Turan Research Center

A Partnership Built for the Long Haul

On December 10, 2025, Uzbekistan's Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjayev stood at Masan Port in Changwon, South Korea, watching sleek high-speed trains being loaded onto cargo ships bound for Tashkent. Capable of traveling 160 miles per hour through desert sandstorms, these Hyundai Rotem trains represent the latest chapter in a relationship that began more than three decades ago with something far more modest: the Daewoo Tico, a boxy subcompact car that became ubiquitous on Uzbek roads in the 1990s.

The contrast between those first Ticos and today's high-speed rail cars tells a larger story about South Korea's distinctive approach to Central Asia. While other powers have surged into the region with flashy mega-deals or retreated when conditions changed, South Korea has maintained a steady, pragmatic presence in Uzbekistan — one that has evolved from basic manufacturing to cutting-edge technology transfer. As Russia's attention has shifted to its war in Ukraine and competition intensifies among China, Gulf states, and Western powers for influence in Central Asia, South Korea's three-decade track record offers a case study in sustained economic diplomacy.

The question is why this partnership has endured when so many others have faltered, and what it reveals about Uzbekistan's approach to balancing relationships with multiple powers.

Foundation: Pragmatism Meets Historical Ties

South Korea's engagement with Uzbekistan began with practical advantages that few other countries possessed. When Uzbekistan gained independence in late 1991, South Korea moved quickly, establishing diplomatic relations by January 1992 — the eighth country to formally recognize the new state. By late that year, Daewoo had already formed UzDaewooAvto, a joint venture with state company Uzavtosanoat, to manufacture cars in the eastern town of Asaka.

The timing reflected both opportunity and obligation. Some 250,000 ethnic Koreans lived in Uzbekistan in 1991, descendants of families forcibly relocated by Stalin from the Soviet Far East to Central Asia in the late 1930s. While most other deported groups — ethnic Germans, peoples from the North Caucasians — eventually left Central Asia after the USSR's collapse, the Korean community remained substantial, numbering approximately 174,200 by 2021 according to Uzbekistan's State Statistics Committee. This diaspora provided cultural familiarity and linguistic bridges that smoothed early business relationships.

But sentiment alone doesn't explain three decades of sustained engagement. South Korea approached Uzbekistan with clear economic interests: access to natural resources, particularly uranium for its 26 nuclear reactors that supply 30 percent of the country's electricity, and opportunities in a market that Western companies often overlooked. The relationship was transactional from the start, which paradoxically may have contributed to its longevity — expectations were clear, and both sides benefited.

Building Industrial Foundations: Energy and Infrastructure

South Korean companies followed Daewoo's automotive success by moving into Uzbekistan's energy sector, establishing partnerships that would anchor the relationship for decades.

The Korean Gas Corporation (KOGAS) signed a pivotal agreement in February 2008 with state company Uzbekneftegaz, forming a 50-50 partnership to develop the Surgil gas field and construct the Ustyurt Gas Chemical Complex in western Uzbekistan. The deal was sealed during Uzbek President Islam Karimov's visit to attend the inauguration of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak—a sign of how closely economic ties had become intertwined with diplomatic relations. Later that year, Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) secured agreements to explore for oil and gas in eastern Uzbekistan's Namangan-Tergachi and Chust-Pop regions, and later in dried-out areas of the Aral Sea in partnership with Uzbekneftegaz and China National Petroleum Corporation.

These energy deals created a foundation for deeper involvement in Uzbekistan's infrastructure. Hyundai Engineering partnered with Russia's Lukoil to build the Kandym gas-processing plant in Bukhara Province, commissioned in 2018 with capacity to handle 8 billion cubic meters annually. SK Engineering & Construction won contracts to modernize the Bukhara oil refinery in 2019, upgrading it to produce Euro-5 quality gasoline — a critical improvement as Uzbekistan grapples with severe air pollution and phases out low-quality fuel.

Power generation became another focus area. Daewoo International and Hyundai Engineering & Construction modernized the Andijan and Tupolang hydropower plants in 2015, installing new units that boosted combined capacity to 150 megawatts. The companies then partnered with Uzbekenergo to modernize the 900-megawatt Talimarjan thermal power plant and install new capacity at the Angren plant. In 2021, SK Engineering & Construction secured the tender to modernize the Mubarek thermal power plant, increasing capacity from 120 to 300 megawatts.

What distinguishes these projects is their focus on upgrading existing infrastructure rather than building vanity projects. South Korean companies have concentrated on making Uzbekistan's energy and power systems more efficient and environmentally sound — less glamorous than new cities or mega-dams, but essential to the country's development needs.

The Technology Leap: Positioning for the Future

The high-speed trains arriving in Uzbekistan represent a strategic shift in the partnership. South Korea is no longer just helping Uzbekistan modernize Soviet-era infrastructure; it's enabling the country to leapfrog into advanced technologies that will shape its economic future.

The Hyundai Rotem trains, designed with dust-resistant systems to withstand extreme heat and sandstorms, will first serve the Tashkent-Urgench-Khiva route, cutting travel time to seven hours and better connecting the capital with western regions. The route will be named after Jalaladdin Manguberdi, the last Khwarezmian ruler who resisted the Mongol invasions — a symbolic choice linking technological progress with historical pride. As more trains arrive through 2027, additional lines will connect Tashkent and Bukhara, transforming domestic connectivity.

Aviation infrastructure is another frontier. Incheon International Airport Corporation, alongside Saudi and Japanese partners, is participating in construction of Tashkent's new international airport, with a first-phase cost of $2.5 billion. In April 2025, Incheon won the tender to modernize Urgench airport in western Uzbekistan, extending South Korean expertise across the country's aviation network.

Perhaps most striking is South Korea's push into emerging technologies. In December 2025, during Deputy Prime Minister Khodjayev's visit to Seoul, a memorandum of understanding was signed for South Korean company ROBOTIS to assemble humanoid robots in Uzbekistan. Uzbek pharmaceutical companies signed another agreement with South Korea's National Institute for Bioprocessing Research and Training to boost innovation in biotechnology and train Uzbek specialists. An Uzbek delegation attending a procurement conference in Seoul reached agreements for South Korean assistance in digitalization and introducing artificial intelligence into public procurement systems — details of which were discussed between Uzbekistan's deputy Economic and Finance Minister and the South Korean ambassador in October.

These aren't isolated deals. They represent a coordinated strategy to position Uzbekistan as a technology hub and manufacturing center for advanced industries, with South Korea serving as the principal partner and knowledge transfer agent.

The Human Connection: Labor and Diaspora

Behind the billions in contracts and infrastructure projects lies a human dimension that reinforces economic ties. In December 2012, Uzbekistan and South Korea signed an agreement allowing Uzbek laborers to work in South Korea. By July 2025, approximately 98,457 Uzbeks were living in South Korea, with reports suggesting the potential for up to 100,000 workers on temporary visas. Remittances from South Korea to Uzbekistan surged 56 percent in 2024, totaling $534 million — a significant flow of capital into Uzbek households.

This labor migration has created challenges, including some workers leaving approved positions for other employment and overstaying visas, leading to recent quota reductions and a voluntary exit program for those without legal status. Yet a December 2025 agreement allowing select Uzbek laborers to work at KIA Auto service centers demonstrates how both countries are trying to structure migration to benefit Uzbekistan's development — workers will gain skills to support the domestic automotive sector when they return home.

The ethnic Korean community in Uzbekistan, while smaller than in 1991, continues to serve as a cultural bridge. These historical ties provide familiarity and trust that purely commercial relationships often lack, even as the partnership has evolved far beyond diaspora connections.

What Makes This Partnership Different?

South Korea's sustained engagement with Uzbekistan stands in contrast to other powers' approaches to Central Asia. China has pursued massive infrastructure investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, often involving large loans and Chinese contractors. Gulf states have recently entered with major financial commitments focused on specific sectors. Russia's historical dominance has waned as Moscow's attention has turned to its war in Ukraine. Western countries and companies have increased interest but often lack the long-term commitment and cultural proximity that South Korea offers.

Several factors explain South Korea's staying power. First, the partnership has been consistently reciprocal—Uzbekistan provides resources and market access while South Korea brings technology, investment, and employment opportunities. Neither side has sought to dominate the relationship politically. Second, South Korean companies have proven adaptable, evolving from basic manufacturing in the 1990s to sophisticated technology transfer today, matching Uzbekistan's development trajectory. Third, the relationship operates at multiple levels—government-to-government, business-to-business, and people-to-people—creating resilience when any single channel faces obstacles.

Most importantly, South Korea has avoided the perception of strategic competition that accompanies Chinese or Russian engagement, or the conditional assistance often associated with Western partnerships. For Uzbekistan, this makes South Korea an attractive partner as the country seeks to balance relationships with multiple powers while maintaining sovereignty and pursuing rapid development.

Looking Ahead: A Model for Multi-Alignment?

As Uzbekistan pursues what observers call a "multi-vector" foreign policy — engaging simultaneously with Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and Gulf states — its partnership with South Korea offers a template for how mid-sized powers can build influence in Central Asia without triggering great power competition.

The third meeting of parliamentary leaders from Central Asian countries and South Korea, held in Tashkent in December 2025, suggests this model may be expanding regionally. Discussions focused on economic cooperation, digital transformation, and industrial development — areas where South Korea has demonstrated expertise in Uzbekistan and could replicate across the region.

Questions remain about the partnership's future trajectory. Can South Korea maintain its position as competition for Uzbek contracts intensifies? Will the technology transfer agreements produce the innovation ecosystems both countries envision? How will labor migration evolve as Uzbekistan's economy develops and demand for overseas work potentially declines?

