Turan Research Center

In a February 24 interview in France — four days before the launch of the joint U.S.–Israel operation — Alexander Grinberg predicted that Washington would strike not only Iran's military infrastructure but also its senior military leadership. Speaking with Vozpópuli on March 15, he assessed the operation's unfolding logic, the likely death of Iran's new supreme leader, and the broader implications for Western security.

Below are key excerpts from the interview, translated from the original Spanish.

Is a diplomatic resolution to the conflict possible?

I don't believe so.

What are Israel's objectives in the Iran operation? And what about the United States?

For Israel, the objective is reached when Iran can no longer pose a threat. The military is destroying the regime's capabilities, because 7,000 ballistic missiles could theoretically saturate all of our air defense systems. For the Israeli government, we are close to that goal. But the U.S. naturally requires the normalization of energy conditions as well.

On Saturday, the U.S. struck Kharg Island to prevent Iran from controlling the Strait of Hormuz…

Yes, but the U.S. didn't target Iranian oil — it struck Iranian weapons on that strategic island. I believe this is preparation for a U.S. ground operation. While the strategic situation isn't dire, it matters because of Iran's capacity to spike global energy prices. Once the American military machine starts moving, it's impossible to stop. And many Arab countries now want Iran punished for attacks on their territory.

Is there a coherent strategy behind the coordinated strikes, or has the U.S. entered a war it doesn't know how to end?

No country reveals all its military objectives publicly. If we can understand the plan, so can the enemy. For example, early in the campaign, strikes hit sports stadiums. I didn't understand why until an Iranian contact explained that sports facilities serve as military assembly and training centers. Destroying them degraded the ability of military units to organize. And it's not only the strikes that are coordinated — the messaging is too. We see daily that statements from Trump and Netanyahu echo one another.

Trump has denied it multiple times, but he has also called for the fall of the Iranian regime. Is regime change really possible?

Regime change is possible, but it depends on the will of the Iranian people. There is a total disconnect between the Iranian people and their government. In the West and in Israel, we expect a formal process with a clear beginning and end. But I don't think it works that way in Iran, because this is an ideological regime that doesn't think long-term. The regime may not be destroyable with a single blow, but it can be stripped of its capacity to function — to govern or administer the country.

Trump and Netanyahu have repeatedly urged Iranians to rise up against their government. What could come next?

Right now I don't think an uprising is possible — it's dangerous to go out into the streets. We believe Iran is killing its own people with drones, because we see that some attacks within its territory are carried out with quadcopters, not the fixed-wing drones Israel uses. It's still not safe to take to the streets. Iranian society doesn't want this regime. They demonstrated en masse in January. The Iranian economy wasn't functioning before the February 28 strikes — inflation was already extremely high. There could even be a power vacuum for some time. But I cannot imagine a situation worse than one under this regime, which kills its own people.

There has been significant speculation about the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and his absence from the media. What do you think?

I believe he died, or was so severely wounded that it would be impossible to show him on television. Iranian media initially said they would broadcast Khamenei's message but not his image. There is no photograph. If he had only been wounded as they claim, they would show him to make him look heroic.

From a security perspective, how would the end of the ayatollahs' regime affect the West?

We should not forget that Iran has far more Arab and Western blood on its hands than Jewish blood. It maintains alliances with criminal networks in France coordinating with Algeria, with narcotrafficking networks, with terrorist organizations worldwide — Hezbollah, networks across Latin America and Africa. If the Iranian regime falls, these networks will be significantly weakened.

Read the full interview on Voz Populi (Spanish).

Alexander Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins 'La Linterna' with Expósito, to discuss the paralysis of the West in the face of the crisis of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's threat to close this neuralgic point for world trade has triggered an escalation of tension that already affects the global economy, while the main European powers have declined the request of the United States to intervene militarily.

Watch the full interview on Cope (Spanish).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Dayana Bermúdez of DNews speaks to Senior Fellow Grinberg, who analyzed the complex political and military situation, especially in relation to Iran and its regime. Grinberg explains that the apparent strength of the Iranian regime is based on an authoritarian and fascist ideological system that, although powerful, also contains the seeds of its own weakness. He clarifies that Persian culture is rich and ancient, but the regime does not represent the entirety of Iranian culture or the Iranian people, most of whom disagree with the government. Furthermore, he points out that Iran does not have strong state allies, but rather relies primarily on weaker proxy groups.
Watch the interview on DNews (Spanish).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

A direct military conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran continues. How stable is the regime in Tehran under conditions of strikes on military infrastructure and centers of power?

In the program “Good Morning, Israel,” Yulia Tsodyks and Oleg Klots speak with Senior Fellow Alexander Grinberg.

Watch the full interview here (Russian).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Maj. (res.) Alex Grinberg, an expert at JISS on Iran and the Shi’ite world, provided insight into the internal dynamics of the Iranian regime under fire. He said that the goal must be to “break the back of the enemy.”

“It’s a regime that is sadistic and that blackmails money from families to get [back] the bodies of their dear ones [protesters] who were massacred. So, this regime must be destroyed,” Grinberg argued.

He analyzed Iran’s strikes against Gulf nations, suggesting they are a desperate attempt to saturate American air defense systems.

“Its geopolitical behavior proves that there is no way to compromise with this regime,” Grinberg said, describing the Islamic Republic as “incurably aggressive.”

He also called for the elimination of former senior IRGC commanders and military advisers, saying, “These are very powerful people, and they must be done in as soon as possible because they’re very dangerous.”

Any scenario of the regime surrendering as Nazi Germany did in 1945 is baseless, said Grinberg, adding that this is based on decentralized power networks, and that the war goal should be to “break separately all of the vertebrae of this spine. And this way it will stop functioning.”

Read the full article on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins GB News to discuss the differences between the US and Israel's aims in the war against the Iranian regime, and the possible involvement of Kurdish militants.

Watch the full interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The decision to move the talks between Iran and the United States that began in Oman on February 6, 2026, after they were initially scheduled to be held Istanbul, sparked a firestorm of criticism in the Turkish media. The move, even though it was framed as a logistical and strategic necessity, exposed deep-seated structural tensions and a burgeoning rivalry between Ankara and Tehran. Turkey views the shift as an Iranian rejection of the “Istanbul Process,” a diplomatic framework Ankarahad meticulously constructed to position itself as the indispensable arbiter of regional stability. As the negotiations opened in Muscat, the rhetoric employed by Turkish commentators signaled the end of a period of “managed competition” and the beginning of a more confrontational era in Turkish-Iranian relations.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), one of the oldest Christian institutions, made Armenia the first nation to adopt Christianity as its state religion in 301 AD under St. Gregory the Illuminator and King Tiridates III. Over centuries of foreign domination and diaspora, it has served as the primary guardian of Armenian national identity, language, culture, and historical continuity, while continuing to occupy an important role in Armenian social, moral, and everyday life.

Now, the AAC has entered a phase of political engagement unprecedented in Armenia’s post-independence history. Long regarded as a guardian of national identity and a symbol of cultural continuity rather than a direct political actor, the Church has increasingly positioned itself as a central pillar of opposition to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government. This shift has unfolded in parallel with Armenia’s attempted strategic reorientation away from Russian security dependence and toward Western-backed connectivity and normalization initiatives, most notably the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), also known as the Zangezur Corridor.

The Church’s political activism cannot be understood solely as a domestic reaction to government policy. Rather, it reflects the convergence of internal elite resistance with external pressures exerted by Russia and Iran — two actors whose strategic interests are threatened by Armenia’s prospective integration into Western economic and security frameworks. In this context, the AAC has emerged as a uniquely effective vehicle for influence: socially authoritative, constitutionally ambiguous in its political boundaries, and historically intertwined with Russian intelligence and pro-Russian elite networks.

The AAC’s political positioning also resonates with a longer history of religious institutions as vectors of geopolitical contention. A salient comparative case can be found in Ukraine, where the Russian Orthodox Church and its affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church (historically aligned with the Moscow Patriarchate) became a focus of contention after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian authorities and church leadership repeatedly invoked shared Orthodox heritage to justify political claims and to criticize Kyiv’s moves toward religious independence, even as Ukraine moved to establish an autocephalous church recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Moscow’s use of ecclesiastical structures in Ukraine exemplifies a broader pattern in which religious institutions — especially those with transnational affiliations — are leveraged to shape political narratives and influence state behavior. In the Ukrainian case, the Orthodox Church became a proxy battleground in which Russia’s broader strategic aims were articulated through appeals to religious identity and historical unity, even as Kyiv viewed these appeals as undermining its sovereignty. Moscow-backed church structures were actively used to propagate narratives framing Ukrainian statehood as illegitimate, to challenge Kyiv’s authority, and to undermine U.S. support for Ukraine by presenting Western backing as interference in “historically Orthodox lands,” even as Ukraine moved to establish an autocephalous church recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This Ukrainian example illustrates how religious institutions with transnational affiliations can be leveraged to shape political narratives, legitimize foreign policy aims, and contest sovereignty.

Armenia now faces a parallel dilemma. The AAC’s transnational ties, historical intelligence linkages, and political mobilization echo patterns observed in Ukraine, suggesting that ecclesiastical influence is being repurposed as a strategic tool in response to declining secular leverage.

Connectivity, Constitutional Reform, and the Strategic Timeline

The immediate geopolitical context for the Church–state confrontation is the proposed TRIPP, brokered by the United States at the August 2025 Washington Peace Summit. The project envisages an unimpeded transit route through Armenia’s Syunik province connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave and onward to Turkey and European markets. If implemented, the corridor would substantially reduce Iran’s role as a regional transit hub and diminish Russia’s leverage as Armenia’s principal security arbiter.

The corridor’s realization is closely tied to Armenia’s domestic political trajectory. Pashinyan has indicated that a renewed mandate following the June 2026 parliamentary elections would allow his government to initiate a constitutional referendum removing references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence that Azerbaijan interprets as an implicit territorial claim over Karabakh. From the government’s perspective, this amendment is a prerequisite for a comprehensive peace treaty with Azerbaijan and for completing Armenia’s transition from what Pashinyan has described as “Historical Armenia” to a “Real Armenia” grounded in sovereign statehood rather than inherited claims and Russian security guarantees.

For both Moscow and Tehran, this trajectory represents a strategic loss. Russia risks forfeiting one of its last reliable levers in the South Caucasus, while Iran faces the prospect of being structurally bypassed by new east–west trade routes. Preventing the consolidation of political support for this course has therefore become a shared objective, albeit pursued through different means.

The Church’s Political Turn and the Collapse of Post-2018 Equilibrium

Relations between the AAC and the state began to deteriorate following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, which brought Pashinyan to power on an anti-corruption and reformist platform. Prior to that moment, the Church had little incentive to intervene directly in politics. Armenia’s presidents were uniformly pro-Russian, embedded in oligarchic patronage systems, and broadly aligned with the Church’s geopolitical worldview. The separation between ecclesiastical authority and day-to-day politics was therefore as much a product of shared interests as of constitutional principle.

