Turan Research Center

Iran's domestic turmoil is usually viewed through the lens of Middle Eastern politics or Tehran's standoff with the West. But hundreds of miles to the northeast, the ripples from Iran's crisis could reshape a cornerstone of Central Asian statecraft: the carefully cultivated strategy of playing multiple powers against one another while maintaining independence from any single patron.

For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors, Iran is more than another regional state. It's a neighboring country, a potential transit route, and a fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. More importantly, it represents access to the Indian Ocean — a key component of Central Asia's strategy to diversify economic ties and reduce dependence on any single major power. Whether that access becomes a liability or an opportunity depends entirely on what emerges from Iran's current crisis.

The Southern Corridor Dreams

For decades, Central Asian leaders have pursued a vision of connectivity that would liberate them from geographic fate. Hemmed in by mountains, steppe, and desert, these former Soviet republics have long depended on routes through Russia to reach global markets. One alternative they envisioned ran south through Iran and Pakistan to warm-water ports like Chabahar and Bandar Abbas.

This wasn't merely about logistics. The southern corridor embodied a broader diplomatic philosophy that Central Asian governments call "multi-vectorism" — the art of cultivating relationships in all directions simultaneously, never becoming too dependent on Moscow, Beijing, or Washington. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, have styled themselves as pragmatic middle powers more interested in infrastructure deals than ideological camps.

The Turgundi-Herat railway, specialized cargo terminals in Iranian ports, promised transit times slashed by days and shipping costs cut dramatically. Central Asian exporters saw a pathway to South Asian and African markets that bypassed both Russian territory and Chinese-controlled routes.

But infrastructure ambitions are only as solid as the ground they're built on. Persistent violence along the Afghan-Pakistani border has already exposed the brittleness of the southern strategy. Iran's deepening instability adds a new dimension of risk. Climbing insurance premiums, unreliable shipping schedules, and a lack of foreign investment all serve as major barriers. Even without a full regional conflagration, prolonged uncertainty is enough to make the southern route a gamble few companies want to take.

Two Futures, Two Outcomes

The trajectory of Iran's crisis profoundly affects Central Asia, though not in the ways typically discussed. The most important factor is not whether Iran experiences instability, but rather, the direction ultimately chosen by the government that controls Tehran.

If the current period of turmoil results in a continuation of the status quo — where ideological rigidity and international isolation prevail — Central Asia faces a difficult scenario. The years of diplomatic effort and infrastructure investment risked being sidelined, leaving the region's southern corridor as a project of unfulfilled potential.

However, should Tehran emerge from this crisis by recalibrating its priorities toward a more pragmatic, growth-oriented model, the calculus changes entirely. If the leadership moves away from regional ideological pursuits in favor of economic integration, Iran could transform from a source of uncertainty into a cornerstone partner. For Central Asia, a stable and commercially focused Iran would provide the missing piece for a truly independent multi-vector policy, turning a theoretical alternative into a viable reality.

When Neutrality Becomes Impossible

Central Asian states have perfected the art of diplomatic discretion, usually responding to international crises with studied silence or bland calls for stability. Iran, however, defies that playbook. It's not Venezuela or Libya — some faraway trouble spot that can be safely ignored. It's a neighbor, a transit partner, and a fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

That proximity is forcing uncomfortable choices. The SCO has in the past issued the occasional statement expressing concern about external pressure on Iran, but when it comes to Iran's internal breakdown, the organization has made no statements. This exposes an awkward truth that Central Asian governments would prefer not to acknowledge: the multilateral security frameworks they participate in provide diplomatic cover but almost no practical crisis management.

The result is a widening gap between rhetoric and reality. Officially, Central Asian states remain committed to collective security arrangements and principled non-alignment. In practice, they're falling back on bilateral deals and improvised solutions to protect their interests. Multi-vectorism, once an active strategy of diversification, increasingly resembles a reactive scramble to avoid picking sides — unless Iran's political transformation creates the stable partner they've been waiting for.

The Afghanistan Connection

One of the least appreciated dimensions of this crisis involves Afghanistan. Despite Iran's larger economy, Central Asian states trade more with Afghanistan. But repeated closures of the Afghan-Pakistani border have altered commercial ties.

