Turan Research Center

Illustration by Dinmukhamed Kairulla.

Two powers locked in global rivalry rarely end up invested in the same piece of infrastructure. On the Middle Corridor, the United States and China now are. The route across Kazakhstan, the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey is, for Beijing, the last dependable land path to Europe after sanctions foreclosed the northern route through Russia and escalation risk shadowed the southern branches through Iran. For Washington, it is something else — an instrument for shaping how the competition with China is conducted. Their interests converge, and the convergence is narrow, situational and reversible: a window, not a settlement.

What makes the window worth Washington's attention is the asymmetry inside it. The American economy does not rely on this corridor; China's increasingly does. That imbalance turns a trade route into leverage and points U.S. strategy away from its reflex — excluding Beijing — toward a more durable question: who sets the rules the corridor runs on. The Middle Corridor's value to the United States lies less in controlling a route than in managing a rivalry, and the contest worth winning runs through standards, not segments.

China's Geo-economic Imperative: From Diversification to Dependence

Beijing did not choose the corridor's new prominence; the closing of its alternatives produced it. The Belt and Road Initiative was built on redundancy — multiple land routes hedging one another — and the crises around Ukraine and Iran have compressed that redundancy into a single priority. In purely economic terms, the Middle Corridor is now the only viable land route to Europe China has left.

Overland connectivity also answers a deeper anxiety. A confrontation with the United States in the Indo-Pacific could throttle the maritime chokepoints, Malacca foremost, on which China's seaborne trade depends; a working land bridge across Eurasia is insurance against a blockade it cannot otherwise escape. This is the strategic logic beneath the commercial one, and it is why the corridor outranks its tonnage.

The result is a contradiction Beijing has to hold open. Politically, it stays bound to Russia and Iran to advance multipolarity and contest U.S. primacy. Geo-economically, its most secure path to Europe now runs through terrain — Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey — where U.S. and EU influence is pronounced. China sustains Moscow and Tehran inside BRICS and the SCO while deepening a stake in a corridor those partners do not control.

One consequence is easy to miss. The stability and policy predictability of the Central Asian and South Caucasian states have acquired direct economic value for Beijing; as the northern and southern routes grow less dependable, the institutional resilience of the Middle Corridor becomes proportionally more valuable to China — a valuation the regional states are aware they now command.

U.S. Strategic Interests: Eurasian Decentralization and Managed Competition

For Washington, the corridor's value is geopolitical before it is commercial. Its development widens the foreign-policy autonomy of the Central Asian and South Caucasian states; integrating them into global supply chains through the corridor enlarges their room to maneuver — room these states already use deliberately, not reluctantly.

Since the disruption of Eurasian trade by the war in Ukraine and the maritime chokepoints of the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, the United States has treated alternative routes as a piece of its economic-security strategy, on the logic that diversified supply chains are less hostage to localized conflict and blockade. The Trump administration's approach sharpens this further, foregrounding economic and fiscal effectiveness in U.S. policy toward Central Asia.

Washington's incentive, then, is to back the corridor while keeping it multilateral — its core interest being to prevent a closed system under exclusive Chinese control. This is where the asymmetry does its work. Because China's exposure to the corridor exceeds Washington's, every increment of the route's development raises the cost of large-scale confrontation for Beijing and presses it toward predictable conduct in Central Eurasia — without the United States having to spend equivalently to hold the same leverage. The Middle Corridor is not merely transport infrastructure for Washington but a potential mechanism for managing competition with China on terms of transparency and inclusivity.

The Corridor as a Competition-Management Mechanism: From Containment to Coordination

The route's growing weight in global trade opens a space where strategic rivalry and a limited overlap of interests can coexist. Washington can treat the corridor as a working instrument for managing competition with China across Eurasia.

The older logic of containment — restricting China's technological reach and presence — does not vanish here. It is joined by a second objective: managed competition. The aim is a Eurasian connectivity architecture that keeps transport routes open, strengthens the sovereignty of regional states, and stops any single power, China above all, from securing unilateral control.

The analogy is the managed rivalry of the late Cold War, where both sides preserved predictability and open channels to prevent escalation. Applied to the corridor, the risk being managed is the fragmentation of the global economy into sealed blocs. Current U.S. policy in Central Asia is drifting in this direction, privileging economic cooperation and fiscal efficiency. The corridor could then anchor a new geo-economic order for Central Eurasia, one in which breaking the shared transport system becomes too costly for any stakeholder — infrastructure as a brake on destructive confrontation.

The regional actors — the Central Asian states, the South Caucasus and Turkey — are not the backdrop to this arrangement but its load-bearing players. Their drive to maximize transit volumes and sustain multi-vector foreign policies is what keeps the system open. The EU has a direct stake too, seeking to reinforce regional independence while preserving its trade ties with China; it sits at the meeting point of geopolitical interests shared with the U.S. and geo-economic interests shared with Beijing.

The mechanism has limits worth naming. The corridor can shape behavior in secondary and tertiary arenas — trade, logistics, regional policy in Central Eurasia. It will not be decisive in an existential confrontation, such as one over Taiwan, where security and military control would override economic logic.

The Temporal Factor: Why the Window Is Transitory

The present alignment among the U.S., China, the EU and the regional states does not reflect a structural shift in global politics. It is the product of a particular cluster of crises, which makes it reversible. Several developments could close the window:

·       Revival of the other land routes. A stabilization of Russia–West relations could quickly restore the northern route's appeal for China, given its established infrastructure and the absence of Caspian transit complications. A de-escalation around Iran would do the same for southern branches, which Beijing values for redundancy.

·       Escalation of U.S.–China confrontation. A sharp move to direct confrontation would dissolve the room for coordination. If the corridor comes to be seen purely as leverage, the pragmatic basis for cooperation erodes.

·       Competition from new systems. Arctic routes or other maritime schemes could redistribute cargo flows rapidly.

The political task of the moment is whether stakeholders can convert a temporary convergence into a durable system. The opportunity can easily be squandered — not least because Central Eurasia still sits in the "limited interests and limited means" category of American strategic thinking. With simultaneous pressures in the Middle East, Europe and the Indo-Pacific, Washington's attention and resources may stay fixed on theaters judged more central to U.S. security and economy. If a path-dependence effect can be locked in through coordination mechanisms and long-term investment while the current configuration holds, the corridor keeps its relevance after the political weather changes. Without that, it remains a stopgap that loses viability at the first realignment.

Toward a Logic of Managed Connectivity

The situation hands Washington a rare chance to do three things at once: integrate Central Eurasian states into the global market, reinforce the sovereignty of the Central Asian and South Caucasian states, and shape — fiscally efficiently — an infrastructural architecture compatible with U.S. interests even amid competition with China.

Seizing it requires adjusting the traditional U.S. approach to Eurasian infrastructure. Turning the corridor into an instrument of direct containment would undermine the very stability that makes it useful. For most regional states the priority is not enlistment in an anti-Chinese or anti-Russian coalition but the inclusive expansion of transit, investment and their own multi-vector policies. The more promising strategy is therefore not to exclude China but to shape the rules and institutions that keep the route open, multilateral and resistant to monopolization. If Beijing reads the corridor as a relatively neutral and predictable system, its interest in developing it persists; if it reads the corridor as a U.S. containment tool, Chinese support contracts and a direct struggle for control over the route and its transit states follows.

Influencing the architecture is more realistic and more cost-effective than excluding a player. Here Washington's leverage is real: supply-chain resilience, procurement transparency, anti-corruption mechanisms, digital compatibility and data standards, cybersecurity and logistics norms. In the modern economy, competition has moved from a contest over physical routes to a contest over the rules and standards that govern them — and it is in standards and institutions that American influence proves most durable and most affordable.

