Turan Research Center

Turkey’s defense industry is entering a new phase of global expansion—with Latin America emerging as its next strategic frontier. The recent delivery of Otokar vehicles to Ecuador and the ratification of a defense cooperation agreement with Brazil are recent developments in a potential attempt by Ankara to replicate its success in the Turkic world across the Western Hemisphere.

From Regional Power to Global Exporter

Global instability, advanced defense technologies, and new markets have ushered in a golden age for defense industries. Turkey, once a net importer of military hardware, is expanding its global footprint by selling to longstanding allies and new clients.

Turkey’s domestic defense sector has reached a new level of maturity, marked by the development of advanced platforms such as frigates, the amphibious assault ship and drone carrier TCG Anadolu, the submarine TCG Piri Reis, and various uncrewed aerial systems. These domestic achievements occur parallel to a steady rise in defense exports, positioning Ankara as an increasingly influential player in the global arms market.

Yet arms sales do not occur in a vacuum. They are shaped by diplomatic ties between supplier and buyer states, the cost and reputation of the systems involved, and the strategic ambitions behind such transactions. In some cases,  arms sales can open new avenues for influence in regions where the supplier state has previously had limited diplomatic or trade relations. Turkey’s evolving relationships with the Turkic nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as its growing outreach to Latin America, are examples of such a dynamic.

The Golden Era of Defense Exports

The war in Ukraine and other global conflicts have reshaped the international arms market, displacing traditional suppliers and creating openings for emerging players. Russia, once the world’s second-largest exporter of military technology, has slipped to third place.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for the 2020-2024 period, the United States remains the top exporter, followed by France, with China cementing its position in fourth place. Turkey ranks 11th — between South Korea and the Netherlands — but has increased its share from 0.8% (2015-2019 period) to 1.7% in 2020-2024.

This rise is driven by the success of such Turkish defense firms as Aselsan, Bakyar, Otokar, and Turkish Aerospace Industries, which have diversified their export portfolios. Today, Turkish defense exports reach markets across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Between 2020 and 2024, according to SIPRI, Turkey supplied:

·       Albania – Bayraktar armed drones

·       Kosovo – TAM-MR antitank missiles

·       Philippines – CIRIT air-to-surface missiles and T-129B ATAK combat helicopters

·       Burkina Faso – Akinci armed drones and Ejder armored personnel carriers (APCs)

·       Chad – Aksungur armed drones

·       Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya – Bayraktar drones (Djibouti also received Kirpi APCs)

·       Bahrain – Cobra II armored vehicles

·       Qatar – Fuwairit landing ships, Ishat landing craft, and Ejder APCs

·       Saudi Arabia – Karayel armed drones

·       United Arab Emirates – Kirpi APCs and Bayraktar drones

Ukraine has also turned to Turkish weaponry for frontline defense. Its arsenal now includes Cobra II and Kirpi APCs, Bayraktar armed drones, and Roketsan’s TRG-300 Tiger guided multiple launch rocket system.

As more countries seek to reduce reliance on foreign arms imports, global defense exporters have an opportunity to establish long-term defense partnerships – offering not only economic gains but also deeper diplomatic and industrial ties.

South Korea provides a compelling model. In 2024, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and Peru’s state-run shipyard SIMA signed a landmark agreement to co-build one frigate, one offshore patrol vessel, and two logistics support vessels for the Peruvian Navy, with delivery expected by 2029. A year later, the two companies signed a memorandum to explore submarine development in Peru – a significant victory for HHI.

Turkey should take note. At the IDEF 2024 defense expo in Istanbul, Ankara and Astana signed an agreement to co-manufacture Bayraktar drones in Kazakhstan, signaling a shift toward regional industrial integration. While production timelines remain unclear, the agreement reflects Turkey’s growing interest in joint manufacturing projects.

Pan-Turkic Ties

Turkey and Turkic states across the Caucasus and Central Asia share deep historical and cultural bonds. In recent years, Ankara has actively sought to strengthen such partnerships and forge alliances. Through entities like the Organization for Turkic States, Ankara has promoted a new vision of pan-Turkism, positioning itself as both cultural anchor and emerging power among its Turkic brethren.

One of Ankara’s most tangible initiatives is its collaboration with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia to expand the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route -- also known as the Middle Corridor. This route aims to transport goods, including energy supplies, from Central Asia to Europe, while bypassing Russian and Iranian territory.

State agencies reinforce this effort. Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was established to provide development assistance to Central Asian republics and has operated in close coordination with local authorities.

