Turan Research Center

Following the widely publicized meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Washington D.C. facilitated by President Trump, momentum is building along the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. While challenges remain and the path forward is far from smooth, recent developments suggest a renewed sense of possibility.

After decades of stalled efforts, the prospect of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey appears to be accelerating. Though the current process began, it was an August summit in Washington D.C. between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev facilitated by U.S. President Donald Trump that appears to have injected new momentum. Turkey was neither present nor directly mentioned at the meeting, yet its long-standing alignment with Azerbaijan indicates that progress between Ankara and Baku is a prerequisite for reconciliation between Yerevan and Baku.

This interdependence has long shaped the regional dynamic.

It was precisely this linkage that derailed the 2009 attempt to normalize Armenia-Turkey relations when two protocols signed in Zurich were never ratified and eventually canceled in 2018.

Today, however, the stakes are higher. Russia’s waning influence in the South Caucasus, coupled with deteriorating relations between Moscow and both Yerevan and Baku, has created a new sense of urgency. While normalization is far from guaranteed, it is now believed to be within reach.

A breakthrough occurred in September, when Serdar Kilic, Turkey’s special envoy for normalization, traveled to Armenia to meet his counterpart, Deputy Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly, Ruben Rubinyan. Their previous meeting last year had taken place near the border; but this visit in the Armenian capital of Yerevan was unprecedented.

Although former Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Yerevan in 2008 to attend a World Cup qualifying match despite the absence of diplomatic relations, many Armenians remain skeptical of a breakthrough. Civil society voices have grown wary, especially after the failure to partially open one of the two border crossings between Armenia and Turkey for third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders – an agreed step that remains unfulfilled, likely out of deference to Azerbaijan.

The unofficial linkage between Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan dates back to 1993, when Armenian forces occupied Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar region. Since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Baku has regained its territory and both Azerbaijan and Turkey appear determined to take no chances.

Previous attempts to bring the two sides together have failed. In 2001, the controversial U.S.-facilitated Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission collapsed under nationalist opposition in Armenia. Following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Turkey proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform for the region, which also failed to materialize. The Zurich Protocols of 2009 – signed by Armenia and Turkey to establish diplomatic relations– were formally withdrawn by then-President Serzh Sargsyan in 2015 and annulled in 2018 due to Azerbaijan’s objections over the Karabakh conflict.

After the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Ankara and Baku again coordinated two ostensibly separate tracks – one concerning Armenia’s normalization with Azerbaijan and one with Turkey. There has been no breakthrough in unblocking economic and trade connections in the region, particularly the proposed Zangezur Corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenian territory. The August summit in Washington D.C. introduced a new term for this route in Armenia: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The route would also connect Turkey with Central Asia.

Yet signs of gradual progress have emerged over the past several years.

In 2022, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan attended the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey. Rubinyan followed suit last year. Also in 2022, Pashinyan – having signaled recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity – met with the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the presence of Aliyev. In 2023, Pashinyan attended Erdogan’s re-inauguration ceremony in Ankara.

Humanitarian gestures have also helped: the Armenia-Turkish border briefly opened for earthquake relief in 2023, and Armenian aid similarly passed through Turkey en route to Syria earlier this year. In June, Pashinyan’s visit to Istanbul included talks with Erdogan on potential energy cooperation. And although it has yet to function, an embargo on direct cargo flights between Yerevan and Istanbul was lifted in early 2023. However, overland routes through Georgia still remain a more economical form of transit.

Most importantly, disputed terminologies and symbols continue to shape the narrative. On April 24, 2024, Armenia’s official remembrance day for the 1915 mass killings and deportations of as many as 1.5 million ethnic Armenians by Ottoman Turks, Pashinyan notably used the Armenian term Meds Yeghern (“Great Calamity”) more frequently than the word “genocide.” Earlier, senior Member of Parliament Andranik Kocharyan had sparked controversy in Armenia and its diaspora by suggesting the need to ascertain the precise number of victims – a stance many Armenians view as a dangerous concession. Pashinyan echoed similar comments during a meeting with Swiss Armenians in January, prompting accusations that his government was making unilateral concessions to normalize relations with Turkey, just as critics allege he is doing with Azerbaijan.