Iran has steadily expanded its economic role in Afghanistan, becoming a vital supplier of fuel, food, and consumer goods. This growing interdependence means Iran's fate and Afghanistan's are now intertwined in ways that directly affect Central Asia. Disruptions in Iran ripple through Afghanistan and ultimately compromise Central Asian access to the south.

If the current regime persists or is replaced by another ideological government, even contained instability in Iran could trigger a collapse in Afghanistan, leading to a potential rise in cross-border terrorism and narcotics smuggling. But a stable, economically focused Iran could help anchor Afghanistan, creating a genuine southern corridor that extends Central Asian reach into South Asia and beyond.

China's Conditional Windfall

While Iran's troubles close doors to the south, they're quietly opening others to the east — but only if those doors stay closed. China's influence in Central Asia may grow not through aggressive expansion but through simple arithmetic: as alternative corridors remain unreliable under continued instability or ideological governance, Beijing's routes look increasingly essential.

China's long-standing interest in stable overland connections that avoid maritime chokepoints aligns neatly with Central Asia's need for predictable partners. As southern uncertainty mounts under the current scenario, Central Asian governments risk becoming more dependent on eastward trade, not less — precisely the outcome multi-vectorism was designed to prevent.

This shift won't announce itself with dramatic summits or treaty signings. It will emerge gradually, visible only in logistics contracts, investment patterns, and the accumulated weight of thousands of small decisions by government officials and business executives reassessing their options.

However, this outcome is not inevitable. If Iran transitions to a growth-oriented government focused on regional integration rather than ideological projects, Central Asia gains precisely what it needs to resist overdependence on any single power. A commercially reliable Iran would give these countries genuine leverage in negotiations with Beijing and Moscow.

The Cost of Miscalculation

Iran's crisis reveals a vulnerability in Central Asian foreign policy that few officials want to confront. Multi-vectorism does not only depend on diplomatic dexterity but also on the physical reliability of transport networks and the stability of neighboring states. When those foundations crack, strategic flexibility evaporates.

The difference between Iran as a persistent problem and Iran as a solution is the difference between Central Asia gradually sliding into Beijing's economic orbit and Central Asia achieving the genuine independence its leaders have long proclaimed. Should non-economic priorities continue to take precedence, the southern gateway may remain a project of unfulfilled potential. However, a pivot toward regional connectivity and mutual growth would provide the stability necessary to turn these strategic aspirations into a functional reality.

For Central Asian governments, this moment demands more than optimistic infrastructure announcements. It requires honest reckoning with the fragility of southern connectivity and greater investment in redundancy over ambition. But it also demands recognition that Iran's political evolution could be the most consequential variable in the region's strategic future.

For Western policymakers debating Iran strategy, the implications extend beyond the Middle East. Pressure on Tehran creates spillover effects that flow through Afghanistan and into Central Asia. But the question isn't just whether to pressure Iran — it's what outcomes that pressure might produceProlonged instability, or the continued survival of ideological priorities over economic pragmatism, drives these countries closer to Beijing at a time when Washington claims to want to expand its options in the region. A transition to pragmatic governance in Tehran, however unlikely, would create genuine opportunities for Central Asian independence that currently exist only on paper.

Iran's internal struggles may seem peripheral to Central Asia's core concerns. However, whatever emerges from Iran will have the potential to redraw the region's economic geography and constrain its strategic choices in ways that could define the next decade. Whether that reshaping pushes Central Asia into deeper dependence on China or liberates it into genuine multi-alignment depends almost entirely on what kind of government ultimately emerges in Tehran.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Eldaniz Gusseinov is a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Heydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at the Ibn Khaldun University and co-founder of Nightingale Int., a political forecasting consultancy. He specializes in European and international studies, focusing on the European Union's foreign policy and its interaction with Central Asian countries, as well as analyzing foreign policy processes in Central Asia.

Azerbaijan’s deepening engagement with Central Asia represents one of the most consequential — albeit under-examined — shifts in Eurasian geopolitics. Its influence will ultimately be measured not merely by its presence at the Consultative Meetings of Central Asian Leaders, but by its capacity to shape agendas, contribute to the drafting of strategic documents, and embed itself in the emerging regulatory and legal frameworks that define the region’s institutional future. Should these processes continue apace, Azerbaijan could, de jure, become a permanent stakeholder in agreements that traditionally bound only the Central Asian quintet.

