Turan Research Center

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Tajikistan on October 9. Their meeting, after many months of outright hostility, was interpreted by many as a signal of rapprochement, and with some reason. 

Distrust will nevertheless persist — Azerbaijan considers itself a significant regional power better off when it is free of the Kremlin’s policy shackles. And there’s not much Russia can do about it. 

The talks centered on what Putin described as the “most sensitive issue” — the December 2024 shooting down by a Russian missile battery of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190, with the deaths of 38 people. Putin expressed condolences and, in effect, issued an apology by belatedly accepting that the cause of the crash was indeed the Russian military. 

The Russian president has argued that the investigation into the tragedy had concluded, that the incident was triggered by the presence of three Ukrainian drones over Russian territory at the time, and that the missiles did not directly hit the aircraft, but detonated roughly 10 meters (about 30ft) away. He did not mention that this is precisely the aim of many anti-aircraft missiles, and more than enough to inflict catastrophic damage. 

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

BACKGROUND: Over the past two months, Azerbaijan’s relations with both Russia and the U.S. have undergone significant changes, reflecting Baku’s continued commitment to maintaining balance in its foreign policy.
On October 9, Vladimir Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. During the meeting, Putin addressed what he called the “most sensitive issue,” the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 jet, caused by a Russian air defense missile. He expressed his condolences and effectively issued an apology. Putin stated that the investigation into the crash had concluded and that the causes of the tragedy had been identified. He attributed the incident to three Ukrainian drones allegedly flying over Russian territory at the time and mentioned technical malfunctions in Russia’s air defense system, which launched two missiles that did not directly strike the plane but exploded about ten meters away.
Between the downing of the Azerbaijani airliner and the meeting in Dushanbe, relations grew even more strained following the arrest of members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg in June 2025. Russian security forces detained a group of Azerbaijani nationals in connection with murders committed in the early 2000s, resulting in the deaths of two suspects during the operation. In response, Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures, arresting eight Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime. The Russian House in Baku was subsequently closed, all Russia-related cultural events were cancelled, and Azerbaijani authorities detained both the director and the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan.

Read the full article on the Caucasus and Central Asia Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

As Moscow reorients its commercial and political ties away from the West toward the Global South, its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have grown significantly.

Over the past few months, Russia has expanded its engagement with the oil- and gas-rich Arab nations of the GCC.

This trend demonstrates the resilience of Russia’s influence across the Middle East, especially in the face of Moscow losing its major ally, the Assad dynasty in Syria, following the fall of Baath regime in December 2024.
Then there’s the weakening of Iran, exacerbated by its confrontations with Israel and the United States, which has further complicated Moscow’s regional position.

Russia’s closer ties with the GCC are evident in its deepening relations with Oman. In April, the two countries signed an agreement to establish a visa-free programme.

The meeting in Moscow also marked the first-ever talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, a historic milestone in the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Read the full article on TRT World.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Ankara plans to attract funds for the Eastern Türkiye Railway Infrastructure Development Project (ETMIC), which would renovate and electrify the Divrigi–Kars–Georgian border railway line. This was outlined in a document called “Request for Participation in Early Market Engagement for Procurement of: Eastern Türkiye Middle Corridor Railway Development Project (ETMIC) and Istanbul North Rail Crossing Project (INRAIL),” published by the Turkish Government and World Bank on September 25 (Government of Türkiye, September 25). The estimated cost of the ETMIC, including value-added tax (VAT), is $1.615 billion (BPN, October 10). The ETMIC would also construct bridges, tunnels, culverts, and retaining walls, and expand stations. The modern traffic management system includes substations, 154-kilovolt transmission lines, signaling and telecommunications equipment, a centralized traffic control system (CTC), and a 320-kilometer-long (199-mile-long) distributed acoustic monitoring system (DAS). The project will contribute to increased rail freight traffic, more active domestic passenger train traffic, and the economic development of the eastern parts of Türkiye (Report.az, October 4). Türkiye aims to position itself as a leading architect of connectivity in the region by implementing new regional projects.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced plans to build a new railway to the border with Georgia on January 5. The Samsun–Trabzon–Sarpi high-speed train line will provide rail transportation between the Turkish capital of Ankara, the Black Sea region, and Georgia (Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications; 1tv.ge, January 5). The new railway will connect the Turkish cities of Ordu, Giresun, Trabzon, Rize, and Artvin via a line starting in Samsun. The project is part of the Ankara–Kırıkkale–Çorum–Samsun high-speed line, which will facilitate traffic from the heart of the Anatolian peninsula to the Black Sea (Railmarket, June 19). 

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria last year initially seemed to be a huge blow to Russia, stripping it of a long-time ally and undermining the link between Russia and the African continent, where Russian mercenaries have been actively engaged in the economic and security spheres.

Nine months after Islamist rebels overthrew the Assad dynasty, however, Russian relations with Syria are on an apparent road to recovery. By skillfully using differences among regional actors as well as its status as Syria’s chief weapons supplier, Russia has managed to reconstitute parts of its former influence, including retaining access to three military bases.

Moscow’s most important influence during its decades-long alliance with the Assad regime may be even more important to Syria now — serving as a deterrent or at least a break on Israeli military activities.

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Read the full article on the Stimson Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On August 8 in Washington D.C., Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a landmark arrangement. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration on Future Relations, pledging to “chart a bright future not bound by past conflict, consistent with the UN Charter.” The historic document stated that the two countries no longer regard each other as enemies. A core component of the Washington deal is the TRIPP, Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which envisions a transit and trade corridor through Armenia’s southern territory to link Azerbaijan proper with the Nakhchivan enclave. The United States is granted a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of the transit corridor across Armenian territory.  

For Turkey, the TRIPP offers an opportunity to diversify its commercial routes across the South Caucasus. Until now, Turkey enjoyed only one transit route to the Caspian Sea. The corridor through Georgia built in the 1990s, expanded in the 2000s and consisting of roads, railways and pipelines has been an important factor in strengthening Ankara’s relations with Tbilisi. The Georgia route has boomed since February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and the north Eurasian route linking China with the EU became less secure. As a viable alternative, the Middle Corridor running from Turkey and Georgia to Central Asia has become more attractive for global transport companies and actors such as the EU and China.

Yet reliance on one route is fraught with risks. The fickle geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus calls for developing alternatives and the route through Armenia’s southern territory is attractive to Ankara and Baku. Indeed, right after the TRIPP announcement, the Turkish side unveiled the start of construction of the Kars-Iğdır-Aralyk-Dilucu railway line, which will become a key element of the corridor. The project’s cost is up to €2.4 billion and is set to serve as yet another link for China-EU trade. More importantly, it will connect Turkey with the Central Asian market and sideline its competitors in the South Caucasus – Russia and Iran.

Read the full article on Turkey Analyst at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The Azerbaijan-UAE strategic partnership agreement aligns with Baku's broader outreach to the Gulf region and reinforces its long-standing multi-alignment policy. More importantly, it signals a shifting geopolitical landscape – one in which Russia's traditional dominance in the South Caucasus is waning, while the region itself becomes increasingly connected with the Middle East.