That equilibrium collapsed after 2018. The new government’s emphasis on transparency, institutional reform, and foreign policy diversification generated unease within the Church hierarchy, which had long operated in symbiosis with the pre-revolutionary elite. Early signs of mistrust were evident, particularly as Pashinyan’s rhetoric suggested that reform would eventually extend to all public institutions, including those traditionally shielded by moral authority.

The rupture became overt after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. While the Church framed its criticism of the government in spiritual and civilizational terms, the substance of its opposition increasingly overlapped with the agenda of secular forces seeking to halt normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey. This convergence was most visible in the 2024 “Tavush for Our Fatherland” movement led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, which mobilized tens of thousands against border delimitation and portrayed territorial compromise as a betrayal of Armenian identity and faith. The protests coincided with increasingly belligerent rhetoric from senior church officials, with Shirak Archbishop Mikael Ajaphyan calling the Pashinyan administration “traitors” who “deserve to be shot” over the loss of Karabakh to Azerbaijan. By shifting the debate from constitutional legality to existential morality, the movement sought to delegitimize electoral mandates and policy trade-offs alike.

The government responded by framing this activism as unconstitutional political interference. In 2025, Armenian authorities arrested several Church-affiliated figures, including high-ranking clerics, including Galstanyan and Ajaphyan, on charges ranging from obstruction of voting procedures to participation in an attempted coup. Among those implicated were individuals linked to opposition networks with strong financial and political ties to Russia. The Church and its supporters characterized these actions as persecution and described the Church as being “under siege,” while the government argued that it was enforcing the constitutional separation of Church and state.

Russian Influence: Intelligence Continuities and Elite Patronage

The plausibility of Russian involvement in the Church’s political role is reinforced by the AAC’s historical entanglement with Soviet and post-Soviet security structures. During the Soviet period, a significant proportionof Armenian clergy serving abroad were recruited by the KGB, creating dense networks of obligation and influence. Armenian parliamentarians have stated publicly that many of these connections persisted after independence, shaping the institutional culture of the Church well into the post-Soviet era.

These legacies are most frequently discussed in connection with Catholicos Karekin II. Long-standing allegations — circulating even among dissident clergy — that his election in 1999 occurred under Russian pressure have never been conclusively resolved. His public rhetoric has reinforced perceptions of alignment: he has referred to Russia as the “second homeland” of Armenians, and he has received high-level Russian state honors, including an award from Russian President Vladimir Putin recognizing his contribution to Russo-Armenian relations.

Russian influence also operates through oligarchic channels closely linked to the Church. Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire named in the U.S. Treasury’s 2018 “Kremlin List” and sanctioned by Ukraine in 2019 over his ties to Moscow, has been identified in Armenian media and investigative reporting as a major donor to Church-linked initiatives and opposition causes. Karapetyan was arrested last year on accusations of an alleged coup planning involving Church allies. Although legal proceedings remain contested, the pattern mirrors established Kremlin practices in the post-Soviet space: combining religious legitimacy, oligarchic financing, and political mobilization to preserve influence where secular proxies have weakened.

Former President Robert Kocharyan, widely regarded as Moscow’s preferred interlocutor in Armenia, has openly called for Armenia’s next leader to be chosen from the Church and has previously advocated for the country’s “full-fledged integration” with Russia. When Pashinyan accused Kocharyan of orchestrating the protests, the statement was widely interpreted as an indirect attribution of responsibility to Moscow itself. This interpretation was reinforced by Pashinyan’s simultaneous threat to restrict Russian television channels accused of disseminating anti-government narratives.

Iran’s Strategy: Soft Power, Proxy Logic, and Corridor Politics

Iran’s engagement with the Armenian Church follows a more indirect but increasingly explicit logic. Publicly, Tehran emphasizes interfaith dialogue and presents the AAC as evidence of religious coexistence within Iran. Armenians are frequently highlighted in official discourse as a loyal and respected community, and the Church is cited as a bridge of friendship between Tehran and Yerevan.

Unofficially, Iranian strategic discourse treats the Church as a security-relevant social actor. This was articulated with unusual clarity by Ehsan Movahedian, a senior Iranian analyst on Caucasus affairs, who urged Iran to “synergize” with the Armenian Church to advance Iranian foreign policy objectives. Movahedian explicitly compared the Church to Husseiniyyun, the Iran-backed Shiite proxy group operating in Azerbaijan, describing the two as “two wings” of Iranian influence in the South Caucasus. While the Church is not a militant organization, the analogy reflects Tehran’s view of it as a mechanism for shaping narratives, mobilizing constituencies, and constraining state decision-making without direct intervention.

A similar line of thinking appears in analyses published by the Institute for Research of Eurasia and Asia (IRAS), an Iranian think tank closely aligned with conservative strategic circles. In commentary on recent developments, IRAS described Archbishop Galstanyan as the authentic representative of the Armenian nation and suggested — albeit obliquely — that the Armenian Church could play a role analogous to that of the Shiite clergy in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The implied parallel is unmistakable within the Iranian ideological lexicon: just as clerical leadership mobilized against the Shah, the Armenian Church might serve as a focal point of resistance to what Tehran and its aligned analysts frame as the unjust and externally influenced policies of the current Armenian government.

Iran’s interest is driven primarily by opposition to TRIPP. The corridor threatens to marginalize Iran’s transit role and weaken its leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have been open about their opposition to TRIPP, calling it a “red line.” Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader, went further, warning that TRIPP would become a "graveyard for the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” By amplifying Church narratives that frame the corridor and normalization as existential threats posed by a “Turkic axis,” Iran can indirectly foster domestic resistance to the constitutional and political changes required for the project’s implementation.

Pashinyan’s Strategic Shift: From Political Contestation to Spiritual Legitimacy

Initially, Pashinyan sought to counter the Church’s activism through political and constitutional arguments, emphasizing legal prohibitions on clerical involvement in partisan politics. This approach proved ineffective, as it allowed the Church to position itself as a moral authority persecuted by a secular state.

Beginning in late 2024 and intensifying in 2025, the government altered its strategy. Rather than contesting the Church’s political claims, Pashinyan and government-aligned actors began to challenge the spiritual legitimacy of Catholicos Karekin II directly. Central to this shift were public allegations that Karekin II had violated his celibacy vow and fathered a child — an accusation that, if accepted by believers, would fundamentally undermine his standing as a spiritual leader. These claims were accompanied by broader accusations of corruption, opaque financial practices, and collaboration with foreign intelligence services, supported by investigative reporting examining patterns of institutional penetration and group treason.

This escalation marked a deliberate attempt to move the conflict from the political arena — where the Church enjoys structural advantages — into the spiritual domain, where moral credibility is decisive. The risks are considerable: politicizing spiritual legitimacy threatens to polarize society and destabilize long-standing norms. Yet from the government’s perspective, the alternative is acquiescence to a parallel authority increasingly aligned with foreign strategic objectives.

Conclusion

The Armenian Apostolic Church’s transformation into an active political actor reflects the convergence of domestic elite resistance and external strategic interference. For Russia, the Church represents one of the last institutional footholds capable of constraining Armenia’s westward realignment after the erosion of secular proxies. For Iran, it offers a culturally legitimate means of sustaining volatility and obstructing connectivity projects that threaten Tehran’s regional position.

As Armenia approaches the June 2026 elections, the contest between the government and the Church will shape not only domestic political outcomes but the regional order itself. The central question is no longer simply whether Armenia will implement a corridor or amend its constitution, but whether democratic institutions or ecclesiastical structures — repurposed as instruments of foreign influence — will ultimately arbitrate sovereignty in the South Caucasus.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Intelligence.

The ongoing destabilization of Iran poses one of the most complex strategic dilemmas faced by Turkey in the twenty-first century. This assessment is far from self-evident, as it conflicts with the widespread perception of Ankara and Tehran as historical rivals. 

Turkey fears a resumption of Iran’s disruption and meddling in Syria. For its part, Iran fears Turkey’s growing influence in the Caucasus, which it views as detrimental to its strategic interests. Following the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, Iran accused Turkey and Israel of a joint anti-Iranian conspiracy. Other arenas of contest between Turkey and Iran also exist. 

However, regarding current events, a range of geopolitical calculations shapes Turkey’s stance on the anti-regime protests in Iran American threats to act against the regime. This paper posits that Ankara is gripped by a “Crisis of Calculation.” The Turkish political and security establishment views the potential collapse of the Islamic Republic not as an opportunity for regional advancement but as a prelude to ethno-sectarian fragmentation that could irreparably damage Turkey’s territorial integrity and demographic stability.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins ILTV to discuss protests and the ensuing crackdown in Iran. In the interview, Grinberg discusses Tehran's strategic calculation in the face of the protests and U.S. threats.

Watch the full interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Introduction

In January 2025, reports emerged that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had assured U.S. envoy Steven Witkoff that Tehran would not carry out 800 executions of protesters. According to multiple accounts, this assurance may have led President Donald Trump to halt a planned military strike against Iran. The episode raises a question with serious implications for both Iranian society and U.S. policy: Will the Islamic Republic follow through on mass executions, or will strategic considerations stay its hand?

The answer lies not in diplomatic assurances — which Tehran has broken before — but in understanding the regime's internal calculus when ideology collides with survival. For over four decades, the Islamic Republic has navigated between revolutionary principle and strategic necessity, sometimes sacrificing enormous national interests for ideological purity, and at other times shelving sacred commitments to preserve the system itself. The historical record reveals clear patterns about when each imperative prevails, offering insights into whether the current wave of protesters faces the gallows or a reprieve.

This paper examines the ideological and strategic factors that will determine the fate of Iran's detained protesters. It analyzes past episodes when the regime prioritized revolutionary doctrine over national interest, contrasts these with moments when survival imperatives forced ideological compromise, and applies these patterns to assess the likelihood of mass executions. The conclusion challenges conventional Western assumptions about both Iranian decision-making and the efficacy of external pressure.

The Doctrine of System Preservation

To understand Iran's approach to domestic dissent, one must first grasp the theological framework that governs the Islamic Republic. The regime operates on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurist, which transforms political survival into religious obligation. Protecting the Islamic government is not merely a matter of state security — it is a divine duty that supersedes conventional ethical constraints.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's founder, articulated this principle with stark clarity. In various speeches, he declared that preserving the Islamic system constitutes the highest religious obligation, particularly when facing internal or external threats. In a 1983 address to officials, Khomeini went further, stating that maintaining the Islamic Republic "takes precedence over the life of any single person, even Imam Mahdi" — the twelfth Shi'a Imam revered as the promised redeemer. The statement is theologically radical: it places the political system above the most sacred figure in Shi'a eschatology.

After 1979, the regime systematically subordinated Iran's traditional religious establishment to political control, monopolizing the interpretation of Shi'ism and defining what constitutes proper Islamic governance. No religious authority could challenge these definitions without risking persecution. This consolidation meant that threats to the regime could be framed as threats to Islam itself, requiring a religious response from all faithful Muslims in Iran.