Yet this trajectory faces significant structural constraints. Decisions adopted at the consultative meetings are not legally binding, leaving a gap between political intent and institutional commitment. As a result, Azerbaijan's future role in the region will hinge on three factors:

1.              Which existing agreements Azerbaijan formally accedes to;

2.              How many of the five Central Asian states join the new agreements negotiated after Azerbaijan’s inclusion;

3.              Whether external actors are prepared to recognize Azerbaijan as an integral part of the region’s political architecture.

Azerbaijan Has Not “Become Central Asian” Yet

Azerbaijan’s admission into the Consultative Meetings challenges long-standing assumptions about the geographic and political definition of Central Asia. The traditional "C5" framework — comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — was never codified in a foundational legal document. It emerged as a normative construct rather than a judicial category. In the absence of rigid definitional boundaries, the region’s contours have remained fluid, enabling the gradual development of what analysts increasingly as "New Regionalization."

Within this context, the inclusion of Azerbaijan signals the emergence of a "C6" core. The impetus for this expansion is overwhelmingly economic. Central Asia’s aspirations to integrate into the global economy are constrained by geography, making cooperation with transit states. For access to European, U.S., and Gulf markets, Azerbaijan — and to a lesser degree Afghanistan — occupies a crucial position in developing multimodal transport corridors, enabling not only trade but also security cooperation among special services and defense ministries.

Since 2022, as the Middle Corridor gained prominence, Azerbaijan has moved closer to the security landscape of the region — rivaling Turkey in the scale of military exercises with Central Asian states. Notably, it is the only country to hold joint Birlestik exercises for a second time with four Central Asian countries outside the frameworks of either the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Recent intelligence and defense agreements underscore this trend. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed a Defense Intelligence Cooperation Agreement last year centered on early-warning mechanisms for safeguarding the Middle Corridor. The same year, Azerbaijan's foreign intelligence chief met Uzbekistan's president to discuss counterterrorism, extremism, cybercrime, and stability in Afghanistan. These developments illustrate the rise of shared security spaces — transport, intelligence, and military cooperation — between Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Still, the core integration agenda for the five Central Asian states remains energy and water resources — domains where Azerbaijan's involvement remains limited.

Economy as Agenda, Data as Evidence

Economic pragmatism is the primary engine of Azerbaijan-Central Asia convergence. Azerbaijan increasingly positions itself as the gateway between Central Asian states and European markets, and this relationship being institutionalized through new formats aimed at harmonizing trade, investment, and joint production.

The European Union’s strategic push to diversify connectivity under its Global Gateway initiative aligns natural with these ambitions. Its recent Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and Connectivity Investors Forum in November brought together actors from the European Union, Central Asia, Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

A major milestone came earlier that month with the adoption of a communiqué last month at the of the Council of Ministers of Trade and Investment of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Tashkent. The agreement prioritizes: harmonizing customs procedures, developing digital platforms, and creating industrial hubs. Some specific measures included introducing digital document flow, mutual recognition of permits, and a single-window system at borders to reduce transaction costs. The agreement also called for a unified electronic catalogue of manufacturers to be created and platforms of relevant ministries and chambers of commerce to be integrated to facilitate direct supplier searches. A separate focus was placed on developing industrial zones to integrate production chains and export high-value-added goods under a joint “Made in Central Asia” brand.

If fully implemented, this package aims to double intra-regional trade turnover to $20 billion, strengthen Azerbaijan’s role along the Middle Corridor, and attract international financial institutions to invest in infrastructure projects. The planned 2026 investment forum in Samarkand will be the next venue for advancing these initiatives.

Recent trade data illustrate both dynamism and asymmetry. Between 2020 to 2024, Azerbaijan’s trade with Central Asia more than tripled — from approximately $344 million to over $1.15 billion. Yet the imbalance is stark: in 2024, imports from the region were nearly triple Azerbaijan’s exports. The surge was driven largely by mineral fuels, particularly from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and a sharp rise in precious metal imports.

The pattern underscores a crucial reality: Azerbaijan is emerging as a key consumer and transit manager of Central Asian resources, threading the region more tightly into broader Eurasian supply chains.

