Turan Research Center

When on April 1, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in the Russian capital, the Armenian leader’s agenda was clear — to bolster his difficult position before the June parliamentary elections.

It did not go smoothly.

The Russian side used the opportunity to present an ultimatum to Yerevan and to broadcast the videoed exchange — choose us, Putin told Pashinyan, or choose the European Union (EU). You cannot choose both.

The Russian logic is clear — one cannot be a member state in mutually exclusive supranational economic entities such as the EU and the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Read the full article on The Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Over the past year, relations between Egypt and Iran have undergone a marked thaw. The war in Gaza, anxiety over Israel's expanding military operations, a deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea, and the practical need for cooperation in trade and investments have pushed Iran and Egypt toward rapprochement. The drive for normalization has been so strong that not even the US-Israel war on Iran has undermined it.

The war and Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone strikes on Gulf countries’ oil and other vital infrastructure have, paradoxically, united much of the Arab world. Egypt, however, is striving to strike a balance and position itself as a mediator between the warring sides. On March 12, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty argued that Cairo would continue working to help end the war. On March 23, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi began a Gulf tour aimed at showing solidarity with the Arab states while also seeking a mediating role. Egypt fears an economic downturn from a potential collapse in tourism, and hundreds of thousands of Egyptians working in the Gulf face instability that would ripple back to Cairo.

But Egypt’s interest in mediation also has a deeper strategic logic. Cairo and Tehran have been normalizing their ties for some time. In February, just before the war broke out, reports emerged that Egypt and Iran had reached an agreement on fully restoring diplomatic ties by reopening embassies in each other’s capitals. If confirmed, this would mark a major development in the Middle East.

The agreement follows a series of high-level exchanges between the two countries. In September, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Cairo to finalize a technical arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, restoring Tehran’s cooperation with the world’s principal nuclear oversight body. Although the so-called “Cairo Agreement” ended following an IAEA Board of Governors resolution urging Tehran to provide greater transparency on its nuclear facilities and enriched uranium, Egyptian officials quietly suggested that Cairo had played a sustained behind-the-scenes role in brokering the deal.

Araghchi’s September trip followed his third visit to Egypt in June 2025, during which he met with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to discuss regional security and potential avenues for engagement. But such high-level contact has not been limited to foreign ministers: in December 2024, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation summit in Cairo, signaling Tehran’s interest in expanding its economic ties. And in July 2025, Iran renamed a street previously dedicated to Khalid Al-Islambouli, the mastermind behind Anwar Sadat’s assassination — a symbolic but geopolitically significant gesture that underscored the Islamic Republic’s willingness to change its posture toward Egypt.

The most recent meeting between Egyptian and Iranian leaders took place on the sidelines of the emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha in September 2025, convened in response to the Israeli attack on Hamas in Qatar, when the two sides released a joint statement on the need to deepen bilateral cooperation. This diplomatic tempo continued into late December, when Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty spoke with Araghchi about “ways to enhance bilateral relations and exchange views on regional issues of mutual concern, foremost among them developments related to Iran’s nuclear file.”

A Long Rupture, a New Opening

The momentum behind Egypt-Iran normalization has the potential to reshape Middle East geopolitics. Relations between the two countries have been severed since 1979, when the Islamic Revolution reversed what had been a historically cordial relationship. Tehran cut ties after Cairo granted asylum to the ousted Mohammad Reza Shah and Egypt’s subsequent alignment with Iraq during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Although there occurred a brief flirtation with normalization between 2012 and 2013 — marked by then-President Mohamed Morsi’s visit to Tehran and then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s trip to Cairo — conciliation never matured into a substantive reset.

Today, however, conditions are markedly different.

A series of regional shifts over the past few years has helped erode the long-standing hostility between Egypt and Iran. The China-brokered normalization between Iran and Saudi Arabia followed Tehran’s earlier rapprochement with the United Arab Emirates. Both shifts signaled that the Islamic Republic was no longer isolated within the Arab world. This is likely to change due to the Israeli-US war on Iran and the latter’s retaliation but Egypt is unlikely to shift its position. At the same time, Turkey’s posture toward Iran has changed. Since Tehran’s regional power has been significantly diminished over the Gaza war, Ankara has moved quickly to expand its footprint in Syria and, to a lesser extent, into Iraq. Yet a severely weakened Iran is not in Turkey’s strategic interest. An unstable Iran could cause instability on their common border, boost Kurdish separatism, and further strengthen Israel. Ankara has therefore sought to bolster Tehran where possible.

The crisis in the Red Sea added a new layer of urgency to Cairo’s calculations. As the Houthis — often acting independently but broadly aligned with Iran’s within Axis of Resistance — began attacking international shipping, Egypt faced the prospect of significant revenue losses and mounting economic pressure. This made Cairo increasingly interested in finding common ground with Iran to minimize the fallout. At the same time, Egypt is seeking to reassert itself as a mediator in the wider Red Sea region, and a normalization of ties with Iran fits neatly into that ambition by expanding Cairo’s influence.

There is also a strategic economic dimension. Should renewed nuclear diplomacy lead to sanctions relief for Iran, Egypt stands to benefit indirectly; Iranian crude routed through Iraq could become more accessible, while a more stable regional environment would reinforce the Suez Canal’s role as a principal artery for the transit of energy.

Egypt is also increasingly uneasy about the dramatic shift in the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor — both along its northeastern frontier and across much of its northeastern frontier and across much of the Middle East. Although Egypt has maintained a stable, decades-long peace with the Jewish state, it views Israel’s expanding military reach and political assertiveness with growing concern. The erosion of Iran’s regional power, accelerated by the Gaza war, has opened space in Syria, particularly along Israel’s northeastern frontier, that Jerusalem has been quick to fill.

Rapprochement with Iran also positions Egypt as a potential mediator between Tehran and Washington. Both capitals see value in Cairo’s regional standing and its interest in regional stability. This dynamic was made explicit before the current conflict, when on January 15, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Cairo was actively working to prevent another round of military escalation between Washington and Tehran.

Another powerful incentive for Egypt-Iran rapprochement is the position of the Arab states. Up until the ongoing war, the Gulf region has generally viewed the trend as positive. The wealthy Arab states themselves have significantly improved relations with Iran, and the shift in Cairo-Tehran dynamics, in their view, will only expand de-escalation in the Middle East. The war may complicate this dynamic, but the Gulf states will likely remain keen to pursue de-escalation with Tehran — and Cairo's mediating role could prove useful in that effort.

Iran, for its part, has seen its regional power sharply curtailed and is now seeking to normalize relations with countries that once formed the core of the anti-Iranian bloc, mainly the Gulf states. Egypt was among them, and rapprochement with Cairo helps Tehran ease political pressure from within the Arab world. Iran is also working to mitigate Western sanctions — a central pillar of its foreign policy, particularly in light of the January protests across the country, which resulted in thousands of casualties and underscored the regime’s vulnerability.

Therefore, the path toward Egypt-Iran rapprochement has long been in the making and, above all, has become a strategic necessity for both countries.

Persistent Constraints

Although momentum is building and both sides seem to have reached an agreement on fully restoring diplomatic ties, constraints remain that would limit the level of rapprochement. For Egypt, a central limitation is its security and overall geopolitical orientation — both are deeply anchored in cooperation with the United States, Israel, and key Gulf states. This alignment makes any rapid — let alone comprehensive — rehabilitation of relations with the Islamic Republic politically sensitive. Cairo also remains highly skeptical of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. In Gaza, Egypt serves as the principal intermediary between Israel and Hamas despite its distrust of Hamas’s Islamist roots. Given that Iran continues to support Hamas, this divergence highlights the limits of convergence. Moreover, any escalation in Gaza, Syria, or the Red Sea could quickly undermine the fragile progress made so far.

On the economic front, the benefits of renewed ties remain limited. Tourism and trade offer only marginal gains, and the Western sanctions imposed on Iran continue to limit any meaningful economic cooperation between Cairo and Tehran. For instance, 2023 bilateral trade reached a meagre $5.1 million. For Egypt, commercial ties with its Gulf partners remain far more important. Another powerful constraint is the US position. So far, Washington has been cautious about Cairo-Tehran rapprochement: too much normalization could harm the US and Israeli interests in the region. At the same time, a certain level of normalization of ties could benefit regional de-escalation.

Outlook

Looking ahead, the thaw in Iran-Egypt relations reflects a strategic recalibration shaped by broader regional changes. For Tehran, engagement with Cairo has become increasingly necessary as its regional strategy adapts to its diminished influence and shifting alliances. For Egypt, the ambition to restore diplomatic centrality requires maintaining dialogue with all consequential actors — Tehran included.

Yet decades of ideological antagonism and strategic rivalry impose clear limits on how far normalization can go. The relationship is likely to remain pragmatic and transactional: it carries the potential to reshape the Middle Eastern balance of power, but for now it remains a tactical adjustment rather than a strategic realignment. The ongoing war will test whether that adjustment proves durable — or whether it becomes another false start in a long history of them.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

On Jan. 30, border guards in Tajikistan repelled armed intruders seeking to enter the country from Afghanistan, with the clash leaving three suspects dead. Less than two weeks earlier, on Jan. 18, Tajik forces killed four militants under similar circumstances. These were not isolated incidents. Rather, they came on the heels of a series of similar episodes, of which the most notable took place in November, when two consecutive attacks by militants entering Tajikistan from Afghan territory killed five Chinese workers involved in infrastructure and mining projects in the country.

Taken together, the incidents reflect a marked deterioration in security conditions along the roughly 900-mile frontier between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. At the heart of bilateral tensions is the presence in northern Afghanistan of Jamaat Ansarullah, a Taliban-aligned militant group composed largely of ethnic Tajiks. Dushanbe views the organization as a potential instrument for destabilizing Tajikistan.

Read the full article on World Politics Review.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakh Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia on February 18. During talks with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, the two sides discussed developing political dialogue, expanding trade, and economic cooperation, as well as cultural and humanitarian ties (Caravan Info, February 18). The visit is illustrative of the growing relationship between Saudi Arabia and Central Asia. 

Saudi Arabia is particularly interested in tapping into shifting connectivity in the heart of Eurasia (Gulf Research Center, April 25, 2025). Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s biggest economies, attract most of the kingdom’s attention. Astana seeks to attract Saudi investments into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, or Middle Corridor). This corridor, if not an outright alternative to the northern Eurasian route passing through Russia, is at least a strong complementary route for East–West connectivity, including trade between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union (see EDM, January 28, December 4, 2025). The Emirati company, Dubai PortsWorld, has stakes in two special economic zones in Kazakhstan. Because the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are economic competitors, Abu Dhabi’s investment in the region makes it highly likely that Riyadh will also expand its engagement (Ducascopy, March 25, 2018).

Investments in Middle Corridor-related transport infrastructure, such as Kazakhstan’s Aktau port, could be profitable for Saudi Arabia as the TITR expands. Other areas of potential bilateral cooperation include oil, gas, and uranium production, as these resources play a key role in the economies of both countries. Another key infrastructure project that makes Kazakhstan interesting to Saudi Arabia is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russia to the Middle East. Despite instability in the Middle East, which often disrupts the operation of the INSTC, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are interested in developing routes to reach Russia (Gulf Research Center, August 26, 2025; Povorot Rossii v Aziyu, December 14, 2025). Another connectivity project linking the regions is the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan corridor. Pakistan may be a crucial link given its growing ties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia (Kursiv, February 3).