Preserving the route's multilateral character serves the same end. The less it looks like one power's project, the better its odds of survival. Washington can support a distributed management model spanning the regional states, the EU, the international financial institutions and outside partners, including China. The most promising direction is not financing discrete projects but underwriting the corridor's overall logistical and digital architecture. Its central weakness is that it functions today not as one artery but as a chain of national segments — Chinese, Kazakh, Azerbaijani, Turkish, European — each adding transaction costs, administrative friction and disruption risk. Knitting those segments together is what converts the corridor from a set of disjointed links into a resilient Eurasian system.

Backing regional leadership in governance — Central Asian and South Caucasian states alongside Turkey — advances Washington's Eurasian priority of reinforcing their sovereignty and, in the same move, keeps the architecture open, because openness is exactly what their multi-vector policies require. Institutional integration of the Middle Corridor with TRIPP (the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan transit link) is a pivotal piece, and it raises geopolitical problems the regional states cannot resolve alone. The international financial institutions — the World Bank, the EBRD, the IFC — offer a vehicle for port modernization, digitalization and supply-chain resilience that does not brand the corridor as an American project.

The wider prize is a shift from the reactive logic of containment to a model of managed competition through connectivity — building conditions under which rival powers find it in their mutual interest to keep a shared system intact.

A Stable Eurasian Architecture, or a Stopgap

The current convergence is not strategic alignment; it is an opening for pragmatic coordination on infrastructure and logistics, and openings expire. What the participants do with it will decide which of two Eurasias takes shape: one of sealed, economically isolated blocs, or one of managed interconnection able to absorb shocks and dampen conflict. The decisive contest will not be over the corridor's physical segments but over whose rules govern them — and that is the contest Washington is currently best positioned to win and most likely to neglect. The standards-setting moment is the window, and it is narrow. If the architecture is not locked in while the alignment holds, the corridor reverts to a stopgap that the next realignment renders obsolete. The cost of waiting is not a worse deal later; it is no seat at the table when the rules are written.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center specializing in international relations and security in Eurasia. He is also a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and has held academic appointments at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Eurasian National University in Astana, and Narxoz University in Almaty. During the war on terror in Afghanistan, he directed the Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and served on the Russian–American Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan under the East–West Institute. He is the author of over 100 publications, including 25 peer-reviewed articles indexed in Scopus, and his expert analysis has been cited by major international media including The Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Washington Post, BBC, and Deutsche Welle.

The architecture of Eurasian connectivity is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation, driven by the systemic destabilization of traditional trade routes. As sanctions and geopolitical risks render the Northern and Southern corridors increasingly unreliable, the Middle Corridor is probably evolving from a supplementary diversification tool into an indispensable land artery linking the markets of the East and West. Furthermore, the potential integration of the Middle Corridor with the Indo-Israeli “Spice Route” creates a new “Eurasian arc of connectivity”. In this framework, Israel can emerge as a vital technological hub and “intellectual integrator,” bridging regional logistics through innovation. This analysis explores how these intersecting interests can forge a resilient, multilateral network of interchangeable nodes, where the stability of transit states becomes the cornerstone of Eurasian and global economic security.

The Collapse of Traditional Eurasian Connectivity: Implications for China, the U.S., and the EU.

For decades, the architecture of Eurasian logistics within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has leaned primarily on the Northern (via the Russian Federation) and Southern (via Iran) land routes. During this period, the Middle Corridor was largely perceived by China as merely a supplementary diversification tool, essential only for safeguarding primary arteries. However, the current geopolitical landscape, defined by sanctions pressure on Russia and the heightened risks of military escalation involving Iran, has radically shifted this balance, rendering traditional trajectories critically unreliable for trade between Asia and Europe. From the perspective of Chinese strategists, the development of this route is a pivotal element in overcoming the “Malacca Dilemma”—the PRC’s excessive reliance on maritime routes that are vulnerable in the event of a conflict with the United States in the Indo-Pacific.

For Washington, the Middle Corridor has consistently been regarded as a strategic instrument for reinforcing the sovereignty of Central Asian and South Caucasian states. Under the current administration, this geopolitical objective is increasingly complemented by an economic agenda focused on supply chain resilience and fiscal efficiency. Consequently, Washington is incentivized to ensure the corridor maintains a multilateral character, preventing the emergence of a closed infrastructural system under the exclusive control of Beijing.

Read the full article on The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Illustration by Dinmukhamed Kairulla.

The 2026 war involving Iran has drawn attention to Iranian military-technological activity well beyond the Middle East. Tajikistan, the only Persian-speaking state in Central Asia, is a natural focus: it has sharply deepened its security, military-technical, and logistical cooperation with Tehran in recent years. The clearest symbol of that rapprochement was the 2022 announcement of an Iranian drone production facility on Tajik soil. This report weighs the expert debate over that project, examines what Tehran and Dushanbe each sought from it, and assesses the risk it poses of pulling Tajikistan into the conflicts and sanctions standoffs around Iran.

The Expert Debate on Iranian Drone Production in Tajikistan

 The status of Iran’s announced drone production in Tajikistan remains genuinely disputed among analysts—a question made more urgent by the 2026 war between Iran and a U.S.–Israeli coalition and its potential to spill into Central Asia.

 On May 17, 2022, Iran announced the opening of a drone manufacturing plant in Tajikistan, marking Iran’s first overseas drone production facility. The plant was designed to produce Ababil-2 drones. The opening ceremony was attended by the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad Bagheri, and the Minister of Defense of Tajikistan, Sherali Mirzo. Bagheri was subsequently received by President Rahmon, who officially welcomed the "defensive and military cooperation" between Tajikistan and Iran. Neither principal remains in place: Bagheri was killed in June 2025 during the 12-day Israel–Iran war, and Mirzo was removed from his post in a January 2025 reshuffle.

 Crucially, the Ababil-2 is by no means Iran's most advanced drone. These are simpler and cheaper UAVs than the Shahed models currently employed by Iran. The Ababil-2 is a multi-role platform with both reconnaissance and strike capabilities, an approximate range of 200 km, and a relatively simple design well-suited for mass production.

 Tajikistan’s motives are clear. A developing state, it needs access to technology, military hardware included, and the project promised localization: on-site manufacturing, possible technology transfer, and with them a production base, investment, and jobs. The drones are meant largely for domestic use—patrolling the Afghan border and countering the radical Islamist groups based across it—but Dushanbe also needs to strengthen an army operating in a region thick with conflict and with organized crime networks that move Afghan narcotics into the post-Soviet space and on into Europe. Producing Iranian drones lets Dushanbe diversify its security partners and lean less heavily on Russia, China, and the West, while the cultural and linguistic affinity between the two countries eases both the politics and the transfer of technology.

 Skepticism and Conflicting Reports

 However, several Tajik experts believe the plant was never actually opened in 2022, suggesting it may be one of many corruption schemes in Iran-Tajikistan relations. They note that satellite imagery has failed to detect an active enterprise. Another view suggests that the Tajik leadership, later realizing the potential for Western sanctions, ensured the plant did not become operational and quietly dismissed the Defense Minister who initiated it. In this scenario, Iran was satisfied with the propaganda effect, and Iranian officials reported a successful foreign policy operation to their leadership.

 A competing reading points the other way. In March 2026, Tajikistan dispatched a large humanitarian aid shipment to Iran — 3,610 tons of cargo on 110 trucks that, according to Dushanbe, carried medicines, hygiene products, clothing, food, and construction materials. Open-source and Israeli-linked accounts alleged the trucks might instead be carrying drones produced in Tajikistan, noting that the convoy was unusually large for a country with Tajikistan's limited resources and went without independent verification. The suspicion rests on a documented precedent: Reuters, citing nine Syrian, Iranian, Israeli, and Western sources, reported that Tehran had been using humanitarian channels to transfer weapons to allies in Syria after the 2023 earthquake—an account Iran denied. The Tajik allegation remains unverified, but it fits a tactic Iran has used elsewhere.

 The Tajik Drone Project as Part of Iranian Geopolitical Strategy

 At the 2022 opening, General Mohammad Bagheri stated the plant was a "turning point" and that Iran would produce drones in the Tajik capital "both for its own needs and for supplies to allied and friendly countries". Currently, Iranian supplies to the "Axis of Resistance" fighting the US, Israel, and Gulf monarchies include the Yemen-based Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah. This suggests Iran originally intended to link Tajik production to its global drone export network.