Last month, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (known as MBZ), President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), undertook an official visit to Azerbaijan, making a significant moment in the deepening relationship between the two nations. The high-level meeting was held in the city of Shusha in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. The visit resulted in the signing of 14 bilateral agreements, poised to inject fresh momentum into an already expanding strategic partnership.

Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and the UAE were first established in 1992. But President Ilham Aliyev’s first official visit to the UAE in 2006 marked a turning point in bilateral relations, ushering in a new era of cooperation. Since then, Aliyev has made six more visits to the UAE, with reciprocal high-level exchanges further solidifying ties. In 2024, MBZ became the first UAE leader to visit Azerbaijan. This momentum between the two nations culminated in July 2025, when the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed during Aliyev’s visit to the UAE – an accord that laid the foundation for a new phase of economic and strategic collaboration. The agreement aims at boosting bilateral trade which still largely remains untapped.

A testament to the burgeoning bilateral partnership is the scale of mutual investment. Between 1995 and 2024 ,the UAE infused $3.4 billion in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijani investments in the UAE reached $1.1 billion. A major driver for this expansion was the establishment in late 2023 of a $1 billion Joint Investment Fund between the Azerbaijan Investment Holding and the Abu Dhabi Investment Holding Company. The Azerbaijan Trade Representative Office was established in Dubai in 2017, followed by the opening of the Azerbaijan Trade House in 2019. The latter plays a key role in promoting the “Made in Azerbaijan” brand across the UAE and the broader Persian Gulf region. Currently, more than 350 commercial enterprises with UAE capital are registered in Azerbaijan.

Among the most prominent investments is the UAE’s national oil company, ADNOC, which acquired a 30% stake in Azerbaijan’s Absheron gas field for an unknown amount. Meanwhile, momentum is building in the green energy sector. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power is currently developing a $300 million wind farm in Azerbaijan while Abu Dhabi-backed projects such as the Garadagh Solar Power Plant are helping Baku accelerate its transition toward renewable energy. During the latest high-level visit, both sides signed multiple Memoranda of Understanding aimed at exploring joint opportunities in renewable and clean energy projects. Moreover, a $1 billion joint venture between Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and Azerbaijan Investment Holding further signals a deepening commitment to long-term economic collaboration.

Despite the visible expansion of diplomatic and strategic ties between Azerbaijan and the UAE, bilateral trade still lags behind outwardly developing ties. In 2024 trade reached just $96.8 million – a sharp decline from $1.6 billion the previous year, signaling a major drop in commercial activity. Geography remains a major impediment, compounded by the heavily sanctioned status of Iran which under ideal circumstances would serve as a vital transit hub between the two nations.

However, this dynamic may be poised for change.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – linking Russia’s heartland with Iran and the Indian Ocean – offers both the UAE and Azerbaijan a pathway to a more efficient north-south connectivity. Indeed, the INSTC’s major branch passes through Azerbaijan, and the UAE has recently expanded its ties with Russia, positioning itself to benefit from the corridor’s expansion.  

Yet for the INSTC to fulfill its full potential, sustained investment and robust multilateral cooperation will be essential. Streamlining customs procedures, aligning technical standards, and eliminating logistical bottlenecks must become shared priorities among participating countries. If these challenges are addressed, the INSTC could evolve into a fully optimized, major commercial route for Eurasian commerce. Historical precedent also favors its success; in ancient and medieval times, a similar route along the western Caspian Sea linked the Eurasian steppes with the Middle East.

The UAE president’s recent visit to Azerbaijan reflects Abu-Dhabi’s growing interest in the shifting connectivity landscape of the South Caucasus and the wider Black Sea region. As global trade routes shift in the wake of the war in Ukraine, the importance of alternative transit corridors has become increasingly urgent. The once-dominant northern route through Russia has lost viability, prompting China and the European Union to explore options through the South Caucasus. While the Middle Corridor -- stretching from Turkey across  he Caspian Sea to Central Asia -- may be geographically distant from the UAE, its emerging economic potential is enticing enough to attract Emirati investment. Notably, the UAE president’s mid-September visit to Georgia -- where an Emirati company is building a dry port near Tbilisi – underscores Abu Dhabi’s strategic understanding of the expanding East-West connectivity across the region.

Multi-Alignment Strategy

Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has long been defined by its pursuit of multi-vector diplomacy, and in recent years, a distinct pivot toward the Middle East has become increasingly evident. Since 1990s, Baku has actively cultivated simultaneous relationships across geopolitical divides -- maintaining strong ties with Russia and Turkey, while also deepening commercial and energy partnerships with Western countries. Azerbaijan’s strategic geography, particularly its role alongside Georgia as a key transit link between Central Asia and the EU, has further amplified its relevance on the global stage.

Building on decades of regional engagement, Azerbaijan has recently expanded its partnerships to include the Arab world. In addition to the growing relationship with the UAE, dynamic cooperation is now unfolding with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), spanning such sectors as energy, investment, logistics, and humanitarian affairs. For the GCC – particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia -- enhanced economic and political engagement with Azerbaijan aligns with their broader ambitions to diversify investments and assert long-term influence over the evolving connectivity landscape that links Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

But a deeper geopolitical shift may also be underway – one that helps explain the growing convergence between Azerbaijan and the UAE: the South Caucasus’ gradual shift toward the Middle East. Historically, the formidable Caucasus Mountain range divided the region into northern and southern spheres, with the southern part naturally gravitating toward commercial, political and cultural ties with the Middle East. This pattern was evident throughout ancient and medieval times. However, the rise of the Russian Empire in the 19th century disrupted this dynamic. After defeating the Persian and Ottoman empires, Russia imposed a new order, effectively sealing off the Caucasus from the Middle East and asserting exclusive influence over the region.

That dominance now appears tenuous. Geography, once again, is dictating its logic, pulling the South Caucasus back into the orbit of the Middle East. Russia, long accustomed to near monopoly influence in the region, is facing strained relations not only with Azerbaijan but also with Armenia, traditionally one of its closest allies. This diminution of Russian influence in the South Caucasus is compounded by a broader trend that Moscow itself has championed: the emergence of a multipolar world.

In this new landscape Moscow is increasingly no longer the major actor in South Caucasus affairs, but one among several – including the UAE, Turkey, the US, China and the EU – each vying for strategic footholds in a region whose connectivity and relevance are rapidly expanding.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Ever since the war in Ukraine began, Russia and Iran have expanded their military and political cooperation, which culminated in the signing of a major bilateral agreement that the two inked earlier this year.[i] The development of their relations, however, always stopped short of achieving a full-scale alliance. Neither side has provided ironclad commitments on mutual defence and such a clause was notably absent from the 2025 comprehensive agreement as well. Moreover, the supply of certain critical air-defence systems (such as the S-400), modern fighter jets (like the Su-35), and other equipment has not materialized, indicating that there are still limits to Moscow–Tehran cooperation.