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On 17th February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia. This is the second such visit – the first took place in 2015. Turkey’s foreign policy has changed dramatically since. Ankara has become more engaged across Africa, especially in the Sahel and the eastern part of the continent. Before the trip to Ethiopia, the Turkish president also visited Egypt, furthering the normalisation process with the Arab country and highlighting how Ankara increasingly applies a regional approach to this part of Africa.

Relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa have been friendly for over a century, despite alignment within rival blocs during the Cold War. In 1926, Ethiopia was the first country the young Turkish Republic recognised in Sub-Saharan Africa. The particular expansion of ties has taken place over the past years and is well reflected in a 2024 deal[i] that Ankara helped secure between Ethiopia and Somalia regarding potential sea access for Ethiopian trade.

During Erdoğan’s visit, the countries signed[ii] a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation that would lead to joint production and projects. This particularly concerns cooperation in hydroelectric energy, the area in which Turkey has extensive know-how. Given that Ethiopia wants to develop energy beyond the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the Turkish experience will be of vital importance. Both sides also discussed cooperation regarding COP31, which will be held in Turkey in 2026, and then in Ethiopia next year.

Read the full article on Manara Magazine.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

NATO’s political cohesion crisis has transformed the alliance enlargement from a forward-operating strategic instrument into a reputational liability. In the South Caucasus, this effectively removes membership as a credible policy trajectory for Georgia, and eliminates any potential aspirations for Armenia or Azerbaijan. The alliance’s regional posture is transitioning from institutional expansion to transactional engagement.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has paradoxically frozen NATO’s South Caucasus ambitions, not accelerated them. Most likely, Turkey’s regional influence will increasingly substitute for NATO’s collective footprint in the South Caucasus.

Since 2022, NATO has undergone a significant doctrinal reorientation. While the accession of Finland and Sweden appeared to validate the continuation of enlargement as a central policy vector, these were exceptional cases – advanced, Western countries with advanced military compatibility and no territorial disputes.

Read the full article on Caucasus Watch.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

BACKGROUND: On February 3, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Riyadh where he met Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The two sides pledged to elevate bilateral relations by expanding cooperation in defense and renewable energy spheres marking a new page in bilateral relations.

The two countries have not always enjoyed positive ties. In the recent past, divergent strategic visions on most of the conflicts in the Middle East kept Riyadh and Ankara apart. By 2021, however, the strategic environment shifted. Turkey’s outreach to its regional competitors –including Saudi Arabia – began amid a “de-escalation moment,” driven by economic constraints after the pandemic and uncertainty about long-term United States security commitments.

One of the key drivers of the growing alignment between the two countries has been the expanding military cooperation. Riyadh wants to become less dependent on foreign supplies of military hardware and boost domestic military production. As a major military exporter, Turkey’s experience in know-how is key in that regard. The two countries have signed a string of military deals over the past few years. For instance, during President Erdoğan’s  tour of the Gulf countries in 2023, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy Turkish drones; moreover, the package was explicitly tied to industrial cooperation such as technology transfer and joint production leading to long-term high-technology development. Later the same year, the Saudi side announced a strategic agreement with the Turkish defense producer Baykar to localize drone manufacturing in the kingdom. Another area of ongoing cooperation is joint investment in Turkey’s KAAN fighter project.

Read the full article on the American Foreign Policy Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Iran and the United States are engaged in intense negotiations to resolve the deadlock around Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as its support for what remains of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” The diplomatic opening is narrow and fragile, shaped by deep mistrust and competing priorities. The United States aims to leverage Iran’s current vulnerabilities—a battered economy, domestic instability, and recent military defeats—to obtain substantial concessions on several fronts. Iran, for its part, seeks relief from crippling sanctions while insisting that its national sovereignty be respected and that its capacity to intervene across the region be preserved.

At the heart of the negotiations is Iran’s nuclear program. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for partial sanctions relief, has been defunct since 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the agreement. In his second term, Trump has continuously demanded a more comprehensive deal.

Still, if Washington’s objective is more limited—preventing Iran from advancing its nuclear program or acquiring a nuclear weapon—a narrower agreement may be within reach. Iranian officials have hintedthat they would consider capping uranium enrichment at civilian-grade levels or transferring their stockpile of highly enriched uranium to international custody in exchange for significant sanctions relief. Such measures would roll back Iran’s nuclear timeline and restore a degree of transparency without forcing Iran to abandon uranium enrichment. Even so, a limited nuclear understanding will be difficult to implement. Iran’s nuclear capacity expanded significantly after the JCPOA’s collapse, with enrichment jumping to 60 percent purity, and stockpiles of enriched uranium growing far beyond previous limits.

Read the full article on the Gulf International Forum.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In December 2025, Tokyo hosted its first Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue, representing an upgraded version of a cooperation framework originally established in 2004. The region has thus evolved from a relatively peripheral area into a significant area in Japan’s foreign policy.

A series of agreements was concluded during the summit. Uzbekistan and Japan elevated their relationship to an expanded strategic partnership, prioritizing cooperation in green energy, the IT sector, deep industrial decarbonization, and the development of critical minerals, including uranium supplies. The two sides plan to implement projects worth over US$12 billion through a joint investment platform and the establishment of an economic zone in the Samarkand region.

Japan will also extend yen-denominated loans to Uzbekistan for the procurement of medical equipment and to improve small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to financial resources. In addition, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzioev proposed holding biennial summits at the head-of-state level and initiating the development of a Cooperation Strategy between Central Asia and Japan.

Read the full article on the Central Asia Caucasus Analyst.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Since the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s connections with the South Caucasus have accelerated. Kazakhstan’s recent foreign policy toward the South Caucasus is indicative of this trend. Astana has always maintained active ties with Tbilisi and Baku, and it has recently boosted contacts with Yerevan through mutual high-level visits (Arka, April 15, 2025). On February 11, Kazakh Ambassador to Armenia Bolat Imanbayev and Armenian Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Armen Simonyan discussed strengthening Kazakhstan–Armenia cooperation in logistics and transport, particularly in establishing direct air service and building business, cultural, and humanitarian ties (Facebook/kazakhembassyarm; Arminfo, February  11). In November 2025, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Astana. During this visit, they signed numerous cooperation agreements on digitalization, artificial intelligence, and innovation (Prime Minister of Armenia, November 20, 2025;The Astana Times, November 21, 2025). Kazakhstan’s strengthening cooperation with the South Caucasus is just one way it is diversifying its partnerships, particularly in the realm of economics and transit.

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

J.D. Vance toured Armenia and Azerbaijan on February 9-11, the first such high-level US visit to Armenia. The trip underlined two things: America’s indifference to Russia’s claimed areas of influence, and Kremlin weakness.

Vance’s visit underlines that while the Trump administration seeks better relations with Russia, the United States is undaunted about entry to an area the Kremlin likes to call its “near abroad”.

The vice president’s visit brought a frustrated response from the Russian state-controlled newspaper Kommersant. “There’s disappointment, frustration and a sense of helplessness,” the author wrote of Vance’s arrival in the South Caucasus. “Because it’s precisely in this region that Russia’s position has eroded noticeably in recent years. The main reason is obvious: excessive absorption in the Ukrainian conflict ties the hands in all other areas.”

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia persist, and this despite the tacit rapprochement that materialized as a result of the meeting between the presidents of the two countries in October in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.  

During the talks, held on the margins of a CIS summit, Putin expressed regret that the Russian military shot down an Azeri civilian airliner in late 2024, killing 39 people. He blamed a combination of Ukrainian drone activity in Russian airspace and a malfunction in the air defense system. The Russian president pledged full cooperation with investigators and promised that the conduct of all officials involved would be scrutinized. 

Relations had seemed to improve until late December, when the rhetoric took a radical turn for the worse. In a year-end press conference, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov revealed that Baku had been informed that Russia’s investigators had reportedly closed the criminal case.  

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at Turan Research Center.

Over the past few months, Russia has been actively engaged in mediation efforts from Israel to Syria to Iran, trying to prevent an already unstable region from devolving into wider conflict.

On January 28, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa paid a visit to Moscow, following a similar trip in October. Two days later, Iranian top national security official Ali Larijani met Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin as Iran scrambled to stave off new U.S. threats of attack over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Earlier in January, Putin held phone calls with the leaders of Israel and Iran, offering Russian help at preventing a new war between them at a time when Iran had been convulsed with internal protests and was cracking down forcefully on widespread opposition to the regime.

Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian told Putin at the time that Iran was seeking to return calm to the country, according to the Kremlin’s account of the call. The parties also reaffirmed their mutual commitment to further strengthening the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership and the practical implementation of joint economic projects in various fields.

Read the full article on the Stimson Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Under Donald Trump’s second presidential term, the relations between Russia and India have undergone a major test as New Delhi is increasingly pressured by Washington to take sides in the Russia-West rivalry and lessen its dependence on the import of Russian oil. The goal is to weaken Moscow’s military might, which, as seen by the United States, is buttressed with Indian money.

Though tactically, India might concede to the United States on some points, in the longer run, Washington’s pressure is unlikely to drive a wedge between Russia and India. Instead, a continuation of traditionally close cooperation in the military as well as economic spheres is expected. As ardent adherents of the pursuit of multi-aligned foreign policy, Moscow and New Delhi will push for maintaining freedom of maneuver in foreign relations. Both will avoid making brusque moves, which otherwise would imply them siding against each other. Strategic autonomy will remain at the core of their relations, backed up by the belief in the need to work toward a multipolar world order, regarded by Moscow and New Delhi as a more just version of the global system.

Read the full article on TRENDS Research and Advisory.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The Sahel region of Africa, stretching from Mauritania in the west to Sudan in the east, traditionally was not a main focus of Iran’s foreign policy when it came to the African continent. Geographic distance and the relative poverty of the region’s countries coupled with a heavy security and economic presence of Western countries were major disincentives for Tehran.

Yet, following a series of coups in the Sahel, the presence of Western countries in the region began to shrink, particularly with the withdrawal of French and U.S. military forces from parts of the region. And Iran has moved to fill the geopolitical void, notably providing training and military equipment, such as combat drones and surface-to-air missiles, to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

Iran’s interest in cooperating with the Sahel countries is partially driven by its nuclear program. In 2024, there were reports that Iran was negotiating with Niger’s military, offering advanced military equipment in exchange for access to approximately 300 tons of uranium concentrate from deposits near Arlit in Niger. Iran and Niger denied the deal, which would have been valued at $56 million. The alleged deal may have contributed to tensions with the U.S. military presence in Niger, leading Niger to end its defense cooperation agreement with Washington, prompting a U.S. troop withdrawal.

Read more on the Arab Gulf States Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

China’s engagement with the South Caucasus is undergoing a major transformation. Once a peripheral region in Beijing’s wider engagement across the Eurasian continent the South Caucasus has now turned into a focal point for Beijing’s expanded trade, deeper political cooperation, and a more active economic footprint across the region. Indicative of Beijing’s shifting priorities are the relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan which throughout 2025 have assumed strategic importance.

This shift in Beijing’s approach reflects broader changes in Eurasian connectivity and the intensifying competition among major powers in the South Caucasus to shape emerging transport and energy corridors.

Boosted by the Middle Corridor

A central factor behind this recalibration is the rising prominence of the Middle Corridor – the transcontinental route linking the Black Sea to Central Asia. Although the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initially prioritized the more established northern route through Russia, the geopolitical landscape altered dramatically after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Sanctions, disrupted logistics, and heightened security risks weakened the reliability of the Russian pathway, prompting Beijing to reassess and diversify its transit options. The South Caucasus, geographically located along the shortest land bridge between China and Europe, naturally emerged as an attractive alternative.