To be sure, Turkey had in the past insisted on reexamining the events of 1915 during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan has also demanded Armenia adopt a “realistic roadmap,” warning that the “doors of opportunity” will not remain open indefinitely.

The joint statements following the latest meeting of the special envoys echoed familiar themes: opening the border for diplomats and third-country nationals; restoring the long-dormant Kars–Gyumri railway; expanding cooperation in education, aviation and other sectors. Yet one symbolic move stood out. On the eve of the meeting, Yerevan announced that beginning November 1, Armenian passport stamps would no longer feature Mount Ararat -- a potent national symbol located just across the borderin Turkey, where it is known as Mount Agri. That decision has been widely interpreted as a gesture to Ankara, signally that Armenia harbors no territorial claims in Eastern Turkey.

In early September, during an official visit to China for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey made a rare public gesture of unity: their spouses posed together for photographs and shared them on social media. Just this month, press reports added substance to this gesture of unity, revealing that Turkish Airlines -- the country’s national carrier -- plans to launch flights to Armenia. No dates were announced.

While smaller airlines have operated flights between the two nations since the mid-1990s, Turkish Airlines has avoided the route. According to Armenian sources, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had long prohibited the government-linked airline from doing so until Armenia and Azerbaijan resolved their bilateral disputes. Back in 2009, the International Crisis Group noted that such a move by Turkish Airlines would signal a breakthrough in regional diplomacy.

Now, with Yerevan and Baku widely believed to be on the cusp of signing a long-overdue peace treaty, the airline’s announcement takes on added significance.

Yet, to Yerevan’s chagrin, normalization with Ankara remains contingent on progress with Baku. Azerbaijan continues to insist on the removal of a controversial preamble in Armenia’s constitution, which refers to the “reunification of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh,” which Baku sees as making territorial claims on Azerbaijan. Aliyev has also criticized a reference to “achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia” as a territorial claim against Turkey. Pashinyan has pledged to hold a referendum on a full constitutional change following next year’s June parliamentary elections.

For Pashinyan, whose political fortunes hinges on his “peace agenda,” normalization with both Azerbaijan and Turkey is central to his electoral strategy. He sees it as a gamble fraught with risk, but rich in opportunities. For the European Union and United States, it also offers an opportunity to reduce Russian and Chinese influence in the South Caucasus and further connect the West to Central Asia beyond existing routes through Georgia.

As Baku and Yerevan inch closer to reconciliation, the prospect of Armenian- Turkish normalization no longer feels remote.

Whether it materializes remains uncertain. Much will depend on electoral cycles, the ability to counter entrenched narratives and sustained international interest to preserve the fragile momentum achieved so far. For now, Yerevan remains optimistic, suggesting that major breakthroughs could be achieved within months. Yet, as is often the case, no concrete details have been disclosed.

Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, analyst, and consultant from the United Kingdom based in Tbilisi, Georgia, since 2012. From 1998 until then he was based in Yerevan, Armenia, covering issues related to democracy, society, and conflict. In 1994 he first visited Karabakh as a journalist and photographer, also covered the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, and consulted for intergovernmental organisations on countering violent extremism. He writes news and analysis for international media and various analytical publications. He can be followed on X at @onewmphoto.

Armenia’s Soviet-era past, U.S. technological know-how, and a globally connected diaspora are converging to give the small, landlocked republic a rare chance to leapfrog into the next phase of digital transformation – Artificial Intelligence (AI).

The recent announcement of a $500 million AI “factory” -- an enhanced data center designed to train, refine, and deploy AI models – signals Armenia's ambition to transcend its role as a regional IT hub. Instead, it hopes to become an important node in a developing global AI ecosystem that could shape the future.

“We are excited about the potential for U.S. technology exports and AI leadership to drive more innovation in Armenia’s dynamic tech sector, benefitting the United States and Armenia,” said U.S. Ambassador to Armenia Kristina Kvien in June about what Pashinyan has called Armenia’s “largest and most important" tech investment. “Companies like Nvidia continue to offer world-leading computing and AI solutions, and we are proud that they are the partners of choice for Armenian counterparts,” Kvien concluded.

The U.S. Embassy reiterated the same message when Brendan Hanrahan, Director of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, visited Armenia this month to follow up on agreements reached with Yerevan at the 8 August summit between the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and American leaders.