The doctrine has been implemented with brutal consistency. In April 1979, security forces suppressed an uprising in Khuzestan province, killing more than a hundred Arab Iranians seeking autonomy. The Kurdish revolt, which began in March 1979 and lasted over four years, claimed 5,000 Kurdish fighters and resulted in 1,200 executions. But the most chilling application came in the summer of 1988, when Khomeini ordered the mass execution of political prisoners — including leftists, Kurdish activists, and Baha'is — even as the Iran-Iraq War was ending and the country desperately needed reconstruction. Between July and December of that year, between 2,800 and 5,000 people were executed without trial in Iranian prisons.

These principles remain operative today. Following the suppression of the 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests, then-President Ebrahim Raisi visited the Fatehin Special Unit — an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) formation responsible for crushing dissent — and reiterated that "preserving the Islamic system is the highest religious obligation."

The Legal Machinery of Religious Repression

The regime's willingness to execute protesters rests on two complementary concepts embedded in the Islamic Republic's criminal law: Mohareb and Baghi. These categories transform political dissent into capital offenses while cloaking state violence in religious legitimacy.

Mohareb, defined as "someone who wages war against God and society," and Baghi, defined as "a rebel who takes up arms against the legitimate government," provide the legal and Islamic framework for executing those who challenge the system. Crucially, Shi'a jurists aligned with Velayat-e Faqih perceive domestic protesters not as citizens with grievances but as existential threats to the Islamic order. The judiciary has consistently labeled mass protesters under these categories, transforming demands for reform into acts of war against God.

During the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the judicial system characterized protesters as engaged in "armed rebellion" against God and society. Following the 2026 protests, Asghar Jahangir, spokesperson for the judiciary, again invoked the Mohareb designation. For the regime, enforcing capital punishment in these cases is not discretionary — it is a religious obligation. Failure to act would constitute defiance of divine command, a grave sin in the regime's theological framework.

This creates a powerful internal logic: regime officials face religious pressure to execute those deemed threats to the system. Any hint of leniency risks being interpreted as weakness before God, potentially undermining an official's standing within the ideological hierarchy. The question, then, is whether strategic considerations can override this theological imperative.

When Ideology Trumps Strategy: Six Cases

The Islamic Republic's history reveals multiple instances when the regime chose ideological purity over obvious strategic advantage, often at devastating cost. These cases establish a pattern: when core ideological commitments or clerical authority are at stake, Tehran has repeatedly sacrificed national interests.

The Rushdie Fatwa: Permanent Diplomatic Damage for Clerical Authority

Perhaps no decision better illustrates this pattern than Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against novelist Salman Rushdie. The timing revealed its strategic irrationality. The Iran-Iraq War had just ended after eight years of devastating conflict. Iran's economy lay shattered, its cities damaged, its population exhausted. The regime desperately needed reconstruction aid and normalized trade relations with Europe.

The fatwa destroyed these prospects immediately. Britain severed diplomatic ties. European investment evaporated. Iran's image as a potentially normalizing state collapsed overnight. Yet the regime never formally rescinded the fatwa, despite repeated opportunities over subsequent decades to do so at minimal political cost.

The logic was ideological, not strategic. Revoking the fatwa would have implied clerical fallibility and undermined the foundational claim that the Supreme Leader's religious rulings carry divine authority. The regime chose long-term ideological credibility over short-term diplomatic and economic gain. Decades later, despite warming relations with Europe at various points, the fatwa remains in force — one of the clearest examples of ideology trumping strategy in modern statecraft.

Hostility Toward Israel: The Enemy That Justifies Everything

Iran's uncompromising stance toward Israel operates on similar logic. While Tehran has at times modulated its approach to the United States, engaging in backchannel negotiations and even cooperation, it has consistently refused to soften its position on Israel. The regime will not recognize the Israeli state, continues to deny Israel's legitimacy in official rhetoric, and maintains maximalist positions even when unnecessary for deterrence.

At multiple junctures — particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s — reducing rhetorical hostility toward Israel could have eased international pressure at minimal internal cost. The regime chose otherwise. Anti-Zionism is foundational to Iran's revolutionary narrative, and Israel functions as the symbolic enemy that legitimizes militarization, regional proxy networks, and domestic repression. Retreat on this front would risk unraveling the regime's ideological coherence, a cost Tehran has refused to pay.

The Hostage Crisis: Revolutionary Consolidation Through Catastrophe

The 1979-1981 seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its 52 hostages followed similar logic. The crisis paralyzed Iran's economy, undermined moderate factions, triggered sanctions, and established a framework of U.S.-Iranian hostility that persists today. Strategically, it was catastrophic. Yet the leadership allowed it to continue for 444 days, even after the costs became undeniable.

The hostage crisis served ideological purposes: it consolidated revolutionary power, destroyed liberal and nationalist rivals within Iran's fractured post-revolutionary elite, and established the regime's anti-imperialist credentials. Ideological mobilization mattered more than international standing or economic welfare. The pattern would repeat: ideology as a tool of internal consolidation, deployed even at enormous external cost.

Exporting the Revolution: Inviting Invasion

In its early years, Iran openly called for overthrowing neighboring regimes, supported subversive movements throughout the Gulf, and rejected basic norms of state sovereignty. These actions directly endangered Iran's security and helped trigger Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion, which would claim hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives over eight years.

The regime persisted because it was still defining itself, and leaders believed revolutionary expansion was necessary for survival. Retreat would have signaled weakness at this formative moment. Only when survival itself became threatened did expansion give way to defensive consolidation. During the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini doubled down on revolutionary export, claiming the “road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala.”

The 1988 Prison Massacres: Purification During Vulnerability

Even as Iran was ending the catastrophic war with Iraq and desperately needed reconstruction, the regime carried out mass executions of political prisoners in 1988. Strategically, this was unnecessary and damaging, inviting international condemnation at precisely the moment Iran needed to rehabilitate its image.

But the leadership feared ideological contamination more than external pressure. Internal enemies were perceived as existential threats regardless of cost. The regime prioritized ideological purification during a moment of maximum vulnerability — a decision that presaged its approach to future domestic unrest.

Mandatory Hijab: The Symbol That Cannot Bend

Despite repeated waves of unrest — including the massive 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests triggered by Mahsa Amini's death — the regime has refused to abolish mandatory hijab laws. The strategic costs are clear: continuous protests, alienation of youth, loss of legitimacy among educated urbanites, and international condemnation.

Yet ideology prevails. The hijab represents clerical authority over public life. Backing down would signal that mass protest can rewrite Islamic law, establishing a precedent the regime fears more than ongoing unrest. As with the Rushdie fatwa, retreat would imply clerical fallibility — an admission the system cannot afford.

When Survival Trumps Ideology: Seven Cases

The Islamic Republic's willingness to compromise ideology is less well understood but equally consistent. When the regime has faced genuine existential threats, it has demonstrated remarkable flexibility, shelving core revolutionary principles to preserve the system. These cases establish the conditions under which ideological compromise becomes possible.

The "Poisoned Chalice": Khomeini's Strategic Retreat

In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini accepted UN Resolution 598, ending the Iran-Iraq War on terms he had spent years rejecting. He had insisted the war must continue until Saddam Hussein was overthrown, framing it as a sacred struggle. By 1988, however, Iran faced military exhaustion, economic collapse, U.S. naval intervention in the Gulf, and real risk of elite fracture and popular uprising.

Khomeini described accepting the ceasefire as "drinking a poison chalice" — an unusually candid admission of ideological defeat. The statement established a template: preserve the Islamic Republic even if revolutionary ideals must be shelved. The survival of the system superseded the maximalist goals that had justified eight years of war.

Post-Khomeini Pragmatism: Abandoning Revolutionary Economics

After Khomeini's death in 1989, the regime faced economic ruin and a legitimacy crisis. President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani abandoned radical economic policies including aggressive nationalization and war economy measures, prioritizing reconstruction, foreign investment, and oil revenue. Iran quietly sought better relations with Europe and regional states.

This wasn't ideological liberalization — it was technocratic survivalism. The revolution's form was preserved, but much of its early economic content was softened or discarded. The flexibility demonstrated that revolutionary doctrine could be reinterpreted when the alternative was systemic collapse.

Scaling Back Revolutionary Export: Going Underground

After incidents like the 1992 Mykonos restaurant assassinations in Berlin nearly collapsed Iran's ties with Europe, the regime recalibrated its approach to exporting the revolution. Tehran scaled back overt assassinations abroad, reduced rhetorical calls for overthrowing regional governments, and rebranded its foreign policy language while maintaining proxy networks through less visible means.

The ideology didn't disappear — it went underground and became more deniable. The regime demonstrated it could modulate revolutionary zeal when faced with severe international isolation and intelligence warfare that threatened its security.

The Taliban's Enemy: Post-9/11 Cooperation

Perhaps most striking was Iran's quiet cooperation with the United States after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Despite "Death to America" being a foundational revolutionary slogan, Iran shared intelligence against the Taliban, helped shape the post-Taliban Afghan government, and facilitated U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

This cooperation occurred because Iran feared becoming the next target after Afghanistan, especially with U.S. forces building up on its borders. The Taliban were Sunni extremists hostile to Shi'a Iran, making cooperation strategically logical, but it required temporarily deprioritizing ideological hostility to America — a significant compromise.

The "Grand Bargain" That Wasn't: 2003 Panic

In 2003, as U.S. forces swept through Iraq, Iran reportedly offered comprehensive negotiations covering nuclear transparency, implicit recognition of Israel, and limits on support for militant groups. Whether this offer was fully authorized at the highest levels remains disputed, but its existence reflects genuine elite panic.

The regime was willing to discuss previously untouchable ideological red lines when it believed its survival was directly threatened by U.S. military force. The episode reveals how regime-change fears can override even core revolutionary commitments.

"Heroic Flexibility": The 2015 Nuclear Deal

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) required Iran to accept severe limits on enrichment, intrusive inspections, and rhetorical softening toward diplomacy — all contradicting the regime's narrative of nuclear "resistance" and defiance of Western pressure. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei justified the compromise as "heroic flexibility," a revealing phrase that signals doctrine: ideology is flexible when the system faces existential risk.

The regime calculated that economic strangulation posed a greater threat than ideological concession. The JCPOA demonstrated that even core strategic programs could be constrained when the alternative was internal unrest driven by economic collapse.

Brutal Repression: Sacrificing Islamic Legitimacy

Paradoxically, the regime's repeated brutal suppression of mass protests — in 1999, 2009, 2017-18, 2019, 2022, and 2026 — represents another form of ideological compromise. By killing large numbers of protesters, lying transparently about casualties, and sidelining religious rhetoric in favor of raw coercion, the regime undercuts its own ideological self-image as a just Islamic state.

Yet survival trumps legitimacy. When faced with serious unrest, Tehran has consistently chosen violent repression over accommodation, accepting the damage to its Islamic credentials in exchange for maintaining control. This pattern suggests the regime views immediate survival as more important than long-term ideological consistency.