There were no expectations that Moscow would come to Tehran’s help in the latter’s latest round of confrontation with Israel in June, during which Israeli and U.S. forces bombed Iran’s nuclear and aerial defence sites across the country. Iranian politicians have nevertheless voiced their concern about the state of Russia–Iran ties. This is in large part due to Tehran’s suspicions of Moscow in the wake of US-Russia talks, which they expect will not only concern Ukraine but also cover the Iranian issue in a series of tit-for-tat exchanges.[ii] The fear of this remains a major concern for the Iranian leadership, further nurturing the already present distrust between Tehran and Moscow.

Read the full article on Manara Magazine.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

BACKGROUND: On July 18, the European Union and Tajikistan initialed the EPCA. This accord will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that has been in place since 2010, establishing a legal framework to advance reforms in Tajikistan. The EPCA corresponds closely with the EU’s strategic priorities in Central Asia, which call for a more reinvigorated approach to the strategically significant region. It also seeks to establish a basis for future relations, reflecting emerging economic and political conditions on the ground. Brussels and Dushanbe foresee cooperation in trade as well as in human rights, sustainable development, education, energy, and related areas.
Similarly, in July the two parties discussed the present state of cooperation and prospects for launching new joint projects in mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and the food industry. Additional areas include the mining sector, with particular focus on the extraction and processing of critical raw materials. Officials from Tajikistan and the EU also considered Dushanbe’s potential participation in the EU Global Gateway initiative, designed to promote sustainable infrastructure and reinforce strategic linkages across Eurasia.

The EPCA builds upon already established cooperation across multiple sectors. For example, during the past five years, 500 Tajik students have studied in Europe through EU funding. The Union has financed projects in the healthcare sector and promotes digital transformation, including initiatives to expand digital access via satellite technology. The EU also contributes to the development and modernization of green energy production in Tajikistan. With European support, the Nurek, Sebzor, and Kayrakkum hydroelectric power station projects are under implementation, and Brussels is assisting the establishment of infrastructure to transmit electricity to South Asia through the CASA-1000 transmission line.

Read the full article on the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.
Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On August 19, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian paid a visit to Belarus, where he met with his counterpart, Alyaksandr Lukashenka (President of Iran, August 19). The visit was originally scheduled for early June, but due to the confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv, it was postponed until August. The two countries signed 12 cooperation documents, pledging greater cooperation in areas such as politics, tourism, media, investment, and special economic and industrial zones (Tehran Times, August 20). Additionally, the two presidents signed a joint statement to deepen the development of relations between Belarus and Iran. The two sides also expressed satisfaction with the dynamic development of bilateral cooperation, as reflected in the increased frequency of high-level visits in recent years. More importantly, the Iranian president also suggested that the Islamic Republic of Iran could consider developing a strategic partnership model with Belarus (President of Iran, August 20).

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The establishment of silk production and research stations in the 19th century Europe

responded to the needs that emerged on the continent during that time. The lack of scientific study

of silk production became evident as early as the 1740-1760s when silkworms were affected by an

epizootic disease, and the measures taken proved insufficient. The necessity arose to create a solid

scientific foundation for silk production and its research, for which special stations were

established. Germans, Austrians, and Italians were the first among European countries to set up

sericulture stations. These institutions were essential not only for studying existing problems in

sericulture but also to address the requirements for the future development of this field.

The objectives of a sericulture station usually were to determine the conditions that would

promote the development of sericulture in various geographical and climatic environments;

furthermore, to develop specific methods for achieving the first goal, to study different diseases,

to research new silkworm breeds through experiments, and in the end to provide necessary

recommendations. The ultimate goal was to implement innovations in agriculture in order to raise

general economic level. In Europe sericulture stations were often created based on demands

presented by local commercial circles, which were interested in raising their countries’ economic

productivity. In other words, as will be described below, one of the main purposes of the stations

was to disseminate scientific knowledge about sericulture. Moreover, the stations also aimed at the

implementation of acquired knowledge in agriculture, particularly through providing information

to the population on how to rear silkworms.

Read the full article on the State Silk Museum.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center.

China’s relationship with the South Caucasus is entering a new phase, defined by a greater economic engagement, expanding trade, and a steady elevation of political partnerships with the three regional countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The region, once peripheral to Beijing’s Eurasian strategy or its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has now become more vital amid shifting connectivity across the continent and heightened great power competition.

Central to this shift is the growing importance of the so-called Middle Corridor—a trans-Eurasian trade route spanning from the Black Sea to Central Asia—that has gained momentum amid the wars and general instability in Ukraine and the Middle East. When Beijing unveiled the BRI more than a decade ago, the South Caucasus barely figured in its plans. At the time, the Russian route—backed by Soviet-era infrastructure and political reliability—offered a more straightforward path for China towards the European Union (EU).

Read the full article on the Observer Research Foundation.

Among the agreements signed in August when the U.S. president hosted the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington was the “Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). Intended to link Azerbaijan proper with its ethnic enclave of Nakhchivan via southern Armenia, the TRIPP has the potential of transforming security and connectivity in the South Caucasus and beyond.

Iran regards the TRIPP negatively, fearing it will jeopardize its land border with Armenia, a long-time ally. But Tehran may not be able to do much to prevent its realization due to other geopolitical constraints and fear of further antagonizing Washington.

In the wake of the August summit, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs talkedof “the negative consequences of any form of foreign intervention, especially near shared borders.”

Read the full article on the Stimson Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Oman and Russia’s bilateral relations have grown significantly, driven by socioeconomic development in Oman and wider geopolitics in the Middle East.

In 2023, Russian and Omani officials exchanged several visits. In July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made his first visit to Muscat since 2016. In September, a Russian delegation of law enforcement agency representatives, the Rosatom State Corporation, and the central bank visited Oman. Just three months later, the Omani minister of culture, sports, and youth, Crown Prince Sayyid Theyazin bin Haitham al-Said, traveled to Moscow and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The two countries have since worked to strengthen economic ties. In 2023, Oman’s foreign minister said the country was working with Russia on reaching a mutual investment promotion agreement. Oman also participated as an honorary guest at the 2024 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and at the 2024 international economic forum “Russia – Islamic World: KazanForum.” In October 2024, Muscat hosted the business mission “Made in Russia,” with 39 Russian companies from a range of sectors. Trade ties have grown drastically: In 2010 trade turnover between the countries was $12 million and exceeded $400 million by 2023. However, the trade balance has tilted in favor of Russia – in 2022, Russia exported $246.8 million in goods to Oman and imported only $4 million.

Read the full article on the Arab Gulf States Institute.

It has been a long, long time since relations between the South Caucasian nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been so good. The signing of several deals in the White House on August 8 has delivered that, confounded Russia, which breezily describes this as its backyard, and brought prizes to the US, which wins has a direct stake in the region. 

It’s all very unusual. As a result of the agreement, the United States now has a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of a potentially lucrative transit corridor. The project — branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP — uses Armenian land that will be subleased by the US to a consortium tasked with its construction and management, which aims to link Turkey in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east, offering a shorter route than the traditional through Georgia.  