Read the full article on China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Azerbaijan’s accession to the Central Asia Consultative Summit is less an expansion of a diplomatic forum and more the birth of an increasingly interlinked regional space. By bringing together the strategic resources of Central Asia with the transit capabilities of the South Caucasus, this development has the potential to reshape Eurasia’s political economy. Azerbaijan’s admission as a permanent member of the Central Asia Consultative Summit represents a significant geopolitical shift, signaling the emergence of a trans-Caspian political and economic space, connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus more closely than at any point since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The rise of the "Cauc-Asian" region is thus a chief geopolitical development of the past decades in the heart of the Eurasian continent. The decision to welcome Baku institutionalizes a relationship that had previously evolved through bilateral and sector-specific cooperation, and it positions Azerbaijan as an integral actor in the strategic architecture of Central Asia’s future. For decades after independence, the Central Asian republics and the South Caucasus evolved as separate geopolitical theaters. Despite geographical proximity and shared infrastructure legacies, there was no formal mechanism linking the two regions at the level of heads of state.

Central Asia consolidated internally around its own integration agenda, while the South Caucasus remained fragmented by conflicts, competing transit projects, and divergent geopolitical orientations. Azerbaijan’s entry into the consultative summit effectively dissolves this long-standing separation. It transforms the format from a C5 group into a C6 regional platform that encompasses both sides of the Caspian Sea. This move reflects the changing priorities of Central Asian states. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have become increasingly committed to diversifying their connectivity and reducing their dependency on Russian transit routes.

Read the full article on Caucasus Watch.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The South Caucasus is growing closer to South Asia. India and Pakistan exert greater influence in a region that was once considered geographically distant and unimportant economically. Recently, it was revealed that Armenia was planning to purchase fighter jets from India. Although the news was later denied, it nevertheless marks a shift in the country’s defense orientation and signals the deepening strategic entanglement between two distant but increasingly interconnected geopolitical theaters: the South Caucasus and South Asia.

Although Armenia has been expanding its defense partnership with India for several years, the decision to acquire combat aircraft would have constituted a qualitative leap, revealing both Yerevan’s frustration with its traditional security provider, such as Russia, and its search for new partners capable of supplying advanced military technology without political preconditions. At the same time, such a move would have had immediate regional implications, especially as Azerbaijan embarks on its own fighter-jet modernization path by turning to Pakistan—India’s strategic rival—and, indirectly, to China through the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 program.

This potential military procurement dynamic captures a broader geopolitical realignment. For Armenia, India has become an increasingly attractive partner, offering weaponry that is both competitively priced and politically unconstrained. The relationship has matured rapidly: over the past several years, Yerevan has purchased Indian artillery systems, anti-drone platforms, radars, and surface-to-surface missiles. Moving into the realm of fighter aviation suggests that Armenia is seeking not only to replenish its depleted arsenal after the 2020 and 2023 conflicts with Azerbaijan—when the latter regained full control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region—but also to reorient its security thinking around suppliers outside the post-Soviet sphere.

Read the full article on Caucasus Watch.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

BACKGROUND: On November 6, Washington hosted a summit between the U.S. and the five Central Asian republics. The meeting was notable for several reasons. It marked the first time such a summit had been held at the White House and it followed President Trump’s recent bilateral meetings with the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Washington approached the summit with a pragmatic agenda. Its priorities were twofold: to secure long-term access to critical mineral resources and to strengthen the Middle Corridor as a reliable route to Central Asia that bypasses sanctioned Russian and Iranian territory.
Notably absent from the discussions were themes that had dominated earlier decades, such as the promotion of human rights, democratization, and the export of Western governance models. This marks a clear departure from the period when the C5+1 format was first introduced under President Obama in 2015. At that time, the initiative was largely designed to counter Russian and Chinese influence, rather than to promote trade and investment from the U.S.
President Trump’s regional policy is explicitly transactional. An agreement with Uzbekistan envisages approximately US$ 100 billion in investments flowing into U.S. industries over the coming years. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has joined the Abraham Accords and concluded around US$ 17 billion in commercial agreements with the U.S., including a US$ 1 billion joint mining venture.

Read the full article on the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakhstan is actively pursuing a multi-vector approach to foreign policy and has so far succeeded in maintaining a careful balance in its international relations. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent visit to Moscow stands as a clear testament to this strategy.

On November 12, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev concluded a two-day state visit to Russia, which he described as “perhaps the main event of this year.” His remark underscored the continuing strategic importance that Astana places on its relationship with Moscow.

During the visit, the two sides signed a declaration elevating their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance. This new framework is notable since Russia maintains such strategic relations with only a small circle of states - China, India, Iran, Belarus among them – and now Kazakhstan formally joins that select group. The declaration commits both countries to deepening cooperation across all sectors and as well as providing mutual support in international forums.

Kazakhstan is pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at balancing relations with major powers while safeguarding its own strategic interests. This approach enables Astana to maintain respectful ties with Russia even as it expands economic and diplomatic cooperation with China, the United States, and Europe, thereby avoiding overdependence on any single nation. The strategy underpins Kazakhstan’s ambition to serve as a middle power and a key transit hub—a geopolitical bridge linking major economic centers across Eurasia.

This marks a significant evolution from previous bilateral relations when Kazakhstan and Russia relied on such key documents: as the 1992 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance; the 1998 Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Alliance Oriented to the 21st Century and the 2013 Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Alliance in the 21st Century. While the former documents stressed a general between the countries, the latest agreement highlights the strategic nature of bilateral relations.

Additionally, the November visit resulted in the signing of 13 more documents covering cooperation in transit transportation, including flight tests of the Soyuz-5 and Baiterek space rocket systems, the opening of a Russian consulate general in the western port city of Aktau, and collaboration on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The latter point is particularly important for both Moscow and Astana, as it paves the way for the future construction of a nuclear power plant built by Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom. This follows the June decision in which Astana granted Rosatom the rights to build what will be Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP) since the 1990s.

Moreover, the trip underscored Russia’s enduring influence over Kazakhstan. Moscow remains Kazakhstan’s second largest trading partner. By the end of 2024, bilateral trade has neared $30 billion. According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, in 2024 foreign direct investment from Russia to Kazakhstan totaled approximately $4 billion, accounting for nearly a quarter of all investment inflows into the country. Some 20,000 companies with Russian participation now operate in Kazakhstan and 175 major joint projects are currently underway.

Wider Geopolitical Context

The deepening Russian-Kazakh cooperation also reflects a broader geopolitical landscape. Globally, the strategic alignment of the two nations is reinforced through their joint participation in such multilateral organizations as the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, Russia and Kazakhstan agree on limiting military presence of non-Caspian Sea states in the Caspian Sea – a stance that underscores their common security outlook.

Tokayev’s visit to Russia is also notable given its timing. It came shortly after the Kazakh leader’s early November trip to the United States, where he and other Central Asian leaders met with President Donald Trump within the C5+1 framework. In Washington, Astana signed several investments agreements and announced its intent to join the Abraham Accords, an American initiative aimed at facilitating normalization between Israel and the Arab states as well as the wider Islamic world.

Tokayev’s visit to Moscow is particularly important for Russia, whose influence in Central Asia has been increasingly tested since its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Kazakhstan is a key state for Moscow’s projection of regional power, yet a growing number of external powers have been moving to fill the geopolitical vacuum created by Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine. China, the European Union, United States, and to a lesser degree, Turkey, are all actively expanding their economic and political influence in Central Asia with Kazakhstan at the center of their strategies. Indeed, China has already surpassed Russia in terms of its economic presence in Kazakhstan. Washington is seeking a larger role in the development of Kazakhstan’s critical minerals and rare earth mining sector to reduce its reliance on Chinese rare earth exports.

Therefore, Tokayev’s trip is seen as a testament that Moscow’s still retains powerful political and economic levers in the region. Russia may lag behind China’s economic potential and the U.S. may appear more attractive in certain sectors such as rare earth extraction or oil and gas deposits exploration, but Moscow still benefits its geographic proximity and decades of cooperation. Russian and Kazakh political elites have also maintained close ties since the 1990s, and despite leadership changes in both nations, this continuity remains a core pillar of their relationship.

Perfect Case of Multi-Vectorism

Central to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector strategy is its role in competing transport corridors. The Russia-sponsored International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) — especially its eastern branch — runs through Kazakh territory. This route allows Russia not only access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also connection with markets in South Asia.

At the same time, Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role in the China-Europe east-west network often referred to as the Middle Corridor. Astana is actively investing in the corridor’s expansion and has improved ties with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to that end. For Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor is a means of deepening engagement with global markets while facilitating China-EU trade flows that bypass Russia.

Pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy is also rooted in Kazakhstan’s size, resources and geopolitical position. When relations between Moscow and Astana experienced moments of tension because of war in Ukraine and the expectation that Astana as an ally would support Russia, Kazakhstan moved to strengthen ties with China and the West, effectively declaring a position of neutrality regarding the conflict. Tokayev publicly referred to the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics — Ukrainian territory annexed by Russia — as quasi-state entities and ruled out recognizing them. Reasons vary from pragmatism to actual fear of potential separatism in the northern part of Kazakhstan, mostly populated by ethnic Russians. These reasons led Kazakhstan to expand diplomatic and economic ties with Ukraine, signaling a calibrated balancing act between Kyiv and Russia

Multi-vectorism remains the defining feature of Kazakhstan’s international identity and its primary tool for preserving sovereignty amid intensifying geopolitical competition throughout Eurasia. But the idea of multi-vectorism is also intricately related to Kazakhstan’s ambition to position itself as a middle power —an actor garnering the respect and capable of influencing larger powers’ behavior. Astana thus aspires to join a club of other middle powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and others.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Since the fall of the Assad dynasty in Syria in December 2024, Turkey’s regional influence has notably grown across the eastern Mediterranean. From Libya to Syria to northern Iraq and the South Caucasus, Ankara’s posture has become more pronounced. This development is aided by major regional shifts such as Iran’s weakening, following its direct confrontation with Israel and the United States in 2025.

Another development that facilitated Turkey’s strengthening clout is that regional countries have grown increasingly fearful of Israel’s overbearing power. The Israeli attack against leaders of Palestinian group Hamas[i] in Doha in September served as a further reminder that Arab states should seek the diversification of their partnerships away from exclusive reliance on the United States. Therefore, it was no coincidence that Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan nearly a week after the strikes in Qatar. These shifts allow Turkey to skillfully position itself as an indispensable actor to stabilize the shaken regional balance of power.

Read the full article on Manara Magazine.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On October 24, Uzbekistan and the European Union signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA). The agreement is far more expansive than what governed the Brussels–Tashkent relations since bilateral cooperation was officially established in 1999 (European Council, October 24). The previous engagement framework no longer addressed today’s challenges, and both sides urgently needed an upgrade. Uzbekistan has grown economically, Central Asia has become more important, and the European Union is eager to diversify its energy dependence.