The Protester's Calculus: Four Determining Factors

Whether Iran executes hundreds of detained protesters depends on how the regime weighs four competing pressures. Each has historical precedent, and their interaction will determine the outcome.

Factor 1: Threat Perception—Existential or Manageable?

The regime's response will depend critically on whether it perceives the recent protests as an existential threat or a manageable challenge. The historical record suggests a clear pattern: when the system itself appears threatened, the regime responds with maximum force regardless of cost.

The 1988 prison massacres occurred precisely because the regime, exhausted from war, feared that surviving political prisoners represented an ideological contagion that could unravel revolutionary authority. The 2019 protests, which saw several hundred killed, were suppressed with exceptional brutality because they spread to working-class areas and included attacks on banks and government buildings — suggesting deeper social rage beyond middle-class reformism.

If regime elites conclude that current protesters represent a broader revolutionary movement rather than contained unrest, the ideological imperative to eliminate "enemies of God" will intensify. Conversely, if they assess the threat as manageable through imprisonment and selective punishment, mass executions become less likely.

Factor 2: International Pressure—Credible or Performative?

The reported Trump administration threat to strike Iran if executions proceed represents an unusual form of external pressure. Historically, Western criticism has rarely deterred Iranian repression, but credible military threats have occasionally altered regime calculations.

The key word is "credible." Tehran has extensive experience managing international condemnation and has shown willingness to accept severe diplomatic costs for ideological goals, as the Rushdie fatwa demonstrates. However, when faced with immediate, concrete threats to regime survival — as in 1988 with the ceasefire, or 2015 with the JCPOA — the regime has proven capable of tactical flexibility.

The challenge for external actors is that threats must be both credible and proportionate. If Tehran believes that refraining from executions will not fundamentally alter its relationship with the United States or spare it from regime-change pressure, the incentive to show restraint diminishes. The regime may calculate that it will face American hostility regardless, making the domestic imperative to execute "enemies of God" more salient than foreign policy considerations.

Factor 3: Internal Elite Cohesion—United or Fractured?

The regime's approach to political violence has historically depended on elite consensus. The 1988 prison massacres required coordination between the judiciary, the IRGC, and clerical authorities. The 2019 crackdown succeeded because hardliners dominated all key institutions.

If elements within the regime question the wisdom of mass executions — whether for pragmatic reasons or concern about long-term legitimacy — implementation becomes more difficult. However, there is little evidence of such dissent currently. President Ebrahim Raisi, who himself is linked to the 1988 executions, represented the ascendancy of hardliners committed to uncompromising repression. His death in 2024 and the selection of Masoud Pezeshkian as president potentially introduces uncertainty, though Pezeshkian operates within severe constraints imposed by hardline institutions.

More important is the IRGC's assessment. If the Guards leadership views executions as necessary for deterrence and system preservation, they will likely proceed regardless of diplomatic costs. The IRGC's increasing dominance over Iranian politics since 2009 means that revolutionary ideology, rather than pragmatic statecraft, increasingly drives decision-making on internal security matters.

Factor 4: Precedent and Deterrence—The Moral Hazard of Restraint

From the regime's perspective, showing mercy creates a dangerous precedent. If protesters believe they can challenge the system without facing capital punishment, the cost of dissent decreases and future unrest becomes more likely. This logic has driven previous waves of executions: the regime seeks to establish that certain forms of opposition carry an absolute, non-negotiable penalty.

The theological framework of Mohareb and Baghi reinforces this calculus. If the regime designates protesters as enemies of God, failing to execute them amounts to defying divine command. This creates internal pressure within the judiciary and security apparatus to follow through on death sentences, independent of external considerations.

However, the regime must also weigh whether mass executions will trigger even larger protests or potentially fracture its own support base. The Woman, Life, Freedom movement demonstrated that excessive repression can generate sustained domestic and international backlash. If executions risk catalyzing a broader revolutionary movement, they become counterproductive even from a pure survival perspective.

The Verdict: Between Ideology and Survival

The historical evidence points toward a grim conclusion: the Islamic Republic is more likely to execute significant numbers of protesters than to show systematic clemency, but the scale will depend on its threat assessment and the credibility of international consequences.

Three factors support the likelihood of executions:

First, theological imperative. The regime has consistently demonstrated that when core ideological principles — particularly clerical authority and the inviolability of the Islamic system — are at stake, it prioritizes ideology over strategic cost. The Rushdie fatwa, mandatory hijab enforcement, and the 1988 massacres all demonstrate this pattern. Designated as Mohareb, protesters represent not political opponents but enemies of God. The religious obligation to punish them creates powerful internal momentum toward execution.

Second, precedent and deterrence. The regime fears that restraint will encourage future unrest. Every major protest wave since 2009 has been met with escalating violence precisely because the regime concluded that insufficient repression in one cycle emboldened protesters in the next. From this perspective, executions serve a functional purpose beyond punishment: they raise the cost of dissent to prohibitive levels.

Third, hardline dominance. The current configuration of Iranian politics favors uncompromising repression. The IRGC, hardline judiciary, and conservative clerical establishment control all key institutions and have shown no indication of questioning the necessity of severe punishment for protesters. The ideological infrastructure that enabled the 1988 massacres remains firmly in place.

However, three factors could limit the scale of executions:

First, regime survival calculus. If mass executions threaten to trigger a broader revolutionary movement or risk catalyzing international military action that endangers the regime itself, Tehran has demonstrated capacity for tactical restraint. The 1988 ceasefire, post-Khomeini economic reforms, and 2015 nuclear deal all show that when survival is genuinely threatened, ideology can be shelved.

Second, international leverage. While Western diplomatic criticism alone has rarely deterred Iranian repression, concrete and credible threats — particularly military action — have occasionally altered regime behavior. The reported Trump administration warning, if backed by clear and proportional consequences, could influence Tehran's calculus. However, this influence is likely to result in reduced numbers rather than wholesale clemency.

Third, tactical flexibility. The regime may opt for a mixed approach: executing a significant but not catastrophic number to establish deterrence while showing selective mercy to manage international pressure and avoid the appearance of mass slaughter. This would allow Tehran to satisfy its ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" while maintaining plausible deniability about systematic repression.

Policy Implications: The Limits of Engagement

For policymakers in Washington and European capitals, the analysis yields sobering conclusions about leverage and limits. Four implications merit emphasis:

Diplomatic assurances should be treated with extreme skepticism. Foreign Minister Araghchi's reported promise to forgo 800 executions should be understood as tactical rather than binding. The regime has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to mislead international interlocutors when core ideological commitments are at stake. Any claims that executions have been "abrogated" likely represent strategic attempts to manage international pressure rather than genuine policy shifts.

External pressure works only when survival is threatened. The regime has proven willing to endure enormous costs — economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, international condemnation — for ideological goals. Pressure becomes effective only when it credibly threatens the system's existence, as during the 1988 war exhaustion or 2015 economic crisis. Short of such threats, Tehran can absorb external criticism while proceeding with domestic repression.

Ideology and survival are not mutually exclusive. Western analysis often treats these as distinct categories, but the regime views them as integrated. From Tehran's perspective, failing to execute designated enemies of God threatens the ideological foundations that legitimate the system, making such executions a form of survival strategy. Convincing the regime otherwise requires demonstrating that repression endangers the system more than restraint does.

Long-term engagement requires acknowledging immovable positions. Certain ideological commitments — clerical authority, the nature of Islamic governance, and the right to eliminate perceived existential threats — have proven non-negotiable across four decades. Effective policy must work around rather than through these obstacles, focusing leverage on areas where the regime has demonstrated flexibility rather than core theological principles.

Conclusion: The Probability of Tragedy

Will Iran execute the protesters? The weight of historical evidence suggests yes, though likely in calibrated rather than wholesale fashion. The regime will almost certainly proceed with significant numbers of executions, framing them as religious obligations under Mohareb and Baghi designations, while attempting to manage international blowback through strategic ambiguity about precise numbers and limited clemency in high-profile cases.

The theological framework of Velayat-e Faqih, the historical pattern of prioritizing ideology over strategy when clerical authority is at stake, and the current dominance of hardline institutions all point toward repression. Foreign Minister Araghchi's assurances to American envoys should be understood as tactical rather than definitive — a pattern consistent with the regime's historical approach to managing international pressure while pursuing domestic imperatives.

Yet the regime retains capacity for strategic calculation. If executions genuinely risk triggering a broader revolutionary movement or invite military action that threatens system survival, Tehran has demonstrated it can modulate its approach. The question is not whether the regime will show mercy — it will not, in any systematic sense — but rather how many must die before the ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" is satisfied.

For the protesters awaiting judgment in Iranian prisons, this analysis offers little comfort. They have become pawns in a larger contest between revolutionary ideology and strategic survival, their individual fates determined by calculations that treat human life as instrumental to regime preservation. The Islamic Republic's 45-year history suggests that when this contest plays out, survival wins only when genuinely threatened — and ideology extracts a terrible price along the way.

The international community's ability to alter this trajectory remains limited. Without credible threats to regime survival or genuine willingness to fundamentally alter Iran's strategic environment, external pressure will likely affect the scale but not the fact of repression. The protesters' best hope lies not in diplomatic assurances or Western criticism, but in the regime's own cold calculus: that mass executions might trigger the very revolutionary crisis they are meant to prevent.

That is a thin reed on which to rest the lives of hundreds, but it is the only one history provides.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Intelligence.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins CNN-News 18 to discuss the key flaws in the proposal and explains why India and Israel are exercising caution instead of embracing it outright.

Watch the interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The massacre of October 7th, returned Israeli society to a face-to-face confrontation with Jewish history. The sadistic mass murder, which took place against the backdrop of internal division within Israeli society, made the concept of a covenant of fate more present than ever. The conduct of the Hamas murderers and the absolute absence of any manifestations of humanity among the Gazans illustrated, with their full horrifying force, the validity of the biblical description of Amalek. Without delving into the depths of halakhic or theological debates, one can agree that Amalek serves as a distinction between an ordinary geopolitical rival and a different kind of enemy—one that attacks the Jews in order to annihilate them.

After the dreadful nadir of the day of the massacre, the Jewish people rose like a lion, struck powerful blows on seven fronts, and neutralized—though did not destroy—its two principal enemies: Hamas and the Iranian regime. The victory is indeed partial, but it is unquestionably a victory, even if the road ahead remains long. It seems there is broad agreement that it is impossible to return to the state of affairs that prevailed among us before the massacre; however, the destination of the movement is unclear. Today it appears more strongly than ever that a covenant of fate and a covenant of destiny are intertwined.

Yet one cannot advance toward a destination without a map and a compass. Thus it is no coincidence that the memorization of a navigation route in the army is called a “route story.” Failure to understand the enemy is one of the principal reasons for the terrible collapse that befell the State of Israel, and this is the first matter that requires immediate correction. However, statements such as “one must not underestimate the enemy” or calls for “assuming responsibility” and “soul-searching” often suffer from vagueness and an excess of emotional charge. Moreover, it is clear that the military and intelligence community in any society are influenced by that same society—by its values and by the spirit of the times (Zeitgeist). It would be naïve and absurd to assume that intelligence assessments are unaffected by what prevails within that society.