Read more at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Amid attacks by Israel and the United States, Iran has unveiled a new transcontinental trade route to China in line with one of the central pillars of Iranian foreign policy: to position Iran at the center of shifting and growing Eurasian connectivity.

Traditionally, the Persian Gulf has been critical to Iranian trade. The more recent push to develop land routes to Central Asia aims to diversify commercial links and boost cooperation with a booming area of economic growth.

These land routes have become increasingly important as the region redefines itself as a major node in transcontinental trade, between Russia and Afghanistan, as well as between China and the European Union. Major powers have all established separate summit formats with the five Central Asian states and seek trade and investment opportunities with them. In the past, Central Asia was not at the epicenter of Iran’s foreign policy, yet this might be changing given the region’s growing economic and transit potential.

Read more at the Stimson Center.

The military campaign by the United States and Israel against Iran, which ended in U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, puts Russia in an uncomfortable geopolitical position. Moscow has already endured the loss of one of its most strategically vital clients with the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Partnered with a weakened Iran, Moscow could face a far greater challenge to its ability to influence developments in the Middle East.

Read the full article on the Gulf International Forum.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In late June, as part of a police raid in Yekaterinburg, Russian security forces arrested a dozen ethnic Azerbaijanis, two of whom died in custody, with a subsequent autopsy reportedly showing signs they had been beaten. To register the seriousness with which it viewed the incident, the government of Azerbaijan arrested Russian nationals it said were illegally living and working in Baku, while also rolling back all Russia-related cultural activities and downgrading interparliamentary work. Both sides subsequently summoned their ambassadors to file official protests.

Far from being an isolated incident, the diplomatic spat between Moscow and Baku reflects a broader shift in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, where Russia’s position is in flux. Long considered one of the core spaces of Moscow’s geopolitical sphere of influence and an anchor of its claim to great power status, the region is now being increasingly contested by other actors. From China, the European Union and the U.S., to Turkey, Iran and even the wealthy Gulf states, external powers are playing a greater economic and geopolitical role in the South Caucasus.

Read the full article on World Politics Review.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Given the intensity of the recent military confrontation between Iran and Israel, Tehran's influence in the South Caucasus could experience fundamental changes. The short war between the Islamic Republic and Israel/United States has underscored the shifting balance of power in the Middle East, with Israel now emerging as the dominant military force in the region. The relative weakening of Iranian power is set to impact its neighbors, and the South Caucasus region has been particularly vulnerable to geopolitical reverberations from instability in the Middle East.

One of the possible repercussions is the impact on the ongoing negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given the fragile nature of the talks and Baku’s far more powerful position vis-à-vis Armenia, Iran’s more retrenched posture could further embolden Azerbaijan regarding the opening of the Zangezur corridor, a move opposed by the Armenian side. For the moment, however, there is no evident shift in Azerbaijan’s posture indicating that it might encroach on Armenia’s territory. Baku is pragmatic and understands that such a move would kill the ongoing peace process with Yerevan. Furthermore, a forceful solution to the Zangezur corridor issue would destroy the good relations Baku has cultivated with Tehran, which is highly interested in preserving the existing balance of power in the South Caucasus.

Read more on Caucasus Watch.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Central Asia has emerged as an increasingly strategic priority in India’s foreign policy. Driven by regional realignments and shifting trade agreements across Eurasia, New Delhi is intensifying its engagement with the region. At the same time, the potential of bilateral cooperation remains constrained by persistent geographical hurdles, limited infrastructure, and overlapping spheres of influence, particularly those of China and Russia.

India no longer perceives Central Asia as a peripheral  concern but views it  as a pivotal space to advance its Act East and Connect Central Asia policies. The region presents a unique opportunity for India to project its economic footprint and counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative. From the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to investments in the Iranian port of Chabahar, India is working to establish alternative linkages that enhance its strategic autonomy and diversify regional access.

Central Asia’s evolving role as a transit hub – linking Chinese markets to Europe and Russian networks to South Asia – further amplifies its relevance. In 2016, India joined the Ashgabat Agreement for Transport Links Development, which simplifies the transportation of goods between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. In the same period, India also signed the Trilateral Transit Agreement with Iran and Afghanistan that sought to build the Chabahar port in Iran. In 2024, India and Iran finalized a 10-year agreement to further develop the port. From the Indian perspective, the Chabahar project offers an alternative to bypass Pakistan and reach Central Asia via Afghanistan, which allows the latter to integrate into regional infrastructure.

The Chabahar project is not the only one that India has promoted linking connectivity with Central Asia.

New Delhi renewed its interest in the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project, a critical initiative aimed at deepening regional energy cooperation. The pipeline’s construction within Turkmenistan was completed in 2024, and has now been extended southward through Afghanistan’s Herat province. Once operational, the TAPI pipeline will transport natural gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field through Afghanistan and Pakistan, ultimately reaching India.

The TAPI project promises not only enhanced access to Central Asia’s rich hydrocarbon reserves but also a significant boost to India’s geopolitical footprint in the region. The emphasis on connectivity was evident during the June meeting in New Delhi between the foreign ministers of India and the five Central Asian countries. Discussions focused on civilizational and cultural ties, as well as strengthening trade, investment and logistics partnerships – including collaboration under the International North South Transport Corridor, a 7,200-kilomter trade route that connects India, Iran, Russia, Europe and Central Asia through a combination of sea, rail and road networks.

The gathering marked a diplomatic milestone, occurring after a three-year hiatus, and underscored New Delhi’s awareness of intensifying its strategic competition in Central Asia. It also built on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s landmark 2015 tour of all Central Asian countries, reaffirming India’s long-term commitment to regional engagement.

Beyond traditional connectivity and energy cooperations, several emerging areas offer promising bilateral ties between India and Central Asia. Green energy collaboration is gaining traction, as both regions seek sustainable solutions amid climate challenges. Joint initiatives in glacier preservation -- vital to the region’s water security -- also underscore the growing importance of environmental projects.

Medical tourism continues to grow steadily, with India positioning itself as a regional healthcare hub. India also is advancing financial and digital integration, focusing on the use of national currencies, digital payment systems and fintech innovation. Platforms such as United Payments Interface, Aadhaar and DigiLocker present models for secure transactions, digital identity management and data portability – areas where Central Asian countries are increasingly receptive to Indian expertise. Cooperation in financial services, healthcare and pharmaceuticals – sectors where Central Asia remains a key export destination for India – continues to be a strategic priority for New Delhi. These areas not only bolster commercial ties but also support India’s broader ambition to integrate itself more deeply into the region’s socioeconomic development.

At the same time, Central Asia is increasingly viewed by India as a crucial source of strategic resources. With India currently dependent on imports for nearly 80% of its supply of critical minerals, tapping into the region’s growing reserves of rare earth elements (REEs) has become essential. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have recently showcased their potential to exports REEs, prompting India to engage more proactively as global powers like the United States, European Union and China intensify competition over access to these vital Central Asian resources.