 That ambition is precisely what risks turning Tajikistan from a beneficiary of the partnership into an instrument of Iranian strategy.

 The pattern is familiar from Iran’s typical military-technological export strategy. Tehran generally exports basic systems first before gradually upgrading the level of technology, as was specifically the case with short-range missiles and UAVs in Syria and Yemen.

 On this logic, Tajikistan was likely meant to serve as an infrastructure bridgehead — for training personnel, building out logistics, and upgrading production over time — with the plant eventually moving to more complex, modern UAVs.

Tehran treated the Tajik factory as a breakthrough. Iran had long supplied drones to Middle Eastern allies and helped them produce, maintain, and upgrade the systems, but an official plant in a neutral state with an internationally recognized government marked a new export model for its military-industrial complex.

 Seen this way, Tajikistan offered Iran a relatively "safe territory" for its military industry: far from Israel and the United States, under less international scrutiny than Middle Eastern states, and so at lower risk of direct strikes, sabotage, or heavy sanctions pressure.

 That arrangement carried a real risk of pulling Tajikistan into Middle Eastern conflicts — and the exposure was not confined to the Middle East. Against the backdrop of Tajikistan’s deep corruption, Western and Russian outlets leveled competing accusations at Dushanbe over the sale of Iranian-designed drones to Russia or, conversely, to Ukraine.

 In April 2022, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Stop Iranian Drones Act, House-passed legislation that amended the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act to cover combat drones, extending the threat of sanctions to foreign entities that supply, sell, transfer, or support Iranian UAVs. Joint drone production with Iran therefore raised Dushanbe’s exposure to U.S. sanctions in Tajikistan. Dushanbe almost certainly understood the danger and worked to manage it, though how far it actually stalled the Iranian project remains unclear — as the conflicting assessments above make plain.

 Sanctions Risks and "Plausible Deniability"

 This raises the operative question: could a facility — non-functional by some accounts, barely functioning by others — still serve Iran as a means to circumvent sanctions and international agreements, and in doing so expose Tajikistan to the covert operations of the IRGC?

 The actions of the Iranian military and intelligence services in Tajikistan are facilitated by the fact that in April 2025, Iran and Tajikistan signed a memorandum on expanding security cooperation. The memorandum covers cooperation against terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, the smuggling of nationals, and human trafficking. The scope for Iranian use of Tajik territory matters more now that the 2026 war with the U.S. and Israel may leave Tehran bound by new commitments. As experience with such agreements shows, it will likely seek ways to bypass the restrictions imposed upon it.

 Suppose Iran commits to abandoning aggressive expansion in the Middle East — the terrorist acts and military operations of the so-called "Axis of Resistance." The IRGC would then need to continue that policy informally, without breaching the agreement, and moving the activity offshore becomes the obvious answer. Remote Tajikistan could serve as exactly that bypass channel.

Iran operates under extensive international sanctions and monitoring. Even a nominally functioning plant in Tajikistan could therefore help obscure the true origin of military goods, complicate supply-chain tracing, and route activity through a “third-country jurisdiction.”

The most straightforward scenario would involve Iranian drones or other military equipment being exported to third countries or non-state actors under documentation formally identifying Tajikistan as the point of origin or intermediary. A more realistic possibility is a form of “soft” sanctions evasion. For example, a drone assembled in Tajikistan could formally be classified as locally manufactured and carry Tajik labeling. From there, particularly given Tajikistan’s high levels of corruption, such systems could potentially be transferred to virtually any conflict zone worldwide. This would create a degree of plausible deniability, making it considerably more difficult to prove direct Iranian involvement in the export process.

Such a mechanism could in turn evolve into a more sophisticated “fragmented supply chain”: components sourced from several countries, final assembly in Tajikistan, the drone’s true origin blurred both legally and logistically, and Iranian involvement that much harder to prove. Exposure, though, would put Tajikistan itself at serious risk, secondary international sanctions included.

Dushanbe is aware of these risks and will try to avoid them. But given the scale of Tajik corruption and Iran’s demonstrated willingness to exploit corrupt networks abroad, whether the government can fully insulate itself remains an open question.

Corruption and the Iranian Exploitation of Tajik Infrastructure 

Evidence shows Tajikistan was previously used by the IRGC to launder funds from illegal oil trade. Businessman Babak Zanjani admitted to using a network of 64 companies to bypass sanctions and transfer nearly $17.5 billion to Iran. Some of these funds moved through Tajikistan’s Kont Investment Bank in Dushanbe and other Zanjani’s properties in this country, including an airline, a taxi company, and a bus terminal. Zanjani had close ties to the Tajik elite, though the government later distanced itself from him. The Basel Institute on Governance’s AML Index has ranked Tajikistan among the world’s highest money-laundering risks. It topped that index as recently as 2018, though Tajikistan’s score has since improved.

 The U.S. Department of the Treasury noted that the Zanjani group was used by the Iranian government to facilitate global oil sales and highlighted Zanjani’s links to Khatam al-Anbiya, the engineering arm of the IRGC. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) explicitly included the Zanjani-linked Kont Investment Bank in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in its list of sanctioned entities on April 11, 2013, designating it under the regime covering proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). U.S. Treasury filings thus confirm that the IRGC has used Tajik territory for oil-sales operations whose proceeds could, among other things, have financed Iran’s nuclear program or its terrorist activity.

The corruption involved was so severe that Zanjani was later accused by Iran of embezzling $2.7 billion that was supposed to return to the treasury. While Zanjani claimed the money was in a Tajik bank, Tajik authorities called his documents "fake". Although initially sentenced to death by Iranian court, Zanjani resumed economic activity in 2025, suggesting the Iranian authorities still value his expertise in money laundering and exploitation of corruption schemes abroad.

Strategic Risks of Iran–Tajikistan Military Cooperation

Whether or not a single Ababil-2 was ever assembled in Dushanbe may be the least important question here. The factory’s real significance is as a template: proof that Iran will site military-industrial capacity — or merely its paperwork — in weakly governed states far from Israeli reach and Western scrutiny. For Western policymakers, that reframes the target. Sanctions enforcement designed for Iranian soil will miss a model built on third-country labeling, corruption, and the kind of IRGC influence documented in Tajikistan. And for Dushanbe, the lesson is sharper still: the same neutrality and opacity that attract Iranian investment are what could one day place Tajikistan, not Iran, on the receiving end of secondary sanctions.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center specializing in international relations and security in Eurasia. He is also a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and has held academic appointments at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Eurasian National University in Astana, and Narxoz University in Almaty. During the war on terror in Afghanistan, he directed the Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and served on the Russian–American Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan under the East–West Institute. He is the author of over 100 publications, including 25 peer-reviewed articles indexed in Scopus, and his expert analysis has been cited by major international media including The Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Washington Post, BBC, and Deutsche Welle.

Economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and Armenia is gaining momentum, set against Trump administration-backed efforts to normalize Armenian–Azerbaijani relations. This engagement could give the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, initiative real economic substance, driven by regional actors seeking to develop new transport corridors and diversify existing routes. For now, however, significant military and political risks remain beyond the capacity of local actors to overcome.

How Astana Entered the TRIPP Conversation

On April 8-9, Kazakhstan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yerzhan Kosherbayev, and Minister of Transport, Nurlan Sauranbayev, traveled to Armenia on an official visit. The discussions built on issues first raised on November 20, 2025, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Kazakhstan. Pashinyan's trip followed a new stage in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace dialogue, backed by the Trump administration, and the announcement of the TRIPP project. In November 2025, the Kazakh side proposed a new transport artery based on TRIPP and linked to the Middle Corridor, which would pass through Armenia to provide faster access to Turkey and, through it, to Europe.

The April visit also produced a strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and Armenia. The Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process has allowed Astana to deepen ties with Yerevan without risking discontent from Azerbaijan, with which Kazakhstan also maintains close relations.

