Turan Research Center

Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persia to discuss the US strikes on ISIS position in Syria following the killing of two US soldiers and an interpreter. According to CENTCOM, several militants were killed in the strikes.

Watch the full interview here (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On the day after the Taliban seized Kabul in 2021, a Turkish Airlines flight carrying 234 passengers arrived in Istanbul. Among them was Sarwar Danish, Afghanistan’s Second Vice President, and two members of President Ashraf Ghani’s fleeing cabinet.

Danish, became the highest-ranking Hazara official of the Afghan government to flee the Taliban without seeking refuge in Iran, despite having lived and studied there for many years. Like many educated Hazara elites, he spent much of the 1980s and 1990s in Iran, pursuing religious studies in Qom, home to the world’ s largest Shiite theological seminary.

Hazara Shiites and Iranian Shiites share the Twelver branch of Shia Islam but differ ethnically. The Hazaras have Mongol-Turkic roots and speak Hazaragi, a Farsi-based language. Iranian Shiites are ethnic Persians who speak Farsi.

Iran’s deepening relations with the Taliban convinced Danish that it was too risky to seek refuge there. Ultimately, he resettled in New Zealand.

In the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom brought about the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001. The subsequent Bonn Agreement established a power-sharing framework that reshaped Afghanistan’s political order. Within this arrangement, the Hazaras — the second most powerful opposition to the Taliban after the Tajiks — secured 20 percent of Cabinet positions. Their representation was led by Islamic Unity Party (Hizb-e-Wahdat) leader Mohammad Karim Khalili, who assumed the role of Second Vice President Today, Khalili lives in exile in Turkey.

Following the U.S. intervention in 2001, the Hazaras community has pursued gradual yet consistent efforts to define an identity that extends beyond its Shiite religious affiliation. This process has contributed to a degree of distancing from Iran’s Islamic regime. In their search for a broader cultural and political framework, Hazara political and academic elites have taken tangible steps to cultivate ties with Turkey, positioning themselves as leading actors within the Turkic world. Such outreach has resonated with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s promotion of Pan-Turkism.

Within this context, Turkey’s reception of prominent Hazara political leaders such as Khalili and Mohammad Mohaqqiq, the long-time leader of the People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (PIUPA), appears strategically coherent. Both figures, together with Danish, have played active roles in exile politics, most notably through the establishment of the National Resistance Council for Salvation of Afghanistan in Turkey in 2022. The council has formed a political opposition coalition against the Taliban. Both Mohaqqiq and Danish are the among the organization’s founders.

Iran’s relationship with the Taliban has steadily deepened over the past decade, diminishing its appeal as a refuge for Hazara leaders. From 2015 onward, reports indicate that Iran began engaging both diplomatically and militarily with the Taliban, with some analysts noting the establishment of Taliban training infrastructure inside Iran. This alignment was not merely pragmatic but political: Iran appeared intent on cultivating influence with the Taliban, even at the expense of marginalized Afghan groups. In return, Iran secures its eastern border, gains access to the Afghan market, uses the Taliban’s anti-West sentiments as its global P.R., and can stay influential in regional dynamics. In 2023, the relationship was formalized further when Tehran transferred control of the Afghan embassy to Taliban-appointed diplomats.

The Hazara community’s historical experience with Iran is more complex than shared Shiite identity might suggest. During the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, Iran provided support to Hazara jihadist groups, but this assistance weakened Hazara political cohesion after the Soviet withdrawal, some analysts argue.

Moreover, within Hazara narratives, Iran is remembered as having prioritized other Afghan factions — such as the Tajik mujahideen group, Jamiat-e Islami. during the early 1990s civil war that erupted after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, offering more military support, while limiting aid to Hazara groups. Although archival evidence remains sparse, these perceptions left a legacy of mistrust among some Hazara elites toward Tehran.

One of the most significant sources of Hazara mistrust toward Iran stems from Iran’s use of Hazara refugees in its regional military engagements. The Fatemiyoun Brigade, backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), recruited large numbers of Afghan Hazaras — including minors — to fight in Syria. Human Rights Watch documented cases of Afghan children as young as 14 who were deployed and killed in Syria under Fatemiyoun’s banner.

Beyond such recruitment, reports highlight coercive practices: Hazara refugees allegedly pressured through economic vulnerability or promises of legal residency for fighting in the Fatemiyoun. Human Rights and migrant-rights groups argue that the IRGC exploited refugees’ precarious lives for geopolitical gain. In a 2020 report by the Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights, IRGC Qud’s Force recruited thousands of Afghans Shias mainly from the Hazara community to fight in Syria. One Afghan described being approached at a mosque in Efsahan, “They suggested we go to Syria to help defend the Shi’a holy shrines from Daesh’, adding that ‘we’d get passports and have an easy life afterwards. We’d be like Iranian citizens and could buy cars, houses…”

For Hazara leaders, these practices transformed Iran from a potential sanctuary into a place of exploitation, casting serious doubts about Tehran’s willingness to protect the broader Hazara community.