By strengthening its foothold in this emerging market, India seeks not only to diversify supply chains, but also to reduce its strategic vulnerability to China, which currently dominates nearly 60% of the global REEs market. Recognizing this opportunity, India proposed to create a "Regional Alliance on Critical Minerals" with Central Asian countries in 2024 order  the formation of a regional alliance on critical minerals in 2024, aimed at fostering joint geological exploration and establishing shared processing facilities in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

To be sure, India’s growing engagement with Central Asia is not driven solely by economic interests – but by the region’s rising geopolitical significance in global affairs. All major powers, including the U.S., EU, China and Russia, have developed distinct ties with the five Central Asian nations.

India, recognizing such a competitive landscape, is following suit, pursuing a dual-track approach: advancing multilateral cooperation through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and India-Central Asia Dialogue, while also deepening bilateral ties with individual countries. Among these nations, Kazakhstan stands out as a key trade partner. Its extensive hydrocarbon reserves have long drawn India’s interest, prompting collaborations such as ONGC Videsh LTD’s acquisition of stakes in the Kazakh oil fields of Alibekmola and Kurmangazy. Kazakhstan also accounts for the bulk of India’s imports from Central Asia and has served as a gateway for commercial and energy cooperation. Notably, it was the first country in the region to elevate its ties with India by signing the Declaration of Strategic Partnership in 2009, setting a precedent for deepened bilateral ties.

The engagement by India is hardly one-sided. Central Asian states likewise are interested in building more expansive ties with the massive Indian economy. It fits into the Central Asian countries’ pursuit to diversify their foreign relations. In a world that has grown increasingly multipolar, closer ties with India emerges as an effective geopolitical move by Central Asian states to limit their dependence on either Russia or China. Central Asian states, while being landlocked, specifically seek maritime sea routes.

Yet, there are constraints that limit India’s engagements with Central Asia. Foremost among these is geography: India lacks a direct land route to the region. This logistical barrier is compounded by strained relations with Pakistan and ongoing instability in Afghanistan, making overland connectivity both politically and practically unfeasible. The impact is evident in the modest trade volume between India and the Central Asia nations, which remains below $2 billion annually.

India must also contend with stiff competition from larger powers that benefit from geographic proximity and deeper cultural and economic ties with the region. Russia, for instance, continues to wield significant influence through long-standing security and economic partnerships. Meanwhile, China has expanded its footprint via the Belt and Road Initiative, positioning Central Asia as a strategic alternative to the vulnerable maritime route through the Malacca Strait.

Over the long term, India’s foreign policy toward Central Asia has undergone a significant shift. Until the 2010s, the region occupied a peripheral place in New Delhi’s priorities. However, in recent years, India has advanced its “Look North” strategy, aimed at cultivating stronger ties with northern powers to diversify its foreign partnerships and capitalize on emerging economic opportunities in the Eurasian heartland.

This major shift also reflects the geographic and historical linkages between the two regions. Centuries ago, the terrain stretching from Central Asia to modern-day northern India, was controlled by the Kushan and Mughal empires. One entity tied the region together politically and helped to develop connectivity propelling the Indian subcontinent to emerge in ancient and medieval times as one of the paramount global economic powerhouses on a par with China. It is with the Kushan and Mughal empires that the “India Road” emerges – a system of routes leading in and out of the region. A striking contrast with the modern period.

Central Asia’s shifting dynamics carry direct implications for India’s strategic ambitions. No longer a peripheral concern, the region now anchors India’s efforts to expand its influence across Eurasia. Through investments in infrastructure, trade, and critical resources, New Delhi aims to position itself as a stabilizing force and alternative to regional powers like China and Russia. Success will depend on India’s ability to navigate rivalries and offer enduring partnerships—reviving historic ties while shaping a new Eurasian order.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

On July 12, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa made a strategic visit to Azerbaijan, signaling a new chapter in bilateral ties with a sharp focus on deepening economic cooperation. Beyond politics and trade, Sharaa emphasized that the relationship between Damascus and Baku is anchored in shared history and culture — underscoring Syria’s strong support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity amid a shifting regional landscape.

Baku and Damascus signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation, with Azerbaijan agreeing to export gas to Syria via Turkey. For Syria, a country grappling with energy shortages, the agreement marks a major success that could significantly improve its domestic situation. Although the timeline for initiating exports remains uncertain, projections suggest that Azerbaijan will supply around 1 billion cubic meters of gas to Syria annually through Turkey.

Azerbaijan’s gas exports could eventually reach beyond Syria. With the rehabilitation of the Turkey-Syria gas pipeline, it is feasible that Azerbaijan — a country with experience exporting to Middle Eastern markets — could send gas to other countries such as Jordan. Specific projects on gas pipelines have already been unveiled. For instance, Azerbaijan has been Israel’s main oil supplier (via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), covering some 40-60% of the country’s oil needs.

More importantly, the energy memorandum with Syria is part of Azerbaijan’s broader strategy to diversify its gas exports. Baku's energy policy, once focused almost exclusively on Europe, is shifting: The Middle East is emerging as a solid buyer of Caspian oil and gas.

Read more at Al Monitor.

In late June, 14 members of the Sacred Struggle organization were detained and accused of attempting to seize power. Among those held were two archbishops of the Apostolic Church, the country’s largest, and an Armenian-Russian billionaire, who had spoken in their support.  

Investigators claimed to have discovered a number of items they said proved the involvement of the detainees in preparing a coup d’état, including weapons and ammunition, drones, firecrackers, smoke bombs, military equipment, and radio communications equipment.  

Foremost among those detained was Archbishop Bagrat (Bagrat Galstanyan), head of the Tavush for the Motherland movement, another name for the Sacred Struggle, which was established in 2024 during a series of protests and marches following an agreement with neighboring Azerbaijan on delimitation of the border. Archbishop Mikael Ajapayan was also arrested. 

Read more on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center, a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Photo by Demirören News Agency

Amid the volatile geopolitical situation in the Middle East and the Black Sea region, Eurasia is witnessing creation of a new trilateral partnership.

As crises grip the Middle East and Black Sea region, the three nations of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan are forging a new strategic alliance.

At a recent summit in Lachin, Azerbaijan, leaders of the three nations attended the opening of a new airport, the third in territories that Azerbaijan regained possession following its 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The three leaders vowed to to make such meetings a regular affair in discussing such issues as transportation, energy, trade, defense, infrastructure and the fight against terrorism.

The trialateral partnership was formally established in 2017 during a meeting between foreign ministers in Baku. At that time, they signed the Baku Declaration to develop partnerships on common issues affecting the South Caucasus, Asia Minor and South Asia. In 2021, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan set up a forum for intergovernmental meetings between the countries’ parliaments. Three years later, the leaders of the three countries met for their first time in Astana, Kazakhstan during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Bilateral visits have also taken place.

A critical element of the trilateral cooperation is mutual defense. Pakistan signed contracts with Turkey to buy Mogul-class corvettes ships built under the auspices of the Turkish Navy’s MİLGEM project. In past years, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have also concluded a series of military agreements.