A Mutual Dependency of Corridors Linking Central Asia and the South Caucasus

Azerbaijan’s integration into Central Asian regionalization is heavily influenced by external actors — above all China and the European Union. A triangular dynamic has emerged, in which the South Caucasus acts as the connective hinge.

For China, access to the South Caucasus is predicated on Central Asian stability and cooperation. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) relies increasingly on the Middle Corridor as a hedge against maritime instability and instability in the northern route. For Beijing, the political consolidation of the "C6"  simplifies the regulatory landscape for transport from Western China to Europe. Through the BRI, China has significantly expanded its influence in the South Caucasus, focusing on infrastructure, energy, and digital sectors, while prioritizing transport links that bypass Russia such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and port expansions in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Strategic partnerships have deepened, exemplified by Azerbaijan's elevated comprehensive strategic partnership in 2025 and bilateral trade with China reaching $3.74 billion in 2024. But China’s outreach is not limited to Azerbaijan, it has recently signed free trade and strategic agreements with Georgia and a strategic partnership agreement with Armenia. Chinese firms are actively building solar plants, wind energy projects, and telecom networks across the region, supported by soft power institutions like Confucius Institutes. Central Asia is key in maintaining this reach.

For the European Union, meaningful engagement with Central Asia is contingent upon robust partnerships in the South Caucasus. Central Asian outreach has been an increasing priority. In 2025, In April, Brussels allocated €12 billion in investment to the region under the Global Gateway initiative. Last month, senior EU officials travelled to Tashkent for the 3rd EU-Central Asia Economic Forum, where they announced six major deals in the spheres of trade, the Trans-Caspian transport corridor, green energy, and critical raw materials. Subsequently, the 22nd Kazakhstan-EU Cooperation Councilin Brussels this month, co-chaired by High Representative Kaja Kallas and Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev, celebrated a decade of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, highlighted bilateral trade of nearly $50 billion in 2024, and launching negotiations on easing visa procedures for Kazakhstani citizens traveling to Europe.

Meanwhile, in late 2025, the European Union elevated Armenia to a strategic partner and expanded energy and connectivity ties with Azerbaijan. Although relations with Georgia remained strained over democratic concerns, these steps indicate that the EU’s strategic approach to Central Asia runs through the Caucasus.

If current trends continue, broader South Caucasus participation in Central Asian cooperation formats is plausible — but Azerbaijan, due to its geography and energy profile, remains the indispensable node.

No Recognition, No Identity

Despite promising developments, Azerbaijan’s institutionalization within the Central Asian system remains incomplete. The core challenge is one of political recognition. While regional leaders may speak of a "C6," external formats — such as the U.S.’s "C5+1" platform — may continue to exclude Azerbaijan.

Moreover, regionalization remains functional and project-based, not institutionalized. Central Asia still lacks a common market, common customs space, or unified investment regime. Divergent external alignments — such as World Trade Organization membership, Eurasian Economic Union affiliation, and neutrality policies — complicate integration.

There is also the risk of a resource-export-oriented model, which could limit the development of higher-value regional supply chains. The vision of a "Made in Central Asia" industrial ecosystem remains aspirational without deeper technology transfers and industrial coordination.

Finally, expanding the region’s boundaries raises new strategic questions: if Azerbaijan qualifies as part of Central Asia, what about Afghanistan, whose historical and cultural ties run equally deep? The answers will shape the future cartography of Eurasian regionalization.

Azerbaijan’s entry into the Central Asian consultative framework marks a pivotal shift. Its most consequential impact lies not in symbolic participation, but in its growing ability to influence agenda-setting and contribute to the drafting of strategic documents that will guide regional cooperation.

Whether Azerbaijan ultimately becomes recognized as part of an expanded Central Asian core will depend on its ability to convert functional cooperation into institutional reality—and on whether external actors are willing to adjust their regional frameworks accordingly. Time, and political will, will determine whether the emerging “C6” becomes a durable geopolitical fact.

Eldaniz Gusseinov is a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Heydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at the Ibn Khaldun University and co-founder of Nightingale Int., a political forecasting consultancy. He specializes in European and international studies, focusing on the European Union's foreign policy and its interaction with Central Asian countries, as well as analyzing foreign policy processes in Central Asia.