What's clear is that after more than three decades, the Uzbekistan-South Korea relationship has evolved from opportunistic early engagement into a strategic partnership that serves both countries' interests. From Tico cars to high-speed trains, from basic energy extraction to AI-powered government systems, the partnership has continuously adapted while maintaining its core pragmatism.

In a region where great powers compete for influence and partnerships often prove fleeting, South Korea's quiet consistency in Uzbekistan may offer the most valuable lesson: sustainable relationships are built not on grand gestures but on mutual benefit, technological collaboration, and patient investment in shared futures.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center. Before joining the TRC, he was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.

Along a short strip of the Tajik-Afghan border, there has been a lot of activity in recent months, including the most serious incidents of cross-border violence in decades. Most of this activity has involved Tajikistan’s Shamsiddin Shohin district, a sparsely inhabited area where the population ekes out a living farming and herding in the foothills of the Pamir Mountains. Why the situation changed so suddenly is not entirely clear, but it is clear that the district is now the hot spot along the Tajik-Afghan frontier.

A Dubious Post-Independence Reputation

The Shamsiddin Shohin district is in Tajikistan’s southwestern Khatlon region. The district is located near the place where Afghan territory starts to make its northern-most protrusion. The elevation across most of the district is between 1,500-2,000 meters.

The district is about 2,300 square kilometers and has a population of some 60,000. Shuroobad, population roughly 11,000, is the district capital, and the entire district was once called Shuroobad. It was renamed Shamsiddin Shohin in 2016 to honor the Tajik poet and satirist of the late 19th century, who was born in the area.

Tajikistan and Afghanistan are divided by the Pyanj River, which further downstream merges with other rivers to become the Amu Darya, known to the Greeks as the Oxus, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“Well guys, are we going, or are we going to sit here taking a piss?”

It has been many years since the culmination of the so-called Russian constitutional crisis, when the country’s president, Boris Yeltsin, sought to dissolve the parliament and then ordered the military to crush opposition led by the vice president at the time, Aleksandr Rutskoi, and the chairman of parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov.

I was working in Central Asia when the crisis broke out in September 1993, and heard bits and pieces from Radio Mayak every now and again from the Uzbek village I was working in at the time.

I traveled regularly to Moscow for my job — heading a Central Asian sociology project for the University of Manchester and the Soros International Fund for Cultural Initiative — to hand over material from our Central Asian colleagues, pick up their salaries, and restock my own household supplies for the next period of village life.

By chance, I arrived in the Russian capital on October 1. Friends there explained the rapidly changing situation. (I was more interested in the party that some friends told me was set for the Penta Hotel on Saturday night, October 2.)

I had my first look at the Russian parliament building, known as the White House, on the way to the Penta. It was surrounded by trucks, the Soviet-era tanker trucks that had big letters on the sides showing they carried moloko (milk) or voda (water), or something. There was also barbed wire around the building. Small groups of people were milling about on both sides of the barricade.

Sunday, October 3, was shopping day for me. There were always too many people at the Irish store on the Arbat on the weekend, but there was another Irish store on the Ring Road. There was a smaller selection but I was only looking for basic products, like toilet paper.

Read the full article on Soldier of Fortune Magazine.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Alisher Sultanov was relieved of his post as presidential representative on energy security on December 16, ending some ten years of dubious performance as one of Uzbekistan’s top energy officials. Under Sultanov’s watch as head of the state oil and gas company and then as a top official in Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry, the country’s oil and gas production decreased, and Uzbekistan went from being a gas exporter to an importer.

A Career in the Gas and Oil Sector

Sultanov started working in Uzbekistan’s energy sector in the mid-1990s and gradually made his way through the ranks at the state oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz. In 2015, Sultanov became Uzbekneftegaz’s chairman, serving in that position until 2018.

In 2017, Sultanov was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the fuel, energy, and industrial sector, and in February 2019, he was named Energy Minister. He stepped down as Energy Minister in April 2022, officially for health reasons, but by 2023 was back as presidential advisor on oil and gas, chemical, and energy matters, though that title was changed in July 2025 to the president’s representative on energy security.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On December 12, 2025, Turkmenistan marks the 30th anniversary of a UN decision granting Turkmenistan the status of a neutral country.

Defining what “permanent neutrality” means for Turkmenistan is impossible, as it is a flexible term used to justify a range of policies, both domestic and foreign. This vague special status has not provided many benefits, but has helped Turkmenistan’s leadership isolate the country and create one of the most bizarreand repressive forms of government in the world today.

Last Item on the Day’s Agenda

On Tuesday, December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA) 90th plenary meeting reconvened at 15:20 to consider items 57 to 81 on its agenda. Item 81 was the draft resolution on “permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan.”

The UNGA president at that time, Freitas do Amaral, noted to the Assembly that the draft resolution “was adopted by the First Committee without a vote,” and asked if the Assembly wished “to do likewise.” The Assembly did, and after a few brief remarks about the next Assembly meeting on December 14, the session ended at 18:05.

That is how the UN officially granted Turkmenistan the status of neutrality.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Not long after late 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan became independent, illegal narcotics trafficking started through the region, mainly coming from drug-producing countries in South Asia, particularly Afghanistan, and being smuggled through Central Asian territory to Russia and from there to Europe. For the most part, Central Asia was simply a transit area for narcotics trafficking but that is changing. Drug smuggling continues but now newer illegal narcotics also are being produced in Central Asia for a growing domestic market. After more than 30 years of developing counter-narcotics agencies, officials in the countries are faced with rapidly evolving situation that makes drug interdiction more difficult and distribution much easier.

The Problem

On November 13, the website of Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry posted the results of the 10-day “Law and Order” counter-narcotics operation that had just concluded. They detained 27 people and seized some 80 kilograms of narcotics, mostly mephedrone and Alfa-PVP, so-called synthetic drugs. One of the raids was on a laboratory in the city of Karaganda, about 140 miles south of the capital Astana, that produced Alfa-PVP. Police seized two tons of precursor substances at the laboratory.

At the start of November, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyoev approved the 2025-2026 national programfor combating drug-related crimes. According to information posted on the Uzbek president’s website, there were more than 11,000 drug-related crimes and some 2.5 tons of narcotics seized in Uzbekistan since the start of 2025. In July, Uzbekistan’s chief narcologist Zarifjon Ashurov noted drug use among youth is increasing. Ashurov said there are 5,000 registered cases of minors who are drug-dependent and the youngest is 10 years old. Some of that is attributed to misuse of prescription drugs, but Tashkent Deputy Mayor Durdona Rahimova said in November 2024 there is an increase in the number of students at schools in the Uzbek capital who are using synthetic drugs.

In Kyrgyzstan on October 30, the head of the country’s counter-narcotics department Kanybek Usenov said in the first nine months of 2025, Kyrgyz law enforcement seized 4.725 tons of illegal drugs and precursors. Usenov pointed out that of narcotics confiscated, 798 kilograms was synthetic drugs, compared to 34 kilograms seized in all of 2024. Usenov added that five laboratories for producing synthetic drugs were uncovered in Kyrgyzstan in 2025, but he said use of these drugs is growing mainly because of shipments arriving from Kazakhstan and Russia.  

Read the full article on the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Someone in northern Afghanistan near the Tajik border is targeting Chinese workers just across the river inside Tajikistan.

On November 26, three Chinese miners were killed in an attack in which assailants used a drone equipped with firearms and grenades, while on November 30, two Chinese roadworkers were shot dead.

It is difficult to say who is behind the killings or pinpoint their motive, but the violence has led to the highest-level contact between authorities of Tajikistan and Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

EU-Kazakhstan relations have strengthened significantly over the past decade, accelerating after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an analyst has told TVP World.

According to Bruce Pannier from the Caspian Policy Center, Kazakhstan has become a vital trade and energy partner for Europe, thanks to its position on the Middle Corridor—a route linking China and Europe without crossing Russia. 

While Moscow resents losing its northern route, Beijing has backed the corridor and invested heavily in Kazakhstan, giving China political leverage. Despite Astana’s efforts, some sanctioned goods still reach Russia through Kazakhstan. 

Meanwhile, Europe depends on Kazakh oil, uranium and critical minerals, with new deals focusing on local resource processing. 

Watch the interview on TVP World.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kyrgyzstan held snap parliamentary elections on November 30 that seem not to have elicited widespread enthusiasm among the electorate.

Not long ago, Kyrgyzstan had the most vibrant political culture in Central Asia. Campaigning for parliamentary elections was a lively period that was impossible not to notice. Parties and candidates were in the news constantly in the weeks before the elections. There were campaign posters and signs, and public events with concerts organized by parties or candidates all around the country.

The rapid pace of these latest elections, in which candidates had only 20 days to campaign, might have contributed to voter confusion and apathy on election day, but the elections do seem to have come off without any major controversy.

In a country that has had three revolutions in the last 20 years, two of them directly connected to parliamentary elections, a quiet election day is a victory of sorts.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

KazMunaiGaz (KMG) says it has no concrete plans to sell any of its European assets, though pressure is building to at least sell off some of the Kazakh company’s shares in oil refineries in Romania. Reports on November 21 said KMG was looking to privatize up to 50% of its shares in its subsidiary KMG International’s (KMGI) European operations in Europe.

The reports were based on a list of recommendations from Kazakhstan’s Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition (APDC), which proposed, as part of the 2026-2027 strategy, that KMGI should have a two-stage tender to sell up to 50% of its stakes. On November 26, KMG denied making any decisions about KMGI businesses in Europe, adding that the APDC’s list of recommendations “includes assets from different sectors, but this in itself does not automatically trigger a sale.”