Dubbed “Our Stargate” by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan – a nod to President Donald Trump’s own $500 billion AI initiative – the AI “factory” is nothing short of ambitious. Spearheading the project is Firebird AI, a San Francisco and Yerevan-based startup backed by diaspora entrepreneurs, which has partnered with the Armenian government and U.S. tech giant Nvidia. Together, they aim to construct this next-generation data center.

Once completed in 2026, the facility is expected to consume up to 100 megawatts of power in its initial phase, with scalability to support further AI research and applications over time.

While opinions diverge on whether AI constitutes the next industrial revolution, one thing is clear: there is now global competition for countries to adopt and deploy the technology earlier than potential rivals. The European Union has already approved seven AI factories, with more, Armenia’s would be the first in the South Caucasus region, while Nvidia is already partnering with Kazakhstan in Central Asia.

A Google-commissioned study published in March 2025 concluded that South Caucasus and Central Asia continue to lag in AI adoption and innovation, despite the technology’s projected contribution to regional GDP growth. Other reports published last year concluded that meaningful progress will require greater inter-regional integration.

In this context, Nvidia’s involvement is pivotal.

Its Graphic Processing Units (GPUs), initially intended for digital image processing, have become synonymous with AI development. With a market capitalization now exceeding $4 trillion, the company dominates the sector. Nvidia opened its Yerevan office in 2022 thanks to the efforts of the company’s Vice President Rev Lebaredian, a Los Angeles-born ethnic Armenian.

Lebaredian is the nephew of Gerard Libaridian (both share the same surname but with different spellings), a former foreign policy advisor to Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrossian. Such connections demonstrate how diaspora ties have played a central role in Armenia’s IT resurgence since the late 2000s.

Institutions like the Tumo Center for Creative Technologies, founded in 2011, have already transformed youth education in Armenia and expanded globally. Nvidia’s Lebaredian serves on Tumo’s advisory board. The Afeyan Foundation for Armenia, established by Moderna co-founder Noubar Afeyan – best known for his role in developing the COVID-19 vaccine – is among the early investors of Firebird AI, the Armenian-American startup partnering with Nvidia and the Armenian government on the AI Factory initiative.

Yet Armenia’s technological prowess predates these recent developments. Often dubbed the “Silicon Valley of the Soviet Union,” the country played a pivotal role in computing, electronics, and software development during the Cold War. Following independence, however, Armenia’s landlocked geography – compounded by closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan – posed significant barriers to trade and technological exchange. In response, successive governments prioritized the revival of the tech sector since the late 2000s, recognizing that digital industries could flourish without reliance on physical trade routes.

Between 2008 and 2017, the IT sector’s grew from $96 million to $765 million, attracting such U.S. tech giants as Synopsys and Microsoft. More recently, the 2022 influx of Russian IT professionals fleeing conscription or a sanctions-hit economy has provided an additional boost. In 2023, Armenia’s IT sector reached $2.12 billion.

If managed correctly, Armenia’s emerging AI factory could embed Armenia within global digital supply chains. Yet the project’s success hinges on vast energy resources, high-speed fiber-optics, and cross-border cooperation. Green Energy Corridors could also offer a viable solution, but political instability, energy constraints, and regional volatility could relegate the initiative to paper.

Most important, Washington increasingly views Armenia as a potential partner.

Earlier this year, the two countries signed a Strategic Partnership Charter that specifically includes cooperation on AI and semiconductors. At the recent Trump-brokered trilateral summit in Washington, two of the three memoranda of cooperation signed between Yerevan and Washington focused on AI, semiconductor development, and energy security – critical areas given U.S. export restrictions on advanced technologies, especially in AI and civilian nuclear use.

Armenia’s aging Soviet-era Metsamor nuclear power plant is slated for decommissioning by 2036. In response, the government is Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) as a replacement, linking energy modernization to its digital ambitions. Prime Minister Pashinyan favors SMRs, calling the American technology “politically appealing” as a means of reducing dependence on Russia. One Armenian analyst, Areg Kochinyan, has even proposed obtaining nuclear fuel from Kazakhstan to diversify Armenia’s energy security.