Read the full article on Kohelet (Hebrew).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

As the unrest subsides in Iran, all eyes are on US president Donald Trump and his next moves. While Trump has said that he's weighing "very strong" options, it's not clear if he will deploy the US military to weaken or topple the regime. Which way will Trump go? Iran expert Alex Grinberg answers in conversation with Firstpost's Prathik S Vinod.
Watch the full interview on First Post.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Executive Summary

Iran’s replacement of its ambassador to Armenia in late 2025 marks a significant recalibration of Tehran’s regional strategy. The shift from Mehdi Sobhani, who is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force to Khalil Shirgholami, a career diplomat from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflects Tehran’s response to fundamental changes in the South Caucasus geopolitical landscape. The move signals Iran’s acknowledgment that its traditional approach to Armenia — leveraging security relationships and permissive transit arrangements — has become untenable in the face of Armenia’s westward orientation and growing U.S. engagement in the region.

The Strategic Context: A Changing Regional Order

The South Caucasus witnessed dramatic developments in 2025 that reshaped the strategic calculus for all regional actors. Three have been particularly consequential for Iranian interests:

First, the August 2025 U.S.-mediated normalization agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan fundamentally altered the regional balance. This accord, which addresses long-standing territorial disputes and opens pathways for economic integration, represents a significant diplomatic achievement that reduces traditional points of leverage for external powers seeking to exploit regional tensions.

Second, the announcement of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), also known as the Zangezur Corridor, which links Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia’s Syunik province, introduces a Western-supervised connectivity framework . TRIPP transcends conventional infrastructure development; it represents a comprehensive connectivity initiative with substantial U.S. commercial, political, and security oversight. For Tehran, this development effectively places Yerevan’s strategic transit corridors, and potentially its border with Armenia, under American scrutiny.

Third, Armenia’s broader pivot toward Western institutions has accelerated under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government. Yerevan has signaled interest in closer cooperation with NATO structures, expanded engagement with the European Union, and diversified security partnerships beyond its traditional reliance on Russia. These shifts reflect Armenia’s strategic reassessment following the 2020 and 2023 conflicts with Azerbaijan, during which Russian security guarantees proved insufficient.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Alex Grinberg joins the Russian service of Kaan Radio's "Good Morning, Israel Broadcast." In the interview, he discusses how the conception that chaos would follow the fall of the Iranian regime is a narrative spread by the Islamic Republic targeted at the West. In the interview, Grinberg also discusses:

• The end of the proxy era: after direct strikes between Israel and Iran, whether there are any remaining “rules of the game,” and if a major war is inevitable;

• The great uncertainty: who will succeed the aging Khamenei, and will the transfer of power turn into an elite civil war;

• The Iranian street: how “Generation Z” lives, why young people are abandoning religion en masse, and what the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement has become today.

Watch the full interview here (Russian).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

When Kazakhstan announced on November 6, during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Washington, that it would join the Abraham Accords, the decision raised a more interesting question than the move itself: why did Astana take this step before Azerbaijan—despite Azerbaijan’s far deeper and longer-standing strategic ties with Israel?

For years, Azerbaijan had been widely viewed as the natural candidate to lead Central Asia and the Turkic world into the Accords framework. Its close cooperation with Israel in energy, defense, and intelligence, combined with shared concerns about Iran, made Baku the obvious frontrunner. Yet when the moment arrived, it was Kazakhstan—not Azerbaijan—that moved first.

The explanation lies less in bilateral relations with Israel than in how the Abraham Accords are currently being deployed.

Reactivating and expanding the Abraham Accords has become a priority of the Trump administration. While the Accords formalize normalization between Israel and Muslim states that were never at war with it—and therefore differ fundamentally from classic peace treaties—their current strategic significance extends well beyond Israel. They function as a framework for advancing American influence in regions contested by Iran, China, and Russia. From this perspective, Kazakhstan’s decision was driven not by the state of its relations with Israel, which have long been stable, but by Astana’s broader geopolitical weight and signaling value.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan visited Israel on November 27, 2025, engaging in a series of meetings with senior Israeli officials. Such visits are rare, as relations between the two countries have long remained mostly neutral. The current meeting can be considered historic as it indicates a significant development in the relationship between Israel and Armenia. While closer ties between Jerusalem and Yerevan are welcome, significant obstacles still need to be addressed.

Armenia has always been wary of Israel’s support for Azerbaijan, with which it maintains a strategic partnership encompassing areas ranging from economics to security. However, Israel’s ties with Azerbaijan were established immediately after Azerbaijan gained independence, and the strategic partnership with Baku was never intended to target Armenia. Additionally, Armenia remains aligned with Iran, a regime that is deeply hostile to Israel’s existence.

Israel has also voiced concern over rising antisemitism in Armenia. In recent years, there have been several acts of vandalism targeting Jewish sites, including four attacks on a synagogue in the capital, Yerevan. Antisemitic content on Armenian social media has also increased, particularly in response to Israeli arms deliveries to Azerbaijan. The Armenian lobby in the United States has attempted to pressure Congress to restrict American military aid to Israel unless Jerusalem ceases its provision of weapons to Baku.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins Yaakov Lappin on the JISS Podcast, where he examines Iran’s covert influence operations in Europe and the true status of its nuclear and missile programs. Grinberg exposes a Soviet-style Iranian campaign in France, highlighting Tehran’s recruitment of agents of influence in academia, science, and government, its promotion of strategic narratives, and the use of criminal networks to target Jewish and Israeli communities. He also discusses the overlooked Iranian-Algerian cooperation in France and the organized campaign against French Jewish authors, revealing the sophisticated scope of Iran’s destabilization efforts.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In October 2025, two French nationals detained in Iran were finally allowed to return home, reportedly in exchange for France’s release of an Iranian agent held on its soil. This high-profile swap highlighted the covert tug-of-war between Tehran and Paris. This struggle extends far beyond hostage diplomacy and involves secret networks of influence, espionage, and ideological infiltration. A new independent report presented to French authorities in late 2025 reveals how the Islamic Republic of Iran has been systematically working to infiltrate and destabilize France from within.

Compiled by the France 2050 think tank, led by Gilles Platret, the mayor of Chalon-sur-Saône, the 86-page study describes what one contributor calls an Iranian “mécanique du chaos”—a mechanics of chaos—orchestrated through espionage, influence peddling, and even criminal proxies. The report states that Tehran’s goals are strategic: to pressure France over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, to influence French policy toward Israel, and to “bring chaos, without waging war, into the heart of our democracies.” This article reviews the main findings of that report and other expert insights into Iran’s covert activities in France—from spy rings and academic indoctrination to unlikely alliances that combine radical Islamism with the far-left under the banner of Palestine.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“Iran’s nuclear program has been destroyed to the level that it has zero functionality,” Maj. (ret.) Alex Grinberg, a former Israeli military intelligence officer and an expert on Iran at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, told The Media Line. “Resumption of the program requires immense resources that Iran does not have at the moment.”

Iran is in the midst of a deepening socioeconomic and energy crisis. Its economy has exhibited virtually no growth. Despite vast oil and gas reserves, decades of infrastructure neglect, underinvestment, mismanagement, and the diversion of funds to terrorist organizations around the world have caused energy production and distribution systems to break down. International sanctions against the Islamic Republic have only exacerbated the situation. Frequent blackouts and water shortages have affected not only industry but also the general public.

Read the whole interview on The Media Line.
Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) Iran expert Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg told JNS that Saudi escalation signals a willingness to challenge the Iranian-Houthi axis more directly: “According to these reports, the Saudis are intending a large-scale operation against the Houthis. If they do that, it will be a clear indication that they don’t care about their agreement with Iran,” he said.

Grinberg argued that the regional landscape has shifted sharply since the Trump presidency and Israel’s dismantling of Iranian proxies.

“Everyone understands that Iran is weak because it has lost all its pieces on the chessboard. It doesn’t have an axis of resistance anymore, and it lost its deterrence,” he added.

Read the full article on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

However, Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, a former officer in the IDF Military Intelligence research department and an Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, said that the reports of dual-use chemical shipments were misleading and overinterpreted the significance of the influx.

“The shipment of the dual-use materials is a hint that they are rebuilding, but there is a lack of precise information, and Iranian agents have an interest in making it seem like the significance of this sort of shipment is greater than it is in reality,” Grinberg told JNS. “There is a long way from these chemicals to full ballistic missiles; it doesn’t mean in any way that war is imminent.”

Satellite imagery shows that Iran has moved quickly to reconstruct key solid-propellant facilities destroyed in Israeli strikes. Several production halls are being rebuilt, including structures that previously housed the mixers used to convert chemical inputs into solid rocket fuel. Those mixers were among Israel’s primary targets during the 12-day “Rising Lion” operation in June, because they are essential for manufacturing high-energy propellant used in medium- and long-range missiles, including systems that could carry nuclear warheads.

However, Grinberg challenged this assessment, saying that it is wrong to put too much weight on the satellite images. “There are some photographs from missile and nuclear sites showing that there is activity, but that doesn’t definitively prove anything about the pace of missile production,” he said. “It’s not surprising to see that there is some rebuilding going on after a site is blown up, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the capacity is rebuilt.”

Read the full interview on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On October 14, 2025, the Iranian judiciary sentenced two French citizens imprisoned in the country to lengthy prison terms. Cécile Kohler, a teacher, and her partner, Jacques Paris, were detained in May 2022 and initially accused of attempting to incite protests. An Iranian court has issued a preliminary ruling sentencing both French nationals to long prison terms on charges of espionage and collaboration with foreign intelligence agencies.

The judiciary-affiliated news website Mizan Online either omitted or distorted important details in its October 14 report. According to the report, the two individuals, whose names were not officially disclosed, were arrested in March 2023 and have since been convicted of multiple charges, including spying for the French intelligence agency, conspiracy against national security, and intelligence cooperation with Israel. The defendants were identified as “employees of the French intelligence service” and detained on March 9, 2023.

The report stated that the indictment was 715 pages long and resulted in seven court sessions, during which the defendants and their appointed lawyers presented their defense. Iranian officials claimed that the defendants had access to legal representation throughout the investigation and trial and were allowed to contact their families. All proceedings were conducted with a judiciary-appointed translator present, according to the report.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The detention and release of the French couple, Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, reveal only the tip of the iceberg regarding the Iranian intelligence war with France and other Western democracies. Tehran employs hostage detention tactics to bargain for the release of its arrested agents in Europe. These “intelligence activities” are directly linked to terrorism, as the Iranian regime has consistently attempted to assassinate Iranian dissidents abroad and target Jewish and Israeli civilians worldwide.

In October 2025, French investigative journalists Emmanuel Razavi and Jean-Marie Montali published a book in which they describe the history and current state of Iranian influence in France. The Iranian infiltration in France is a complex network that blends ideological influence with covert operations carried out by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Maj. (res.) Alex Grinberg joined ILTV to discuss the current state of Iran-backed militias. In the interview, Grinberg discussed the threat posed to Israel by both Iran and its proxies as well as relations and the potential of future confrontations. The interview also touched on the situation inside Iran and why Iranians are not rising up against the regime.

