’s reliance on Russian routes and compete with Beijing’s infrastructure dominance. For the region's governments, this competition offers leverage and the opportunity to diversify partnerships. Local leaders have also emphasized the need for projects to align with national priorities like job creation.

Challenges to Partnership

Exporting energy to Europe faces logistical hurdles. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is a key oil route, but the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, meant to carry Turkmen gas to Europe via Azerbaijan, requires costly LNG conversion, which can increase the price two to five times higher, making exports less competitive. Underdeveloped transport networks along the Middle Corridor further limit connectivity. The TITR, a vital trade link from China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus, is constrained by underdeveloped transport infrastructure, limiting its capacity to just 4.5 million tons in 2024, with Azerbaijan’s Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway handling 5 million tons annually and the Baku International Sea Trade Port seeing a sixfold volume increase over five years. Despite projections of 5.2 million tons in 2025 and 10 million tons by 2027 for the Middle Corridor, this remains a fraction of the Northern Corridor’s capacity, which processed an estimated 766 million tons in 2023 despite a 51% westbound and 44% eastbound cargo drop due to sanctions. The Northern Corridor, capable of handling over 1 billion tons annually based on Russian Railways’ 3.5 million tons daily throughput, transported roughly 147 times more cargo than the Middle Corridor’s 2025 projection, underscoring the urgent need for infrastructure upgrades to enhance connectivity.

The EU, aiming for climate neutrality by 2050 under the European Green Deal, expects Azerbaijan to fund the $5 billion TCP, but Baku sees little financial incentive as EU gas demand may decline by 2030. Russia and Iran oppose the TCP, citing Caspian Sea environmental risks, though Moscow’s stance is hypocritical given existing Caspian pipelines like Shah Deniz 2 and Kashagan. Underdeveloped Middle Corridor infrastructure, despite EU’s €12 billion Global Gateway investments, further limits connectivity.

Russia and Iran have also opposed the Trans-Caspian, citing environmental concerns but aim to protect their gas market dominance. The 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea permits such projects, yet unresolved maritime boundaries and pricing disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan complicate progress. Russia and Iran’s energy cooperation, including a gas pipeline via Azerbaijan and the INSTC trade route, competes with the Middle Corridor by diverting cargo and investment, potentially reducing its growth. Their strategic moves, like environmental objections to the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, further delay alternative routes.

Additionally, projects like the Trans-Caspian Pipeline risk harming the Caspian Sea’s ecosystem, a concern often voiced by local communities in Kazakhstan. Hydropower development, most notably Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam, a 3,600 MW hydropower project, intensifies transboundary water disputes, a critical issue in Central Asia, by threatening downstream agricultural water supplies in Uzbekistan, despite a 2018 energy import agreement. Kazakhstan’s reliance on coal –still accounting for 70 percent of its energy consumption—continues to drive severe air pollution. To help mitigate environmental risks, the EU has committed €700 million through its SECCA program, funding environmental assessments and the expansion of renewable energy across the region.

EU’s Global Gateway meets China’s BRI

The EU’s €12 billion Global Gateway initiative and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) jointly enhance Central Asia’s role as a trade bridge, yet compete for regional influence. The EU’s Middle Corridor, projected to handle 5.2 million tons of cargo in 2025, dovetails with BRI’s China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to improve connectivity, reducing reliance on Russian routes. However, the EU’s focus on sustainable projects clashes with BRI’s rapid, large-scale investments, creating a contest for dominance. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan leverage both, balancing green ambitions with economic growth. “We are facing a historic chance to make our region not only sustainable but also prosperous,” said Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Summit. For both initiatives to succeed, they must prioritize local needs like infrastructure and jobs over geopolitical rivalry.

Opportunities for Cooperation

The Samarkand summit opened new pathways for collaboration. Plans to modernize energy grids and lay undersea cables could accelerate exports, while aligning Kazakhstan’s 2050 carbon neutrality goal and Uzbekistan’s 2030 target with the EU’s Green Deal creates opportunities for joint research on hydrogen and energy storage. An EU–Central Asia task force could streamline Trans-Caspian Pipeline negotiations, while vocational training programs would strengthen local capacity for green technologies. More harmonized cross-border energy trade could also reduce reliance on Russia, benefiting both regions.

Conclusion

The Samarkand summit has positioned Central Asia as a pivotal partner in Europe’s evolving energy strategy. With €12 billion in EU investments, agreements on critical minerals, and a roadmap for connectivity, the region offers significant potential to support Europe’s diversification away from Russian energy. Yet, realizing this potential hinges on overcoming infrastructure gaps, navigating geopolitical rivalries with Russia and Iran, and mitigating environmental risks. If these obstacles can be addressed, Central Asia could become a cornerstone of Europe’s long-term energy security while advancing its own economic integration and green transition.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist and researcher specializing in Central Asia. She covers press freedom, human rights, and China’s regional influence, with work published in The Guardian, The Diplomat, Reuters, and Eurasianet. A Rumsfeld Fellow, she also contributes to the AFPC’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.