These developments coincide with progress toward normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The recent White House meeting – where three memorandums were signed – was specifically geared towards this process. Simultaneously, the U.S. and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum to develop a Strategic Partnership Charter that includes future AI partnerships. If successful, normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan could also lead to the long-awaited opening of Armenia's border with Turkey.

In anticipation, Armenian and Turkish officials met in Istanbul in late June to discuss energycooperation. During the last normalization attempt in 2009, Ankara and Yerevan signed an electricity supply agreement. Today, only a small amount of power is believed exported from Armenia to Turkey via Georgia. Armenian opposition figures claim the government is preparing to import electricity from Turkey and gas from Azerbaijan in case relations with Moscow deteriorate further and the country faces energy shortages from Russian-managed facilities.

Yet these developments are not occurring in a vacuum. Armenia’s energy sector is in flux as the government attempts to nationalize its electricity distribution network, currently owned by Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, now in pre-trial detention on charges of planning a coup. Some allege that snatching the power grid away from Karapetyan is necessary for the AI Factory to proceed. Political uncertainty could also deter foreign investment, though it has not dissuaded Nvidia. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is forming its own tech partnerships, and Georgia continues to position itself as a regional logistics hub.

Nonetheless, the potential for future cooperation with Turkey, Central Asia, and even Azerbaijan is still there, including in green energy. While Armenia and Turkey relations remain strained, with closed borders and a long history of mistrust, technology may offer a less problematic space for engagement. If normalization proceeds, Armenian companies could pursue cross-border partnerships in education, agricultural technology, and combatting climate change – sectors with mutual benefits.

Security concerns, however, loom large. AI has already been weaponized -- whether directly in terms of actual munitions or through massive online disinformation campaigns. In a June interview, however, when asked whether an AI factory could strengthen Armenia’s defense industry, Firebird’s co-founders Razmig Hovaghimian and Alexander Yesayan stressed that U.S. technologies such as Nvidia’s are subject to export controls and cannot be repurposed for military applications.

Across the Caspian, Armenia has the potential to strengthen ties with Central Asia’s growing digital market. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are actively exploring AI in governance, fintech, and education. Armenia’s Nvidia-powered AI facility could complement these efforts by offering GPU processing power to regional firms and universities – or drawing on theirs when needed. In a region dominated by Russia and China, a South Caucasus and Central Asia partnership built on U.S. technology could provide more strategic breathing room.

Yet perhaps the most transformative possibility lies closer to home. If Armenia and Azerbaijan finalize a peace agreement, new opportunities for digital cooperation could emerge. Baku, flush with energy revenues, is investing in smart villages, e-governance and renewable energy – resources that could help meet Armenia’s AI energy demands. Armenia, in turn ,could offer complementary skills and networks in educational and technological spheres.

The symbolism would be profound: the two former adversaries using cutting-edge technology to build a more stable regional future. Realistically, such cooperation would require sustained political trust but could also help cultivate it. By its nature, AI is forward-looking. Armenia’s challenge is to build partnerships that complement rather than compete, transforming rivalry into collaboration and relegating past mistrust and conflict to history.

Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, analyst, and consultant from the United Kingdom based in Tbilisi, Georgia, since 2012. From 1998 until then he was based in Yerevan, Armenia, covering issues related to democracy, society, and conflict. In 1994 he first visited Karabakh as a journalist and photographer, also covered the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, and consulted for intergovernmental organisations on countering violent extremism. He writes news and analysis for international media and various analytical publications. He can be followed on X at @onewmphoto.

In 2018, Serzh Sargsyan was ousted as Armenia’s leader by mass protests led by an unlikely challenger, Nikol Pashinyan, who now risks a similar fate as Armenia heads toward parliamentary elections in 2026. Though there are many differences between the two situations, there are also some similarities. What might hold the key to Pashinyan’s political future is normalizing Armenia's relations with neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey while ushering in an era of peace and stability for the region.

At the end of March 2018, few took Nikol Pashinyan seriously when he set off on a 117-kilometer march from Armenia's second largest city of Gyumri to the capital, Yerevan. His goal was to stop the nation’s third president, Serzh Sargsyan, from clinging on to power after his second and final term ended the following month. In 2015, Sargsyan orchestrated constitutional changes that transformed Armenia from a presidential to a parliamentary system. This shift allowed him to bypass term limits by assuming the newly empowered role of prime minister, while relegating future presidents to largely ceremonial duties.