Turkish companies also maintain a strong presence across Central Asia, particularly in construction, hospitality, and manufacturing (notably textiles). Nearly 4,000 Turkish businesses operate in the region, according to Kiran Baez of the Atlantic Council’s Turkey program. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani foreign direct investment in Turkey has reached $6.3 billion in the first six months of this year, a 27.1% increase over the same period in 2024.

Turkey’s deepening ties with the Turkic states are reflected not only in cultural affinity and economic cooperation but also in frequent high-level diplomatic meetings. In August, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met in Ankara to sign 20 agreements spanning energy partnerships between national oil companies, freight transport across the Middle Corridor, and joint initiatives in artificial intelligence, space, mining, and health. Bilateral trade between the two nations reached $5 billion in 2024.

Trilateral meetings are also gaining traction. Ministers from Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan convene regularly, with the most recent meeting held in Ankara in January.

While this commentary does not aim to provide a broad analysis of Ankara’s relations with its Turkic partners, it is worth noting that such high-profile engagement is occurring at a time when states like Azerbaijan are seeking to reduce their dependence on Russia. While Turkey cannot fully replace Russia, China, or the European Union as a primary trade or investment partner, it offers the region a way to balance existing relations.

 Arms Sales to Turkic States: Drone-Led Expansion

Defense exports have become a cornerstone of Turkey’s engagement with the Turkic world. While the battlefield success of the Turkish-made Akinci and Bayraktar TB-2 armed drones during the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict is well documented, Ankara’s arms outreach extends much further. Every Turkic state has acquired Turkish-made weaponry this decade alone, particularly drones: Turkey has supplied Azerbaijan with Cobra II APCs; Kyrgyzstan with Aksungur, Akinci, and Bayraktar armed drones; Kazakhstan with Cobra II APCs and Anka drones; Uzbekistan with Bayraktar drones as well as technology for domestic production; and Turkmenistan with Bayraktar drones.

Latin America: The Next Frontier

Compared to its deep-rooted ties with the Turkic world, Turkey’s engagement with Latin America remains modest – but steadily expanding. Ankara maintains diplomatic representation across the region, with embassies in 15 nations, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

President Erdogan undertook regional tours in 2015, 2016, and 2018 – signaling early interest in Latin America. Reciprocal visits have followed, including former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s trip to Ankara in 2013 and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele’s visit in 2022.

Over the past decade, Turkey has pursued a consistent engagement with Latin America:

·       Turkey and Chile have signed a free trade agreement.

·       Turkish company Yilport, a subsidiary of the Yildirim Holding Group, secured a 50-year concession to operate El Salvador’s Acajutla and La Unión ports.

·       In May, the eighth roundtable of Turkish–Peruvian relations convened in Lima, resulting in agreements to deepen cooperation in trade, culture, and diplomacy. Peruvian media report growing interest from Turkish mining companies.

·       Brazil, Turkey’s largest Latin American trade partner, reached $5.1 billion in bilateral trade in 2024.

Despite earlier efforts, Erdoğan’s direct engagement has waned in recent years. Possible explanations include a shift toward regional geopolitics driven by the war in Ukraine, ongoing conflicts and evolving dynamics in the Middle East — particularly the prolonged Syrian crisis — Turkey’s economic challenges and domestic priorities, and a renewed emphasis on relations with the Turkic world and geographically closer regions such as Africa. His only recent visit to the region was to Brazil in 2024 — specifically to attend the G20 Summit. As Argentine scholar Ariel González Levaggi notes, Latin America and the Caribbean have long been perceived as within the United States’ sphere of influence, but are now “belatedly part of the new Turkish agenda.”

Turkish Defense Technology: Latin America’s Emerging Interest

While Turkey’s defense exports have flourished in the Turkic World and Africa, Latin America is increasingly on Ankara’s radar. Though still limited, recent sales and diplomatic overtures suggest growing momentum.

·       Argentina’s Army operates Aselsan’s ACAR-K radars and IHASAVAR man-portable C-UAS jammers.

·       According to the defense news and analysis agency Janes, the Brazilian Army has selected the Turkish manufacturer Samsun Yurt Savunma Sanayi ve Ticaret to supply 200 M2HB Quick Change Barrel (QCB) 12.7×99 mm machine guns. The contract is reportedly worth $3.1 million.

·       Chile’s military uses Aselsan’s helicopter electronic warfare suites aboard its Airbus Cougar fleet; the Turkish company now maintains an office in Santiago.

·       Ecuador received a fleet of Cobra II tactical vehicles from Otokar in 2023 to support internal security operations against organized crime and drug trafficking.