The expanding ties between Uzbekistan and the European Union are indicative of a changing approach in Brussels’s foreign policy. The European Union has become increasingly adaptable to the needs of each Central Asian country. In many ways, this mirrors how the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and, more recently, the United States have engaged with Central Asia. The November summit between the United States and the five Central Asian countries is a good example of this developing trend (Novaya Gazeta, November 14). To highlight the growing attention the European Union now pays to Central Asia, the EPCA follows the Central Asia–European Union summit held in April in Samarkand, during which Brussels pledged around 12 billion euros (about $13.9 billion) within its Global Gateway framework for infrastructure development in the region (European Commission, April 3; Invexi, April 4).

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

There was something different about the November 6 summit of the US and five Central Asian countries. It was the first such event held in the White House and followed the US president’s meetings with his Uzbek and Kazakh counterparts, where big deals were signed to boost America’s manufacturing sector. 

The US had a clear pre-summit agenda. It pursued two goals: to gain access to mineral resources and to develop the Middle Corridor route to reach Central Asia by skirting Russian and Iranian territory. 

Another striking change was that the US approach made little mention of human rights, democracy promotion, and the transfer of the Western governance model into the region. This appeals to the Central Asian states, which have poor records on basic liberties but are eager to build partnerships with Washington and to pursue tighter integration with global markets. Under President Donald Trump, priority goes to economic, connectivity, and security deals. 

This has not always been the case. The first summit held within the C5+1 framework was first established under President Barack Obama in 2015 and was less about deepening economic and trade ties and more about denying Russia and China greater influence in the region. Yet it proved impossible to achieve concrete results without meaningful economic engagement, something the Trump administration is trying to change, and with some success.  

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Tajikistan on October 9. Their meeting, after many months of outright hostility, was interpreted by many as a signal of rapprochement, and with some reason. 

Distrust will nevertheless persist — Azerbaijan considers itself a significant regional power better off when it is free of the Kremlin’s policy shackles. And there’s not much Russia can do about it. 

The talks centered on what Putin described as the “most sensitive issue” — the December 2024 shooting down by a Russian missile battery of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190, with the deaths of 38 people. Putin expressed condolences and, in effect, issued an apology by belatedly accepting that the cause of the crash was indeed the Russian military. 

The Russian president has argued that the investigation into the tragedy had concluded, that the incident was triggered by the presence of three Ukrainian drones over Russian territory at the time, and that the missiles did not directly hit the aircraft, but detonated roughly 10 meters (about 30ft) away. He did not mention that this is precisely the aim of many anti-aircraft missiles, and more than enough to inflict catastrophic damage. 

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

BACKGROUND: Over the past two months, Azerbaijan’s relations with both Russia and the U.S. have undergone significant changes, reflecting Baku’s continued commitment to maintaining balance in its foreign policy.
On October 9, Vladimir Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. During the meeting, Putin addressed what he called the “most sensitive issue,” the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 jet, caused by a Russian air defense missile. He expressed his condolences and effectively issued an apology. Putin stated that the investigation into the crash had concluded and that the causes of the tragedy had been identified. He attributed the incident to three Ukrainian drones allegedly flying over Russian territory at the time and mentioned technical malfunctions in Russia’s air defense system, which launched two missiles that did not directly strike the plane but exploded about ten meters away.
Between the downing of the Azerbaijani airliner and the meeting in Dushanbe, relations grew even more strained following the arrest of members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg in June 2025. Russian security forces detained a group of Azerbaijani nationals in connection with murders committed in the early 2000s, resulting in the deaths of two suspects during the operation. In response, Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures, arresting eight Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime. The Russian House in Baku was subsequently closed, all Russia-related cultural events were cancelled, and Azerbaijani authorities detained both the director and the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan.

Read the full article on the Caucasus and Central Asia Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

As Moscow reorients its commercial and political ties away from the West toward the Global South, its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have grown significantly.

Over the past few months, Russia has expanded its engagement with the oil- and gas-rich Arab nations of the GCC.

This trend demonstrates the resilience of Russia’s influence across the Middle East, especially in the face of Moscow losing its major ally, the Assad dynasty in Syria, following the fall of Baath regime in December 2024.
Then there’s the weakening of Iran, exacerbated by its confrontations with Israel and the United States, which has further complicated Moscow’s regional position.

Russia’s closer ties with the GCC are evident in its deepening relations with Oman. In April, the two countries signed an agreement to establish a visa-free programme.

The meeting in Moscow also marked the first-ever talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, a historic milestone in the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Read the full article on TRT World.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Ankara plans to attract funds for the Eastern Türkiye Railway Infrastructure Development Project (ETMIC), which would renovate and electrify the Divrigi–Kars–Georgian border railway line. This was outlined in a document called “Request for Participation in Early Market Engagement for Procurement of: Eastern Türkiye Middle Corridor Railway Development Project (ETMIC) and Istanbul North Rail Crossing Project (INRAIL),” published by the Turkish Government and World Bank on September 25 (Government of Türkiye, September 25). The estimated cost of the ETMIC, including value-added tax (VAT), is $1.615 billion (BPN, October 10). The ETMIC would also construct bridges, tunnels, culverts, and retaining walls, and expand stations. The modern traffic management system includes substations, 154-kilovolt transmission lines, signaling and telecommunications equipment, a centralized traffic control system (CTC), and a 320-kilometer-long (199-mile-long) distributed acoustic monitoring system (DAS). The project will contribute to increased rail freight traffic, more active domestic passenger train traffic, and the economic development of the eastern parts of Türkiye (Report.az, October 4). Türkiye aims to position itself as a leading architect of connectivity in the region by implementing new regional projects.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced plans to build a new railway to the border with Georgia on January 5. The Samsun–Trabzon–Sarpi high-speed train line will provide rail transportation between the Turkish capital of Ankara, the Black Sea region, and Georgia (Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications; 1tv.ge, January 5). The new railway will connect the Turkish cities of Ordu, Giresun, Trabzon, Rize, and Artvin via a line starting in Samsun. The project is part of the Ankara–Kırıkkale–Çorum–Samsun high-speed line, which will facilitate traffic from the heart of the Anatolian peninsula to the Black Sea (Railmarket, June 19). 

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria last year initially seemed to be a huge blow to Russia, stripping it of a long-time ally and undermining the link between Russia and the African continent, where Russian mercenaries have been actively engaged in the economic and security spheres.

Nine months after Islamist rebels overthrew the Assad dynasty, however, Russian relations with Syria are on an apparent road to recovery. By skillfully using differences among regional actors as well as its status as Syria’s chief weapons supplier, Russia has managed to reconstitute parts of its former influence, including retaining access to three military bases.

Moscow’s most important influence during its decades-long alliance with the Assad regime may be even more important to Syria now — serving as a deterrent or at least a break on Israeli military activities.

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Read the full article on the Stimson Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On August 8 in Washington D.C., Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a landmark arrangement. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration on Future Relations, pledging to “chart a bright future not bound by past conflict, consistent with the UN Charter.” The historic document stated that the two countries no longer regard each other as enemies. A core component of the Washington deal is the TRIPP, Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which envisions a transit and trade corridor through Armenia’s southern territory to link Azerbaijan proper with the Nakhchivan enclave. The United States is granted a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of the transit corridor across Armenian territory.  

For Turkey, the TRIPP offers an opportunity to diversify its commercial routes across the South Caucasus. Until now, Turkey enjoyed only one transit route to the Caspian Sea. The corridor through Georgia built in the 1990s, expanded in the 2000s and consisting of roads, railways and pipelines has been an important factor in strengthening Ankara’s relations with Tbilisi. The Georgia route has boomed since February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and the north Eurasian route linking China with the EU became less secure. As a viable alternative, the Middle Corridor running from Turkey and Georgia to Central Asia has become more attractive for global transport companies and actors such as the EU and China.

Yet reliance on one route is fraught with risks. The fickle geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus calls for developing alternatives and the route through Armenia’s southern territory is attractive to Ankara and Baku. Indeed, right after the TRIPP announcement, the Turkish side unveiled the start of construction of the Kars-Iğdır-Aralyk-Dilucu railway line, which will become a key element of the corridor. The project’s cost is up to €2.4 billion and is set to serve as yet another link for China-EU trade. More importantly, it will connect Turkey with the Central Asian market and sideline its competitors in the South Caucasus – Russia and Iran.

Read the full article on Turkey Analyst at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The Azerbaijan-UAE strategic partnership agreement aligns with Baku's broader outreach to the Gulf region and reinforces its long-standing multi-alignment policy. More importantly, it signals a shifting geopolitical landscape – one in which Russia's traditional dominance in the South Caucasus is waning, while the region itself becomes increasingly connected with the Middle East.

Last month, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (known as MBZ), President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), undertook an official visit to Azerbaijan, making a significant moment in the deepening relationship between the two nations. The high-level meeting was held in the city of Shusha in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. The visit resulted in the signing of 14 bilateral agreements, poised to inject fresh momentum into an already expanding strategic partnership.

Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and the UAE were first established in 1992. But President Ilham Aliyev’s first official visit to the UAE in 2006 marked a turning point in bilateral relations, ushering in a new era of cooperation. Since then, Aliyev has made six more visits to the UAE, with reciprocal high-level exchanges further solidifying ties. In 2024, MBZ became the first UAE leader to visit Azerbaijan. This momentum between the two nations culminated in July 2025, when the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed during Aliyev’s visit to the UAE – an accord that laid the foundation for a new phase of economic and strategic collaboration. The agreement aims at boosting bilateral trade which still largely remains untapped.

A testament to the burgeoning bilateral partnership is the scale of mutual investment. Between 1995 and 2024 ,the UAE infused $3.4 billion in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijani investments in the UAE reached $1.1 billion. A major driver for this expansion was the establishment in late 2023 of a $1 billion Joint Investment Fund between the Azerbaijan Investment Holding and the Abu Dhabi Investment Holding Company. The Azerbaijan Trade Representative Office was established in Dubai in 2017, followed by the opening of the Azerbaijan Trade House in 2019. The latter plays a key role in promoting the “Made in Azerbaijan” brand across the UAE and the broader Persian Gulf region. Currently, more than 350 commercial enterprises with UAE capital are registered in Azerbaijan.

Among the most prominent investments is the UAE’s national oil company, ADNOC, which acquired a 30% stake in Azerbaijan’s Absheron gas field for an unknown amount. Meanwhile, momentum is building in the green energy sector. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power is currently developing a $300 million wind farm in Azerbaijan while Abu Dhabi-backed projects such as the Garadagh Solar Power Plant are helping Baku accelerate its transition toward renewable energy. During the latest high-level visit, both sides signed multiple Memoranda of Understanding aimed at exploring joint opportunities in renewable and clean energy projects. Moreover, a $1 billion joint venture between Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and Azerbaijan Investment Holding further signals a deepening commitment to long-term economic collaboration.

Despite the visible expansion of diplomatic and strategic ties between Azerbaijan and the UAE, bilateral trade still lags behind outwardly developing ties. In 2024 trade reached just $96.8 million – a sharp decline from $1.6 billion the previous year, signaling a major drop in commercial activity. Geography remains a major impediment, compounded by the heavily sanctioned status of Iran which under ideal circumstances would serve as a vital transit hub between the two nations.

However, this dynamic may be poised for change.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – linking Russia’s heartland with Iran and the Indian Ocean – offers both the UAE and Azerbaijan a pathway to a more efficient north-south connectivity. Indeed, the INSTC’s major branch passes through Azerbaijan, and the UAE has recently expanded its ties with Russia, positioning itself to benefit from the corridor’s expansion.  