Despite initially denying any intention of clinging to power, it was clear that this had been his plan all along. Sargsyan had never enjoyed widespread public support. His long tenure in senior government positions under former president Robert Kocharyan, followed by his own presidency from 2008 to 2018, did little to bolster his standing. The violent crackdown that marked his rise to the presidency in 2008 remained vivid in the public memory, even though much of the blame for the post-election violence lay with Kocharyan.

It’s no wonder that Sargsyan’s 2018 bid to retain power triggered a swift and widespread public backlash.  This time, however, he was up against a markedly different kind of opponent.

Nikol Pashinyan’s populism and use of modern digital tools to awaken a previously apathetic population proved successful.

Against all expectations, he forced Sargsyan to resign, culminating in what became known as the Velvet Revolution. While widely celebrated as a triumph of democracy, the movement arguably owed less to a push for reforms and more to a deep-seated public dislike of Sargsyan himself – whose unpopularity even surpassed that of the more authoritarian Kocharyan.

Pashinyan, a minor albeit firebrand opposition leader and former journalist, first emerged as a prominent political figure during the 2008 presidential election – an event that marked the transfer of power from Kocharyan to Sargsyan. Both men hailed from Nagorno Karabakh, a predominantly ethnic Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan that had seceded declared independence during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their identities were deeply intertwined with the Karabakh leadership and the brutal war of the early 1990s that shaped the region’s fate.

Upon rising to power, Kocharyan and Sargsyan soon became derogatorily known as the Karabakh Clan. Both had played key roles in ousting Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, in early 1998, rejecting his proposed peace plan with Azerbaijan.

Rightly or wrongly, Ter-Petrosyan is frequently referred to as a political mentor to the younger Pashinyan. Indeed, that connection came into sharp focus during the 2008 presidential election, when Ter-Petrosyan sought to prevent Kocharyan’s handover of power to Sargsyan. After Ter-Petrosyan was placed under house arrest, it was Pashinyan who led mass protests in the streets. The demonstrations culminated in tragedy on March 1, 2008, when security forces violently dispersed the crowds, resulting in 10 deaths and prompting the declaration of a state of emergency.

Following the deadly crackdown, Pashinyan went into hiding, evading authorities before eventually surrendering. He was jailed on charges of inciting violence but released under a general amnesty in 2011. The following year, he was elected to parliament. By 2018, Pashinyan had built enough street credibility to turn public anger and dislike of Sargsyan into political capital.

Once in power, Pashinyan employed the very tactics that had propelled him to power – mobilizing pressure from the streets, wielding populist rhetoric, and embracing high-risk gambles to advance his personal vision for Armenia. Even in office, he often behaved more like a pugnacious maverick than a conventional statesman.  He publicly shamed citizens for violating pandemic restrictions, and manipulated parliamentary procedures to force snap elections while rallying crowds outside to ensure all went his way.

His biggest gamble, however, played out on the geopolitical front. Pashinyan’s approach to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict marked a sharp departure from his predecessors, revisiting key treaties and abandoning the OSCE Minsk Group negotiation process with Azerbaijan. His wife, Anna Hakobyan, posed for photographs in army fatigues brandishing a Kalashnikov rifle – a bizarre gesture she framed as part of her own peace initiative. Predictably, war followed.

In 2020, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale offensive – an action it had been warning for nearly a decade should negotiations fail. The result was a devastating defeat for Armenia and Karabakh, with significant territorial losses.

Despite the catastrophic defeat in the 2020 war, Pashinyan managed to win the 2021 snap elections with over 53 percent of the vote. His opponents, -- largely old guard figures -- remained even more unpopular. Still, his post-2018 honeymoon was clearly over. Pashinyan’s approval rating, once as high as 70 percent, had plummeted to just 20 percent by 2024. According to the latest survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) public trust in him now stands at a mere 13 percent. Kocharyan fares even worse at 4 percent, while a striking 61 percent of respondents say they trust no one at all.

Electoral prospects paint a similar picture. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party leads the pack, but only marginally, polling at 17-18 percent. Trailing is Kocharyan’s Hayastan parliamentary faction – dominated by the nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D) with a combined 7 percent. Sargsyan’s Republican Party and the Pativ Unem (I Have Honor) bloc register just 2 percent, while all other political options hover around 1 percent. Notably, 28 percent of respondents say they won’t vote at all and another 22 percent are undecided. 