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In the Spotlight on Central Asia Podcast, Senior Fellow Bruce Pannier and Michael Hilliard unpack how the C5+1 summit in Washington could reshape Central Asia's security and economic architecture, cutting through the new trade deals and MoUs to gauge their real-world impact. Pannier and Hilliard assess Tokayev's trip to Moscow and what it signals, the Moscow arrest of a major Turkmen power broker, fresh twists in Kazakhstan's election season, viral claims that a foreign power has "pulled out" of the region, and worrying economic signals from Bishkek.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Campaigning for seats in Kyrgyzstan’s upcoming parliamentary elections is underway, and it is already shaping up to be a race unlike anything seen before in Kyrgyzstan. The 467 candidates competing for the 90 seats in parliament have only 20 days to make their cases to voters in their districts. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov’s government has vowed to keep these elections clean and fair, and threatened severe punishment for those who attempt to cheat in any way.

Uneven Electoral Landscape

The country is divided into 30 voting districts, and in each district, the three candidates who receive the most votes will win seats.

The level of competition varies, depending on the district. Electoral district 11, which is Manas city (formerly Jalal-Abad), has 155,023 eligible voters. Only five candidates are running in the district, three of whom are women. According to new election rules, a woman (or a man) must win at least one of the three seats available in each district.

Name recognition is always important, and especially so in elections with many newcomers seeking seats in parliament. One of the candidates in District 11 is Shairbek Tashiyev, the brother of the current head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), Kamchybek Tashiyev. He is almost certain to win one of the seats.

In electoral district 19 in Kyrgyzstan’s northern Chuy Province, with 138,373 eligible voters, there are 25 candidates competing.

The two districts with the largest number of voters, district 15 in the Aksy area of western Kyrgyzstan with 160,218 voters, and district 28 in the Zhety-Oguz area of eastern Kyrgyzstan with 160,181 voters, have, respectively, 15 candidates and 17 candidates. In the districts where there are 15 or more candidates, the three winners might only receive around 10,000 votes, or even less.

The candidates are out meeting with voters, but many are relying on social networks to promote their image and spread their message. Domestic television stations, ElTR and UTRK, are airing candidate debates that “will be distributed regionally, depending on the candidates’ electoral districts.”

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Given that Kazakhstan had normalised relations with Israel decades before this month, its entry into the Abraham Accords is a “politically meaningful and strategically useful, but largely symbolic” development that will come with “targeted practical gains in specific areas such as technology, defence, and critical minerals,” explained Aigerim Turgunbaeva, a Bishkek-based journalist and research fellow at the Turan Center, in an interview with The New Arab.

Astana’s official entry into the Abraham Accords “mainly elevates the visibility of bilateral ties, provides a recognised political framework for new commercial and technological partnerships, and reduces perceived risks for US and Israeli investors operating in Kazakhstan,” she noted, while adding that the Central Asian state’s foreign policy will retain its “multi-vector” nature that avoids placing Astana in alignment with any specific geopolitical bloc.

“The move therefore broadens Kazakhstan’s diplomatic toolkit rather than transforming the nature of its ties with Israel,” stated Turgunbaeva.

Israel’s Bukharan Jewish community plays a central role in shaping Israeli-Uzbek relations. Reflecting on this community’s history, Bruce Pannier, a fellow at the Turan Research Centre and board member of the Caspian Policy Centre, noted that the Bukharan Jewish population in what is now Uzbekistan numbered around 40,000 at the time of the Soviet Union’s implosion.

“The community had been in the Bukhara area for thousands of years. Most have left in the time since Uzbekistan became independent, and there are now possibly less than 1,000 still living in the Bukhara area. Most of those who left went to the United States, but several thousand went to Israel with significant help from the Israeli government,” he noted.

“The Bukharan Jews in Israel and those still remaining in Uzbekistan continue to connect the two countries.”

Pannier believes that Kyrgyzstan would likely join after Uzbekistan. “Kyrgyz-Israeli diplomatic relations also date back to early 1992. Kyrgyzstan’s situation vis-à-vis Israel is similar to Kazakhstan’s in that there’s really nothing to lose in joining the Accords,” he told TNA.

Read the full article on the New Arab.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow and Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

When the presidents of the five Central Asian republics gathered at the White House on November 6, 2025, it marked a milestone in the often uneven story of U.S. engagement with the region. For the first time, all five — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — met together with an American president inside the White House.

The occasion was the tenth anniversary of the C5+1 framework, launched in 2015 to promote cooperation between Washington and the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called it“the beginning of a new era of interaction,” a phrase that, while diplomatic, captured a genuine turning point.

This new phase in relations is not about democracy programs or counterterrorism bases. It is about business, minerals, and technology — topics that reflect how both sides have recalibrated what “partnership” means.

The Early Years: Optimism and Experiment

The United States was among the first countries to recognize the independence of the Central Asian states in late 1991. The optimism of that period shaped Washington’s first decade of involvement. American policy centered on helping the post-Soviet governments establish institutions, promote market economies, and transition toward democratic systems.

Many of those efforts mirrored what the U.S. was doing in Central and Eastern Europe. But unlike Poland or the Baltic states, Central Asia was remote, landlocked, and far from Washington and its allies’ primary focus on the European post-Soviet states. Engagement was steady but limited.

Still, the 1990s saw a surge of American activity. Western NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and Human Rights Watch opened offices in the region. U.S.-funded media, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA), began broadcasting locally. The American University of Central Asia was founded in Bishkek in 1993 as a symbol of educational partnership.

At the same time, U.S. companies moved into Kazakhstan’s energy sector. Chevron’s 1993 deal for the Tengiz oil field was followed by ExxonMobil and Texaco joining massive oil and gas consortia at Kashagan and Karachaganak. These early business ventures proved more durable than most of Washington’s political initiatives — Chevron still derives roughly a quarter of its global output from Kazakhstan today.

The 9/11 Decade: From Reform to Security

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, completely reshaped U.S. priorities in Central Asia. With Afghanistan at the heart of the global counterterrorism campaign, geography suddenly elevated the region’s importance.

By the end of that year, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan had agreed to host U.S. and NATO forces on their territories. The Manas air base near Bishkek and the Karshi-Khanabad base in southern Uzbekistan became critical to the mission in Afghanistan.

For much of the 2000s, while U.S.-led forces operated in Afghanistan, Central Asia experienced an unusual period of relative stability and economic growth. With the exception of Turkmenistan, all five Central Asian governments viewed the Taliban as a direct security threat when the movement first emerged in the mid-1990s. The closer the Taliban advanced toward their borders, the more alarmed regional leaders became.

The incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into southern Kyrgyzstan and eastern Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 had already revealed the dangers of militant spillover. The IMU’s alliance with the Taliban — and their sanctuary in northern Afghanistan just across the Tajik border — cemented Central Asia’s dependence on Western-led military containment.

The new partnership brought infrastructure upgrades, fuel contracts, and generous aid packages. For a few years, Washington balanced its counterterrorism objectives with encouragement of political openness. Opposition groups and civil society organizations enjoyed a degree of freedom not seen before.

With Uzbekistan, ties with the United States suffered an abrupt and major setback in 2005. When Uzbek forces opened fire on protesters in the city of Andijan, the United States and Europe called for an international investigation. Tashkent refused, backed by Russia and China, and expelled U.S. forces from its territory. Within months, then-President Islam Karimov ordered western NGOs and foreign media to leave the country.

Yet even after that rupture, strategic necessity brought the two sides together again. As relations with Pakistan deteriorated in the late 2000s, the U.S. needed alternative supply routes to Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) was created, sending cargo from the Baltic ports through Russia and Central Asia into Afghanistan. Uzbekistan became a central transit corridor, and criticism of its human rights record softened.

Few regions benefitted more from the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan than Central Asia. The Taliban’s ouster and the destruction of the IMU removed immediate threats to regional security, while large-scale international assistance financed cross-border infrastructure that continues to yield economic dividends. The electricity transmission lines linking Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan, for example, were constructed during the years of U.S. and NATO presence and still generate millions of dollars in export revenue annually.

The Drawdown and the Rise of the C5+1

In June 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the gradual withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. Allied contingents soon followed. By 2014, the last U.S. personnel had departed the transit center at Kyrgyzstan’s Manas Airport, and French forces vacated their post at Dushanbe Airport in Tajikistan.

Washington and its partners sought to prepare Afghan security forces to stand on their own. Yet by late 2013, Taliban units had reemerged in northern Afghanistan, just across the border from Turkmenistan. Within a few years, most northern districts were either partially or fully under Taliban control, reviving Central Asian anxieties about cross-border instability.

During the drawdown period, the United States provided non-lethal security assistance to its northern partners. In 2015, Uzbekistan received 308 Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles and 20 armored recovery vehicles to help secure its Afghan frontier. Kyrgyzstan obtained military transport trucks; Tajikistan received quad-bikes for border patrols; and Turkmenistan was supplied with surveillance equipment.

As the military dimension of U.S.–Central Asian cooperation receded, Washington sought to institutionalize diplomatic engagement. In 2015, the C5+1 format was established, bringing together the U.S. and the five Central Asian foreign ministers for regular dialogue. The initiative signaled a shift away from the heavy security and democracy-promotion agenda of the previous two decades toward a relationship increasingly framed around economic partnership and pragmatic cooperation.

Despite having a decade of advance notice that foreign troops would leave Afghanistan, Central Asian governments were nevertheless jolted by the abrupt collapse of the Afghan government in August 2021. The chaotic withdrawal underscored for regional leaders how swiftly the United States could disengage from a theater in which it had invested years of effort and billions of dollars. America had picked up and left; managing the enduring instability next door would now fall squarely to the states of Central Asia.

As the American and allied withdrawal unfolded, the security rationale that once underpinned U.S.–Central Asian engagement faded. In recent C5+1 meetings and White House summits, discussions of democracy or human rights have been largely absent. Security was only mentioned by Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, whose government continues to view the Taliban and affiliated groups with suspicion.