In 2025, Azerbaijan and Pakistan signed an agreement whereby Baku pledged to buy fighter jets co-produced by Pakistan and China. The $4.2 billion sale means Azerbaijan will increase its number of JF-17 fighter jets from 16 to 40. The Block III planes are said to be more maneuverable than previous versions as well as greater stealth capabilities.

The purchase of these jets underscores the growing ability of the three nations to lessen their military dependence on such uncomfortable actors as Russia. Azerbaijan, for example, has traditionally been dependent on Russia’s  MIG-29 and SU-25 fighter jets. By purchasing JF-17 jets, Baku is telling Moscow that its  military know-how is no longer necessary.

Moreover, “Three Brothers Exercise,” a trilateral joint military drill initiated in 2021, remains an effective tool for mutual military coordination . Most recently, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have supported each other during the Nagorno-Karabakh and Kashmir conflicts such as during votes at the United Nations. During recent tensions between Pakistan and India, Islamabad first reached out to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

On the trade front, Azerbaijan and Pakistan are currently negotiating various economic and infrastructure projects with investments of $2 billion, mostly in the oil sector. Baku and Islamabad have also expressed interest in developing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer network of ship, rail and road for moving freight between Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Europe, India, Iran and Russia.

Indeed, the trilateral partnership has brought new trade and energy corridors. Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, each consider themselves at the center of Eurasia’s shifting energy geopolitics and connectivity. Azerbaijan positions itself as a vital hub on east-west and north-south transit routes. Turkey likewise is a significant commercial and transit node, which connects to Azerbaijan via various pipelines and railways running through Georgia. Then there is Pakistan, which although geographically far from both Turkey and Azerbaijan, it nevertheless is pushing for integration in various cross-Eurasian projects.

Islamabad is actively seeking participation in the INSTC and there are now plans to send containers northwards via Central Asia. Given the improving ties between Pakistan and Iran, the latter might soon serve as another alternative for Islamabad in reaching Russia through Azerbaijan.

To be sure, each country’s approach to the the trilateral alliance differs. Although each operates in different regional neighborhoods, all three feel their geopolitical ambitions are constrained by the current world order. As a result, their strategic alignment is a logical development.

Turkey has pursued an active regional policy and is seeking to open access to Central Asia through Azerbaijan and to South Asia through Pakistan. Islamabad has three long-term goals within the alliance: the development of military-technical cooperation (primarily with Turkey), strengthening energy security (through ties with Azerbaijan), and obtaining political support on the long-standing Kashmir issue. For Azerbaijan, the partnership is about its growing pivot to Asia and extensive diversification of ties including strategic partnerships with China and Vietnam and closer engagement with Central Asian states.

Nevertheless, the balance of power in the trilateral format is tilted towards Turkey. While the combined economic volume of the three countries exceeds $1.5 trillion and a population of around 350 million, Turkey has by far the largest economy. Its central geographic position as well as integration within NATO and other multilateral institutions renders it the primary actor in the trilateral partnership. Moreover, for Ankara this positioning allows the country to project power into the South Asia. Turkey also sees the alignment with Azerbaijan and Pakistan as a counter to India-Armenia-Greece-France partnership. The latter’s scope of military and economic cooperation has grown since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war when Armenia began to seek new partners for military cooperation and Greece has increase its engagement with the countries antagonistic to Turkey.

Overall, the alignment between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan is likely to persist given the nature of security challenges and mutual benefits these countries enjoy. The trilateral format also reflects the growing importance of pacts between middle powers in a shifting global order.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Ever since the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023 the country has pursued a much more diversified foreign policy by simultaneously building closer ties, beyond what it already had with Turkey and Russia, with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan, Israel and has moved to improve relations with the United States, which suffered during the Biden administration due to the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy building issues.

Since the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 2023, the country has adopted a markedly more diversified foreign policy, strengthening existing ties with Turkey and Russia while simultaneously deepening relations with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf states, Pakistan, and Israel, and taking steps to improve strained relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated under the Biden administration due to its prioritization of human rights and democratic governance.

This dynamic has become particularly pronounced in recent months. In April, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Baku to engage in discussions aimed at enhancing bilateral relations. Similarly, in April, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, visited Baku, where she met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov; during the visit, both parties agreed to resume negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.

Read more at the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In mid-May, Russia hosted the Russia-Afghanistan Business Forum as part of the Russia-Islamic World Economic Forum in Kazan. Russian and Taliban officials discussed developing transit routes to Afghanistan via Central Asia and Pakistan, as well as an additional route through Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea. Moscow has placed special emphasis on linking the Trans-Afghan Railway (still under construction) with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), primarily to maintain connectivity to the Indian Ocean (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, May 20).

The event followed a Russian Supreme Court decision in early April that removed the Taliban from the Kremlin’s terrorist list, thus paving the way for official dealings with the de facto ruling government (seeEDM, November 13, 2024; The Moscow Times, April 17). The decision was long in the making, as Russia has steadily increased engagement with Kabul since the militant group regained control in August 2021 (see EDM, July 29, 2024, January 15). Afghanistan’s prime position as a transit node for north-south trade has also led to increased engagement with the People’s Republic of China and Central Asia. Overall, Russia’s decision is driven by a mixture of security and connectivity issues. Moscow hopes not only to maintain the dominance of north-south transit routes but also to ensure that those routes remain secure from possible sabotage.

Read more on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On June 20, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan paid an official visit to Türkiye, his first since taking office, and a first for any Armenian leader since the country’s independence from the Soviet Union.

The visit came against the backdrop of renewed efforts to recalibrate regional diplomacy. Pashinyan was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Ruben Rubinyan, the Vice Speaker of the National Assembly and Armenia’s special representative in the normalisation dialogue with Türkiye.

Though not entirely unprecedented – Pashinyan and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met briefly on the sidelines of international events in Prague (2022), Ankara (2023), and most recently in Albania – this visit stood out for its formality and timing. It was a calculated gesture by Yerevan, signalling readiness for deeper engagement with Ankara at a time when regional dynamics are shifting rapidly.

Read the full article on TRT Global.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Photo via SPA

By Emil Avdaliani and Joseph Epstein

The evolving relationship between the five Central Asian countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—has become an axis of its own in the shifting geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. Geopolitics push them closer, so do untapped trade, investment potential as well as evolving trade routes.

The engagement between the GCC and Central Asia reflects broader realignment in the global order – a shift toward multipolar system. Central Asian states, which have traditionally balanced ties with such powers as Russia, China, Turkey, and the West, now seek new partners, especially since traditional routes through Russia have become less reliable due to the Ukraine war.

The GCC outreach offers alternative avenues for influence and cooperation. For the Arab states, cooperation with Central Asia provides land access to new markets, strengthens ties in a Muslim-majority region bordering Iran, and entrenches their multi-vectoral foreign policy approach, which builds relations with other nations based on pragmatism and not ideology. As a result,  these growing ties are less about creating blocs and more about hedging relations between two regions with similar geopolitical situations and development goals. Summit meetings have emphasized sovereignty, non-interference, and shared objectives such as energy security and stable supply chains.