Kazakhstan had signaled its interest in the project as early as August 2025, in the first days after the TRIPP agreement was signed. A new international transit route is emerging — an alternative to the Georgian segment of the Middle Corridor — and Kazakhstan is a central player in freight transport between China and Europe.

Kazakhstan is closely monitoring the prospects for integrating TRIPP with the Middle Corridor, as well as the durability of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process that made the TRIPP initiative possible in the first place. Oil-rich Kazakhstan, one of the wealthiest post-Soviet states by GDP per capita, is exploring investment opportunities along the route.

Against this backdrop, Kazakhstan and Armenia have begun exploring the practical implementation of TRIPP, including viable commercial applications for an initiative that remains largely political in scope. Developing its commercial dimension could help stabilize the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process while expanding the transit capacities of Central Asian countries.

At the April 9, 2026, meeting between the two foreign ministers, both sides announced their intention to advance TRIPP and to deepen bilateral trade, economic, and investment dialogue. In a subsequent meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, Kazakhstan's foreign minister reaffirmed Astana's readiness to develop TRIPP as a means of expanding the region's transit potential.

Trade is Growing, But Moscow Still Shapes the Ceiling

Kazakh-Armenian economic relations are developing rapidly. In 2025, exports of Kazakh grain to Armenia resumed via a railway route through Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Contracts for Kazakh food products — including grain and meat — are expected to be long-term.

Bilateral trade volumes nonetheless remain modest. Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Armenia amounted to $69.2 million in 2025, $49 million in exports from Kazakhstan to Armenia and $20.2 million in imports from Armenia. The two countries have signed a Roadmap for Trade and Economic Cooperation for 2026–2030 that is expected to drive rapid expansion in bilateral trade.

An intergovernmental commission and a Kazakh-Armenian business council are already in place. Mutual investment is growing: more than 100 enterprises with Kazakh capital are registered in Armenia, while over 400 Armenian companies operate in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh government has shown particular interest in expanding cooperation in high-tech sectors; a branch of the Armenian educational program TUMO recently opened in Astana.

A potential breakthrough in bilateral relations could come if Armenia's railways were transferred to Kazakh investors — a possibility that surfaced in media reports around the April negotiations. Such an investment would significantly advance the practical realization of TRIPP. But this is only one of several possible scenarios. Armenia's railways remain under the control of Russian investors. While the Pashinyan government does not enjoy particularly strong relations with Moscow, Pashinyan himself has stated that any decision on the railways will be made in dialogue with Russia. The Kazakh government, which maintains fairly close ties with Moscow within its multi-vector framework, is unlikely to invest in Armenia's railways unless such a move is, in some form, coordinated with Russia.

More broadly, extending Kazakh-Armenian cooperation into the implementation of TRIPP faces significant geopolitical risks — above all, the positions of Iran, China, and Russia. Neither Yerevan nor, still less, Astana is willing to challenge these players in the South Caucasus. Both are instead exploring practical pathways for TRIPP's implementation, contingent on the Trump administration reaching an understanding with other extra-regional powers. So long as there are serious risks of spillover from hostilities involving Iran into the South Caucasus (as with recent Iranian drone strikes on Nakhchivan), continued Chinese resistance to expanding U.S. influence in Central Asia and the Caspian region, and the potential escalation of U.S.-Russia confrontation, major investments in TRIPP from a cautious actor like Kazakhstan are unrealistic. Additional risks stem from Armenia's relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. In both cases, the Pashinyan government has made progress toward a stable peace, but the process remains incomplete. Significant domestic political forces in Armenia opposed to such reconciliation continue to challenge Pashinyan. This internal uncertainty further discourages potential Kazakh investors.

Why Kazakhstan Needs TRIPP — and Why TRIPP Needs Kazakhstan

TRIPP runs through the Syunik Province in southern Armenia, linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave and onward to Turkey. Kazakhstan is not a direct participant in the corridor. Indirectly, however, if the route is integrated with connections across Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey, it could provide Kazakhstan with an alternative pathway to Turkey and, beyond it, to Europe, bypassing Georgia. This would create an additional branch of the existing Middle Corridor linking the Caspian region to Europe. Kazakhstan and transit shippers using its territory would gain greater flexibility in using the Middle Corridor.

From Kazakhstan's perspective, TRIPP establishes a second Trans-Caucasian route that allows cargo flows to bypass the Georgian segment. This is less about direct competition with the Georgian route than about diversification within a single macro-corridor. Such diversification could expand overall capacity and improve system resilience, reducing exposure to political disruptions and infrastructure bottlenecks. The Georgian and Armenian routes may also compete on cost and speed, driving down transit prices. In turn, this would strengthen the throughput capacity of the Middle Corridor, improve access for Central Asian exports to global markets, and support the scaling up of China-Europe transit through Kazakhstan.

The Armenian route to Southern and Central Europe via Turkey is more direct than the Georgian alternative — which relies on Black Sea shipping — potentially reducing delivery times along with fuel and operating costs. Diversifying the Middle Corridor across the South Caucasus also allows stakeholders to hedge against rising risks in Georgia, particularly those tied to the deterioration of relations between Tbilisi and the West. These include regulatory risks (potential instability in trade regimes with the EU), institutional risks (declining trust from EU governments, international banks, and logistics operators), and the prospect of domestic political instability linked to polarization within Georgia. All of this may affect insurance and transit costs, increase customs friction, and lead investors to price in higher risk premiums.

Kazakhstan occupies a pivotal position among actors interested in developing TRIPP as part of the Middle Corridor. It is the largest transit economy in Central Asia and a key overland bridge between China and the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan also accounts for a significant share of Central Asia's trade with the European Union. Its interest in investing in TRIPP stems from the fact that the project would expand a system in which Kazakhstan already serves as a central hub. If Middle Corridor capacity grows through integration with TRIPP, overall cargo flows are likely to grow with it, along with transit volumes passing through Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan has a clear interest in investing in TRIPP as a way to secure influence over tariffs, participate in governance mechanisms, and gain access to data and cargo flows. It is well-positioned to do so, drawing on substantial financial resources, state-controlled enterprises, and sovereign wealth funds.

Even without direct investment in Armenia, integrating TRIPP with the Middle Corridor would require Kazakhstan to expand its own transport capacity — overland and maritime. It would also require investment in digital infrastructure, including unified cargo tracking systems, electronic documentation, and integrated tariff platforms. Without such upgrades, broader expansion of trade along the Middle Corridor would be difficult to achieve.

As for Astana's political role, integrating TRIPP with the Middle Corridor will require coordination among a wide range of regional and external actors. Kazakhstan is well placed to act as a neutral mediator, consistent with its multi-vector foreign policy. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are already discussing an agreement aimed at strengthening the status of the Trans-Caspian Corridor in the context of the opening of the Zangezur Corridor.

Astana has developed a reputation as an "honest broker" for several reasons:

·      Multi-vector diplomacy — maintaining working relationships with the United States, China, Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, among others.

·      A track record as a neutral platform — Kazakhstan has previously hosted direct Armenian–Azerbaijani negotiations and played a role in facilitating dialogue between Russia and Turkey over Syria within the so-called "Astana process."

·      No direct territorial or military interests in the South Caucasus.

Kazakhstan can convene formal, high-level meetings among relevant stakeholders while also facilitating informal contacts (Track 1.5 and Track 2). Such consultations could help build political consensus on key issues, including security arrangements along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, corridor governance, transit security, and the protection of investments.

Kazakhstan could also act as a technical intermediary and "systems integrator" in logistics, aligning the interests of different states and commercial actors in integrating the Middle Corridor and TRIPP — particularly in harmonizing customs procedures, digital transport documentation, and transit tariffs.