Yet for the INSTC to fulfill its full potential, sustained investment and robust multilateral cooperation will be essential. Streamlining customs procedures, aligning technical standards, and eliminating logistical bottlenecks must become shared priorities among participating countries. If these challenges are addressed, the INSTC could evolve into a fully optimized, major commercial route for Eurasian commerce. Historical precedent also favors its success; in ancient and medieval times, a similar route along the western Caspian Sea linked the Eurasian steppes with the Middle East.

The UAE president’s recent visit to Azerbaijan reflects Abu-Dhabi’s growing interest in the shifting connectivity landscape of the South Caucasus and the wider Black Sea region. As global trade routes shift in the wake of the war in Ukraine, the importance of alternative transit corridors has become increasingly urgent. The once-dominant northern route through Russia has lost viability, prompting China and the European Union to explore options through the South Caucasus. While the Middle Corridor -- stretching from Turkey across  he Caspian Sea to Central Asia -- may be geographically distant from the UAE, its emerging economic potential is enticing enough to attract Emirati investment. Notably, the UAE president’s mid-September visit to Georgia -- where an Emirati company is building a dry port near Tbilisi – underscores Abu Dhabi’s strategic understanding of the expanding East-West connectivity across the region.

Multi-Alignment Strategy

Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has long been defined by its pursuit of multi-vector diplomacy, and in recent years, a distinct pivot toward the Middle East has become increasingly evident. Since 1990s, Baku has actively cultivated simultaneous relationships across geopolitical divides -- maintaining strong ties with Russia and Turkey, while also deepening commercial and energy partnerships with Western countries. Azerbaijan’s strategic geography, particularly its role alongside Georgia as a key transit link between Central Asia and the EU, has further amplified its relevance on the global stage.

Building on decades of regional engagement, Azerbaijan has recently expanded its partnerships to include the Arab world. In addition to the growing relationship with the UAE, dynamic cooperation is now unfolding with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), spanning such sectors as energy, investment, logistics, and humanitarian affairs. For the GCC – particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia -- enhanced economic and political engagement with Azerbaijan aligns with their broader ambitions to diversify investments and assert long-term influence over the evolving connectivity landscape that links Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

But a deeper geopolitical shift may also be underway – one that helps explain the growing convergence between Azerbaijan and the UAE: the South Caucasus’ gradual shift toward the Middle East. Historically, the formidable Caucasus Mountain range divided the region into northern and southern spheres, with the southern part naturally gravitating toward commercial, political and cultural ties with the Middle East. This pattern was evident throughout ancient and medieval times. However, the rise of the Russian Empire in the 19th century disrupted this dynamic. After defeating the Persian and Ottoman empires, Russia imposed a new order, effectively sealing off the Caucasus from the Middle East and asserting exclusive influence over the region.

That dominance now appears tenuous. Geography, once again, is dictating its logic, pulling the South Caucasus back into the orbit of the Middle East. Russia, long accustomed to near monopoly influence in the region, is facing strained relations not only with Azerbaijan but also with Armenia, traditionally one of its closest allies. This diminution of Russian influence in the South Caucasus is compounded by a broader trend that Moscow itself has championed: the emergence of a multipolar world.

In this new landscape Moscow is increasingly no longer the major actor in South Caucasus affairs, but one among several – including the UAE, Turkey, the US, China and the EU – each vying for strategic footholds in a region whose connectivity and relevance are rapidly expanding.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Ever since the war in Ukraine began, Russia and Iran have expanded their military and political cooperation, which culminated in the signing of a major bilateral agreement that the two inked earlier this year.[i] The development of their relations, however, always stopped short of achieving a full-scale alliance. Neither side has provided ironclad commitments on mutual defence and such a clause was notably absent from the 2025 comprehensive agreement as well. Moreover, the supply of certain critical air-defence systems (such as the S-400), modern fighter jets (like the Su-35), and other equipment has not materialized, indicating that there are still limits to Moscow–Tehran cooperation.

There were no expectations that Moscow would come to Tehran’s help in the latter’s latest round of confrontation with Israel in June, during which Israeli and U.S. forces bombed Iran’s nuclear and aerial defence sites across the country. Iranian politicians have nevertheless voiced their concern about the state of Russia–Iran ties. This is in large part due to Tehran’s suspicions of Moscow in the wake of US-Russia talks, which they expect will not only concern Ukraine but also cover the Iranian issue in a series of tit-for-tat exchanges.[ii] The fear of this remains a major concern for the Iranian leadership, further nurturing the already present distrust between Tehran and Moscow.

Read the full article on Manara Magazine.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

BACKGROUND: On July 18, the European Union and Tajikistan initialed the EPCA. This accord will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that has been in place since 2010, establishing a legal framework to advance reforms in Tajikistan. The EPCA corresponds closely with the EU’s strategic priorities in Central Asia, which call for a more reinvigorated approach to the strategically significant region. It also seeks to establish a basis for future relations, reflecting emerging economic and political conditions on the ground. Brussels and Dushanbe foresee cooperation in trade as well as in human rights, sustainable development, education, energy, and related areas.
Similarly, in July the two parties discussed the present state of cooperation and prospects for launching new joint projects in mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and the food industry. Additional areas include the mining sector, with particular focus on the extraction and processing of critical raw materials. Officials from Tajikistan and the EU also considered Dushanbe’s potential participation in the EU Global Gateway initiative, designed to promote sustainable infrastructure and reinforce strategic linkages across Eurasia.

The EPCA builds upon already established cooperation across multiple sectors. For example, during the past five years, 500 Tajik students have studied in Europe through EU funding. The Union has financed projects in the healthcare sector and promotes digital transformation, including initiatives to expand digital access via satellite technology. The EU also contributes to the development and modernization of green energy production in Tajikistan. With European support, the Nurek, Sebzor, and Kayrakkum hydroelectric power station projects are under implementation, and Brussels is assisting the establishment of infrastructure to transmit electricity to South Asia through the CASA-1000 transmission line.

Read the full article on the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.
Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On August 19, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian paid a visit to Belarus, where he met with his counterpart, Alyaksandr Lukashenka (President of Iran, August 19). The visit was originally scheduled for early June, but due to the confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv, it was postponed until August. The two countries signed 12 cooperation documents, pledging greater cooperation in areas such as politics, tourism, media, investment, and special economic and industrial zones (Tehran Times, August 20). Additionally, the two presidents signed a joint statement to deepen the development of relations between Belarus and Iran. The two sides also expressed satisfaction with the dynamic development of bilateral cooperation, as reflected in the increased frequency of high-level visits in recent years. More importantly, the Iranian president also suggested that the Islamic Republic of Iran could consider developing a strategic partnership model with Belarus (President of Iran, August 20).

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The establishment of silk production and research stations in the 19th century Europe

responded to the needs that emerged on the continent during that time. The lack of scientific study

of silk production became evident as early as the 1740-1760s when silkworms were affected by an

epizootic disease, and the measures taken proved insufficient. The necessity arose to create a solid

scientific foundation for silk production and its research, for which special stations were

established. Germans, Austrians, and Italians were the first among European countries to set up

sericulture stations. These institutions were essential not only for studying existing problems in

sericulture but also to address the requirements for the future development of this field.

The objectives of a sericulture station usually were to determine the conditions that would

promote the development of sericulture in various geographical and climatic environments;

furthermore, to develop specific methods for achieving the first goal, to study different diseases,

to research new silkworm breeds through experiments, and in the end to provide necessary

recommendations. The ultimate goal was to implement innovations in agriculture in order to raise

general economic level. In Europe sericulture stations were often created based on demands

presented by local commercial circles, which were interested in raising their countries’ economic

productivity. In other words, as will be described below, one of the main purposes of the stations

was to disseminate scientific knowledge about sericulture. Moreover, the stations also aimed at the

implementation of acquired knowledge in agriculture, particularly through providing information

to the population on how to rear silkworms.

Read the full article on the State Silk Museum.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center.

China’s relationship with the South Caucasus is entering a new phase, defined by a greater economic engagement, expanding trade, and a steady elevation of political partnerships with the three regional countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The region, once peripheral to Beijing’s Eurasian strategy or its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has now become more vital amid shifting connectivity across the continent and heightened great power competition.

Central to this shift is the growing importance of the so-called Middle Corridor—a trans-Eurasian trade route spanning from the Black Sea to Central Asia—that has gained momentum amid the wars and general instability in Ukraine and the Middle East. When Beijing unveiled the BRI more than a decade ago, the South Caucasus barely figured in its plans. At the time, the Russian route—backed by Soviet-era infrastructure and political reliability—offered a more straightforward path for China towards the European Union (EU).

Read the full article on the Observer Research Foundation.

Among the agreements signed in August when the U.S. president hosted the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington was the “Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). Intended to link Azerbaijan proper with its ethnic enclave of Nakhchivan via southern Armenia, the TRIPP has the potential of transforming security and connectivity in the South Caucasus and beyond.

Iran regards the TRIPP negatively, fearing it will jeopardize its land border with Armenia, a long-time ally. But Tehran may not be able to do much to prevent its realization due to other geopolitical constraints and fear of further antagonizing Washington.

In the wake of the August summit, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs talkedof “the negative consequences of any form of foreign intervention, especially near shared borders.”

Read the full article on the Stimson Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Oman and Russia’s bilateral relations have grown significantly, driven by socioeconomic development in Oman and wider geopolitics in the Middle East.

In 2023, Russian and Omani officials exchanged several visits. In July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made his first visit to Muscat since 2016. In September, a Russian delegation of law enforcement agency representatives, the Rosatom State Corporation, and the central bank visited Oman. Just three months later, the Omani minister of culture, sports, and youth, Crown Prince Sayyid Theyazin bin Haitham al-Said, traveled to Moscow and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The two countries have since worked to strengthen economic ties. In 2023, Oman’s foreign minister said the country was working with Russia on reaching a mutual investment promotion agreement. Oman also participated as an honorary guest at the 2024 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and at the 2024 international economic forum “Russia – Islamic World: KazanForum.” In October 2024, Muscat hosted the business mission “Made in Russia,” with 39 Russian companies from a range of sectors. Trade ties have grown drastically: In 2010 trade turnover between the countries was $12 million and exceeded $400 million by 2023. However, the trade balance has tilted in favor of Russia – in 2022, Russia exported $246.8 million in goods to Oman and imported only $4 million.

Read the full article on the Arab Gulf States Institute.

It has been a long, long time since relations between the South Caucasian nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been so good. The signing of several deals in the White House on August 8 has delivered that, confounded Russia, which breezily describes this as its backyard, and brought prizes to the US, which wins has a direct stake in the region. 

It’s all very unusual. As a result of the agreement, the United States now has a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of a potentially lucrative transit corridor. The project — branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP — uses Armenian land that will be subleased by the US to a consortium tasked with its construction and management, which aims to link Turkey in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east, offering a shorter route than the traditional through Georgia.  

Read more at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Amid attacks by Israel and the United States, Iran has unveiled a new transcontinental trade route to China in line with one of the central pillars of Iranian foreign policy: to position Iran at the center of shifting and growing Eurasian connectivity.

Traditionally, the Persian Gulf has been critical to Iranian trade. The more recent push to develop land routes to Central Asia aims to diversify commercial links and boost cooperation with a booming area of economic growth.

These land routes have become increasingly important as the region redefines itself as a major node in transcontinental trade, between Russia and Afghanistan, as well as between China and the European Union. Major powers have all established separate summit formats with the five Central Asian states and seek trade and investment opportunities with them. In the past, Central Asia was not at the epicenter of Iran’s foreign policy, yet this might be changing given the region’s growing economic and transit potential.