Economic diversification is key to these expanding ties. Gulf states seek to reduce dependence on oil, while Central Asia offers natural resources and a growing market. Investments align with national visions. Indeed, both Central Asian governments and the Gulf monarchies have embarked on ambitious long-term development strategies aimed at diversifying their economies beyond hydrocarbons and raw materials. Saudi Vision 2030, the UAE Vision 2031, Kuwait Vision 2035, and Oman Vision 2040 all emphasize investment in high-tech industries, renewable energy, tourism, and logistics.

Similarly, Central Asian states also tout their own grand strategic plans. Kazakhstan has “Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy,” Uzbekistan’s multi-sector development plans which envision economic growth, infrastructure and private sector participation. Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s visions for the next decade stress building manufacturing, agriculture, and modern infrastructure.

The alliance between the GCC and Central Asia is a natural fit.  As so-called “middle powers” – not a superpower but one with regional influence — both regions seek a balanced approach between large powers while maintaining their independence. While this has always been Central Asia’s strategy, the GCC has increasingly sought friendlier ties with global powers since its traditional closest ally, the United States, continues to signal that it wants to disengage from the Middle East

As a reflection of the growing alignment in 2023, the GCC and the Central Asian states launched their first summit, which was followed by a second meeting in 2024. A 2025 conference is due to be held later this year.

The summits also show how increasingly important the regions are to each other. But beyond trade and investments there is also a geopolitical hedging that drives the relations. Central Asia, wary of geopolitical dependence on Russia or China, sees the Gulf as a key partner for diversification of foreign policy. Similarly, the GCC balances relationships with Iran, the U.S., and China, and views Central Asia as part of a broader pivot toward Asia. This deepening partnership has not disrupted the existing alliances. Central Asia remains engaged with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is comprised of six post-Soviet states. While the GCC avoids hard power projection in the region, the trend signals a quiet realignment: Central Asia is moving beyond its post-Soviet dependency, and the Gulf is evolving into a diplomatic and investment hub. Both regions are navigating a multipolar world by building diversified, balanced partnerships—including with each other.

Bilateral relations also share a security component. Both regions align on the need to battle against threats from terrorism and extremism. GCC and Central Asian leaders have pledged to increase intelligence-sharing, training, and counterterrorism coordination. Discussions include regular defense meetings and joint responses to extremism and narcotics.

Both regions also aim to diversify trade routes and adjust to shifting connectivity in Eurasia. For example, the Trans Caspian International Trade Route (TCIT) or Middle Corridor, would connect Central Asia to Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea, avoiding chokepoints like the Suez Canal. The GCC could benefit from participating in the expansion of this route. The Gulf countries are also interested in Central Asia because of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which connects Russian ports on the Baltic and the Caspian seas to Iran and India. Though INSTC’s main branch goes through Azerbaijan, the eastern part of the corridor spans Central Asia. Russia also eyes the Gulf region as southermost point in INSTC’s reach.

Moreover, Central Asian leaders favored the idea of Gulf participation in new transport corridors that would shorten the route from the region to the Gulf through the proposed Trans-Afghan Railway, which would link Kabul with its neighboring countries Moreover, projects such the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway or the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan corridor, could likewise lead to opening of the new trade routes for Gulf exporters.

However, connectivity has still proven a major challenge. While the most obvious trade route geographically would cross through Iran or Afghanistan, the regimes in both countries prevent such a road from being reliable. Likewise, the INSTC’s reliance on transport through Russia would cause the region to depend on both Russia and Iran for expanding trade with the Gulf. One potential alternative could be the Middle Corridor. Goods could then travel through Georgia to Turkey and through Turkey to the Gulf via Iraq. Ankara has been a large proponent of the Iraq Development Road or Dry Canal, which would link Iraq’s southern gulf ports to Turkish ports in the Mediterranean and could handle

significant trade volumes.

Trade and Investment Links

Trade volumes – around $4 billion in 2024— remain modest by global standards, but both have been rising rapidly in recent years. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia rank among Central Asia’s largest Arab trading partners, importing local minerals, grain, and cotton, while exporting consumer goods, machinery, and fuel. Notably, Kazakh exports of grain and aluminum have found buyers in Gulf states. However there is still considerable untapped potential in trade and investments.

Connectivity issues have not prevented the increase of foreign direct investment. GCC FDI in Central Asia has approximately tripled over two years. Saudi Arabia’s energy company. ACWA Power and Abu Dhabi’s energy company Masdar and state investment firm Taqa are prominent examples. ACWA Power, known for its large-scale solar and wind plants, has signed multi-billion dollar deals in the region. In Uzbekistan, ACWA will build three utility-scale solar parks (totaling over 1.4 gigawatts) and battery storage systems. In May, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign investor Mubadala and the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) acquired an 875-megawatt combined-cycle gas-fired power plant in Uzbekistan.

Similarly, in Kazakhstan, ACWA partnered on a 1,000 MW wind and battery project valued at over $1.5 billion. Masdar will build 500 MW “Zarafshan” wind farm in Uzbekistan (the region’s largest), and is developing another 1 GW wind installation in the south of Kazakhstan. At the COP29 summit in late 2024, Masdar signed a $1.4 billion deal to build a wind farm in Kazakhstan’s Jambyl region.

Agriculture and food security have also become subjects of cooperation. The Gulf states import the vast majority of their food, and Central Asian want to turn into a major exporter of food and water to the GCC. For instance, Kazakhstan co-sponsored the international “One Water Summit” in Riyadh in 2024, reflecting a shared concern over water scarcity and a possibility for technology transfer (such as Saudi desert agriculture techniques) to Central Asian contexts. In this way, food and water security link the regions as complementary strands of the emerging partnership.

Central Asia’s fast-growing tech sectors are also drawing Gulf attention.

Uzbekistan has nurtured an IT export industry, and in 2025 Qatar’s state investment promotion agency signed a digital transformation pact with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Digital Technologies. This agreement, signed at a tech summit in Doha, aims to create joint projects, startup funding and skills programs in fields like AI, data centers, and cloud services. In December 2024, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan reached a bilateral partnership covering 5G, digital infrastructure, and tech entrepreneurship, encouraging Saudi tech firms to establish regional offices in Central Asia. These pacts reflect a broader trend of digital diplomacy: Central Asian countries see the Gulf markets as a new customer base and investor pool for their nascent IT industries, while Gulf states invest in digital skills and platforms that fit their diversification agendas.

Deepening Ties, Lingering Hurdles

The upcoming 2025 GCC summit in the Uzbekistan city of Samarkand and ongoing ministerial and business council meetings will be key in watching how expansive the relations between the two regions will become. Establishment of a free trade zone would mark a qualitatively new period

To be sure, growing challenges persist. Not all Central Asian countries are benefitting equally from recent changes —Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan lead in attracting Gulf deals, while others less so. Economic growth matters for the GCC. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are also most populous and therefore have bigger markets  attractive to investors. Also, geography slows down the pace of economic cooperation. The countries lying in between Central Asia and the Gulf – namely Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan – are difficult to traverse due to poor infrastructure, lack of security and coordination over border controls. And last but not least, though the Central Asian state are diversifying their foreign policy portfolios, Russia and China remain dominant powers in the region. This spans security and trade/investment aspects and should the GCC become more active in the region, the Arab countries may face stiffer resistance from the traditional great powers.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Amid the ongoing US-Iran negotiations around Tehran’s nuclear program, China wants in on influencing the process to its benefit. Close commercial and energy ties with Iran and the Arab states are the drivers of Beijing’s relations with the region.