Kazakhstan would, however, face important constraints. These stem from its role as a formally neutral actor in South Caucasus affairs and from the sensitivities embedded in its relations with multiple partners. Astana neither can nor seeks to guarantee security in the South Caucasus, nor is it in a position to impose solutions on the parties involved. Maintaining balance among actors themselves in conflict will require considerable caution. Armenia could perceive a "pro-Turkish" or "pro-Azerbaijani" tilt; Azerbaijan might view Kazakhstan as insufficiently supportive; Iran, China, or Russia could read Kazakhstan's involvement in a U.S.-backed initiative as a challenge to their own interests. If Astana chooses to mediate on TRIPP within its multi-vector framework, it will do so with considerable restraint.

Kazakhstan is best understood, in this sense, as an "architect of the negotiating environment" — providing a platform, facilitating dialogue, and helping develop technical agreements, rather than acting as a guarantor or enforcer.

A Decisive Role, With Hard Limits

Economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and Armenia is deepening rapidly. This engagement could give TRIPP tangible economic substance, driven by regional actors interested in developing new transport routes. Kazakhstan has a particularly strong stake in diversifying the Middle Corridor and is well-positioned to contribute substantially to its practical implementation through investment, diplomacy, and technical coordination among stakeholders.

Significant military and political risks nonetheless persist. Neither Yerevan nor, especially, Astana is likely to move from economic cooperation to TRIPP implementation unless the Trump administration addresses the project's broader geopolitical risks.

Until these risks are mitigated, Armenia and Kazakhstan will continue to deepen economic cooperation in other areas, laying the groundwork for a rapid pivot to joint engagement in international transport projects should the geopolitical environment become more favorable.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center specializing in international relations and security in Eurasia. He is also a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and has held academic appointments at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Eurasian National University in Astana, and Narxoz University in Almaty. During the war on terror in Afghanistan, he directed the Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and served on the Russian–American Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan under the East–West Institute. He is the author of over 100 publications, including 25 peer-reviewed articles indexed in Scopus, and his expert analysis has been cited by major international media including The Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Washington Post, BBC, and Deutsche Welle.

Turan Research Center Research Fellow Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman contributed to a new analytical report published by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS), examining Kazakhstan's 2026 constitutional reform within a broader framework of institutional and socio-economic transformation.

The report analyzes the constitutional changes approved in the March 15 national referendum — which passed with 87.15% support and 73.12% voter turnout — across several dimensions: institutional modernization of the political system, including the transition to a unicameral parliament and the creation of the vice-presidency; the expansion of rights and freedoms, including in the digital sphere; the constitutional prioritization of education, science, and innovation; and the reform's implications for Kazakhstan's role as a middle power in Eurasia. The analysis integrates comparative perspectives on international constitutional referendums and empirical data from sociological surveys conducted between January and March 2026.

Kazantsev-Vaisman was among the international and Kazakhstani experts who contributed professional expertise and comparative perspectives to the report, alongside Alberto Turkstra of the Diplomatic World, Wesley Alexander Hill of the International Tax and Investment Center, David Aptsiauri, and Karlygash Jamankulova of the Adil Soz Foundation.

Read the full report here.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The military operation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026 may create serious economic challenges for the countries of Central Asia, particularly in the sphere of transportation. The war has significantly disrupted the functioning of two key transport corridors: the International North–South Transport Corridor (Russia – Caspian sea – Iran – India) and the southern branch of the Eurasian East–West transport corridor passing through Iran. This is unfolding against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities in the Black Sea region, which have already had a negative impact on transport routes linking the region with Europe.

Shortly before that, on February 21–22, 2026, the long-simmering conflict between Kabul and Islamabad sharply escalated. This armed confrontation may effectively block the Central Asia-Afghanistan–Pakistan–India transport routes. The hostilities in Iran may also exacerbate instability in Afghanistan due to the close economic tiesbetween the two countries. As a result, the countries of Central Asia may either be forced to increase their involvement in addressing Afghanistan’s internal problems or face growing instability along the Tajik–Afghan and Turkmen–Afghan borders.

Read the full article on the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The war in Iran that began on February 28, 2026, has posed a range of political and economic challenges for the states of Central Asia. This analysis examines how these countries are navigating the crisis within the framework of their multi-vector foreign policies — and why Kazakhstan, in particular, has emerged as the region's most active diplomatic player.

Kazakhstan as a Potential Mediator

The states of Central Asia have long pursued multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to maintain broad cooperation with all major external actors. In times of international crisis, this approach typically produces either deliberately vague statements designed to appear friendly toward all parties, or silence altogether. The outbreak of the Iran war has been no exception — but Kazakhstan's response has stood out.

Astana officially called for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the conflict, consistent with its established practice. Yet the emphasis of its statements placed it closer to the main European positions emphasizing Iranian aggression towards the Gulf than to those of the Global South. While most Central Asian states issued maximally neutral formulations, and China-led countries directed criticism primarily at the United States and Israel without examining Tehran's own role in the escalation, Kazakhstan chose to foreground Iran's aggressive actions toward its Gulf neighbors.

This alignment reflects a clear strategic logic. In recent years, Kazakhstan has refrained from full participation in BRICS, the principal institutional platform of the Global South. In November 2025, Astana announced it would join the Abraham Accords, laying the groundwork for deeper economic cooperation with both the United States and Israel. At the inaugural summit of the Board of Peace on February 19, 2026, Kazakhstan agreed to participate in Gaza's reconstruction, undertook financial commitments, and expressed readiness to deploy peacekeepers. Astana’s position in the conflict with Iran suggests it is prioritizing preserving the special relationships it has begun to develop with the United States and Israel.

After Iran carried out strikes against neighboring countries, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent official messages of support and solidarity to the leaders of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He also held personal telephone conversations with the emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the president of the UAE Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and the king of Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. The United Arab Emirates, as the country most severely affected by the Iranian attacks, was offered humanitarian assistance.

These steps reflect diplomatic, religious, and economic considerations alike. Although Kazakhs are predominantly Sunni Muslims, Kazakhstan, as a secular state, generally avoids framing its foreign policy in religious terms. Nevertheless, expressions of solidarity with Sunni-majority Arab states may be politically less sensitive domestically than overt support for Iran, the leading Shiite power, particularly in moments of regional polarization. The economic rationale is equally clear: the Arab states of the Gulf rank among the largest investors in Kazakhstan's economy.

Given Astana's prior experience coordinating fundamentally divergent actors through the Syria peace process — in which Iran was a participant — and its simultaneously constructive relations with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and Jerusalem, Kazakhstan could emerge as an additional channel of international communication should Oman's mediation efforts falter. In this context, Tokayev's diplomatic activism also strengthens the case for a possible nomination to the position of UN Secretary-General, a prospect some local analysts consider credible given his experience, competencies, and knowledge of Russian, English, and Chinese.

One further nuance deserves attention. While Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed condolencesto Iran over civilian casualties, there was no separate presidential message of condolence following the death of Ali Khamenei — unlike the statements issued by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The omission was noted with dissatisfaction by the Iranian ambassador in Astana.

Responses Across the Region

Kyrgyzstan adhered to its customary approach of maximum distance from the conflict. Its Foreign Ministry issued a brief statement expressing concern, calling for restraint and a return to dialogue in accordance with the UN Charter. Bishkek remained officially silent on the death of Khamenei, although a pro-Iran rally is expected to take place.

The situation is more complex in the southern tier of Central Asia, where geographic proximity to Iran, higher levels of Islamic religiosity, and — in Tajikistan's case — cultural and linguistic affinity with Iran all complicate the diplomatic calculus. In the case of Dushanbe, rising Iranian influence in the country factors into the political calculus.

Uzbekistan expressed serious concern and called on all parties to exercise restraint. On March 3, the Uzbek foreign minister held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart and expressed condolences over civilian deaths. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent a condolence message following Khamenei's death, though it was carefully worded so as not to provoke tensions with Washington or Jerusalem. Already in the summer of 2025, during the Iran–Israel war, Tashkent had called on its population to exercise caution when commenting publicly on the conflict. Uzbek press coverage has accordingly been limited to factual reporting and the practical implications for Uzbek citizens in the Middle East.