This landscape leaves the political field wide open for the rise of a new third political force. One such possibility surfaced in June, when Russian-Armenian billionaire businessman Samuel Karapetyan – despite being ineligible to run because he holds dual citizenship -- announced plans to launch a political movement aimed at challenging Pashinyan in next year’s election. Karapetyan is currently in pre-trial detention, facing charges of allegedly inciting the violent overthrow of the government. The upcoming elections are expected to center primarily on the question of de facto peace with Azerbaijan, and potentially on the prospect of normalization with Turkey. Pashinyan’s “peace agenda,” championed during the 2021 snap elections, promised security and normalization. Instead, it has unfolded as a slow and painful process. Even before the mass exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Karabakh in September 2023, Pashinyan publicly acknowledged the region as part of Azerbaijan just months before. An accompanying shift in tone since 2022 from invoking Karabakh by its nationalist local name of Artsakh, to emphasizing internationally recognized borders, reflects less an ideological evolution than a strategy for political survival. Yet, it marks a crucial turning point.  

Europe and the United States has offered its support. In Armenia’s transition from what Pashinyan calls “Historical Armenia,” -- where the country will always be in conflict with Azerbaijan and Turkey -- to a vision of “Real Armenia,” which renounces territorial claims against its neighbors -- the geopolitical landscape is shifting. This evolution could significantly erode Moscow's influence in the region, aligning with U.S. and EU ambitions to establish new trade routes between Europe and Central Asia via the South Caucasus and bypassing Russia.

To date, Armenia’s strategic pivot away from Moscow had remained largely rhetorical. While Brussels and Washington offer diplomatic backing, they fall short of delivering the robust economic and defensive guarantees required for Yerevan to fully break from Moscow’s orbit. Nonetheless, small shifts are underway: Russian FSB border guards have been removed from Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport and the Armenia-Iran border crossing, for example. Above all, Yerevan needs normalization with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Pashinyan’s shifting rhetoric, including the elevation of Mount Aragats within Armenia as a national symbol over Mount Ararat (Mount Ağrı in Turkey) signals a readiness for further symbolic concessions. He has hinted at removing Ararat from Armenia’s coat of arms and introducing a new constitution that omits references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, a document viewed by Baku as harboring  revanchist claims against Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Protests resurfaced in Yerevan in both 2022 and 2024, but last year marked a notable shift in their character. Rather than being led by traditional political opposition, they were led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan -- a revanchist cleric --  backed by the Armenian Apostolic Church. His march from Tavush, the northeastern province at the heart of ongoing demarcation talks, briefly stirred public concern and marked the Church’s first direct confrontation with the government. Yet despite Galstanyan’s status as a previously apolitical figure, the protests quickly lost momentum and ended.

At their peak, the demonstrations drew about 20,000 participants, though on most days only a few thousand attended. Still, the government was visibly rattled.

Like Karapetyan before him, Archbishop Galstanyan now sits in pre-trial detention, accused of plotting to overthrow the government-- a move widely seen as an effort to neutralize all serious opposition ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections.

Meanwhile, Pashinyan’s political power increasingly hinges not on his achievements, but on the persistent weakness and discrediting of his opponents. For now, he benefits from the fact that allegations of corruption and human rights abuses under his leadership remain far less severe than those levelled against his predecessors. The risk, however, is that this comparative advantage may soon erode – especially as Pashinyan shows signs of leaning toward more authoritarian measures to maintain control.

What could concern Pashinyan is that even if his Civil Contract party gains most seats, it might not be enough to guarantee his reappointment as prime minister. The 2023 Yerevan City Council elections offered a preview of this vulnerability: Civil Contract won the most votes but fell short of a majority. Pashinyan’s candidate only became mayor with the support of a minor party led by a video blogger.

And earlier this year, Pashinyan’s preferred candidate, Sarik Minasyan, failed to become mayor in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city. Opposition council members united to elect a former mayor widely seen as having governed the city like a personal fiefdom under the Kocharyan regime. Ironically, the vote occurred almost seven years to the day after Pashinyan’s dramatic march to Yerevan to depose Sargsyan.