The 2025 Reset: Business at the Center

The November 2025 summit in Washington made clear that U.S. policy in Central Asia has entered a new phase. The main focus was commerce — particularly critical minerals. With China dominating global supplies of rare earths and strategic metals, U.S. policymakers see Central Asia as a valuable alternative.

In Washington, Rahmon emphasized his country’s vast antimony reserves, while others cited lithium, copper, and uranium. Beyond resources, the leaders promoted deals that underline Central Asia’s growing economic relevance.

Kazakhstan signed a $4.2 billion agreement with the American firm Wabtec to supply locomotives, part of a broader package of 29 new contracts worth around $17 billion including joint mining ventures in critical minerals. Uzbekistan announced additional purchases of Boeing 787 Dreamliners, expanding on earlier orders signed in New York during the 2023 UN General for 22 Boeings worth $8.5 billion.  Assembly. Even Tajikistan’s small national carrier, Somon Air, confirmed plans to acquire up to 14 Dreamliners.

The meetings in Washington were preceded by a series of business-focused sessions with major U.S. corporations — many specializing in mining, logistics, and digital technologies. Central Asian leaders also expressed interest in partnerships on artificial intelligence, cyber infrastructure, and renewable energy.

President Donald Trump’s approach has strayed from his predecessors. Unlike previous decades, there was little public mention of governance or human rights. The tone was pragmatic: economic diversification for the Central Asians, and supply-chain security for Washington.

Continuity and Skepticism

This new emphasis on commerce recalls the first wave of American involvement in the 1990s, but with a crucial difference. Then, the United States was one of few outside powers engaging the region as Russia struggled and China remained a minor player. Now, the geopolitical landscape is crowded. Russia remains an unavoidable presence, China is deeply entrenched economically, and Turkey, the Gulf states, India, and the European Union are also active.

Central Asian leaders are therefore cautious. They welcome American investment but understand that U.S. strategic attention has shifted repeatedly over the past 34 years — from democracy promotion to counterterrorism, then to retrenchment, and now to economics. They also understand that Washington will not replace Russia as a security guarantor or compete with the scale of Chinese investments through the Belt and Road Initiative.

Even so, they value the U.S. corporate presence. Firms like Chevron, ExxonMobil, and now Wabtec have proven more consistent partners than successive U.S. administrations. Business deals, not summit rhetoric, will determine whether Tokayev’s “new era” truly materializes.

Conclusion: A Relationship Redefined

The history of U.S.–Central Asia relations reflects recurring cycles — enthusiasm, strategic engagement, and gradual drift. Yet the 2025 summit suggests the start of something more stable, if less ambitious.

The Central Asian states are now more assertive and better connected to multiple global partners. They no longer seek external patrons but balanced partnerships that deliver tangible results. For Washington, this is an opportunity to engage on practical terms — through energy cooperation, digital innovation, and secure supply chains — without overpromising on political transformation.

If the 1990s were defined by democracy promotion, the 2000s by counterterrorism, and the 2010s by disengagement, the 2020s may be remembered as the decade of economic realism. Whether this pragmatic partnership endures will depend not on summit communiqués, but on whether American businesses — and U.S. policymakers — remain committed long after the headlines fade.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center. Before joining the TRC, he was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.

Kazakhstan is widely recognised as the world's leading uranium producer and exporter and as a top-10 oil exporter. But for many of its neighbours, the fact that the country is also a leading and flourishing exporter of grain is equally, if not more, important.

However, Kazakhstan is in fact increasingly moving beyond its neighbours, finding additional markets for its grain commodities. These now include countries in North Africa, the Middle East, Europe and East Asia.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakhstan is turning geography into strategy. In an interview on Eastern Express, Bruce Pannier, a board member at the think tank Caspian Policy Center, said the country is rapidly positioning itself as Eurasia’s transit hinge as shippers reroute away from Russia.

“Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine meant that you couldn’t use the so-called northern route… Now you have both China and Europe hugely interested in developing the Middle Corridor,” he said. 

That corridor—the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route —runs from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian to the South Caucasus and onward to Europe. Pannier argues Kazakhstan’s long, uninterrupted east-west spine gives it a structural edge.  

Read the full article on TVP World.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kyrgyzstan is conducting snap parliamentary elections on November 30. The deadline for would-be candidates to hand in their forms was October 30.

Nearly 600 prospective contenders have submitted registration forms to run for the 90 seats in parliament. The Central Election Commission (CEC) now has until November to process candidates’ applications to ensure they meet all the requirements to participate in the upcoming poll. Those who qualify will then have 18 days to convince voters in their districts to cast their ballots for them.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Bruce Pannier co-hosts the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast with Michael Hilliard. In this episode, Pannier and Hilliard discuss the upcoming C5+1 summit in Washington, clashes between the Taliban and Tajik forces, a crackdown on independent media in Kyrgyzstan, and the foiling of a terror plot in Almaty. Both are joined by Efgan Nifti of the Caspian Policy Center to discuss the growing relationship between Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Depending on one’s financial means, when flying there is a choice of economy, business or first-class. But for three people in Turkmenistan, there is the ultra-luxurious “Berdi-class”.

Turkmenistan is a country rich in natural gas, but with painfully high unemployment and a climbing poverty rate. Recent revelations of the special fleet of planes available to the Chairman of Turkmenistan’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) and self-styled "Leader of the Nation" Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, his son, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and his eldest daughter, Oguljahan Atabayeva, again underscore the great disparity between Turkmenistan’s people and the ruling family.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Peaceful coexistence is turning out to be complicated for Tajikistan and the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

The Tajik government has viewed the Taliban as a threat since the militant group appeared in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. But now that modest efforts are underway to establish some sort of amicable ties, there has been an uptick of violence directly involving the two sides along the Tajik-Afghan border.

Let’s Keep This Between Us

Tajikistan is the lone government in Central Asia that remained hostile to the Taliban after the latter returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. In the weeks that followed, the Taliban again exerted control over Afghanistan, and the Tajik government and the Taliban sent reinforcements to their common border. Russia and Pakistan had to intervene to ease tensions.

The other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have all established a business relationship with the Taliban government since the Taliban again seized control, but Tajikistan has remained aloof. Which is why the visit of Muhammad Yusuf Vafo, the governor of Afghanistan’s northern province of Balkh, to the Tajik capital Dushanbe on October 23 came as such a surprise.

The Tajik government did not say anything about Vafo’s trip. The independent Tajik news agency Asia-Plus cited Afghan media as reporting on the visit, during which Vafo met with the head of Tajikistan’s National Security Committee (GKNB), Saimumin Yatimov. Vafo and Yatimov reportedly discussed ways to improve ties in a variety of spheres and pledged not to let any “hostile elements” use their territory to plot or carry out attacks on the country.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The idea for the 1,800-kilometer Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline project has been around for 30 years. There has not been much progress in building the pipeline during those decades.

The chances of seeing TAPI realized seem far away at the moment, considering Pakistan and India were involved in fighting in May of this year, and in October, there were battles along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

However, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan are still interested in TAPI, and top officials from those two countries just met along the border to inaugurate a new section of the pipeline, and it looks like, for now, these two countries are enough.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Central Asian states continue to send Tehran the same message they voiced in the 1990s: They want nothing to do with the Islamic Republic’s political model. In other words, from a political standpoint, they view Iran as anything but a partner of choice. However, Central Asian states still desire to work with Iran as a potential transit country for shipping goods between East and West. In this respect, these former Soviet republics are likely closer to Tehran today than at any previous point, according to Bruce Pannier, a Turan Research Center fellow and board member of the Caspian Policy Center.

Ultimately, while Central Asian republics value Iran as a trade corridor and seek to have problem-free relationships with Tehran, these ex-Soviet states do not want the conflicts between the Islamic Republic and the American-Israeli alliance to play out on their soil. 

Central Asian states “don’t want to have anything to do with Iran’s political take on the world, or side with them in any of the disputes that Iran has with other countries in the world,” Pannier told this author. 

“They don’t want to cancel anybody out. They don’t want to cancel Iran out either. But they’re certainly not going to get closer to Iran knowing that it might in some way inhibit their relationship with other partners, including Western partners who actually have much more money to offer Central Asia than Iran ever will have, so that’s part of the figuring in [Central Asian states’] relations with Iran,” he added.

At the same time, these countries are close to Russia, whose relationship with Iran underpins a role for Tehran in Central Asia. Nonetheless, with Moscow distracted by the Ukraine conflict and challenged by EU and NATO countries in Central Asia, Russia’s influence in this former Soviet space is not as strong as it was years ago. Furthermore, while Iran is not a major player in Central Asia’s security architecture, one exception, noted Pannier, relates to the struggle against Islamic State Khorasan Province in Afghanistan—a group that has its eyes set on Central Asia...

Describing Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Israel as “formal but limited,” Aigerim Turgunbaeva, a Bishkek-based journalist, told this author the Central Asian country strikes a “diplomatic balance, engaging both Israel and Iran while refraining from taking sides.” As she put it, Bishkek’s approach toward Iran and Israel is “guided by pragmatism and the desire to preserve constructive relations with all partners.”

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Bruce Pannier and Aigerim Turgunbaeva are research fellows at the Turan Research Center.

Bruce Pannier co-hosts the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast with Michael Hilliard. This episode, Pannier and Hilliard discuss snap elections and reinstating of the death penalty in Kyrgyzstan, major electoral reforms in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan's latest gas ambitions, and more. Both are joined by guest Peter Frankopan - Professor of Global History at Worcester College and author of the Silk Road.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The history of the Central Asian states since independence dawned in 1991 centres around the leaders of the five countries.

Even casual observers of the region remember how Nursultan Nazarbayev was Kazakhstan’s president, Islam Karimov was Uzbekistan’s leader and Saparmurat “Turkmenbashi” (head of the Turkmen) Niyazov was Turkmenistan’s demigod. Yet the people behind the scenes who supported this trio and carried out their instructions in the first 10-15 years of independence are now nearly forgotten.