Watch the full interview on ILTV.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The Iranian regime suffered another major setback when the E3 (Britain, France, and Germany) announced on September 28 that sanctions had been reinstated on Iran. The “snapback” reinstates all sanctions imposed before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)nuclear accords in 2015. The E3’s action is a blow to Iran’s diplomacy: Iranian negotiators, led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, had worked hard to prevent the reactivation of the snapback mechanism, however, their efforts were doomed to failure as they sought to accomplish that goal without offering any concessions. 

The move dealt a severe blow to Iran’s economy, leading to market turmoil and raising fears of higher inflation and tighter restrictions on oil exports. The sanctions came after months of economic instability, exacerbated by the twelve-day war with Israel, which deepened the negative trends already afflicting Iran’s economy. 

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The recently announced ceasefire between Israel and Hamas has reshaped the dynamics of the Middle East conflict. Under the deal, Hamas has agreed to release all living hostages in a single exchange – an unprecedented move. The agreement comes amid shifting geopolitical calculations involving the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

To better understand the implications of the ceasefire, Israel’s priorities, and potential regional shifts, News.Az analytical portal spoke with Alexander Grinberg, who analysed the deal, the actors involved, the prospects for future talks, and the possible consequences of violations.

Mr Grinberg is a major (reserve) in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Military Intelligence Research Department. He holds degrees in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, and Arabic Language and Literature from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is a doctoral student in Iranian history at Tel Aviv University.

Read the full interview on News.az.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In early November, Baku will host the General Assembly of the Conference of European Rabbis. The event will focus on the Abraham Accords, religious freedom, and the fight against antisemitism in Europe — topics that align well with Azerbaijan’s effort to present itself as a model of peaceful coexistence among different ethnic and religious groups. Unsurprisingly, Tehran could not let such symbolism go unchallenged. Recently, Iran’s leading media outlets have launched a wave of biased and provocative coverage against Azerbaijan, blending genuine geopolitical concerns with outright antisemitism. 

The most significant statement regarding the rabbis’ conference came from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s top advisor, the seasoned diplomat, Ali Akbar Velayati. He dubbed the gathering “surprising and regrettable” and accused Azerbaijan of “crossing religious boundaries” and “encroaching on the dignity of Shiism.” Velayati further linked the event to what he characterized as Azerbaijan’s broader alignment with the Abraham Accords and the pro-normalization trend among some Muslim-majority states in Central Asia. He characterized the initiative as a “senseless, anti-Islamic, and anti-humanitarian” step that, he warned, would ultimately backfire against Baku.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Iranian media announced on August 3 the creation of a new security body called the “Defense Council”. The new entity will operate under the auspices of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which centralizes strategic military decision-making.

The announcement followed reports by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News of a significant structural overhaul within Iran’s security establishment.  According to these reports, the overhaul would include the establishment of the Defense Council as part of a new governance arrangement in the realm of defense and security. Fars suggested that the Defense Council would focus on “strategic missions of defense policy” without specifying exactly what that means.

The reshuffle occurred just a couple of days after August 1 when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s top adviser, Ali Larijani, was appointed as the new secretary of the SNSC. The changes are a clear indication of Larijani’s growing power. By contrast, the Defense Council is formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, the Council’s secretary has yet to be named. One should bear in mind that the president also chairs the SNSC, making the division of responsibilities even less clear.

The creation of the new security body underscores the limits of the Islamic Republic’s ability to reflect on itself and carry out genuine reforms to address its vulnerabilities. This is mainly because those vulnerabilities stem largely from the strength of informal networks within Iranian politics. It is equally important to understand that the regime’s main goal is not to fix military weaknesses or learn lessons but to preserve its survival by maintaining Khamenei’s rule. 

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

American diplomacy scored a historical achievement on August 8, when President Donald Trump hosted a meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington. The two leaders signed a peace pledge in the presence of the U.S. president ending the thirty-year-old conflict between the two Caucasian nations.

Despite its significance, the event barely registered in international and attracted little commentary form major media outlets. Yet the agreement warrants in-depth analysis because of its far-reaching implications beyond the South Caucasus.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister said that his country would not stop its nuclear program despite the damage inflicted on it by the Israeli American strikes. Is Iran still threatening Israel? Research Fellow Alex Grinberg weighs in.

Listen to the interview at Radio Judaica.

After the ceasefire that ended Israel’s 12-day war against Iran, Iranian officials were stunned by the sophistication of the Mossad’s operation and alarmed by the revelation of where the security breach had occurred.

Despite mounting evidence of a high-level intelligence breach, some Iranian officials deflected blame by targeting a French journalist named Catherine Shakdam. In an interview with state media, Mostafa Kavakebian, a former member of the Iranian parliament, said “the breach came from Catherine Shakdam, an Israeli spy, who shared her bed with 120 officials in the country.” Javad Zarif, a former foreign minister, added: “We need to understand how Catherine Shakdam infiltrated the country.”

For the record, Shakdam, a Jew who converted to Islam, traveled to Iran in 2017 for less than a month. She interviewed candidate Ebrahim Raisi, wrote several articles for the supreme leader’s website, took photos with the daughters of two military men assassinated by Israel -- Emad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s chief of staff and Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force -- and participated in a conference about Palestine. She now identifies as a Zionist and a Jew.

Aside from Kavakebian’s allegations of Shakdam’s espionage activities, a range of speculation went farther and stranger on who was responsible for helping the Israelis. Abullah Ganji, an Iranian conservative activist, posted on X, “After the recent war, a few sheets of paper were found on the streets of Tehran containing talismans with Jewish symbols." Meanwhile, a senior Iranian official accused Jerusalem of using "the occult and supernatural spirits" during its military operation.

Indeed, Iran security intelligence -- including Vezarat–e–Ettelaat (the Ministry of Intelligence) and Ettelaat–e –Sepah, (the Intelligence Department of the IRGC) -- was caught off guard and suffered extensive, system-wide damage. At least 30 IRGC senior commanders were killed during the Israeli strikes, three core nuclear sites were destroyed, along with major IRGC infrastructure, and what remained of Iran's air defense systems after Israeli strikes in October of last year. To date -- Operation Rising Lion is the largest failure experienced by Tehran's intelligence apparatus since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

As the Iranian security apparatus grappled with the embarrassment and internal breach, one question continued to resonate, among the public. Who is aiding Israeli intelligence from within Iran?

While some blame the occult and Shakdam, the security forces have largely scapegoated four groups: Kurds, Baluch, Azerbaijanis, and Afghan refugees. 

The Kurdish Connection

Historically, the Iranian regime has perceived its Kurdish citizens as separatists aligned with Israel’s strategic interests, particularly the push for Kurdish independence -- a movement Tehran fears could destabilize its western borders. Iranian authorities suspect that the Mossad maintains covert cells within Kurdistan, capable of facilitating intelligence operations inside Iran.

Immediately following Operation Rising Lion, Kurdish forces intercepted a drone launched at the Erbil airport by an Iranian proxy. On July 15 and 16, drone attacks targeted Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oilfields, with suspicions falling on pro-Iranian militias.

Hengaw, a Norwegian-based Kurdish human rights organization, says Iranian security forces have already arrested more than 140 Kurds for aiding Israel during the 12-day war. These arrests have likely increased since.

Targeting Iraqi Kurdistan is just as much about Iran's Kurdish minority population as Erbil's relations with Washington. The regime remains deeply uneasy about the U.S. presence in northern Iraq, viewing it as a potential threat to its national security and regional influence. The U.S.’s largest consulate in the world is in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Attacks on the KRG are not without precedent. In 2023, Iran launched ten ballistic missile toward Erbil, in response to the 2023 killing of Sayed Razi Mosavi, the commander of the Quds Force in Syria, in an Israeli airstrike. The missile strikes killed prominent businessman Peshraw Dizayee, his daughter, Karam Mikhail, and three other people.  The IRGC justified the attack, saying Iran had targeted a “Mossad espionage center.”

In 2020, Iranian security forces arrested three Kurdish Iranians after the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an Iranian nuclear physicist and chief of Iran’s nuclear program. He was reportedly killed in a road ambush by an autonomous satellite-operated gun. In June, the three men were executed for killing Fakhrizadeh as part of a crackdown on Israeli spies.

Baluchistan under Fire

The Baluch make up the majority of Iran's poorest province -- Sistan and Baluchistan. For decades, Baluch separatists have been waging a low-intensity insurgency against Tehran that claims the lives of security forces on a monthly basis. During the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests, Zahedan—the capital of the region—witnessed the deadliest crackdown, with security forces killing over 100 people.

On July 1, the IRGC launched a “counterterrorism” operation in the Baluch-majority province of Sistan-Baluchistan, claiming to target “mercenaries of the Zionist regime”—despite no Israeli operations taking place in the region.

Azerbaijanis as Alleged Operatives

Iranian officials have historically portrayed Azerbaijan as a close ally of Israel, suggesting that that its neighbor serves as a strategic sanctuary for Israeli operations. Authorities have accused Iranian-Azerbaijanis  -- Iran’s largest minority of some 30 million inhabitants-- of working for the Mossad during the 12-day war. More than 90 have been arrested for cooperating with Israel, according to Hengaw.

Iranian officials also claim that Israeli drones were launched from Azerbaijan. Notably, the Khorasan newspaper, an outlet linked to the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader, noted that “a collection of reports, field evidence, and credible speculations” indicates that Baku assisted Israel in conducting its attack against Iran.

Refugees Turned Suspects

For the first time, Iranian authorities have alleged that Afghan refugees – most of whom fled to Iran following the collapse of the U.S.-backed government in 2021-- are connected to the Mossad and assisted in the attacks on such sensitive sites as the nuclear facilities. Amid Israel’s recent operations inside Iran, the Iranian government issued an order for Afghan refugees to leave the country by July 6. Since January, around 1.4 million Afghans have been deported, with around 500,000 of those deportations following the 12 Day War.

Following Israel’s strike, Iran arrested Afghan refugees and blamed them for surveillance and building drones to target Iranian facilities. Tasnim, the Iranian news agency,  released a video, claiming  Iranian police found a small drone factory in Shahr-e-Rey, in southern Tehran, a neighborhood with a significant population of Afghan refugees. Moreover, Iranian security officials claimed that they arrested an Afghan university student who had files on making bombs and drones on his cellphone, accusing him of assisting Israeli drone strikes.

In 2021, a surge of anti-Afghan rhetoric flooded social media, fueled by misinformation and disinformation. The campaign centered around the Farsi hashtag of “Deportation of Afghans, National Demand.” Notably, these X accounts fell silent during the Israeli strikes on Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s intelligence branch – avoiding any anti-Afghan posts throughout the 12-day conflict. This coordinated silence suggested that the smear campaign was orchestrated by elements within the intelligence apparatus, aiming to incite public hostility and ultimately facilitate the removal of Afghan refugees from Iran.  After the Israeli attacks, these same accounts reemerged, accusing refugees of being the primary culprits and calling for their expulsion.