Among Central Asian states, Tajikistan maintains the closest and most multi-layered ties with Iran, grounded incultural and linguistic kinship, Iranian investment, and a degree of political influence. President Emomali Rahmon was the first regional leader to send a telegram of condolence following Khamenei's death, describing the two nations as "brotherly." Yet Rahmon, like Mirziyoyev, refrained from any sharp words of condemnation directed at the United States or Israel.

Turkmenistan maintained its traditional posture of official neutrality, describing the escalation as "regrettable" and calling for diplomatic resolution. For Ashgabat, the conflict raises a specific security concern: the long Turkmen–Iranian border runs in close proximity to the capital and the strategically important Ahal region. As private discussions with representatives of the Turkmen Foreign Ministry suggest, this creates the potential for refugee flows and related challenges, including increased narcotics trafficking.

Challenges and Opportunities

Several common challenges have emerged for the region. The most pressing is the need to maintain foreign policy balance while resisting pressure to adopt the more confrontational stance toward the United States and Israel characteristic of much of the Global South. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan and is led by China, issued a statement emphasizing the need to ensure the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iran — a formulation that implicitly challenges the Western-led military operation.

A less openly discussed risk concerns the potential for terrorist attacks against American or Israeli targets in Central Asia. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has considerable experience conducting covert operations in the region and in neighboring Azerbaijan.

The economic challenges are also significant. The military operation that began on February 28 compounds an already deteriorating transit picture: just days earlier, the long-simmering conflict between Kabul and Islamabad had escalated into armed confrontation on February 21–22, effectively closing another southern route. Growing instability in Iran could also deepen Afghanistan's fragility, given the close economic interdependence between the two countries. Experts across the region also point to the risk of a significant influx of refugees from Iran and the broader Middle East. Kazakh military analyst Karlygash Nugmanova has warned that the conflict could expand geographically and affect Central Asia itself.

For Kazakhstan's authorities, the domestic dimension is particularly acute: a referendum on a new constitution has been scheduled for March 15, and securing a positive outcome is a political priority. President Tokayev has introduced an emergency planning framework to prepare for potential economic and socio-political repercussions from disruptions in global trade and energy markets. Security measures have been strengthened across the region at the law enforcement level.

Yet the situation also presents potential opportunities. The Kazakh economist Yerzhan Yessimkhanov notes that only ninety-six Kazakh citizens were in Iran when the war began — a reflection of how thoroughly previous efforts at bilateral economic cooperation had stalled under the current Iranian system. A change in Tehran's political regime could open the way for expanded cooperation in agriculture, transit, and construction. Almas Chukin, another Kazakh economist, argues that the subsequent lifting of Western sanctions could create new transit and transportation opportunities for all Central Asian nations. Rising oil prices may benefit Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, though for the region's oil-importing states, higher energy costs pose risks to the relatively stable economic growth of recent years.

Underlying these calculations is a broader premise. As Kazakhstan's ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov, has noted, Central Asian states are interested in a stable and predictable Iran. The Islamic Republic's nearly five decades of revolutionary governance, marked by cycles of confrontation, sanctions, and regional destabilization, have consistently frustrated that aspiration — which is precisely why the prospect of regime change, however uncertain, holds a strategic appeal for the region that extends well beyond economics.

Conclusion: Multi-Vector Diplomacy Under Stress

Despite pressure from the Global South, the political elites of Central Asia have largely maintained neutrality and shown little willingness to offer meaningful support to Iran. At most, Tehran can expect symbolic gestures — references to a "brotherly people," in the style of Emomali Rahmon.

The war has generated significant risks for the region, from the disruption of cargo transit routes — compounded by simultaneous crises in Iran and Afghanistan — to the possibility that the IRGC may seek to exploit pro-Iranian sentiment among certain segments of the population to conduct operations, including potential attacks against American or Israeli interests.

Kazakhstan has distinguished itself through its diplomatic activism, with Tokayev placing particular emphasis on solidarity with the Arab states of the Gulf. This positions Astana as a potential alternative negotiating channel should Oman lose its mediating role. At the same time, Kazakhstan's leadership has sent clear signals that — while maintaining its characteristic foreign policy balance — it intends to preserve the special political and economic relationships it has cultivated with the administration of Donald Trump and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center specializing in international relations and security in Eurasia. He is also a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and has held academic appointments at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Eurasian National University in Astana, and Narxoz University in Almaty. During the war on terror in Afghanistan, he directed the Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and served on the Russian–American Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan under the East–West Institute. He is the author of over 100 publications, including 25 peer-reviewed articles indexed in Scopus, and his expert analysis has been cited by major international media including The Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Washington Post, BBC, and Deutsche Welle.

Turan Research Center Research Fellow Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman spoke with DKNews about the significance of President Tokayev's participation in the inaugural session of the Board of Peace in Washington, Kazakhstan's potential role in Gaza's humanitarian recovery, and the strategic dimensions of Kazakh-American economic diplomacy. Below is an English translation of his comments, which appeared in the original Russian-language interview.

On the significance of Tokayev's participation in the Board of Peace:

"The participation of Kazakhstan's President in the inaugural session of the Board of Peace is of fundamental importance both for the country itself and for the broader architecture of international relations. First and foremost, it is a step that strengthens Kazakhstan's positioning as a responsible middle power — one capable of acting not as an object but as a subject of global politics. The President's presence at such a forum demonstrates Kazakhstan's readiness not only to support peacekeeping initiatives but to participate in their institutional design.

Second, this is a logical continuation of the country's multi-vector foreign policy. For three decades, Kazakhstan has consistently advanced an agenda of trust, disarmament, and diplomatic mediation — from the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to initiatives within the UN and regional cooperation formats. Participation in the Board of Peace reinforces this image and solidifies the country's reputation as a constructive and predictable partner.

For the Board of Peace itself, such a participant also introduces important nuances. Kazakhstan's example, if followed by others, would strengthen the collective agency of 'middle powers' as an independent group of actors. As President Tokayev himself has noted in his publications, in conditions of transformation of the world order, it is precisely such states that are capable of advancing ideas of inclusive security, sustainable development, and multilateralism without being directly drawn into the geopolitical rivalry of great powers."

On the invitation from President Trump and Kazakhstan's niche:

"The invitation from President Trump can be read as a diplomatic signal of Washington's desire to broaden the circle of international partners involved in finding paths toward de-escalation of the conflict in Gaza — and potentially, in the longer term, in addressing a wider range of issues. In conditions of a protracted global crisis and high polarization of the international community, the United States has an objective interest in engaging states with a reputation as neutral and constructive actors.

Kazakhstan fits this context very organically. The country consistently adheres to a policy of multilateralism and balance, building pragmatic relationships with Western states, with the countries of the Islamic world, with Russia, and with China. This creates potential for a dialogue function — Kazakhstan is perceived as a moderate partner not associated with a confrontational agenda.

Additionally, the personality of Kazakhstan's President himself can contribute to the development of this new format. As is well known, he is a very experienced diplomat with solid experience in the UN system. Accordingly, his personal competencies can make an additional and serious contribution to the advancement of international dialogue and the cause of peace."

On Kazakhstan's potential humanitarian contribution:

"Kazakhstan's potential contribution to ensuring sustained humanitarian support for the region can be assessed as significant and in demand, particularly given the deficit of trust among key international actors.

First, Kazakhstan has a reputation as a state that adheres to a balanced and neutral foreign policy line. The republic maintains good relations with Israel and the United States and recently, as is known, endorsed the Abraham Accords framework. At the same time, Kazakhstan has very good relations with Arab and other Muslim countries. This position allows it to build working contacts with various parties to the conflict and with a broad circle of international partners. In the humanitarian sphere, this is especially important: access to affected populations, coordination of deliveries, and agreement on monitoring mechanisms all require mutual trust and political impartiality.