·       Delegations from Chile, Guatemala visited the IDEF 2025 defense expo in Istanbul.

·       In June, El Salvador’s National Assembly ratified an industrial defense cooperation agreement with Turkey. The same month, the Colombian minister of defense and the Turkish ambassador to Colombia met to discuss defense cooperation.

·       Turkish defense companies actively participate in LAAD, Latin America’s premier defense exhibition in Brazil, with Otokar showcasing its vehicles at both the 2024 and 2025 events.

Brazil, unsurprisingly, remains a strategic priority. Its defense sector is modernizing rapidly, and President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva is seeking international partnerships to bolster domestic capabilities. A 2022 defense cooperation agreement between Turkey and Brazil was ratified by the Brazilian Senate in September 2025, paving the way for deeper collaboration.

A Strategic Pivot

Turkey’s defense diplomacy is evolving from transactional exports to strategic partnerships. Its success in the Turkic world offers a template for Latin America, where Ankara’s blend of affordability, reliability, and political outreach could reshape regional defense dynamics.

The shifting dynamics of the global arms market – driven by Russia’s diminished export capacity, ongoing conflicts, and rising demand for affordable, combat-proven systems – have created new opportunities for emerging defense exporters. Turkey, with its rapidly maturing defense industry and strong brand recognition in drone warfare, is well-positioned to climb the ranks in future SIPRI reports.

However, Turkish defense industries will face stiff competition — not only from established defense giants in the United States, Europe, and China, but also from ambitious mid-tier exporters like Israel and India, which are aggressively pursuing new markets. While Turkey’s recent sales to Arab nations are impressive, they also underscore the limits of its appeal in regions where other suppliers offer compelling alternatives. For example, a March commentary on Turkish arms sales by Professor Michaël Tanchum argues that while Turkey has sold weaponry to Morocco, Rabat “has developed a deep and multi-variegated arms purchasing relationship with Israel including co-production,” an achievement that Ankara has not reached yet with some defense clients.

To sustain momentum, Turkey will have to leverage its cultural ties with the Turkic world while searching for new markets outside of its traditional area of influence, and Brazil has emerged as a key partner,  In this context, arms sales serve different strategic functions; in the Turkic world, they reinforce existing alliances; in Latin America, they open doors for new contracts. Turkey and Venezuela have developed a close partnershipin recent years, strengthening diplomatic and economic ties. The current depth of the Caracas–Ankara relationship, however, is subject to debate. Notably, Turkish companies and individuals have been accused of assisting Caracas in smuggling oil and gold to help the Venezuelan government evade international sanctions.

Over the past decade, Turkey has established itself as a reliable supplier of military technology – particularly drones - to Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Now, Ankara’s challenge will be to translate its regional defense successes into a sustainable global strategy. Turkish military systems have a modest presence in Latin America, however the sale of Otokar vehicles to Ecuador, machine guns to Brazil and the ratification of a defense agreement by the Brazilian congress could be the initial steps towards new defense projects, which could help cement diplomatic and economic partnerships. Should Ankara align its defense diplomacy with long-term industrial cooperation, Turkey could emerge not just as a prolific exporter but also as a global standard-bearer for middle-power defense innovation.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. He recently co-authored a report on water security issues in Central Asia, published by the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) has a new, permanent home. In early July, the organization inaugurated its headquarters in the capital, Astana, with Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev presiding over the ceremony.

In a region crowded with regional blocs, it’s challenging for any organization to stand out, especially one as broad and inclusive as CICA. Yet the organization continues to promote dialogue through small-scale initiatives among its diverse members. 

For Kazakhstan, hosting CICA reflects the country’s multi-vector foreign policy aimed at strengthening and enhancing its international image, cultivating global partnerships, and positioning itself as a regional champion of peace and dialogue.

Kazakhstan and CICA: Joined at the Hip

The deep links between Kazakhstan and CICA are no coincidence. The organization’s secretary general, Ambassador Kairat Sarybay, is Kazakhstani, and its roots are firmly planted in Kazakhstani soil. The organization’s key milestones all trace back to Kazakhstan:

·       In 1992, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev first proposed the initiative.

·       The 1999 ministerial meeting and the adoption of CICA’s guiding principles was signed in Almaty.

·       The Almaty Act, which serves as CICA’s charter, was signed in 2002.

·      The statute establishing the CICA Secretariat was signed in 2006, again in Almaty. In other words, the birth and growth of the organization are deeply linked to the Kazakhstani government.