Read more at the Stimson Center.

The military campaign by the United States and Israel against Iran, which ended in U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, puts Russia in an uncomfortable geopolitical position. Moscow has already endured the loss of one of its most strategically vital clients with the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Partnered with a weakened Iran, Moscow could face a far greater challenge to its ability to influence developments in the Middle East.

Read the full article on the Gulf International Forum.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In late June, as part of a police raid in Yekaterinburg, Russian security forces arrested a dozen ethnic Azerbaijanis, two of whom died in custody, with a subsequent autopsy reportedly showing signs they had been beaten. To register the seriousness with which it viewed the incident, the government of Azerbaijan arrested Russian nationals it said were illegally living and working in Baku, while also rolling back all Russia-related cultural activities and downgrading interparliamentary work. Both sides subsequently summoned their ambassadors to file official protests.

Far from being an isolated incident, the diplomatic spat between Moscow and Baku reflects a broader shift in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, where Russia’s position is in flux. Long considered one of the core spaces of Moscow’s geopolitical sphere of influence and an anchor of its claim to great power status, the region is now being increasingly contested by other actors. From China, the European Union and the U.S., to Turkey, Iran and even the wealthy Gulf states, external powers are playing a greater economic and geopolitical role in the South Caucasus.

Read the full article on World Politics Review.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Given the intensity of the recent military confrontation between Iran and Israel, Tehran's influence in the South Caucasus could experience fundamental changes. The short war between the Islamic Republic and Israel/United States has underscored the shifting balance of power in the Middle East, with Israel now emerging as the dominant military force in the region. The relative weakening of Iranian power is set to impact its neighbors, and the South Caucasus region has been particularly vulnerable to geopolitical reverberations from instability in the Middle East.

One of the possible repercussions is the impact on the ongoing negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given the fragile nature of the talks and Baku’s far more powerful position vis-à-vis Armenia, Iran’s more retrenched posture could further embolden Azerbaijan regarding the opening of the Zangezur corridor, a move opposed by the Armenian side. For the moment, however, there is no evident shift in Azerbaijan’s posture indicating that it might encroach on Armenia’s territory. Baku is pragmatic and understands that such a move would kill the ongoing peace process with Yerevan. Furthermore, a forceful solution to the Zangezur corridor issue would destroy the good relations Baku has cultivated with Tehran, which is highly interested in preserving the existing balance of power in the South Caucasus.

Read more on Caucasus Watch.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Central Asia has emerged as an increasingly strategic priority in India’s foreign policy. Driven by regional realignments and shifting trade agreements across Eurasia, New Delhi is intensifying its engagement with the region. At the same time, the potential of bilateral cooperation remains constrained by persistent geographical hurdles, limited infrastructure, and overlapping spheres of influence, particularly those of China and Russia.

India no longer perceives Central Asia as a peripheral  concern but views it  as a pivotal space to advance its Act East and Connect Central Asia policies. The region presents a unique opportunity for India to project its economic footprint and counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative. From the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to investments in the Iranian port of Chabahar, India is working to establish alternative linkages that enhance its strategic autonomy and diversify regional access.

Central Asia’s evolving role as a transit hub – linking Chinese markets to Europe and Russian networks to South Asia – further amplifies its relevance. In 2016, India joined the Ashgabat Agreement for Transport Links Development, which simplifies the transportation of goods between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. In the same period, India also signed the Trilateral Transit Agreement with Iran and Afghanistan that sought to build the Chabahar port in Iran. In 2024, India and Iran finalized a 10-year agreement to further develop the port. From the Indian perspective, the Chabahar project offers an alternative to bypass Pakistan and reach Central Asia via Afghanistan, which allows the latter to integrate into regional infrastructure.

The Chabahar project is not the only one that India has promoted linking connectivity with Central Asia.

New Delhi renewed its interest in the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project, a critical initiative aimed at deepening regional energy cooperation. The pipeline’s construction within Turkmenistan was completed in 2024, and has now been extended southward through Afghanistan’s Herat province. Once operational, the TAPI pipeline will transport natural gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field through Afghanistan and Pakistan, ultimately reaching India.

The TAPI project promises not only enhanced access to Central Asia’s rich hydrocarbon reserves but also a significant boost to India’s geopolitical footprint in the region. The emphasis on connectivity was evident during the June meeting in New Delhi between the foreign ministers of India and the five Central Asian countries. Discussions focused on civilizational and cultural ties, as well as strengthening trade, investment and logistics partnerships – including collaboration under the International North South Transport Corridor, a 7,200-kilomter trade route that connects India, Iran, Russia, Europe and Central Asia through a combination of sea, rail and road networks.

The gathering marked a diplomatic milestone, occurring after a three-year hiatus, and underscored New Delhi’s awareness of intensifying its strategic competition in Central Asia. It also built on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s landmark 2015 tour of all Central Asian countries, reaffirming India’s long-term commitment to regional engagement.

Beyond traditional connectivity and energy cooperations, several emerging areas offer promising bilateral ties between India and Central Asia. Green energy collaboration is gaining traction, as both regions seek sustainable solutions amid climate challenges. Joint initiatives in glacier preservation -- vital to the region’s water security -- also underscore the growing importance of environmental projects.

Medical tourism continues to grow steadily, with India positioning itself as a regional healthcare hub. India also is advancing financial and digital integration, focusing on the use of national currencies, digital payment systems and fintech innovation. Platforms such as United Payments Interface, Aadhaar and DigiLocker present models for secure transactions, digital identity management and data portability – areas where Central Asian countries are increasingly receptive to Indian expertise. Cooperation in financial services, healthcare and pharmaceuticals – sectors where Central Asia remains a key export destination for India – continues to be a strategic priority for New Delhi. These areas not only bolster commercial ties but also support India’s broader ambition to integrate itself more deeply into the region’s socioeconomic development.

At the same time, Central Asia is increasingly viewed by India as a crucial source of strategic resources. With India currently dependent on imports for nearly 80% of its supply of critical minerals, tapping into the region’s growing reserves of rare earth elements (REEs) has become essential. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have recently showcased their potential to exports REEs, prompting India to engage more proactively as global powers like the United States, European Union and China intensify competition over access to these vital Central Asian resources.

By strengthening its foothold in this emerging market, India seeks not only to diversify supply chains, but also to reduce its strategic vulnerability to China, which currently dominates nearly 60% of the global REEs market. Recognizing this opportunity, India proposed to create a "Regional Alliance on Critical Minerals" with Central Asian countries in 2024 order  the formation of a regional alliance on critical minerals in 2024, aimed at fostering joint geological exploration and establishing shared processing facilities in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

To be sure, India’s growing engagement with Central Asia is not driven solely by economic interests – but by the region’s rising geopolitical significance in global affairs. All major powers, including the U.S., EU, China and Russia, have developed distinct ties with the five Central Asian nations.

India, recognizing such a competitive landscape, is following suit, pursuing a dual-track approach: advancing multilateral cooperation through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and India-Central Asia Dialogue, while also deepening bilateral ties with individual countries. Among these nations, Kazakhstan stands out as a key trade partner. Its extensive hydrocarbon reserves have long drawn India’s interest, prompting collaborations such as ONGC Videsh LTD’s acquisition of stakes in the Kazakh oil fields of Alibekmola and Kurmangazy. Kazakhstan also accounts for the bulk of India’s imports from Central Asia and has served as a gateway for commercial and energy cooperation. Notably, it was the first country in the region to elevate its ties with India by signing the Declaration of Strategic Partnership in 2009, setting a precedent for deepened bilateral ties.

The engagement by India is hardly one-sided. Central Asian states likewise are interested in building more expansive ties with the massive Indian economy. It fits into the Central Asian countries’ pursuit to diversify their foreign relations. In a world that has grown increasingly multipolar, closer ties with India emerges as an effective geopolitical move by Central Asian states to limit their dependence on either Russia or China. Central Asian states, while being landlocked, specifically seek maritime sea routes.

Yet, there are constraints that limit India’s engagements with Central Asia. Foremost among these is geography: India lacks a direct land route to the region. This logistical barrier is compounded by strained relations with Pakistan and ongoing instability in Afghanistan, making overland connectivity both politically and practically unfeasible. The impact is evident in the modest trade volume between India and the Central Asia nations, which remains below $2 billion annually.

India must also contend with stiff competition from larger powers that benefit from geographic proximity and deeper cultural and economic ties with the region. Russia, for instance, continues to wield significant influence through long-standing security and economic partnerships. Meanwhile, China has expanded its footprint via the Belt and Road Initiative, positioning Central Asia as a strategic alternative to the vulnerable maritime route through the Malacca Strait.

Over the long term, India’s foreign policy toward Central Asia has undergone a significant shift. Until the 2010s, the region occupied a peripheral place in New Delhi’s priorities. However, in recent years, India has advanced its “Look North” strategy, aimed at cultivating stronger ties with northern powers to diversify its foreign partnerships and capitalize on emerging economic opportunities in the Eurasian heartland.

This major shift also reflects the geographic and historical linkages between the two regions. Centuries ago, the terrain stretching from Central Asia to modern-day northern India, was controlled by the Kushan and Mughal empires. One entity tied the region together politically and helped to develop connectivity propelling the Indian subcontinent to emerge in ancient and medieval times as one of the paramount global economic powerhouses on a par with China. It is with the Kushan and Mughal empires that the “India Road” emerges – a system of routes leading in and out of the region. A striking contrast with the modern period.

Central Asia’s shifting dynamics carry direct implications for India’s strategic ambitions. No longer a peripheral concern, the region now anchors India’s efforts to expand its influence across Eurasia. Through investments in infrastructure, trade, and critical resources, New Delhi aims to position itself as a stabilizing force and alternative to regional powers like China and Russia. Success will depend on India’s ability to navigate rivalries and offer enduring partnerships—reviving historic ties while shaping a new Eurasian order.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

On July 12, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa made a strategic visit to Azerbaijan, signaling a new chapter in bilateral ties with a sharp focus on deepening economic cooperation. Beyond politics and trade, Sharaa emphasized that the relationship between Damascus and Baku is anchored in shared history and culture — underscoring Syria’s strong support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity amid a shifting regional landscape.

Baku and Damascus signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation, with Azerbaijan agreeing to export gas to Syria via Turkey. For Syria, a country grappling with energy shortages, the agreement marks a major success that could significantly improve its domestic situation. Although the timeline for initiating exports remains uncertain, projections suggest that Azerbaijan will supply around 1 billion cubic meters of gas to Syria annually through Turkey.

Azerbaijan’s gas exports could eventually reach beyond Syria. With the rehabilitation of the Turkey-Syria gas pipeline, it is feasible that Azerbaijan — a country with experience exporting to Middle Eastern markets — could send gas to other countries such as Jordan. Specific projects on gas pipelines have already been unveiled. For instance, Azerbaijan has been Israel’s main oil supplier (via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), covering some 40-60% of the country’s oil needs.

More importantly, the energy memorandum with Syria is part of Azerbaijan’s broader strategy to diversify its gas exports. Baku's energy policy, once focused almost exclusively on Europe, is shifting: The Middle East is emerging as a solid buyer of Caspian oil and gas.

Read more at Al Monitor.

In late June, 14 members of the Sacred Struggle organization were detained and accused of attempting to seize power. Among those held were two archbishops of the Apostolic Church, the country’s largest, and an Armenian-Russian billionaire, who had spoken in their support.  