As it happens, two of those people lately died – and, notably, their passing seems for the most part to have been overlooked by the current leaderships of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In an interview with TVP World, Bruce Pannier of the Caspian Policy Center said Russia “has not many friends in the world these days, and so they’ve got to do what they can to keep such friends as they have.”  

He called the summit “one of the most lackluster” in years, noting that “Russia is slowly losing its influence in the region and grasping at straws.”  

Pannier added that Moscow’s economic promises now pale beside Chinese and European offers, and warned that Central Asian states are “expanding their security relationship with Turkey” as Russia’s capacity to project power and invest diminishes. 

Read the full interview at TVP World.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Tajikistan’s government has remained antagonistic towards Taliban rule in Afghanistan ever since the militant group first appeared some 30 years ago. And in word and deed, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has shown that he would prefer not to have to deal with his neighbour’s current government at all, though that has proven impossible.

There are ties that bind the two countries. Slowly but surely, the Tajik authorities are developing a relationship with the Taliban that involves cooperation on local levels and goodwill gestures, but avoids, as much as possible, actually speaking with Taliban officials.

Read the full article on BNE IntelliNews.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Officials at Russia’s state gas company Gazprom were likely celebrating in early September after signing a long-awaited “legally binding memorandum” with China on construction of the Sila Sibiri-2 or Power of Siberia-2 natural gas pipeline.

For Turkmenistan, however, the deal may mark the death knell for its rival project to supply gas to China. Ashgabat has almost exhausted its options for exporting its vast reserves, with its last remaining hope resting on reviving a 30-year-old vision: the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP).

The Obvious Customer

When Turkmenistan became independent in late 1991, the new country’s leadership was already aware of its vast reserves of natural gas. First President Saparmurat Niyazov said during the early years of independence that Turkmenistan would become a “second Kuwait” and “everyone will drive a Mercedes.”

Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth largest reserves of natural gas – though the exact amount remains contested.  As the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies noted in its 2024 report, “Official gas reserve claims by Turkmenistan have always exceeded independent evaluations.” While Turkmen authorities have estimated figures as high as 24.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) in 2011, current estimates from British Petroleum and the nonprofit international association, Cedigaz, place the reserves closer to 13-14 tcm. Yet even this lower estimate  would  be enough to meet the European Union’s entire natural gas needs for some 30 years, based on 2024 consumption levels.

Since the mid-1990s, Western governments and energy companies have shown interest in Turkmen gas as a strategic resource for diversifying Europe’s supply. Central to these ambitions has been the proposed TCP –a 190-mile conduit running beneath the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. The pipeline is designed to carry up to 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. From there, gas would flow from the South Caucasus and Turkey to European markets.

In 1999, U.S. companies General Electric and Bechtel briefly joined the project’s feasibility study, but both withdrew by mid-2000 due to issues involving the unresolved legal status of the Caspian. The TCP project was resurrected in 2002 when Austria’s OMV, Turkey’s Botas, Hungary’s MOL, Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz, and Romania’s Transgaz formed a consortium to build the Nabucco pipeline – a 2,420-mile corridor stretching from the Georgian-Turkish border to Baumgarten, Austria. While the Nabucco consortium aimed to include gas from several countries, Turkmenistan was intended to be its cornerstone -- and that required the construction of the TCP.

The Nabucco pipeline enjoyed strong backing from the European Union as part of its Southern Gas Corridor initiative. In 2009, two high-profile conferences -- one in Budapest in April, the other in Prague in May -- brought representatives from supplier, transit, and consumer countries to discuss the proposed pipeline. But momentum stalled in 2011 with the emergence of a rival project: the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). This 1,144-mile pipeline aimed to start operations with a 16 bcm annual capacity, with plans to expand to 60 bcm by the 2030s. TANAP targeted the same source countries as Nabucco for supplies. Most importantly, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) held a controlling 58-percent stake in TANAP. By 2013, the Nabucco project fell out of relevance and was eventually shelved.

From 2006 to 2022, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov - now Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, the supreme decision-making body in Turkmenistan – served as Turkmenistan’s president. Though Berdimuhamedov never abandoned the TCP, he consistently favored the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project. Only when the legal status of the Caspian Sea neared resolution did Berdiumhamedov begin to refocus attention to the TCP.

At a 2018 summit in Aktau, Kazakhstan, the five Caspian littoral states finally agreed on maritime borders, navigation rules, and environmental protections. The resulting Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea included a pivotal clause -- Article 14, which states: “Parties may lay trunk submarine pipelines on the bed of the Caspian Sea, on the condition that their projects comply with environmental standards and requirements embodied in international agreements… Submarine cables and pipelines routes shall be determined by agreement with the Party the seabed sector of which is to be crossed by the cable or pipeline.”

That language appeared to clear the way for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to construct a gas pipeline connecting their two countries. However, Russia’s interpretation of the agreement insists that all five states must consent to any pipeline crossing the seabed. Both Russia and Iran – holders of the world’s largest and second largest gas reserves, respectively – have opposed the TCP since it was first proposed in the mid-1990s.

Despite these obstacles, the TCP long remained a promising option for Turkmenistan. Europe continued to be a reliable customer, willing to pay premium prices for imported gas. However, from the early years of independence, relations between Turkmenistan’s president, Saparmurat Niyazov, and Azerbaijan’s president, Heydar Aliyev, were strained — largely due to disputes over three Caspian gas and oil fields claimed by both sides. In 2006, the same year Niyazov died and three years after Aliyev’s passing, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline began transporting Azerbaijani gas westward. By then, Turkmenistan was already exporting large volumes of gas to Russia and had just concluded a major deal with China. The urgency to build the TCP had diminished.

Line D: A Stalled Ambition

Turkmenistan currently exports gas to China through three major pipelines. Line A began operating in late 2009 with a capacity of 15 bcm annually. Line B, also with a 15 bcm capacity, followed in 2010, and Line C, with a larger capacity of 25 bcm, came online in 2014. However, the pipelines are not solely reserved for Turkmenistan. These three pipelines traverse Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on route to China, each of which is allotted 10 bcm per year.

Plans calling for a fourth pipeline network -- Line D – envisioned a route through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, carrying 30 bcm of exclusively Turkmen gas to China. Yet aside from limited construction in Tajikistan in early 2018, the project has seen no substantive progress. Chinese officials occasionally mention Line D, as they did during President Serdar Berdimuhamedov’s China visit in early 2023. President Xi Jinping called natural gas cooperation “the cornerstone of the China-Turkmenistan relationship,” but their joint statement merely expressed an intention “to accelerate construction of Line D and other large joint projects.”

Meanwhile, Russia’s proposed Sila Sibiri-2 pipeline -- expected to ship some 50 bcm of Russian gas annually to China – casts doubt on the future of Line D. Although skeptics note that Russia will need substantial Chinese loans and years of construction to finish the project, the same challenges would apply to Line D.

Other Options: A Pipeline Problem

Turkmenistan’s main obstacle to expanding gas exports is its limited pipeline infrastructure that connects the nation to global markets. The government’s long-standing Delivered At Frontier (DAF) policy means consumers must build pipelines to the Turkmen border. To date, only Iran and China have done so.

Two pipelines connect Turkmenistan to Iran. The Korpeje-Kurdkui pipeline, launched in 1997, spans 125 miles and has a capacity of 8 bcm, though it has never carried that full amount. The Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline, which opened in 2010, runs 113 miles and can carry 12 bcm but has similarly never operated at full capacity.

Following the collapse of global gas prices in 2015, Turkmenistan’s economy – heavily reliant on gas, which accounts for about 80 percent of state revenue – began to unravel. For the first time since independence in 1991, the country faced shortages of basic foods like flour, sugar, and cooking oil. In 2016, Turkmenistan demanded Iran pay $1.8 billion for gas delivered in 2007-2008. Tehran refused to pay, calling the demand nine times higher than appropriate. Ashgabat responded by halting gas shipments in early 2017. To date, only small volumes flow to Iran, and these are part of gas swap arrangements involving third countries.

China, by contrast, built the entire pipeline network from Turkmenistan to its own territory with Lines A, B, and C stretching roughly 1,140 miles long and invested in fields that supply gas to the pipelines. As repayment for loans and infrastructure financing, China deducts a portion of the gas it receives. Turkmenistan’s current allotment is 35 bcm, and it has consistently met that quota in recent years. However, China now accounts for nearly about 80 percent of Turkmenistan’s gas exports, leaving Ashgabat dependent on a single buyer.

Since early 2023, Turkmenistan has been selling modest volumes of gas to its eastern neighbor Uzbekistan – about 1.5 to 2 bcm annually. Following a 2024 call Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Halk Maslahaty Chairman Berdimuhamedov said that the two sides reached an agreement to increase Turkmen gas exports to Uzbekistan, however no specific figures were disclosed.

Turkmenistan also supplies 1 to 2 bcm of gas annually to Azerbaijan via a swap deal involving Iran since 2017, an arrangement that has been in place since 2017. Deliveries have varied over the years, with occasional interruptions. Under a similar gas swap deal involving Iran, Turkmenistan started exporting 2 bcm annually to Turkey in March.

Turkmenistan’s gas swap deal with Iraq, would send up to 10 bcm of gas to Baghdad, also via Iran. When it was announced in October 2024, the deal included advance payments and was described by Turkmen officials as “a binding agreement.” However, to date, no gas has yet been delivered. On August 19, an Iraqi media outlet reported that the United States, citing sanctions on Iran, objected to the arrangement. Washington’s concern centered on Iran retaining a portion of the Turkmen gas as a transit fee, prompting Iraqi officials to suspend the plan.