Generally speaking, Astana’s commitment to CICA has remained steady,  even after the transition from Nazarbayev to Tokayev. Back in 2008, during the third meeting of the CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs -- an event that celebrated the membership of Jordan and the UAE -- then-president Nazarbayev described CICA as an “effective instrument for maintenance of safety and cooperation in Asia,” emphasizing its role in advancing “practical mechanisms of collective diplomacy.”

That vision has endured. Under Tokayev, Kazakhstan has continued to support the organization as exemplified by its new Astana headquarters. “Today, when geopolitical tensions are intensifying, the principles of trust, mutual understanding, and dialogue are becoming particularly relevant,” Tokayev said at the recent inauguration ceremony.

 Why is Astana Invested in CICA?

Kazakhstan’s support for CICA is deeply rooted in its post-independence history. Since gaining sovereignty in the early 1990s, the country has faced the complex task of securing its vast territory -- bordering major powers like Russia and China, with the 4,254-mile Kazakhstan-Russian border ranking as the second-longest in the world after the Canada-U.S. border.

During the early post-independence years, Kazakhstan navigated a series of high-stakes geopolitical challenges. There was the long-standing dispute over the Caspian Sea among the five coastal states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Each nation sought sovereignty over its resources. The impasse was resolved in  2018 with the signing of the Aktau Convention, in which, for example, the parties established the breadth of their territorial waters. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan gave up its vast nuclear arsenal from the Soviet Union, working closely with the United States on Project Sapphire, a covert operation to remove weapons-grade nuclear material. 

In the 1990s, as a newly independent nation, Kazakhstan faced the urgent task of defining its borders, securing its territorial integrity, and establishing diplomatic legitimacy. Rather than pursue rapid militarization or risk armed clashes with its neighbors, Astana chose the route of peace and diplomacy to reduce the risk of conflict. In this context, Kazakhstan’s support for CICA was strategic in the country’s early years to promote regional stability, cultivate partnerships, and reinforce its commitment to peaceful coexistence. For Kazakhstan, CICA was more than a foreign policy initiative – it was a cornerstone of its early statecraft.

Multi-Vector Foreign Policy and CICA

Since gaining independence in the early 1990s, Kazakhstan has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy -- a strategic framework designed to develop partnerships with governments across the globe. Rather than aligning with any single bloc orglobal power or taking sides during international conflicts, Astana has consistently positioned itself as a neutral actor, committed to diplomacy that supports negotiations and dialogue over conflict.

This approach has served Kazakhstan well. The strategy has enabled the country to maintain constructive ties with major powers, including Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union, while avoiding entanglements in geopolitical rivalries. In 2013, Almaty hosted a round of negotiations between Iran and several global powers over its controversial nuclear program.

Kazakhstan has also launched and hosted the Astana Peace Process, aimed at finding a solution to the conflict in Syria. These initiatives have helped Kazakhstan become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council during the 2017-2018 term, the only Central Asian country to achieve this honor. Astana has also remained neutral during the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, barring its citizens from fighting in the conflict.

CICA’s mission in Asia aligns closely with Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy, which emphasizes dialogue and cooperation. At the recent inauguration of CICA’s new headquarters in Astana, President Tokayev invoked the “country’s rich legacy,” highlighting “the enduring values of ‘Steppe diplomacy’ — respect, mutual understanding, and peaceful coexistence.” These values, he noted, are deeply embedded in CICA’s ethos -- an agency built on “inclusive approach, rooted in cooperation, dialogue, and mutual understanding.” (As far as the author’s research shows, the term Steppe diplomacy has not been codified into a set of strategies and objectives but more an attitude some Central Asian states, the term was loosely used to discuss Mongolia-Central Asia relations, for example).

 Moreover, a comparison can be made between CICA and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), commonly known as the Middle Corridor. This strategic transportation project facilitates the movement of goods  -- particularly energy -- from Central Asia, specifically Kazakhstan, through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, ultimately reaching European markets. While China is now connected to the Corridor, TITR remains distinct from Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

 Most importantly, the Middle Corridor has gained popularity since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, as it offers a viable alternative to trade routes that pass through Russian territory en route to Europe. The TITR has become a critical artery for Eurasian commerce – and like CICA – it is also headquartered in Astana.

 Kazakhstan’s role as host and leading role in two major regional initiatives – CICA and TITR – has certainly elevated Astana’s global profile. CICA itself notes that its brand-new headquarters reflects “Astana’s deep commitment to global and regional peace and security and its vision for strengthening the institutional foundations of multilateral diplomacy in Asia.”