Investigators claimed to have discovered a number of items they said proved the involvement of the detainees in preparing a coup d’état, including weapons and ammunition, drones, firecrackers, smoke bombs, military equipment, and radio communications equipment.  

Foremost among those detained was Archbishop Bagrat (Bagrat Galstanyan), head of the Tavush for the Motherland movement, another name for the Sacred Struggle, which was established in 2024 during a series of protests and marches following an agreement with neighboring Azerbaijan on delimitation of the border. Archbishop Mikael Ajapayan was also arrested. 

Read more on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center, a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Photo by Demirören News Agency

Amid the volatile geopolitical situation in the Middle East and the Black Sea region, Eurasia is witnessing creation of a new trilateral partnership.

As crises grip the Middle East and Black Sea region, the three nations of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan are forging a new strategic alliance.

At a recent summit in Lachin, Azerbaijan, leaders of the three nations attended the opening of a new airport, the third in territories that Azerbaijan regained possession following its 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The three leaders vowed to to make such meetings a regular affair in discussing such issues as transportation, energy, trade, defense, infrastructure and the fight against terrorism.

The trialateral partnership was formally established in 2017 during a meeting between foreign ministers in Baku. At that time, they signed the Baku Declaration to develop partnerships on common issues affecting the South Caucasus, Asia Minor and South Asia. In 2021, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan set up a forum for intergovernmental meetings between the countries’ parliaments. Three years later, the leaders of the three countries met for their first time in Astana, Kazakhstan during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Bilateral visits have also taken place.

A critical element of the trilateral cooperation is mutual defense. Pakistan signed contracts with Turkey to buy Mogul-class corvettes ships built under the auspices of the Turkish Navy’s MİLGEM project. In past years, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have also concluded a series of military agreements.

In 2025, Azerbaijan and Pakistan signed an agreement whereby Baku pledged to buy fighter jets co-produced by Pakistan and China. The $4.2 billion sale means Azerbaijan will increase its number of JF-17 fighter jets from 16 to 40. The Block III planes are said to be more maneuverable than previous versions as well as greater stealth capabilities.

The purchase of these jets underscores the growing ability of the three nations to lessen their military dependence on such uncomfortable actors as Russia. Azerbaijan, for example, has traditionally been dependent on Russia’s  MIG-29 and SU-25 fighter jets. By purchasing JF-17 jets, Baku is telling Moscow that its  military know-how is no longer necessary.

Moreover, “Three Brothers Exercise,” a trilateral joint military drill initiated in 2021, remains an effective tool for mutual military coordination . Most recently, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have supported each other during the Nagorno-Karabakh and Kashmir conflicts such as during votes at the United Nations. During recent tensions between Pakistan and India, Islamabad first reached out to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

On the trade front, Azerbaijan and Pakistan are currently negotiating various economic and infrastructure projects with investments of $2 billion, mostly in the oil sector. Baku and Islamabad have also expressed interest in developing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer network of ship, rail and road for moving freight between Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Europe, India, Iran and Russia.

Indeed, the trilateral partnership has brought new trade and energy corridors. Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, each consider themselves at the center of Eurasia’s shifting energy geopolitics and connectivity. Azerbaijan positions itself as a vital hub on east-west and north-south transit routes. Turkey likewise is a significant commercial and transit node, which connects to Azerbaijan via various pipelines and railways running through Georgia. Then there is Pakistan, which although geographically far from both Turkey and Azerbaijan, it nevertheless is pushing for integration in various cross-Eurasian projects.

Islamabad is actively seeking participation in the INSTC and there are now plans to send containers northwards via Central Asia. Given the improving ties between Pakistan and Iran, the latter might soon serve as another alternative for Islamabad in reaching Russia through Azerbaijan.

To be sure, each country’s approach to the the trilateral alliance differs. Although each operates in different regional neighborhoods, all three feel their geopolitical ambitions are constrained by the current world order. As a result, their strategic alignment is a logical development.

Turkey has pursued an active regional policy and is seeking to open access to Central Asia through Azerbaijan and to South Asia through Pakistan. Islamabad has three long-term goals within the alliance: the development of military-technical cooperation (primarily with Turkey), strengthening energy security (through ties with Azerbaijan), and obtaining political support on the long-standing Kashmir issue. For Azerbaijan, the partnership is about its growing pivot to Asia and extensive diversification of ties including strategic partnerships with China and Vietnam and closer engagement with Central Asian states.

Nevertheless, the balance of power in the trilateral format is tilted towards Turkey. While the combined economic volume of the three countries exceeds $1.5 trillion and a population of around 350 million, Turkey has by far the largest economy. Its central geographic position as well as integration within NATO and other multilateral institutions renders it the primary actor in the trilateral partnership. Moreover, for Ankara this positioning allows the country to project power into the South Asia. Turkey also sees the alignment with Azerbaijan and Pakistan as a counter to India-Armenia-Greece-France partnership. The latter’s scope of military and economic cooperation has grown since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war when Armenia began to seek new partners for military cooperation and Greece has increase its engagement with the countries antagonistic to Turkey.

Overall, the alignment between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan is likely to persist given the nature of security challenges and mutual benefits these countries enjoy. The trilateral format also reflects the growing importance of pacts between middle powers in a shifting global order.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Ever since the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023 the country has pursued a much more diversified foreign policy by simultaneously building closer ties, beyond what it already had with Turkey and Russia, with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan, Israel and has moved to improve relations with the United States, which suffered during the Biden administration due to the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy building issues.

Since the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 2023, the country has adopted a markedly more diversified foreign policy, strengthening existing ties with Turkey and Russia while simultaneously deepening relations with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf states, Pakistan, and Israel, and taking steps to improve strained relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated under the Biden administration due to its prioritization of human rights and democratic governance.

This dynamic has become particularly pronounced in recent months. In April, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Baku to engage in discussions aimed at enhancing bilateral relations. Similarly, in April, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, visited Baku, where she met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov; during the visit, both parties agreed to resume negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.

Read more at the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In mid-May, Russia hosted the Russia-Afghanistan Business Forum as part of the Russia-Islamic World Economic Forum in Kazan. Russian and Taliban officials discussed developing transit routes to Afghanistan via Central Asia and Pakistan, as well as an additional route through Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea. Moscow has placed special emphasis on linking the Trans-Afghan Railway (still under construction) with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), primarily to maintain connectivity to the Indian Ocean (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, May 20).

The event followed a Russian Supreme Court decision in early April that removed the Taliban from the Kremlin’s terrorist list, thus paving the way for official dealings with the de facto ruling government (seeEDM, November 13, 2024; The Moscow Times, April 17). The decision was long in the making, as Russia has steadily increased engagement with Kabul since the militant group regained control in August 2021 (see EDM, July 29, 2024, January 15). Afghanistan’s prime position as a transit node for north-south trade has also led to increased engagement with the People’s Republic of China and Central Asia. Overall, Russia’s decision is driven by a mixture of security and connectivity issues. Moscow hopes not only to maintain the dominance of north-south transit routes but also to ensure that those routes remain secure from possible sabotage.

Read more on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On June 20, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan paid an official visit to Türkiye, his first since taking office, and a first for any Armenian leader since the country’s independence from the Soviet Union.

The visit came against the backdrop of renewed efforts to recalibrate regional diplomacy. Pashinyan was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Ruben Rubinyan, the Vice Speaker of the National Assembly and Armenia’s special representative in the normalisation dialogue with Türkiye.

Though not entirely unprecedented – Pashinyan and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met briefly on the sidelines of international events in Prague (2022), Ankara (2023), and most recently in Albania – this visit stood out for its formality and timing. It was a calculated gesture by Yerevan, signalling readiness for deeper engagement with Ankara at a time when regional dynamics are shifting rapidly.

Read the full article on TRT Global.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Photo via SPA

By Emil Avdaliani and Joseph Epstein

The evolving relationship between the five Central Asian countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—has become an axis of its own in the shifting geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. Geopolitics push them closer, so do untapped trade, investment potential as well as evolving trade routes.

The engagement between the GCC and Central Asia reflects broader realignment in the global order – a shift toward multipolar system. Central Asian states, which have traditionally balanced ties with such powers as Russia, China, Turkey, and the West, now seek new partners, especially since traditional routes through Russia have become less reliable due to the Ukraine war.

The GCC outreach offers alternative avenues for influence and cooperation. For the Arab states, cooperation with Central Asia provides land access to new markets, strengthens ties in a Muslim-majority region bordering Iran, and entrenches their multi-vectoral foreign policy approach, which builds relations with other nations based on pragmatism and not ideology. As a result,  these growing ties are less about creating blocs and more about hedging relations between two regions with similar geopolitical situations and development goals. Summit meetings have emphasized sovereignty, non-interference, and shared objectives such as energy security and stable supply chains.

Economic diversification is key to these expanding ties. Gulf states seek to reduce dependence on oil, while Central Asia offers natural resources and a growing market. Investments align with national visions. Indeed, both Central Asian governments and the Gulf monarchies have embarked on ambitious long-term development strategies aimed at diversifying their economies beyond hydrocarbons and raw materials. Saudi Vision 2030, the UAE Vision 2031, Kuwait Vision 2035, and Oman Vision 2040 all emphasize investment in high-tech industries, renewable energy, tourism, and logistics.

Similarly, Central Asian states also tout their own grand strategic plans. Kazakhstan has “Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy,” Uzbekistan’s multi-sector development plans which envision economic growth, infrastructure and private sector participation. Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s visions for the next decade stress building manufacturing, agriculture, and modern infrastructure.

The alliance between the GCC and Central Asia is a natural fit.  As so-called “middle powers” – not a superpower but one with regional influence — both regions seek a balanced approach between large powers while maintaining their independence. While this has always been Central Asia’s strategy, the GCC has increasingly sought friendlier ties with global powers since its traditional closest ally, the United States, continues to signal that it wants to disengage from the Middle East

As a reflection of the growing alignment in 2023, the GCC and the Central Asian states launched their first summit, which was followed by a second meeting in 2024. A 2025 conference is due to be held later this year.

The summits also show how increasingly important the regions are to each other. But beyond trade and investments there is also a geopolitical hedging that drives the relations. Central Asia, wary of geopolitical dependence on Russia or China, sees the Gulf as a key partner for diversification of foreign policy. Similarly, the GCC balances relationships with Iran, the U.S., and China, and views Central Asia as part of a broader pivot toward Asia. This deepening partnership has not disrupted the existing alliances. Central Asia remains engaged with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is comprised of six post-Soviet states. While the GCC avoids hard power projection in the region, the trend signals a quiet realignment: Central Asia is moving beyond its post-Soviet dependency, and the Gulf is evolving into a diplomatic and investment hub. Both regions are navigating a multipolar world by building diversified, balanced partnerships—including with each other.

Bilateral relations also share a security component. Both regions align on the need to battle against threats from terrorism and extremism. GCC and Central Asian leaders have pledged to increase intelligence-sharing, training, and counterterrorism coordination. Discussions include regular defense meetings and joint responses to extremism and narcotics.

Both regions also aim to diversify trade routes and adjust to shifting connectivity in Eurasia. For example, the Trans Caspian International Trade Route (TCIT) or Middle Corridor, would connect Central Asia to Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea, avoiding chokepoints like the Suez Canal. The GCC could benefit from participating in the expansion of this route. The Gulf countries are also interested in Central Asia because of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which connects Russian ports on the Baltic and the Caspian seas to Iran and India. Though INSTC’s main branch goes through Azerbaijan, the eastern part of the corridor spans Central Asia. Russia also eyes the Gulf region as southermost point in INSTC’s reach.