Israel’s strike provided Iranian officials with a pretext to label Afghan refugees as Mossad operatives or collaborators, resulting in the expulsion or departure of more than 700,000 Afghan refugees, according to the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs. However, the credibility of the accusations quickly unraveled. In an interview with Iranian state media, Member of Parliament Mannan Raeesi, said that precise intelligence and assessments had found no Afghan refugees among alleged Israeli spies. “This is mostly a defamation campaign,” Raisi asserted.

These accusations also carry a strong sense of hypocrisy.

Both long-term Afghan residents – who have lived in Iran for nearly four decades -  and those who fled the Taliban regime, have consistently faced systemic discrimination, including being denied access to such fundamental rights as opening bank accounts or even obtaining SIM cards. This level of scrutiny and control have placed them in a precarious situation under constant surveillance by Iranian authorities. Yet, despite these restrictions, Iranian officials have accused Afghans of collaborating with Israeli intelligence – alleging they’ve shared sensitive information, including the locations of IRGC commanders, strategic sites, and military bases.

Internal Crackdowns as a Deterrent

The Iranian regime’s treatment of its ethnic minorities -- Kurds, Baluch, Azerbaijanis, and Afghan refugees – bears striking resemblance to the oppressive tactics of Saddam Hussein, who ruthlessly cracked down on Shia populations in southern Iraq and on Kurds in the north following his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam responded with internal repression to reassert his control.

Iranian allies across the region have echoed this playbook. For example, when mass protests swept across Syria in 2011 during the Arab Spring, President Bashar al-Assad responded with indiscriminate violence against Sunni civilians, particularly in the northern regions of Homs and Idlib. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Houthis movement launched a brutal campaign of arrests and executions, accusing civilians of colluding with Saudi forces and revealing strategic Houthis positions.

Iran’s post-conflict actions suggest a regime grappling more with psychological defeat than with strategic recovery. Following Israel’s unexpected strike, which contradicted years of Iranian bravado about swift retaliation and impenetrable defenses, the Islamic Republic appears to have turned its frustration inward. The sudden crackdown on ethnic minorities seems less about uncovering espionage networks and more about asserting control in the face of humiliation. For Tehran, it is essential to maintain deterrence over its own citizens.

For decades, Tehran has positioned itself as a regional powerhouse, relentlessly threatening Israel with annihilation and projecting an image of unshakeable strength. But the surprise attack dismantled that illusion. In its aftermath, the regime scrambled to restore authority – not by identifying real culprits – but by targeting marginalized communities who already face institutional discrimination and surveillance.

The effectiveness of Israeli intelligence operations in Iran reveals not only its capabilities but also sheds light on the disposition of the Iranian people—especially among Iran’s oppressed groups, each for their own reasons. No successful intelligence effort is possible without a network of human assets. The fact that Israel has managed to build such networks suggests that many Iranians are willing to cooperate with Israeli intelligence. In some cases, these individuals may not have even known they were working for Israel; their main motivation was simply to strike at the regime.

This willingness to undermine the Islamic Republic underscores the moral and economic bankruptcy of the revolution. A regime that fears spies around every corner is not just facing a capable enemy—it is facing a crisis of legitimacy. When citizens are open to aiding foreign intelligence against their own rulers, it says more about the regime than its adversaries.

There’s also a deeper layer to the regime’s behavior. Its repression of ethnic and religious minorities reveals the moral degradation of a state that claims to defend the “oppressed” (mostazafin) against the “oppressors” (mostakberin). In reality, those lofty revolutionary slogans are used to justify the systematic oppression of Iran’s most vulnerable communities.

Paradoxically, the regime is compelled to act against its own fundamental interests. Although it has no desire to further alienate minority populations, it feels obligated to demonstrate a show of force. In doing so, it traps itself in a self-defeating cycle with narrowing room for maneuver.

However, there is some short-term pragmatism in Iran's actions. Israeli intelligence has clearly penetrated the highest echelons of Iranian power; otherwise, the precision targeting of senior military officials would not be possible. These are not just formal high-ranking officers but also insiders known in Iranian political slang as khodiha—members of the inner circle.

Instead of investigating the security breaches, the regime prioritizes protecting these insiders from suspicion. As a result, its harsh crackdowns on dissidents and vulnerable populations are not just acts of repression—they are diversions, meant to shield the system’s own insiders from accountability for its growing internal failures.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence.

During and after the 12-day Iran–Israel war, Iranian propaganda levelled harsh accusations against Azerbaijan, directly blaming its northern neighbor for collaborating with Israel. Some Iranian political commentators including officials and persons affiliated with the IRGC threatened Baku and called for decisive action against Azerbaijan. As the war erupted at a time of relative warming in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, Tehran has sought to avoid open hostility at the official level, instead projecting goodwill. The result has been an incongruent and contradictory policy approach.

Iranian propaganda against Azerbaijan has focused on two main accusations: that Azerbaijan supported Israel’s attack and that Baku failed to condemn either the Israeli or American strikes on Iran.

One of Iran’s foremost Caucasus and Central Asia experts, Ehsan Movahedian at Allameh Tabataba’i University, claimed in an interview with the Armenian news agency that Israeli drones and F-35 fighter jets entered northern Iran via Azerbaijani airspace. He asserted that Iranian air defense systems detected several drones approaching from the direction of Azerbaijan.

Read more at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On June 27th the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service) and police forces conducted simultaneous raids in Yekaterinburg, targeting dozens of ethnic Azerbaijanis. This city is one of the centers of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, which numbers between 2 and 3 million people (not all of them are Azerbaijani citizens). The targets of the raid were portrayed as part of an “ethnic criminal group” involved in unsolved murders dating as far as 2001 and 2011. The operation resulted in the deaths of two brothers, Huseyn Safarov (59) and Ziyaddin Safarov (54), both Russian citizens of Azerbaijani descent, who owned the “Caspian” cafe in the city.

Russian authorities claimed that Ziyaddin died of “heart failure” and provided no cause of death for Huseyn. However, Azerbaijan’s forensic examination revealed extensive evidence of fatal, cruel beatings and torture. The autopsy found broken ribs, deformed chests, internal bleeding, and injuries to the genital areas of both men. Azerbaijan’s chief medical examiner concluded they died from “post-traumatic shock” caused by severe bodily trauma, directly contradicting Russian explanations.

Multiple witnesses and family members reported systematic torture during the raids. Survivors described being “thrown to the floor in separate rooms and beaten with various objects,” with some subjected to electric shocks. One detainee, Vugar Safarov, told journalists that he and his brother were “forced to eat dirt” during transport to the police station and beaten when they refused. Their father, who suffers from a heart condition, was reportedly shocked with an electric taser multiple times.

The Russian independent media outlet Meduza documented that at least one suspect showed visible signs of severe beatings during court appearances, while lawyers confirmed broken ribs for detainees. Video evidence showed security personnel smashing car windows with hammers and forcibly dragging diaspora leader Shahin Shikhlinsky from his vehicle. He was detained but released later as a “witness”.

The death of two detainees and the outright racist brutality of the law enforcement triggered the worst ever crisis in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. It is noteworthy that the relations have already went sour following the shooting down of the Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in December 2024. The Russian behavior highlights not only the Kremlin’s pathological proclivity to exacerbate the existing problems instead of resolving them, but also the existence of geopolitical stakes. In both cases, the Kremlin has outright refused to admit guilt, thereby aggravating the crisis.

Russian state media and officials consistently framed the events as legitimate criminal investigations targeting Russian citizens involved in decades-old murderswhich were cold cases for a very long time. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized detainees were “Russian citizens of Azerbaijani origin” and characterized Azerbaijan’s response as an “absolutely inspired campaign… organized, well-planned against our country.” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov blamed Ukraine for trying to “add fuel to the fire” and insisted Russia “has never threatened, and does not threaten Azerbaijan.”

Read the rest at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Israel’s operation “Rising Lion” caught the Iranian regime by surprise, severely limiting its capacity to thwart the Israeli blitz and retaliate effectively. This surprise facilitated the smooth continuation of the Israeli attack and significantly diminished Iran’s strategic assets, including missiles and drones. Although Iran persisted in launching missiles at Israel, much of its strategic arsenal was successfully destroyed, including significant damage to key Iranian nuclear installations during the U.S. assault.

The mere fact that the Iranian propaganda machine had to resort to concocting fake news, such as claims that it had taken Israeli pilots prisoner or that it had targeted F-35 hangars in Tel Aviv, underscore the dire straits the regime found itself in amid a lack of any better option.

According to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel set two strategic objectives for this attack: to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capacity to the point where it could not resume a military nuclear program and to neutralize Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal. Notably, regime change in Iran was never on Israel’s stated list of goals. Statements from Netanyahu and other high-ranking Israeli officials clarified that while the toppling of the Shi’ite theocracy could be seen as a possible or beneficial side effect of the strike, it was not Israel’s premeditated aim.

Yet, the Iranian regime excels in hybrid war, meaning the capacity to fight the enemy on all fronts with all means possible. Propaganda, disruption, and information war are part and parcel of hybrid war, as outlined in Russian and Iranian intelligence playbooks. It is reasonable to assume that Iran will intensify its efforts in this direction as its position weakens. One should never underestimate the damage potential of Iranian disruptive activities in the South Caucasus. The recent Iranian recruitment of Israeli citizens to spy on its behalf demonstrate its capabilities.

Since the onset of Israel’s military operations against Iran in June 2025, Iranian media outlets have crafted specific narratives regarding Azerbaijan’s role in the conflict. These narratives form part of a broader campaign aimed at explaining Iran’s losses in a war it had prepared for decades. The campaign’s central message is that Iran is surrounded by enemies and is not merely fighting against a tiny state located nearly 2,000 kilometers away. Azerbaijan, a long-standing thorn in Iran’s side—a secular state with a Muslim majority and an independent multi-vector policy—serves as an ideal scapegoat for Tehran, which for 30 years has sought to destabilize it.

The narratives mentioned primarily focus on Azerbaijan’s media response, diplomatic stance, and strategic relationship with Israel, blaming the Azerbaijani Republic for allegedly “assisting” the Israeli military effort.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Introduction

Tajikistan, the only Persian-speaking republic amidst a sea of Turkic Central Asian states, has emerged as the latest arena in a quiet yet consequential contest. At the heart of this geopolitical struggle are two rival forces: on one side, Iran, aiming to reassert cultural and strategic dominance over what it sees as the broader Persianate world; on the other side, Turkey and Azerbaijan, spearheading the Turkic revival through institutions like the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This contest is less overtly militaristic and more ideological, infrastructural, and economic. Yet, the implications extend far beyond the immediate neighbors, also affecting players like Israel and the United States, who have significant interests in the alignment of Central Asia.