The following day, Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov visited Washington for the eleventh round of annual political consultations. While official reports did not mention the swap agreement with Iraq, it likely featured on Meredov’s agenda if U.S. objections are indeed blocking the deal.

In 2024, Turkmenistan and Iran reached an agreement to revive and expand gas exports. Iranian companies agreed to repair and upgrade the two existing pipelines, build three compressor stations in Turkmenistan, and construct a new 78-mile pipeline. The agreement – linked to the Iraq swap -- also envisioned boosting Turkmen gas exports to Iran to 40 bcm annually, with 30 bcm staying in Iran and 10 bcm routed to Iraq.

However, U.S. objections to the Iraq swap deal may extend to Iran’s help in expanding Turkmenistan’s pipeline infrastructure. While Washington did not object to the original construction of the Korpeje-Kurdkui and Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipelines, the Israeli-Iran conflict in June 2025 has further clouded prospects for resuming or increasing Turkmen gas sales to Iran, anytime in the near future.

TAPI: Still a Mirage

The long-proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas remains stalled, nearly 30 years after its conception. Designed to ship 33 bcm annually of Turkmen gas – 5 bcm to Afghanistan, and 14 bcm to both Pakistan and India, the 1,127-mile project is still hampered by security concerns and a lack of financing.

Turkmenistan claimed to have completed its 133-mile section in 2018, but doubts emerged in 2019 over whether any actual pipeline had been constructed inside the country.

There have been two inaugural ceremonies to launch construction of the TAPI pipeline inside Afghanistan. The first took place on February 23, 2018, when the presidents of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, the Pakistani prime minister, and India's Minister of State for External Affairs gathered in the Turkmen border town of Serhetabat, then briefly crossed into to the western Afghan city of Herat to mark the launch of construction on Afghan soil. A second ceremony followed on September 11, 2024, when Taliban acting prime minister and Chairman Berdimuhamedov inaugurated construction of TAPI at Islim Cheshme border point.

Actual construction of TAPI on Afghan territory finally started in January 2025, and by month’s end, the Taliban governor’s office in Herat claimed 3.7 miles of pipeline had been completed. However, at about that same time, reports emerged that India was losing interest in the project due to renewed concerns about relying on gas shipments that needed to transit Pakistani territory.

Russia: From Buyer to Competitor

Russia was once Turkmenistan’s largest gas customer, purchasing more than 40 bcm annually in 2007 and 2008. But relations soured in 2009 following a pipeline explosion during a pricing dispute with Russia’s Gazprom. After repairs, Gazprom capped purchases at no more than 11 bcm. In following years, Moscow never bought that much gas and in 2016, the Kremlin canceled the agreement entirely.

In 2019, Gazprom began to purchase some 5.5 bcm annually, but when the contract was up for renewal in 2024, both sides declined to extend it. By then, Russia had pivoted from purchasing Central Asian gas to selling Russian gas to Central Asia.

Central Asia Tsentr: Reversed Flows

The Soviet-era Central Asia-Tsentr pipeline network, originally constructed to carry Turkmen, Kazakh and Uzbek gas northward, now runs in reverse. Severe power shortages during the winters of 2021 and 2022 forced Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to halt exports to Russia and redirect gas for domestic use -- still insufficient to meet the two nation’s demands.

In 2023, Gazprom signed an agreement to sell 2.8 bcm to Uzbekistan, prompting Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan  to reverse pipeline flows. By 2024, Uzbekistan agreed to import up to 11 bcm, and Kazakhstan bought 3.8 bcm, up from 500 million cubic meters the year before. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, lost not only Russia as a customer, but also the chance to supply two of its immediate neighbors with additional gas.

Turkmenistan’s current annual gas exports – if all contracts are fulfilled – amount to roughly 41 bcm, with China, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan as buyers. That’s less than what Turkmenistan shipped to Russia alone two decades ago. The only potential new customers for Turkmen gas are in Europe and the TCP may be Turkmenistan’s only hope of finding a new markets and expanding exports.

Russia and Iran continue to oppose the TCP, but their objections lack firm legal grounds. The Caspian Charter states that two adjacent maritime countries can agree on pipeline construction. Citing environmental concerns seems disingenuous as both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan operate pipelines in the Caspian Sea and Russia and Iran have not objected. In May 2025, Iran announced it would issue licenses for drilling and exploration in its sector of the Caspian Sea for the first time in 30 years. If major deposits are found, Iran will likely build its own pipelines – undermining its opposition to TCP.

While construction of a 30 bcm of Turkmen gas may be unfeasible now, a more modest proposal -- a Trans-Caspian interconnector pipeline that would “ship natural gas from existing offshore production platforms in Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan’s operating offshore platforms” – has gained traction. It would link existing offshore platforms in Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan’s operating platforms, requiring construction of just 48 miles of pipeline, costing an estimated $500-$800 million, and delivering 10-12 bcm annually. Completion could take as little as 24 months.

Turkey has endorsed the plan as a gateway to European markets, and supports future expansion to 30 bcm, potentially giving Turkmenistan political clout in negotiations with Russia and Iran.

Financing Fatigue and Political Will

Another formidable obstacle to the TCP remains: Turkmenistan’s refusal to invest in export infrastructure beyond its borders. Speaking less than two weeks after the Caspian summit in Aktau, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said the “supplier of the gas should be more interested in the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline” and noted that “Azerbaijan as a gas supplier has launched construction of 3,500-kilometer pipeline.” Aliyev has repeated several times that Azerbaijan is ready to transit Turkmen gas to destinations further west but will not finance the TCP itself.

A Closing Window

With global momentum shifting toward renewables and nuclear power, Turkmenistan’s window to monetize its vast gas reserves is narrowing. Gas accounts for about 80 percent of Turkmenistan’s export revenue, making urgency paramount. Europe is the only market actively seeking new supply, and unless Turkmenistan makes a concerted effort, much of its gas may remain stranded underground.

To be sure, Turkmen, Turkish and Azerbaijani officials have been meeting with increasing frequency. But without decisive action, the TCP remains only a blueprint – and Turkmenistan’s gas, a missed opportunity.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. Before joining the TRC, he was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.

Many in Central Asia welcomed Turkey as a potential “big brother” following the Soviet implosion, Bruce Pannier, a Turan Research Center fellow and board member of the Washington-based Caspian Policy Center, told Amwaj.media. As a NATO member straddling Europe and Asia, Turkey’s identity was appealing to the fledgling Central Asian states. However, domestic economic challenges during the 1990s limited Turkey’s ability to meet regional expectations.

In contrast, Iran aligns with China and Russia in seeking to limit western influence in Central Asia. Tehran sees NATO member Turkey’s growing presence as a proxy for American power, stoking fears of geopolitical encroachment. The Donald Trump administration’s quest to draw Central Asian countries into the Abraham Accords have exacerbated such anxieties.

Ankara wants Central Asian states to be less dependent on Russia and China and more deeply tied to Turkey and Azerbaijan. “They want them to be independent actors insomuch as it strengthens their sovereignty and territorial integrity, so that they can work more effectively with the Turkish government in promoting Turkey’s interests in that region,” said Pannier.

Read the full article on Amwaj Media.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan, faces profound challenges,  from the ecological collapse of the Aral Sea and severe public health impacts to political unrest and questions over cultural identity. In this ENC analysis, Bruce Pannier explores the region’s complex history, the events surrounding the July 2022 protests, ongoing development efforts, and the prospects for the Karakalpak people.

Read the full paper at the European Neighborhood Council.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Uzbekistan has confirmed it will be building a large nuclear power plant (NPP) with two 1000-megawatt (MW) reactors as the country prepares for a sharp increase in electricity consumption in the coming years. Uzbekistan’s state atomic energy company, Uzatom, posted on September 26 that a new agreement calls for both a large and small NPP to be constructed at the same site in Uzbekistan.

The revised plan for NPPs in Uzbekistan combines agreements the country signed with the Russian state nuclear company Rosatom in 2018 and 2024.

Uzbek Prime Minister Abdullo Aripov and his Russian counterpart at the time, Dmitri Medvedev, signed a deal in September 2018 for a large NPP with two VVER-1200 reactors.  However, in late May 2024, during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Uzbekistan, a new agreement was signed for six small reactors, each with a capacity of 55 MW. Preparation work for six RITM-200N reactors started shortly after in the Farish district of Jizzakh Province.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On August 28, at 9:35 am, local time, Uzbekistan’s resident population reached 38 million people.

Central Asia’s population in general has been increasing at a phenomenal rate since its five countries became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, but Uzbekistan is the only one of the five to have seen such a high pace of growth.

Half of all people

The current trends indicate that Uzbekistan’s population will account for half of all people in Central Asia within a few years.

Figures from the Soviet Union’s census of 1989 show the Uzbek population standing at 19,810,077 people, so it was somewhere over 20mn when the USSR met its end in late 1991 and the Central Asian countries became independent.

Read more at BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Pyramids of various kinds of melons, fruits laid across the ground to form intricate, traditional patterns, as well as an abundance of fruit, dried fruit, nuts, and bread overflowing from tables, and even fountains, surrounding the edible ground arrangement, and grapes hanging from poles.

As an advertisement for national products, a background for international events, or a gift for an ally, Tajikistan is gaining fame for elaborate displays of fruit. It is an amazing sight, with fruits and nuts arranged in patterns that cover large areas of the pavilions and gardens where foreign guests are being entertained.

However, as good as these lavish presentations look and taste, these cornucopias are being exhibited in some of Central Asia’s poorest countries, and, unsurprisingly, there has been some discontent and some scandals.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The population of Central Asia when the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991 and the five Central Asian republics became independent countries was some 50 million people. Thirty-four years later, the population of the region is about 80 million. However, in Kyrgyzstan, the birth rate has been declining in recent years, and it has officials confused and alarmed.