Yet the political tide is not entirely turning against him. According to the recent IRI poll, 47 percent of respondents support signing a peace deal with Azerbaijan while another 10 percent say their support depends on the terms of the agreement. Crucially, there is broad recognition that any such a deal can only be brokered under Pashinyan’s leadership. Nonetheless, Pashinyan’s geopolitical maneuvers are riddled with contradictions and paradoxes that may well complicate Armenia’s path forward.

On 8 August in a much-heralded meeting with Azerbaijan’s Aliyev and U.S. President Donald Trump in the White House, Pashinyan gave the U.S. exclusive development rights on restoring road and rail links along its southern border with Iran connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia. Tehran is outraged while public sentiment in Armenia tells a different if confusing story. According to the IRI poll, most respondents named Tehran as Armenia’s primary political and security partner. Russia ranked third, yet a sizeable number of respondents also saw Moscow as the country’s leading security threat despite strong strategic dependencies.

Nonetheless, if there was to be a referendum on European Union membership the week of the survey in June 2025, 49 percent of respondents would vote for it. However, that figure was 58 percent in September 2024. Moreover, only 14 percent supported a solely pro-EU course for the country. A combined 57 percent supported options where relations with both Russia and the EU were accommodated.

It’s worth recalling that as early as 2013, Sargsyan pursued closer ties with the European Union, aiming to sign both the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Agreement. However, under pressure from Moscow, Armenia instead joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. Still, in 2017, the Sargsyan administration managed to sign the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU.

Pashinyan's pivot toward the West hinges on normalizing relations and opening borders with Turkey – a goal that still depends on first resolving tensions with Azerbaijan. That process rests on a peace agreement, finalized in March, which   remains stalled until Armenia amends its constitution. The prospect of a referendum to enable that change is uncertain -- not necessarily due to public opposition, but because it’s unclear whether enough voters would turn out at the polls.

Previous constitutional referendums in Armenia -- in 2005 and 2015 – were widely  believed to have been have been manipulated to reach the minimum turnout threshold. Such tactics are unlikely to be viable for the current government, which faces greater scrutiny than before.

Many observers now believe that Pashinyan’s political future may hinge on Armenia's relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Ironically, Pashinyan’s predecessor, Sargsyan, also staked his leadership on normalizing ties with Turkey. Instead, just one month before his  forced resignation and after surviving an attempted coup over Karabakh in 2016, Sargsyan annulled the 2009 Armenia-Turkey Protocols. It was a move widely seen as a humiliating admission of failure.

As the 2026 elections approach, Pashinyan will be hoping to avoid the same fate as his predecessor. Though the 8 August Trump-facilitated summit at the White House was a major step forwards, it is still unclear whether it is sufficient for Turkey to open its border with Armenia sooner rather than later. Although a declaration of intent was issued following the meeting, the bilateral treaty —finalized by both sides in March—remained unsigned and was only initialed. Nevertheless, it marked an important step forward.

As Armenia approaches the 2026 parliamentary elections, the stakes could not be higher. Pashinyan -- once the face of revolutionary change -- now finds himself in a battle for political survival. His grip on power appears to rely less on public trust and more on the lack of credible challengers, a fragile situation that cannot last indefinitely. With geopolitical pressures mounting, borders still sealed, and society increasingly polarized, Armenia stands at a crossroads, teetering on the edge of prolonged uncertainty. There is no doubt, however, that the situation has changed markedly since the White House summit with the meeting heralded globally as “historic.”

Pashinyan is also poised to benefit from next year’s European Political Community (EPC) Summit, scheduled to take place in Yerevan shortly before the June parliamentary elections. He has already announced plans to invite Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to attend. Whereas playing the nationalist card was once a reliable strategy for gaining or holding power in Armenian politics, the opposite now seems to be true.

Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, analyst, and consultant from the United Kingdom based in Tbilisi, Georgia, since 2012. From 1998 until then he was based in Yerevan, Armenia, covering issues related to democracy, society, and conflict. In 1994 he first visited Karabakh as a journalist and photographer, also covered the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, and consulted for intergovernmental organisations on countering violent extremism. He writes news and analysis for international media and various analytical publications. He can be followed on X at @onewmphoto.