Second, the country has practical experience participating in international peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives under the UN aegis. Kazakh peacekeepers and humanitarian structures have been deployed in various regions, building institutional competence in coordination, logistics, and interaction with multilateral missions. Most importantly, Kazakh peacekeepers have gained experience with a presence in Syria, Lebanon, and in the mission monitoring the ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. They are even present in such hotspots as the Golan Heights.

Third, Kazakhstan's experience in intercultural and interreligious dialogue could serve as an important resource. In the long term, humanitarian support must be accompanied by programs for restoring interreligious and interethnic peace. Here, Kazakhstan — as a state with a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic society that has developed its own unique model of tolerance — can offer positive solutions."

On the Tokayev-Trump personal dynamic:

"Personal contacts between Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Donald Trump can certainly play a role in Kazakh-American cooperation within the new organization. Donald Trump's diplomatic style has traditionally been characterized by pronounced personalization. Therefore, establishing a trusted communication channel between the presidents can facilitate discussion of sensitive issues. For his part, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is an extremely professional diplomat who excels at establishing channels of international dialogue.

However, it is important to understand that personal relationships between leaders do not replace institutional foreign policy mechanisms. They can accelerate decision-making, create an additional layer of trust, or ease tensions, but sustainable agreements still rest on the work of diplomatic teams and interstate procedures."

On economic diplomacy and strategic trust:

"Tokayev's meetings with the heads of major American companies during his visit to the United States should be viewed not only as an economic event but as an important element of strategic diplomacy. When a relationship features a stable economic interest, dialogue acquires a more predictable and pragmatic character. The economic dimension is especially important in the context of Trump's views on foreign policy. He is, above all, a businessman by personal experience. His approach to foreign policy has traditionally relied on the logic of favorable deals, investment agreements, and trade balances.

For Kazakhstan, this logic largely resonates with its own foreign policy philosophy. The Kazakh model of multi-vector diplomacy was built from the outset on pragmatism: strengthening political ties for the purpose of economic development, diversifying partners, and creating stable channels of interaction with all global centers of power. Engagement with American business strengthens not only the investment climate but also strategic trust — since major corporations, which have particular influence on the Republican administration but can also influence Democrats, become additional stakeholders in stable bilateral relations. Moreover, it is very important for Kazakhstan to maintain a balance between relations with the United States and relations with Russia and China. If the emphasis is on business and diplomacy rather than military-political alignment with Washington, this allows Kazakhstan to sustain its balanced multi-vector policy. In the context of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy, it is also important that active diplomatic consultations are underway between Moscow and Washington, so the very fact of the visit to the United States again reflects the logic of 'both-and' rather than 'either-or' that has always distinguished Astana's foreign policy."

Read the full interview on DKNews (Russian).

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Iran and Tajikistan have rapidly expanded bilateral cooperation in recent years, yet the relationship carries significant risks. Chief among them is the increasing activity of Iranian intelligence — led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — in Tajikistan, and the possibility that the country could become partially integrated into Iran's "axis of resistance," potentially against Dushanbe's own preferences. This analysis examines one dimension of what Iranian experts describe as a "deepening of Iran's strategic view towards Tajikistan": the recruitment of Tajik citizens by Iranian intelligence services.

Following the civil war of 1992–1997, Tajikistan faced profound socioeconomic hardships and has since relied heavily on remittances from its migrant labor force abroad. The Central Asian country consistently ranks among global leaders in the share of GDP derived from foreign remittances. Structural dependence on migration makes many Tajik citizens willing to accept virtually any form of work abroad — a vulnerability actively exploited by terrorist organizations and intelligence agencies, including those operating under Iranian authority.

Religious Outreach as Strategic Cover

Shiites constitute only around five percent of Tajikistan's Muslim population — approximately 400,000 people. Most are Ismailis from the Gorno-Badakhshan region, traditionally shaped by the liberal and pro-Western religious influence of the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the 12-15 million global Ismaili community. Nonetheless, beginning in the 1990s, an extensive propaganda campaign conducted by Iranian emissaries brought hundreds of Tajiks to religious seminaries in Iran, where they received training in Shia doctrine. Today they form the nucleus of the country's Shia clergy and come not only from Gorno-Badakhshan but also from regions where Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school has historically predominated.

Iran's religious outreach — along with funding for cultural initiatives in Tajikistan — was accompanied by deliberate efforts to insert Iranian operatives into Tajik institutions, a pattern familiar from several Middle Eastern states. According to regional experts, through active recruitment campaigns, Iranian intelligence services have succeeded in infiltrating segments of the administrative and law enforcement apparatus and now occupy influential mid-level positions.

Iranian intelligence services did not limit their activities to contacts with Tajik Shia communities. Close cooperation between Iran and Tajik Islamist groups — including Sunni members of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) — dates back to the civil war of the 1990s and continued well beyond that period. Collaboration between Iranian intelligence and Sunni actors is by no means unprecedented; recent examples include Tehran's ties with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, while earlier instances of IRGC engagement with Sunni factions in the Middle East are also well documented.

Tellingly, some UTO representatives, influenced by their interactions with Iran, began to display flexibility in blending Shia and Sunni religious practices. On December 2, 2011, several prominent UTO figures conducted the Shia ritual of Ashura inside a Sunni mosque near Dushanbe. For Shia Muslims, Ashura is a day of mourning for the martyred Imam Husayn. In the political theology of contemporary Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah, however, it has become a central symbol within the broader narrative of the "axis of resistance," signifying struggle against the United States, Israel, and Arab monarchies.

Among Sunnis, Ashura carries a fundamentally different meaning: it commemorates the deliverance of the Prophet Musa (Moses) and the Children of Israel from Pharaoh. Sunnis mark the day through fasting and prayer, but the occasion lacks the public, mobilizing, and politically charged character it has acquired in Shia contexts. The commemoration of Husayn's martyrdom in a Sunni mosque — instead of the traditional Sunni remembrance of the Israelites' exodus from Egypt — provoked major controversy in Tajikistan. The incident became one of the arguments cited by authorities when they imposed an official ban on Tajik students pursuing religious education in Iran.

Documented Operations and Terrorist Activity

Several materials released by Tajik authorities assert that Iranian intelligence services have been involved in operations on Tajik territory, including recruitment, the use of proxy groups, and organization of terrorist attacks. On July 29, 2018, a terrorist attack targeting foreign cyclists took place in Tajikistan's Khatlon region, resulting in the deaths of two U.S. citizens, one Dutch national, and one Swiss national.

According to the testimony of Abdusamadov, a terrorist detained by Tajik security services, he underwent ideological indoctrination and military training between 2014 and 2015 in the city of Qom and at a training camp in Iran's Mazandaran province. Following the 2015 ban on the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), he sought refuge in Iran. At the same time, he maintained membership in ISIS. The individual identified as the organizer of the attack, Ubaidov, likewise studied at religious institutions in Iran and received similar training in IRGC camps. He later engaged in recruiting Tajik labor migrants in Russia on behalf of Iranian intelligence services. In doing so, the Iranians allegedly used IRPT membership as convenient cover for recruitment activities inside Russia.

Skepticism toward Tajik law enforcement agencies, sympathy for the IRPT — which was subjected to repression in Tajikistan — and general reluctance among Russian analysts to engage with the argument that Tajik migrants were being recruited on Russian soil led several experts, primarily from Russia, to advance an alternative version. According to their assessment, the attack had been organized by ISIS. This divergence prompted debate between Russian and Tajik experts. Tajik commentators insisted that Iranian intelligence had been recruiting Tajik labor migrants in Russia under the banner of the IRPT first, while the attack in Tajikistan was later carried out under the borrowed brand of ISIS. At that time, the IRPT was viewed relatively benignly in Russia, whereas ISIS was not — making such dual-layered cover logically plausible.

In 2018, thirteen individuals were detained in Tajikistan on charges of preparing another terrorist attack; they too had undergone training in Iran. Once again, recruitment was reportedly carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives. In Russia, recruitment was conducted under the familiar cover of affiliation with the IRPT, while the planned attack was meant to appear as an operation carried out under the banner of ISIS.