The Data

Kyrgyz parliamentary deputy Dastan Bekeshev raised the matter on August 7, noting the country has seen a steady fall in the number of babies born from 2019, when it reached a record of some 173,000, to about 140,000 in 2024. Bekeshev was responding to recently released figures from Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee that showed the birth rate for 2020 was 156,112, for 2021 it was 150,164, climbing a bit to 150,225 in 2022, then dropping to 145,977 in 2023, and 140,419 in 2024.

According to the Health Ministry’s chief specialist on demography, Raisa Asylbasheva, there are currently some 1.8 million women in Kyrgyzstan considered to be of childbearing age.

Asylbasheva said it could be cyclical and “in five years, possibly, there will be an increase.”

Bekeshev, however, has pointed out that if the trend continues, “In 15-20 years, there will be fewer young people in the country who can work, pay taxes, and provide for pensioners.”

Read more at Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

There has been a split in Tajikistan’s largest opposition party.

Muhammadiqbol Sadriddin, who has lately been criticising the leadership of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), on August 6 released a statement announcing the formation of the Reformers Movement of Tajikistan.

Tajikistan’s embattled opposition already faces enormous hurdles in challenging the firmly entrenched government of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, in power for some 33 years. The rift in the IRPT is likely to weaken the opposition’s efforts.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The role of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan has once again sparked diplomatic tensions, prompting familiar reassurances from both Kyrgyz and Kazakh leaders.

Russian officials remain highly attentive to language policies in former Soviet republics, frequently voicing concerns over any perceived threats to the status of Russian. Most recently, Moscow has directed particular scrutiny toward developments in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Allegations of discrimination against Russian speakers have long been a sore point for the Kremlin. Such claims were among the justifications cited for the occupation of eastern Ukraine in 2014—and again for the full-scale invasion launched in February 2022.

A Renewed Push for Kyrgyz Language

In the most recent flareup over language, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed amendments in June requiring fluency in the Kyrgyz language for key government officials including: parliamentary deputies, ministers, judges, and National Bank employees.

The new legislation also includes mandates that at least 60 percent of all television and radio broadcasts be in Kyrgyz.

With Kyrgyzstan preparing to celebrate 34 years of independence from the Soviet Union on August 31, such decisions may appear long overdue. But these statutes are building on a previous law passed in 2023, which made Kyrgyz mandatory across government institutions, court proceedings, geographic names and educational materials. 

Not surprisingly, the day after that 2023 legislation passed, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Moscow had “repeatedly” raised the issue with Kyrgyz officials, warning that such laws could “undesirably affect” the rights of the non-titular population, including “our [Russian] compatriots.”

Now, the same concern hangs over the June amendments.

Less than a week after Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed the new language mandates, President Sadyr Japarov flew to Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

Upon returning to Bishkek, Japarov told the Kyrgyz state news agency Kabar that, “We need the Russian language.

Colonial Sensitivity 

According to Russian state news agency TASS, at the July 2 meeting with Japarov, Putin said, “the fact that the Russian language has a special status in Kyrgyzstan… allows us to work more efficiently in a number of other areas, including the economy.”

Putin linking Russian language in Kyrgyzstan with economic cooperation seems like a thinly-veiled message to Japarov.

Russia is Kyrgyzstan’s second largest trade partner after China and in 2024, Kyrgyz-Russian trade turnover accounted for more than $3 billion. Bishkek's economy is also dependent upon Russia for key imports. Up to 90 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s petroleum products come from Russia, and in 2014, Russian state energy giant Gazprom purchased 100 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s natural gas company which it continues to own and operate.

Russian nationalism is growing since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Several Russian officials, including President Putin, have spoken in the last three years about “historic” Russian lands, which according to Putin, includes the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Kremlin views perceived insults to, or diminishment of, Russian language use in areas that were part of the Tsarist Empire, later the Soviet Union, as a loss of influence, a sign of the ending of the Russian empire.

Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian officials made it clear to Kyrgyzstan that in the presence of the former colonial master’s officials, only one language is to be spoken.

On October 23, 2020, then-Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Ruslan Kazakhbayev was in Moscow and met with Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Kyrgyz media was present at two foreign ministers’ joint press conference and when a Kyrgyz journalist asked Kazakbayev questions in Kyrgyz, Lavrov grew impatient and finally said, “Excuse me, you still have to respect the host, OK?”

Support Continues for Russian

For more than 30 years, Kyrgyz authorities have consistently reassured Moscow about their commitment to preserving the role of Russian. Nonetheless, each time new policies elevate the status of the Kyrgyz language, Russian officials react fearfully. And each time, Kyrgyz leaders routinely offer guarantees that Russian’s status is not at risk. In fact, Russian remains the second-most prominent language in the country, officially recognized and widely used. It enjoys a status second only to Kyrgyz. In 1995, then-President Askar Akayev proposed making Russian a state language alongside Kyrgyz. That proposal faced local pushback. In 1996, parliament moved to give Russian “official,” but not” state” status and later that year, Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Court approved a parliamentary initiative to designate Russian as an official language.

Akayev consistently called for Russian to be granted state language status. Yet his efforts were met with resistance from segments of the population who believed Kyrgyz should take precedence as the national language. That sentiment still resonates 30 years later.

Despite his support for Russian, Akayev also sought to strengthen the role of Kyrgyz. In 1998, he signed a decree aimed at increasing its official usage across public institutions.

However, in 2000, Akayev changed course, formally proposing to grant official status to Russian. The Kyrgyz parliament swiftly passed the measure, and Akayev signed it into law.

Since Akayev, Kyrgyzstan has had six successive presidents -- each of whom has affirmed the importance of Russian, particularly among the nation’s diverse population, which includes more than 80 ethnic groups who use Russian as a lingua franca.

At the same time, each leader has also stressed the need to promote and expand the use of Kyrgyz.

In Kazakhstan – where Russian holds official language status -- authorities have consistently dismissed accusations of discriminatory practices against Russian, similar to the defenses made by Kyrgyz officials.

In fact, Russian is widely spoken in Kazakhstan, even though ethnic Russians, make up only 14.6 percent of the population, especially since minority populations that make up an additional 15 percent of the population, like in Kyrgyzstan, often do not speak Kazakh. In its attempts to promote Kazakh, Astana has endured the same sorts of criticism as Bishkek, perhaps to even a greater degree in the first decade after independence when the ethnic Russian population of Kazakhstan was larger.

In Kyrgyzstan, the picture is slightly different. As of early 2025, the population stood at 7.3 million. According to the 2022 data from Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee, there were 335,237 ethnic Russians living in the country. For comparison, the ethnic Uzbek community is roughly three times larger, yet the Uzbek language does not enjoy any special status.

Although Kazakhstan speaks the most Russian, according to one report from 2017, “the use of Russian [as a first language] has retreated fastest in Kazakhstan, where in 2016 just 20.7 percent of people said they typically spoke Russian at home, compared with 33.7 percent in 1994.” While Kazakh authorities have offered assurances that the Russian language is respected and necessary, Russian officials and pundits often complain that Astana discriminates against it. Russian television news presenter Tina Kandelaki summed up Moscow’s concerns after Kazakhstan changed the names of two railway stations into Kazakh in January 2024. Kandelaki wrote on her Telegram channel that Russian was “slowly but surely being pushed out on the state level.” She warned that like with the Baltic nations, such tendencies could snowball into the “closing of Russian schools, the removal of Soviet statues, banning of the Russian language and, finally, [Russian] retirees will be thrown out into the cold.”

Kandelaki was referring to Moscow’s worst nightmare – the Latvia scenario. Not only did Riga strip the Russian language of any official status but insists that all its citizens must demonstrate proficiency in the Latvian language. Russian permanent residents who fail to pass required language exams have even been deported to Russia.

For Moscow, the Russian language is not merely a matter of ethnic minority rights—it is a key instrument of soft power. It not only connects Russian-speaking populations across these countries but also facilitates the spread of Russian-language media and pop culture. More importantly, it symbolizes these countries' inclusion in Russia’s sphere of influence, a status that Moscow is both sensitive to and eager to protect. For Russia, each move toward a distinct national identity represents a departure from the shared Russian-Soviet legacy.

But this process may be unavoidable. Russian language proficiency has been steadily declining across Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Precise data on how many people in the region can speak Russian at a basic or higher level is hard to obtain. Many individuals over the age of 45 grew up using Russian as their primary language, and millions of younger people have acquired varying degrees of fluency through migrant work in Russia over the past 25 years. Nevertheless, the overall trend is clear: fewer individuals from non-Russian ethnic groups in Central Asia speak Russian today. Despite this, Russian often still serves as a lingua franca among different ethnic minority communities, as well as in interactions between these groups and the titular nationalities.

In Central Asia, only Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan grant the Russian language special status. Interestingly, the Kremlin has shown little concern over Russian's diminished standing in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Still, the growing preference for English over Russian can occasionally provoke irritation among Russian officials. In April, for example, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed discontent after seeing a World War II memorial in Uzbekistan that featured inscriptions in Uzbek and English—but not in Russian. The overall lack of formal protest may be tied to demographics: ethnic Russians make up just 0.5 percent of the population in Tajikistan, around 2 percent in Turkmenistan, and less than 2 percent in Uzbekistan.

Back in Kyrgyzstan, Russian television channels have remained widely accessible since the country gained independence in 1991.

The Russian language is spoken throughout Kyrgyzstan and remains a significant medium of communication in education, media and daily life.

 Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, reinforcing close strategic and economic ties with Russia. Additionally, Russia maintains a military base in Kyrgyzstan, further reflecting the depth of bilateral cooperation between the two nations.

Despite close ties, Kyrgyz authorities are still unable to promote the Kyrgyz language without provoking a sense of threat from Russia. As a result, Bishkek is often compelled to offer reassurances to Moscow.