Moreover, Central Asian leaders favored the idea of Gulf participation in new transport corridors that would shorten the route from the region to the Gulf through the proposed Trans-Afghan Railway, which would link Kabul with its neighboring countries Moreover, projects such the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway or the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan corridor, could likewise lead to opening of the new trade routes for Gulf exporters.

However, connectivity has still proven a major challenge. While the most obvious trade route geographically would cross through Iran or Afghanistan, the regimes in both countries prevent such a road from being reliable. Likewise, the INSTC’s reliance on transport through Russia would cause the region to depend on both Russia and Iran for expanding trade with the Gulf. One potential alternative could be the Middle Corridor. Goods could then travel through Georgia to Turkey and through Turkey to the Gulf via Iraq. Ankara has been a large proponent of the Iraq Development Road or Dry Canal, which would link Iraq’s southern gulf ports to Turkish ports in the Mediterranean and could handle

significant trade volumes.

Trade and Investment Links

Trade volumes – around $4 billion in 2024— remain modest by global standards, but both have been rising rapidly in recent years. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia rank among Central Asia’s largest Arab trading partners, importing local minerals, grain, and cotton, while exporting consumer goods, machinery, and fuel. Notably, Kazakh exports of grain and aluminum have found buyers in Gulf states. However there is still considerable untapped potential in trade and investments.

Connectivity issues have not prevented the increase of foreign direct investment. GCC FDI in Central Asia has approximately tripled over two years. Saudi Arabia’s energy company. ACWA Power and Abu Dhabi’s energy company Masdar and state investment firm Taqa are prominent examples. ACWA Power, known for its large-scale solar and wind plants, has signed multi-billion dollar deals in the region. In Uzbekistan, ACWA will build three utility-scale solar parks (totaling over 1.4 gigawatts) and battery storage systems. In May, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign investor Mubadala and the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) acquired an 875-megawatt combined-cycle gas-fired power plant in Uzbekistan.

Similarly, in Kazakhstan, ACWA partnered on a 1,000 MW wind and battery project valued at over $1.5 billion. Masdar will build 500 MW “Zarafshan” wind farm in Uzbekistan (the region’s largest), and is developing another 1 GW wind installation in the south of Kazakhstan. At the COP29 summit in late 2024, Masdar signed a $1.4 billion deal to build a wind farm in Kazakhstan’s Jambyl region.

Agriculture and food security have also become subjects of cooperation. The Gulf states import the vast majority of their food, and Central Asian want to turn into a major exporter of food and water to the GCC. For instance, Kazakhstan co-sponsored the international “One Water Summit” in Riyadh in 2024, reflecting a shared concern over water scarcity and a possibility for technology transfer (such as Saudi desert agriculture techniques) to Central Asian contexts. In this way, food and water security link the regions as complementary strands of the emerging partnership.

Central Asia’s fast-growing tech sectors are also drawing Gulf attention.

Uzbekistan has nurtured an IT export industry, and in 2025 Qatar’s state investment promotion agency signed a digital transformation pact with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Digital Technologies. This agreement, signed at a tech summit in Doha, aims to create joint projects, startup funding and skills programs in fields like AI, data centers, and cloud services. In December 2024, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan reached a bilateral partnership covering 5G, digital infrastructure, and tech entrepreneurship, encouraging Saudi tech firms to establish regional offices in Central Asia. These pacts reflect a broader trend of digital diplomacy: Central Asian countries see the Gulf markets as a new customer base and investor pool for their nascent IT industries, while Gulf states invest in digital skills and platforms that fit their diversification agendas.

Deepening Ties, Lingering Hurdles

The upcoming 2025 GCC summit in the Uzbekistan city of Samarkand and ongoing ministerial and business council meetings will be key in watching how expansive the relations between the two regions will become. Establishment of a free trade zone would mark a qualitatively new period

To be sure, growing challenges persist. Not all Central Asian countries are benefitting equally from recent changes —Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan lead in attracting Gulf deals, while others less so. Economic growth matters for the GCC. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are also most populous and therefore have bigger markets  attractive to investors. Also, geography slows down the pace of economic cooperation. The countries lying in between Central Asia and the Gulf – namely Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan – are difficult to traverse due to poor infrastructure, lack of security and coordination over border controls. And last but not least, though the Central Asian state are diversifying their foreign policy portfolios, Russia and China remain dominant powers in the region. This spans security and trade/investment aspects and should the GCC become more active in the region, the Arab countries may face stiffer resistance from the traditional great powers.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Amid the ongoing US-Iran negotiations around Tehran’s nuclear program, China wants in on influencing the process to its benefit. Close commercial and energy ties with Iran and the Arab states are the drivers of Beijing’s relations with the region.

China is not satisfied that the current US approach to Iran is rooted in unilateralism that sidelines Beijing unlike President Barack Obama’s multilateral strategy that ended in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that sought to limit Iran’s enrichment levels in exchange for lifting economic sanctions.

During a recent summit, China hosted Russian and Iranian diplomats to discuss the nuclear issue and criticize Washington’s policy of maximum pressure and threats to bomb Tehran’s nuclear sites.

Beijing fears that a maximum pressure campaign as the Islamic Republic is at its weakest position in decades. The so-called Axis of Resistance – a sprawling network of non-state actors from Lebanon and Iraq to Syria and Yemen, has been severely weakened since the start of the war in Gaza. The Israeli military has decimated Hezbollah, nearly defeated Hamas and the Yemeni Houthis have been targeted in intermittent aerial campaigns by both Israel and the United States. The fall of the Assad dynasty has been another key blow to the axis.

The Chinese worry that the Islamic Republic’s weakening influence in the Middle East could push Tehran into advancing its nuclear program, which would likely incur direct US/Israeli military strikes further undermining its economy and the overall stability of the country’s political system.

Excessive pressure on Iran’s nuclear program would also undermine Beijing’s ability to shape the Middle East according to its 2022 Global Security Initiative – a post-liberal global vision aimed at increasing China’s Global Influence.

This initiative facilitated Beijing’s 2023 meaningful reconciliation between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia after decades of confrontations over regional hegemony. This was a major blow to US influence in the Gulf region.

Moreover, though the Trump administration has mostly pursued a unilateral approach in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, Washington has reached out to Russia to help navigate the intricacies of the negotiations process. Such policy makes sense given Moscow’s ever-expanding relations with Tehran following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. But it sidelines China as a potential negotiator.

And it’s not the first time. Beijing has periodically been sidelined under both former US President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump. Current negotiations around ending the war in Ukraine are either directly held between the US and Russia or between Kyiv and Moscow through mediation efforts by Turkey and the Gulf states. China has not been included on cease-fire and peace efforts on the war in Gaza. Beijing’s peace proposals on ending the war in Ukraine and in Gaza have been dismissed by the US and its allies.

Iran’s weakening would also impact China’s business with the Islamic Republic. To be sure, bilateral trade has lagged significantly behind stated goals and Chinese investments have not materialized despite the bilateral 25-year cooperation agreement between the two nations signed in 2021. Yet, it has been China buying heavily discounted Iranian oil that has kept the Iranian economy afloat. Therefore, when the US announced the maximum pressure campaign and threatened to sanction whoever bought Iranian oil this served as a powerful warning for Beijing.

Sanctioning Iran’s oil trade with China has proved to be extremely difficult as tanker fleets are increasingly able to find loopholes to avoid penalties. Under the Biden administration, some aspects of the sanctions enforcement regime was – likely intentionally — unenforced to pave the way for an understanding with Iran. The Trump administration has tried to correct the situation through maximum pressure campaign. So far, attempts have been unsuccessful and oil trade between Iran and China has grown.

Beijing is also concerned over Iran’s internal stability. Wide scale protests in the Islamic Republic have become more frequent and more robust. Coupled with strong Western sanctions, there is always the chance the crumpling of the very foundation of the Iranian state.

These geopolitical challenges pushed China to hold the April trilateral summit with Russia and Iran that explicitly stated displeasure with the US position on the nuclear issue.

Indeed, while Beijing supports Iran’s nuclear civilian program it remains concerned over nuclear proliferation. For Beijing, a nuclear Iran would likely set off an arms race in the Middle East, with states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt all vying to attain nuclear capabilities. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, Beijing “values Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons” and “appreciates Iran’s diplomatic efforts.”

This explains why the Chinese side prefers a new nuclear agreement akin to the one reached under Obama, which would allow the Iranian economy to shake off the heavy burden of sanctions. Lifting sanctions also means Chinese investments would enter the country facilitating Iran’s political stability. Yet, this comes with a major caveat such as a new agreement must also involve the Chinese side as a testament to the shifting global balance of power.

The resurrection of the 2015 JCPOA would not make sense for Beijing as the mechanisms underpinning the agreement back then are no longer relevant today.

In Beijing’s view, the US no longer possesses enough power to dominate Iran’s nuclear issue. In other words, the

negotiations should be based on a multilateral basis. Iran and Russia too seem to align with this vision. Indeed, perhaps it was this sentiment that was reflected in an April 7 announcement by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a second round of trilateral consultations with the Chinese and Russian sides.

To date, the Chinese have been openly against any US-led military solution to Iran’s nuclear program. Surprisingly, Washington and Beijing could still find some common ground. In fact, parts of the US political establishment prefer a negotiated solution to the problem and it could serve as a point for alignment between China and the US around Iran. Even U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that allowing Iran to have a civil nuclear energy program without enrichment capabilities could be an option.

Surely, even if Iran and the US reach a consensus without Beijing’s active involvement, the latter would still support the progress. Faced with a fait accompli, Beijing is expected to hail it as a positive development as it would open the door to greater Chinese economic involvement in Iran and the wider region. It will also decrease geopolitical pressure on China when it comes to balancing its relations between Iran and the Arab states – both sides have feared that Beijing might move closer to either side.

Looking Ahead

For China, maintaining close ties with Iran would now be more important given the US government’s push for expanding bilateral relations with the Gulf states. Trump’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE will lead to closer ties with these countries and Beijing cannot stay on the sidelines. It will attempt to get closer to the Gulf states while also emphasizing  relations with the Islamic Republic in line with its traditional approach to balanced relations in the region.

China’s support for the Islamic Republic will however fall within the existing constraints in which the country has historically operated in the Middle East. Beijing does not seek formal alliances in the region since it is seen as a relic from the age of liberal internationalism and the West’s predominant position globally. This means that China will mostly pursue engagement with the Middle East via greater trade levels especially through oil purchases.

China will also likely abstain from efforts to seriously challenge the US in the region. The latter retains an unparalleled military power and China will continue to benefit from the indirect American naval security provisions. Equidistance in relations with the various countries of the Middle East will remain a defining feature of China’s engagement.

Ultimately, China’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program is driven less by ideology and more by strategic calculation. Beijing wants to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran and a heavily weakened Iran that would threaten energy supplies and destabilize its growing economic footprint across the Middle East. But it also seeks recognition as an important actor in shaping outcomes on major global security issues — a role the current U.S.-led unilateral strategy has largely denied it. Ideally, Beijing seeks a seat at the negotiating table — not just to protect its trade with Iran, but to assert a new vision of multipolar diplomacy that reflects its rising global ambitions.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.