Standing Out in a Crowded Field

 CICA’s scale is striking. If one  combines the landmass and populations of its 28 member states, the organization covers “nearly 90 percent of Asia and represents over half of the world’s population.” Its membership stretches across Eurasia – from Russia and China to Vietnam and Thailand and the Central Asian republics. It also includes Israel and Jordan, and even reaches into Africa, with Egypt as a member.

 This diversity of membership is both a strength and a challenge. On one hand, CICA’s broad membership is a testament to Kazakhstan’s ability to convene disparate actors. On the other hand, it is difficult for any organization with so many member states across different regions to agree to work together. The organization includes states with long-standing rivalries from Iran and Israel to India and Pakistan, and more recently Cambodia and Thailand.

 Another challenge for CICA is the crowded landscape of regional blocs across Eurasia. These include the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). All have overlapping memberships, creating a complex web of allegiances and agendas.

 Curiously, there is no Central Asian Union that encompasses all five regional states. Even CICA, with its broad membership, does not fully represent the region -- Turkmenistan has yet to join the bloc.

Moreover, these organizations are often driven by dominant member states that use them as instruments of foreign policy to expand their influence. Moscow, for example, has utilized the EAEU to strengthen its ties with the “Near Abroad” states (namely, states that were former members of the Soviet Union and border or are geographically close to the Russian Federation). Similarly, Turkey champions the OTS as a vehicle for expanding its relations with other Turkic-speaking states. CICA, on the other hand, operates differently. While it features a revolving chairmanship – with Azerbaijan holding the position for the 2024-2026 term -- the organization remains associated with Kazakhstan via its leadership and HQ location. While Moscow and Ankara are using the EAEU and OTS to expand their influence among each organization’s respective member states, Astana is less interested in unilateral steps than utilizing the bloc to bolster its image and develop partnerships with other states.

Has CICA been successful?

Evaluating the success of CICA necessitates a nuanced understanding of its scope and limitations. Given its diverse and expansive membership, CICA is not designed to function as an integrated bloc like the European Union. The level of political and economic integration and cooperation seen in the EU is unrealistic among CICA’s member states, which span a wide spectrum of governance models and strategic interests.

Nonetheless, CICA has made meaningful contributions to regional dialogue and cooperation. The organization regularly hosts seminars and conferences on such vital topics as “Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purposes” and “Water Security and Climate Resilience: Addressing Environmental Challenges in CICA Member States.”

The latter conference was particularly significant. Access to water is a growing global concern, exacerbated by climate change and rising regional temperatures. In Central Asia, water scarcity is a politically sensitive issue, with obvious implications for human needs, agriculture, energy and cross-border relations. In late August, CICA’s brand-new headquarters in Astana organized the first-ever information meeting to discuss engaging  Taliban-controlled Afghanistan: participants included “Ambassadors and representatives of several CICA Member States.”

According to CICA’s 2025 plan for confidence-building measures, a series of upcoming conferences and seminars will address a diverse array of regional priorities. These include a seminar on “Women’s Role and Contribution to  SMEs [Small and Medium Enterprises] Development among CICA Member States,” a symposium on “Challenges for Sustainable Food Production Under Climate Change,” and a conference of heads of ports.

 Some of these events will take place in CICA’s new facilities, while others will rotate among member states. It is no surprise that Azerbaijan is set to host the upcoming ports summit -- given the rising importance of the Baku port and the Caspian Sea as a commercial artery linking Central Asia to Europe, and Azerbaijan’s current chairmanship of the organization.

 While such small-scale initiatives are unlikely to reshape Eurasian geopolitics – marked by persistent tensions and mutual distrust among many CICA member states – they offer a pragmatic platform for incremental progress. Topics such as human rights (including women’s rights and women’s empowerment), regional crime, environmental protection, and trade issues represent areas of shared interest where cooperation is both possible and necessary.

Beyond Regionalism: Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role

In June, the Center for New American Security (CNAS), a research center in Washington, released a report identifying six global “swing states” poised to “shape the new Great Power competition” are Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. The report describes these states as “multi-aligned” – maintaining ties with the United States, Russia, and China “while declining to choose sides.” The report added that these countries are “determined to reform existing rules and institutions.” Curiously absent from the list is any Central Asian country, despite Kazakhstan’s alignment with many of the report’s criteria.

Scholarly research on evolving global geopolitics is shifting beyond the traditional Great Powers to include states with the capacity to project influence across multiple domains. Kazakhstan’s efforts to promote peace through CICA and boost trade through the Middle Corridor show that it wants to be seen as more than just a regional player – Astana aims to be recognized and respected as an emerging actor with global relevance.

 Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. He recently co-authored a report on water security issues in Central Asia, published by the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.