Historical and Cultural Foundations

Tajikistan’s connection to Iran is grounded in what Sayyid Amir Arjomand termed the “Persianate society”—a sphere defined by Persian linguistic and cultural influence. Though the Soviet project created a distinct Tajik nation in 1929, the underlying language and heritage remained resolutely Persian. The Tajik variant of Persian, shaped by Russian and Uzbek overlays and written in the Cyrillic script, retains a closer resemblance to classical Persian literature than even modern-day Persian of Iran. This linguistic bridge offers Iran an organic opening for cultural diplomacy and ideological exportation

Despite this affinity, relations between the two countries have been tumultuous since Tajikistan’s independence in 1992. During the civil war, Iran backed the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), offering both political and possible financial support. This drew the ire of the Tajik government, which viewed Iranian involvement with deep suspicion. Tensions thawed after the 1997 peace treaty, and for over a decade, Iran became a significant economic partner, investing in hydroelectric plants, tunnels, and media initiatives.

That all changed in 2013 when Iranian billionaire Babak Zanjani was accused of money laundering through Tajik banks, causing a rupture in trust. The situation deteriorated further in 2015 when Iran hosted Muhiddin Kabiri, the exiled leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), then banned by the Tajik authorities. Kabiri met with Ayatollah Khamenei, prompting Tajikistan to veto Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and freeze bilateral cooperation. Tajik street protests followed, and Tajikistan accused Iran of organizing war crimes and preparing Islamic terrorists. The Tajik leader referred to a “so-called friendly country” and claimed IRPT members had converted to Shi’ism, reinforcing the narrative of the IRPT being an extension of Iranian influence. Iran accused the National Bank of Tajikistan of money laundering, which was later confirmed to be false. All cooperation programs were curtailed.

Economic Resurgence and Strategic Positioning

The diplomatic chill began to thaw in the second half of 2024, when Iran and Tajikistan found common cause in addressing regional instability. Shared fears of Taliban resurgence and ISIS-Khorasan terrorism catalyzed renewed dialogue. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s January 2025 visit to Dushanbe marked a turning point, resulting in the signing of 23 memoranda of understanding across energy, infrastructure, and cultural sectors.

Iran sees Tajikistan as a key partner for expanding access to Central Asian markets. Among its most significant offers is the proposal to link Tajikistan to the Chabahar Port, developed with India. This port would allow Tajikistan direct access to international waters. Iran’s goal is to undermine the appeal of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and the Middle Corridor, both championed by Azerbaijan and Turkey.

However, trade volumes still reflect Iran’s limited role. While trade increased by nearly 50% in 2024, it only amounted to $378 million—significantly less than Tajikistan’s $1.12 billion trade with Russia. Iran remains an ambitious but junior partner in economic terms.

The Cultural Playbook and Its Limitations

Iran continues to pour resources into cultural diplomacy. Initiatives include establishing Persian-speaking associations, funding cultural festivals, offering scholarships for Tajik students, and attempting to revive Persian script usage. It even opened branches of Iranian universities in Tajikistan and invested in joint cultural productions. But the results have been mixed.

Tajikistan’s secular elite remains wary. Cultural efforts often double as soft propaganda campaigns, and Iran’s religious conservatism clashes with Tajikistan’s more secular governance. The attempt to launch a joint TV channel was blocked, with authorities citing concerns that it would serve as a vehicle for Iranian ideological messaging.

One glaring example of this cultural friction was the Iranian TV series Paytakht. Produced with participation from Tajik actresses, the series became controversial when the actresses revealed that Iranian producers attempted to enforce hijab and promote Islamic themes, reflecting the values of the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.

President Rahmon himself has pushed back against Iranian cultural dominance, emphasizing Tajikistan’s Aryan heritageand rejecting the idea that Tajiks are merely part of a broader Iranian identity. This divergence in worldview makes long-term Iranian cultural integration a hard sell.

Propaganda, Indoctrination, and the Israeli Connection

One of the more controversial aspects of Iran’s cultural outreach in Tajikistan is its covert ideological influence, particularly the promotion of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment. Educational institutions like Al-Mostafa University in Qom serve not only as centers for religious education but also as potential recruitment hubs for the IRGC Quds Force.

In October 2023, the Association of Tajik Muslim Youth issued a letter condemning the “child-killing Zionist regime” and expressing support for the Palestinian resistance, referencing Quranic verses about just war. The statement, published less than two weeks after the October 7 Hamas massacre, employed language that mirrored classic Iranian euphemisms— “global Zionism” as a stand-in for global Jewry. While the letter didn’t explicitly justify the massacre, it echoed the regime’s usual denial-and-deflect tactic: ignore the atrocities, blame the victim.

The statement linked directly to Al-Mostafa University, suggesting a concerted effort to propagate Iranian ideological narratives through Tajik proxies. Tajik officials, fully aware of this dynamic, have cracked down on book distributions and scrutinized educational exchanges.

Proxy Networks and Sectarian Outreach

Iran’s involvement in Tajikistan extends beyond traditional diplomacy and ideological messaging. It reflects a broader strategy Tehran has refined since 1979: cultivating influence through proxies. This tactic, while more visible in the Middle East, is increasingly present in Central Asia, particularly where Shi’a populations offer an opening.

Tehran has turned its attention to Tajikistan’s small but symbolically useful Shi’a minority. While Twelver Shi’a are few, Iran has focused on Ismailis, also known as Sevener Shi’a, as a potential ideological constituency. Iranian actors view this community as receptive to messaging that promotes Islamic unity under Tehran’s spiritual and political umbrella.

Security Collaboration and the Double Game

Security concerns offer Iran and Tajikistan common ground. Both nations regard radical Sunni groups like ISIS-Khorasan as existential threats. Iran labels such actors “Takfiri”—a pejorative for violent Sunnis who view Shi’ites as apostates. But Iran’s engagement in the security domain is far from one-dimensional.

The IRGC’s Quds Force has been caught recruiting Tajik nationals for regional operations. Muhammad Ali Burhanov, also known as Samad al-Tajiki, was recruited by the IRGC and later linked to multiple foiled terror attacks in Central Asia, including arson attempts on Jewish and Western targets.

Military collaboration continues, nonetheless. In May 2022, Iran inaugurated a factory in Dushanbe to produce Ababil-2 drones—an answer to Turkey’s widely successful Bayraktar drone diplomacy across the region. These efforts aim to counterbalance Ankara’s growing sway in places like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The Turkic Push: Pragmatism Over Propaganda

While Iran continues to build its engagement with Tajikistan through the language of shared heritage and Islamic identity, Turkey and Azerbaijan are charting a course that speaks in terms of roads, railways, ports, and pipelines. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), formerly seen as a ceremonial gathering of linguistic cousins, has transformed into a dynamic mechanism for geopolitical coordination. Its expansion has alarmed Tehran, which now describe it as a “Turkic NATO,” developed by the “Zionist entity” and designed to advance its interests in Central Asia. This framing highlights the growing effectiveness of Turkic cooperation, particularly in contrast to Iran’s often ideological outreach.

Tajikistan has become an unexpected but central target in this new Turkic orientation. Despite not being a Turkic-speaking country, its participation is actively sought by Ankara and Baku. President Emomali Rahmon’s 2024 visit to Azerbaijan was treated as a major breakthrough, culminating in the signing of numerous bilateral agreements. These agreements, spanning trade, energy, infrastructure, and technological collaboration, indicated a clear pivot toward practical alignment rather than linguistic or ethnic solidarity. While Iran made moves to counter this engagement, hosting Tajik delegations and offering alternatives like the Chabahar Port corridor, the scale and pace of Turkish and Azerbaijani activity were difficult to match.

Trans-Caspian Strategy and the Middle Corridor

One of the core instruments of the Turkic states’ regional strategy is the Middle Corridor—a transcontinental route linking China to Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Tajikistan’s involvement in this framework would represent a major redirection of its external economic orientation. The complementary Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor offers logistical passage across the Caspian and onward into the Caucasus, further reducing the role of Iranian or Russian transit options. From Baku to Istanbul, the vision is clear: integrate Tajikistan into a web of infrastructure that is modern, efficient, and geopolitically autonomous.

The vision is already being translated into concrete partnerships. Azerbaijan has opened discussions with Dushanbe on energy cooperation, with potential collaboration in fossil fuel extraction and transit. These moves are more than speculative. Analysts inside Iran expressed concern that if Tajikistan develops domestic hydrocarbon resources and partners with Azerbaijan, it could soon become part of the Trans-Caspian energy framework. The long-term implication, from Iran’s standpoint, is the loss of a vital frontier—one that might instead become a gateway for Turkic, and possibly Western-aligned, influence.

Why the Turkic Offer Resonates

What should make the Turkic offer especially appealing to Dushanbe is its strategic flexibility. Unlike Iranian cultural diplomacy, which often carries religious or ideological weight, the Turkic model is pointedly non-prescriptive. While Turkey certainly promotes its soft power and historical ties in the Turkic world, there is no requirement for Tajikistan to adopt linguistic changes, religious alignment, or political messaging. The deal on the table is practical: access to energy networks, infrastructure funding, regional platforms, and logistical integration. For a state like Tajikistan, governed by a largely secular regime and focused on stability and development, the minimalist, transactional style of Turkic engagement would be far easier to absorb.

Furthermore, Turkish and Azerbaijani engagement increasingly overlaps with Western technical and commercial interests, enhancing its attractiveness. These corridors—both transport and energy—serve not only regional purposes but also larger geo-economic strategies stretching to Europe and beyond. Tajikistan’s involvement in the Turkic routes would effectively insert it into a Eurasian trade architecture that favors diversification and strategic autonomy. While Iran speaks of shared civilization and Islamic awakening, the Turkic world presents ports, pipelines, and predictable partnerships.

Conclusion

Iran’s initiatives during recent official visits to Tajikistan demonstrate a strategic effort to counter the influence of Turkic powers, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan, in Central Asia. The Islamic Republic is increasingly concerned about the growing investments by Turkic states, which threaten to diminish its regional influence. To counter this, Iran is actively seeking to expand its influence in Tajikistan, leveraging shared Persian cultural and linguistic ties to strengthen bilateral relations, despite the strained relationship between the two countries and Iran’s alleged support for the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). This strategy includes economic initiatives, such as promoting Tajikistan’s access to the Chabahar Port, and military cooperation, exemplified by the 2022 establishment of an Ababil-2 drone factory in Dushanbe. By fostering these ties, Iran aims to position Tajikistan as a strategic partner in Central Asia, potentially countering the influence of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) led by Turkey and Azerbaijan, and observes Tajikistan as a proxy in Central Asia. However, Tajikistan’s secular governance, its ban on the IRPT, with which Iran has extensive ties with, since 2015, and its participation in the 2023 Dushanbe summit alongside Turkic states suggest that it is unlikely to become a mere proxy for Iran, complicating Tehran’s efforts to shape regional dynamics.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a professor of the Persian language at Ariel University, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence.

Hussain Ehsani is a researcher focused on the Middle East, previously serving as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Turan Research Center Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joined Gadi Taub on the Shomer Saf -- or Gatekeeper-- podcast to discuss whether the Islamic Republic of Iran could collapse following Operation Rising Lion.

Listen here.