The enduring need for such assurances reflects the delicate balancing act Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet republics must maintain -- between reviving its national identify through its own language and navigating geopolitical sensitivities surrounding the Russian language.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. Before joining the TRC, he was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.

Research Fellow Bruce Pannier reflects on three decades of reporting and analysis, from his early days gathering scraps of information in the pre-internet 1990s to today’s denser, more contested media landscape.

He joins podcast host Peter Leonard to explore how both Central Asian authorities and audiences have changed over time, the new sophistication of state information control, and the shifting boundaries of censorship, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

They also examine how growing geopolitical autonomy, deepening partnerships with Gulf states and China, and a rising standard of living shape domestic politics.

Finally, they look to the future: Will Central Asia become more technocratic, more pious, or both? And what happens when tomorrow’s leaders know both global capitalism and the Quran? It’s a candid, thoughtful exchange with someone who has seen it all.

Listen to the full podcast on CAPS unlock.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Russia introduced new regulations for foreign citizens in the country on February 5, and started keeping a list at the Interior Ministry of foreigners who are living or staying in Russia without proper documentation, the “controlled persons registry.” The rules are aimed at migrant laborers working in Russia, many of whom come from Central Asian countries.

Russia has set a September 10 deadline for foreigners in the country to clear up all their paperwork with the authorities or face expulsion with a ban on re-entry. Judging by recent comments from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to Russia, Kubanychbek Bokontayev, many might not make that September 10 deadline.
Read more on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Bruce Pannier, a senior analyst at the Turan Research Center who has studied Central Asia for many years, calls the developments a new regional trend.

“It’s fascinating to observe what I’d call ‘daughter diplomacy.’ Recently, Oguljahan Atabaeva met with Saida Mirziyoyeva in Uzbekistan, and now — with Aliyev’s daughter in Azerbaijan. This suggests she is being prepared for active participation in Turkmenistan’s political system. Lately, her public appearances have even been more prominent than those of her brother, the president. This signals potential changes. Saida Mirziyoyeva already plays an important role in Uzbek politics, and Leyla Aliyeva is also well known. The logic behind these meetings is clear — this is no coincidence, but a new format of interstate engagement centered on the role of women in diplomacy,” Pannier said.

Read the full article here.

“When Afghan media reports on trade with Russia or the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, they’re saying this opens up a whole new trade route for them so they’re not dependent on Pakistan and stuff arriving in Pakistani ports and then coming into Afghanistan. So, for [the Afghans] it does have some significance,” Bruce Pannier, a Turan Research Center fellow and board member of the Caspian Policy Center, told this author.

“As far as a North-South trade route opening up that will connect Afghanistan with Russia, which could be used to bring Russian goods into Afghanistan, that should help the average Afghan citizen a little bit as far as being able to obtain basic wears and maybe canned food or something like that,” he added.

Read the full article on National Interest.

Photo by VOA News

The recent visit to Kazakhstan by the Taliban’s industry and commerce minister is yet another example of Afghanistan’s growing ties with its Central Asian neighbors. This pragmatic engagement is a far cry from the Taliban’s first try at government when the five Central Asian states sealed off their borders with their southern neighbor. At that time, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan even aided ethnic Tajik and Uzbek groups in fighting the Islamic militants in northern Afghanistan. In response, the Taliban provided safe havens for militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a group determined to overthrow the Uzbek government by staging incursions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000.

It was no surprise that Central Asian governments were  relieved after the U.S ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. But when foreign forces began a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban started reclaiming villages and districts throughout Afghanistan, Central Asian governments contemplated a different policy toward the militant Islamic group that they had once scorned.

Back In Power

When  the Taliban seized Kabul on August 15, 2021, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were quickly aware that the Ashraf Ghani government had fallen. Military aircrafts from the Western-backed Afghan government began flying across their borders seeking to land in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan early that day.

Uzbekistan’s foreign ministry quickly announced that the Uzbek Embassy in Kabul and consulate in the Afghan northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif  would remain open in spite of the change of government. Other Central Asian states, excluding Tajikistan, soon followed suit.

Today, Taliban diplomats occupy embassies in every Central Asian country except for Tajikistan, where representatives of the ousted government of Ashraf Ghani continue to work.

Another hint of a regional policy change has been the disappearance of the word “Taliban” from official statements and state media. Visiting Taliban officials are now described as representatives of the “acting” or “current” government of Afghanistan.  Uzbek media refers to the chief diplomat at the Afghan embassy as “ambassador,” while the  Taliban envoy in Kazakhstan is referred to as the Chargé d’Affaires.

It’s a stark contrast to 1996 when the Taliban first marched into Kabul. At that time, the five Central Asian governments — except for Turkmenistan — arranged a summit in Kazakhstan with Russia to discuss the Taliban threat and coordinate security measures.

They knew little about the Taliban except that they practiced a strict orthodox form of Islam, which was often brutal.  The Central Asian states had existed for only five years in the new post-Soviet era and its leaders had grown up in atheist Soviet Union. They were frightened by militants on their doorstep waging war and rallying the masses under the banner of fundamentalist Islam.

The New Relationship

Twenty nine years later, it’s a significantly different story.

Using their security forces to monitor activity at mosques and in communities, and with state-approved imams giving state-approved sermons, Central Asian governments now have greater control over the practice of Islam in their countries than at any time before. Their leaders are now confident that the vast majority of their residents reject the Taliban’s stern interpretation of Islam.

Also, during the 20 years the Taliban were out of power, ties between Central Asia and Afghanistan had been transformed.

Border crossings with Afghanistan have been established with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. A railway line from the Uzbek port city of Termez had been extended to Mazar-i-Sharif in 2011. In  2016, the first Chinese cargo train arrived at the Afghan city of Hairaton after traveling through Central Asia. Two other railway lines connected Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.

Moreover, new power transmission lines are sending electricity from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Currently, those three Central Asian countries account for nearly 80% of Afghanistan’s electricity imports.

Even Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who publicly views the Taliban as a destabilizing force in the region, hasn’t stopped electricity exports.

And although, like the rest of the world, Central Asian governments have not officially recognized the Taliban governmentthey makes no secret about wanting economic ties.

In 2021, Nodirbek Jalilov, director of Uzbekistan’s Termez Cargo Center, said his international free trade center  — located just one mile from the Afghan border  —  is anxious to resume trade with Afghanistan. Talks between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan about extending the railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and Peshawar have resumed after the Taliban seized control. The Trans-Afghan railway project would give Uzbekistan a route to Pakistan’s ports on the Arabian Sea, and open potential trade not only with the Middle East, East Africa, and India, but Central Asia, Russia and China. Kazakhstan has also expressed interest in joining the Trans-Afghan railway and is partnering with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in a project to extend a railway line from Turkmenistan to Torghundi, Afghanistan. That proposed route would link to Herat, Kandahar, and Spin Boldak, on the Pakistani border.

Further, Turkmenistan still plans to build the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline to ship Turkmen gas to those three countries. The project dates back to the mid-1990s but has been delayed, mostly due to security concerns caused by decades of fighting in Afghanistan.

Today, business forums including Afghanistan have become annual events.

In 2023, Kazakhstan hosted a Kazakh-Afghan business forum in Astana. The next year, a Turkmen-Afghan business forum in Ashgabat was followed by an Uzbek-Afghan business forum in Kabul and an Uzbek-Afghanforum in Tashkent.

Trading houses – business that facilitates transactions between countries —   are also on the rise. Turkmenistan has had a trading house in Mazar-i-Sharif since 2017.  Kazakhstan opened a trading house in Herat in 2024, and plans to open another in Kabul. Uzbekistan recently opened a trading house in Mazar-i-Sharif. These forums and trading houses have emerged at a time when the Taliban government is offering investment opportunities in mining critical raw materials, oil and gas. Several delegations from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have visited Afghanistan in recent months to discuss such projects.

Afghanistan is also becoming an important market for Central Asian exports. Kazakhstan is Afghanistan’s leading supplier of wheat, grain, and flour. In 2022, Kazakh-Afghan trade amounted to nearly $1 billion, of which some 90 percent was exports to Kazakhstan —  a disparity in trade balance common in Central Asian states’ trade with Afghanistan. Uzbek-Afghan trade for 2024 totaled $1.1 billion, more than $1 billion of which was Uzbek exports. Central Asia’s exports typically amount for 80-90 percent of their trade with Afghanistan with the latter mainly exporting a small number of agricultural products to the region.

With help from international aid from sources such as the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the Taliban government – whose entire GDP was just $17 billion in 2023 — can pay for some imports, including electricity. In 2021, Afghanistan owed a combined $51 million to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran for electricity imports. The next year, the Taliban owed  Uzbekistan and Tajikistan more than $100 million for electricity. But by 2024, Afghanistan’s state power company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, announced it had paid off nearly all of its debt to its electricity suppliers, noting Afghanistan’s remaining debt to Uzbekistan, which supplies about 60 percent of Afghanistan’s electricity imports, was down to $1.2 million.

One Region

Central Asia and Afghanistan are more closely connected now than they have ever been.  The brutality the Taliban uses to enforce their rule is repugnant to many, but it has led to Afghanistan becoming a more stable nation.

The governments of Central Asia and the Taliban are not friends. But they have an understanding that economic  cooperation can yield benefits to all parties. Even the most critical of the five Central Asian nations — Tajikistan — has recently entered into a dialogue for further trade deals, after seeing its neighbors benefit from such ties.

The Taliban is well aware that they cannot afford to ignore regional integration. As long as a stable Afghanistan can open up new lucrative trade routes, it seems Central Asia ‘s relationship with the Taliban can only grow.

Bruce Pannier is a longtime journalist and was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.