Not all instances of such Iranian covert operations became public. Tajik authorities tended to disclose only those cases that could cast a shadow on the opposition IRPT by portraying it as involved in terrorist activity. At the same time, because of Dushanbe's close political and economic relationship with Tehran, the authorities were inclined to publicize only those episodes of Iranian intelligence activity that, directly or indirectly, involved IRPT members. As a result, a significant number of other cases may never have entered the public domain.

The use of organizational cover — operations conducted under the flag of other movements — is a common tactic employed by the IRGC in the Middle East. For this reason, it should be stressed that the use of IRPT-linked identities as operational cover by Iranian intelligence does not itself reflect negatively on the Tajik opposition. Rather, it illustrates a standard modus operandi of Iranian intelligence services.

Escalation After October 7

Following the outbreak of the war in Gaza after Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel — and amid the subsequent escalation of Iranian-Israeli confrontation — Iranian intelligence services significantly expanded their recruitment of Central Asian nationals, especially Tajiks, for potential use against Israel and the United States. Alongside Tajiks, recruitment of smaller numbers of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz has also been reported. According to these accounts, Iranian operatives have been dispatching such recruits to the conflict zone in the Middle East.

The relatively easy recruitment of Tajik citizens by Iranian intelligence services is attributed to three factors: shared language and cultural affinity, difficult socioeconomic conditions faced both by residents of Tajikistan and by Tajik labor migrants abroad, and a sense of religious solidarity with Palestinian Arabs. This recruitment channel has effectively supplemented the well-known pattern through which the IRGC mobilized various groups for the war in Syria and, since 2023, for operations against Israel across multiple theaters. The principal formations involved include Iraqi Shia militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Hazara-dominated Fatemiyoun Brigade from Afghanistan, closely connected to the political organization Hezbollah Afghanistan.

Central Asian militants typically reach the Palestinian theater through two main routes. The first is the Iranian corridor: they travel directly from Central Asia to Tehran, then proceed to Syria, and from there are dispatched to the conflict zone. The second is the Afghan-Iranian route: first to Afghanistan, then onward to Iran, followed by Syria, and ultimately to the operational area, most likely Lebanon.

Regional Influence Operations

Another objective of Iranian intelligence has been to facilitate actions in several Central Asian countries aimed at influencing public opinion and shaping the foreign policy choices of local governments. Here, too, parallels with Iranian behavior elsewhere are evident. The IRGC has long conducted similar operations in Azerbaijan, which Tehran views as aligned with the United States and Israel.

Andrey Serenko, a prominent Russian orientalist and specialist on Central Asia and Afghanistan, reported on his Telegram channel that on November 18, 2023, two Tajik citizens attempted to set fire to a Jewish educational center in Almaty, Kazakhstan. On November 20, according to the same source, four individuals from various Central Asian states — including Tajikistan — attempted a planned attack on the office of the Jewish Agency in Almaty. According to Serenko's description, which was later deleted, these incidents were connected with Iranian intelligence services. Additional incidents occurred not only in Kazakhstan but also in Uzbekistan. Interestingly, Serenko argues that the latter episodes prompted Tashkent to deepen its cooperation with Iran in order to balance its engagement with Israel.

On the other hand, if there was an intention to exert pressure on the government of Kazakhstan, the attempt clearly failed. On November 6, 2025, as part of its traditionally multi-vector foreign policy aimed at preserving regional peace and stability, official Astana announced it would join the Abraham Accords. The decision drew criticism in Tehran, and many Iranian commentators began calling for even more assertive policy in Central Asia to prevent the emergence of a bloc of U.S.-friendly states aligned with Turkey and Israel.

Dushanbe’s Strategic Calculus

How interested might the government of Tajikistan be in such an expansion of Iranian strategic influence? Given Tajikistan's own multi-vector foreign policy strategy — designed primarily to ensure the stability of President Rahmon's authoritarian regime and secure a hereditary transfer of power — Dushanbe has little incentive to enter into strategic entanglements with Iran that could risk drawing the country into direct confrontation with the United States and Israel. At international forums President Rahmon may offer rhetorical criticism of Israel, but it is unlikely to go beyond that. At the same time, Dushanbe will naturally not refuse economic assistance from Tehran.

Constraints on Iranian Influence

For Iran's attempts to exert informal influence in Tajikistan through its intelligence services under the disguise of economic and cultural cooperation, three groups of constraints are particularly significant:

Political constraints. Paradoxically, Iran's deepening political cooperation with Russia and China acts as one of the main limiting factors. Neither Moscow nor Beijing has any interest in the rise of Islamist extremist or terrorist activity in neighboring Central Asia, which could spill over onto their own territories. Indeed, if the Tajik authorities are correct in claiming that the IRGC at least twice previously attempted to stage attacks in Tajikistan under the banner of ISIS, the rationale may well have been, among other things, to avoid provoking Russian and Chinese opposition to Iranian actions. Moreover, the longstanding ties between Iranian state structures and segments of the Tajik opposition compel the Rahmon government — motivated by regime stability considerations — to control Iranian influence inside the country.

Economic constraints. A second limiting factor is that recruitment into terrorist groups can, to some extent, be analyzed through the lens of labor market competition between rival recruiters. This framework is particularly relevant when economic hardship is the primary driver behind recruitment, as is the case in Tajikistan. Competition from recruiters representing various international Sunni terrorist organizations significantly narrows the space available to Iranian intelligence services. The principal competitors in this regard are ISIS-K and the Central Asian group Ansarullah, which maintains links with the Taliban as well as with al-Qaeda.

A terrorist threat exists to Iran itself. A significant strategic constraint is also that the instrument reportedly used by Iranian security services — the recruitment of Tajik nationals — may turn into a weapon that Sunni terrorist organizations deploy against Iran. On January 3, 2024, twin suicide bombings struck the Iranian city of Kerman during a commemorative ceremony at the grave of Qasem Soleimani, one of the most prominent leaders of the IRGC. The attack killed 95 people. Responsibility was claimed by ISIS-K, and one of the perpetrators was a citizen of Tajikistan.

Conclusion

Iran's intelligence operations in Tajikistan reveal a sophisticated strategy that extends well beyond traditional bilateral relations. Through religious outreach, economic leverage, and exploitation of labor migration patterns, Tehran has built a recruitment infrastructure that serves multiple strategic objectives: projecting power in Central Asia, mobilizing proxy forces against Israel and the United States, and potentially integrating Tajikistan into its axis of resistance.

Yet the limits of Iranian influence are equally instructive. Russia and China's security concerns, competition from Sunni extremist groups, and Dushanbe's own regime stability imperatives create meaningful constraints on Tehran's ambitions. The Rahmon government faces a delicate balancing act: accepting Iranian economic assistance while preventing the country from becoming a staging ground for regional destabilization.

For Western policymakers, the recruitment of Tajik citizens — especially labor migrants — into terrorist organizations constitutes a transnational security threat that demands sustained attention. Addressing the challenge requires moving beyond counterterrorism frameworks to tackle the root cause: the economic desperation that makes Tajik workers vulnerable to exploitation by multiple actors, from the IRGC to ISIS-K. Despite Tajikistan's rapid economic growth in 2025, the difficult socioeconomic conditions faced by its population remain the most important factor enabling recruitment.

International organizations and Western governments should prioritize economic development assistance, labor protections for migrants, and support for civil society in Tajikistan. Without addressing these structural vulnerabilities, competing recruitment networks — whether Iranian, Sunni extremist, or hybrid operations — will continue to exploit the country's most vulnerable citizens. The question is not whether recruitment will continue, but rather which actors will succeed in doing so and to what ends.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University specializing in international relations and security in Eurasia. He has held academic appointments at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Eurasian National University in Astana, and Narxoz University in Almaty. During the war on terror in Afghanistan, he directed the Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and served on the Russian–American Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan under the East–West Institute. He is the author of over 100 publications, including 25 peer-reviewed articles indexed in Scopus, and his expert analysis has been cited by major international media including The Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Washington Post, BBC, and Deutsche Welle.