China is not satisfied that the current US approach to Iran is rooted in unilateralism that sidelines Beijing unlike President Barack Obama’s multilateral strategy that ended in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that sought to limit Iran’s enrichment levels in exchange for lifting economic sanctions.

During a recent summit, China hosted Russian and Iranian diplomats to discuss the nuclear issue and criticize Washington’s policy of maximum pressure and threats to bomb Tehran’s nuclear sites.

Beijing fears that a maximum pressure campaign as the Islamic Republic is at its weakest position in decades. The so-called Axis of Resistance – a sprawling network of non-state actors from Lebanon and Iraq to Syria and Yemen, has been severely weakened since the start of the war in Gaza. The Israeli military has decimated Hezbollah, nearly defeated Hamas and the Yemeni Houthis have been targeted in intermittent aerial campaigns by both Israel and the United States. The fall of the Assad dynasty has been another key blow to the axis.

The Chinese worry that the Islamic Republic’s weakening influence in the Middle East could push Tehran into advancing its nuclear program, which would likely incur direct US/Israeli military strikes further undermining its economy and the overall stability of the country’s political system.

Excessive pressure on Iran’s nuclear program would also undermine Beijing’s ability to shape the Middle East according to its 2022 Global Security Initiative – a post-liberal global vision aimed at increasing China’s Global Influence.

This initiative facilitated Beijing’s 2023 meaningful reconciliation between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia after decades of confrontations over regional hegemony. This was a major blow to US influence in the Gulf region.

Moreover, though the Trump administration has mostly pursued a unilateral approach in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, Washington has reached out to Russia to help navigate the intricacies of the negotiations process. Such policy makes sense given Moscow’s ever-expanding relations with Tehran following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. But it sidelines China as a potential negotiator.

And it’s not the first time. Beijing has periodically been sidelined under both former US President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump. Current negotiations around ending the war in Ukraine are either directly held between the US and Russia or between Kyiv and Moscow through mediation efforts by Turkey and the Gulf states. China has not been included on cease-fire and peace efforts on the war in Gaza. Beijing’s peace proposals on ending the war in Ukraine and in Gaza have been dismissed by the US and its allies.

Iran’s weakening would also impact China’s business with the Islamic Republic. To be sure, bilateral trade has lagged significantly behind stated goals and Chinese investments have not materialized despite the bilateral 25-year cooperation agreement between the two nations signed in 2021. Yet, it has been China buying heavily discounted Iranian oil that has kept the Iranian economy afloat. Therefore, when the US announced the maximum pressure campaign and threatened to sanction whoever bought Iranian oil this served as a powerful warning for Beijing.

Sanctioning Iran’s oil trade with China has proved to be extremely difficult as tanker fleets are increasingly able to find loopholes to avoid penalties. Under the Biden administration, some aspects of the sanctions enforcement regime was – likely intentionally — unenforced to pave the way for an understanding with Iran. The Trump administration has tried to correct the situation through maximum pressure campaign. So far, attempts have been unsuccessful and oil trade between Iran and China has grown.

Beijing is also concerned over Iran’s internal stability. Wide scale protests in the Islamic Republic have become more frequent and more robust. Coupled with strong Western sanctions, there is always the chance the crumpling of the very foundation of the Iranian state.

These geopolitical challenges pushed China to hold the April trilateral summit with Russia and Iran that explicitly stated displeasure with the US position on the nuclear issue.

Indeed, while Beijing supports Iran’s nuclear civilian program it remains concerned over nuclear proliferation. For Beijing, a nuclear Iran would likely set off an arms race in the Middle East, with states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt all vying to attain nuclear capabilities. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, Beijing “values Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons” and “appreciates Iran’s diplomatic efforts.”

This explains why the Chinese side prefers a new nuclear agreement akin to the one reached under Obama, which would allow the Iranian economy to shake off the heavy burden of sanctions. Lifting sanctions also means Chinese investments would enter the country facilitating Iran’s political stability. Yet, this comes with a major caveat such as a new agreement must also involve the Chinese side as a testament to the shifting global balance of power.

The resurrection of the 2015 JCPOA would not make sense for Beijing as the mechanisms underpinning the agreement back then are no longer relevant today.

In Beijing’s view, the US no longer possesses enough power to dominate Iran’s nuclear issue. In other words, the

negotiations should be based on a multilateral basis. Iran and Russia too seem to align with this vision. Indeed, perhaps it was this sentiment that was reflected in an April 7 announcement by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a second round of trilateral consultations with the Chinese and Russian sides.

To date, the Chinese have been openly against any US-led military solution to Iran’s nuclear program. Surprisingly, Washington and Beijing could still find some common ground. In fact, parts of the US political establishment prefer a negotiated solution to the problem and it could serve as a point for alignment between China and the US around Iran. Even U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that allowing Iran to have a civil nuclear energy program without enrichment capabilities could be an option.

Surely, even if Iran and the US reach a consensus without Beijing’s active involvement, the latter would still support the progress. Faced with a fait accompli, Beijing is expected to hail it as a positive development as it would open the door to greater Chinese economic involvement in Iran and the wider region. It will also decrease geopolitical pressure on China when it comes to balancing its relations between Iran and the Arab states – both sides have feared that Beijing might move closer to either side.

Looking Ahead

For China, maintaining close ties with Iran would now be more important given the US government’s push for expanding bilateral relations with the Gulf states. Trump’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE will lead to closer ties with these countries and Beijing cannot stay on the sidelines. It will attempt to get closer to the Gulf states while also emphasizing  relations with the Islamic Republic in line with its traditional approach to balanced relations in the region.

China’s support for the Islamic Republic will however fall within the existing constraints in which the country has historically operated in the Middle East. Beijing does not seek formal alliances in the region since it is seen as a relic from the age of liberal internationalism and the West’s predominant position globally. This means that China will mostly pursue engagement with the Middle East via greater trade levels especially through oil purchases.

China will also likely abstain from efforts to seriously challenge the US in the region. The latter retains an unparalleled military power and China will continue to benefit from the indirect American naval security provisions. Equidistance in relations with the various countries of the Middle East will remain a defining feature of China’s engagement.

Ultimately, China’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program is driven less by ideology and more by strategic calculation. Beijing wants to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran and a heavily weakened Iran that would threaten energy supplies and destabilize its growing economic footprint across the Middle East. But it also seeks recognition as an important actor in shaping outcomes on major global security issues — a role the current U.S.-led unilateral strategy has largely denied it. Ideally, Beijing seeks a seat at the negotiating table — not just to protect its trade with Iran, but to assert a new vision of multipolar diplomacy that reflects its rising global ambitions.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.