Throughout the two-decades of the Afghan Republic, Western governments played a dominant role in the nation’s political institutions, development funding, and security architecture. Hazara leaders actively cultivated these relationships to avoid political marginalization and to ensure external backing. During this period, hundreds of Hazara youth obtained scholarships to leading universities in the U.S. and Europe, with many returning to Afghanistan to occupy senior positions within the Republic’s bureaucracy.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Western actors continued to influence Afghan realities primarily through humanitarian aid. According to a UNOCHA, approximately $6.7 billion in humanitarian funding was directed to Afghanistan between 2021 and 2024. This sustained support reinforced the perception that Western countries would remain influential players in any future Afghan political landscape. For Hazara leaders, relocation to the West offered not only physical safety but also continued political relevance and access to resources.

Over the past two decades, Hazara diaspora communities have flourished across Western countries — particularly in Europe, Australia, and Canada. These communities have become hubs for political mobilization, advocacy, fundraising, and civil society initiatives. For exiled Hazara leaders, relocation to these countries provides access to established networks, enabling them to maintain influence and engage in transnational activism.

 By contrast, the political space for Hazaras in Iran has remained considerably more constrained limiting the role of any diaspora there as a platform for political leadership. Iran’s domestic political system imposes strict limits on independent political organizing, particularly for refugees. Hazara leaders attempting to operate politically in Iran risk surveillance, repression, and legal obstacles. It is highly unlikely that figures like Mohammad Mohaqqiq, Sarwar Danesh, or Karim Khalili could freely participate in anti-Taliban groups if based in Iran.

Moreover, Iran’s political climate is far less permissive toward the formation of independent political parties or coalitions — especially those that might challenge Tehran’s strategic interests. For Hazara leaders seeking political agency and a long-term voice, Western democracies offer far greater freedom and opportunity than Iran’s restrictive environment.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persian to discuss the terror attack against a Hannukah celebration in Bondi Beach, Australia.

Watch the interview on BBC (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

UN experts have recently warned that Afghanistan has become a hub for foreign terrorists -- including those from Central Asia. Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani discusses the Islamic State's current standing in Afghanistan.

Watch the full interview here on Afghanistan International (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

United Nations experts say that the Taliban has used forces from Tajikistan’s Jamaat Ansarullah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Imam Bukhari Brigade, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, especially in Northern Afghanistan. Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani comments for BBC Persian.

Watch the interview on BBC Persian.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The twelve-day war between Israel and Iran, marked by targeted strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), nuclear scientists, and key state infrastructure, including IRIB broadcasting headquarters and intelligence centers, triggered a paradigmatic shift in the security landscape of the Middle East. Israel’s focused strategy of precision strikes on predetermined targets, coupled with superior intelligence and operational acumen, allowed Tel Aviv’s security apparatus to swiftly gain and expand its intelligence and tactical superiority over Iran’s security domain. For a period, Israel even maintained de facto control over Iran’s airspace. The situation reached a point where certain Iranian officials, including the foreign minister, reportedly required Israel’s approval to exit the country, an unprecedented revelation that starkly underscored Iran’s diminished deterrent capacity in the region after 46 years of aggressive security posturing.

However, this paradigm shift extended beyond military and intelligence dynamics or the mere weakening of Iran’s regional axis. It heralded a broader behavioral transformation among key players across the Middle East. One notable example was Hezbollah’s conspicuous inaction during the twelve-day conflict. Despite its foundational purpose, established by Iran in 1982 to pursue Tehran’s regional objectives and serve as a strategic lever against Israel, Hezbollah refrained from any military engagement. This restraint was striking, particularly given Hezbollah’s traditional role in responding to escalations involving Israel.

On a regional level, one of the most telling post-war developments was the political discourse and social reactions from segments of Afghanistan’s intellectual elite concerning the Iran-Israel war. Afghan political figures, cultural leaders, poets, intellectuals, and university professors expressed varied reactions on social media, voicing support for the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Israeli state. This stance seemingly stemmed from a belief system rooted in shared linguistic, religious, cultural, and geographical ties between the Afghan and Iranian peoples. For these Afghan elites, endorsing Iran in its confrontation with Israel was perceived as a dual test, both cultural and political, through which they sought to reaffirm a sense of regional solidarity and emerge morally vindicated.

Read the original Persian article on 8am Media.
Read the English translation here.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

After the ceasefire that ended Israel’s 12-day war against Iran, Iranian officials were stunned by the sophistication of the Mossad’s operation and alarmed by the revelation of where the security breach had occurred.

Despite mounting evidence of a high-level intelligence breach, some Iranian officials deflected blame by targeting a French journalist named Catherine Shakdam. In an interview with state media, Mostafa Kavakebian, a former member of the Iranian parliament, said “the breach came from Catherine Shakdam, an Israeli spy, who shared her bed with 120 officials in the country.” Javad Zarif, a former foreign minister, added: “We need to understand how Catherine Shakdam infiltrated the country.”

For the record, Shakdam, a Jew who converted to Islam, traveled to Iran in 2017 for less than a month. She interviewed candidate Ebrahim Raisi, wrote several articles for the supreme leader’s website, took photos with the daughters of two military men assassinated by Israel -- Emad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s chief of staff and Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force -- and participated in a conference about Palestine. She now identifies as a Zionist and a Jew.

Aside from Kavakebian’s allegations of Shakdam’s espionage activities, a range of speculation went farther and stranger on who was responsible for helping the Israelis. Abullah Ganji, an Iranian conservative activist, posted on X, “After the recent war, a few sheets of paper were found on the streets of Tehran containing talismans with Jewish symbols." Meanwhile, a senior Iranian official accused Jerusalem of using "the occult and supernatural spirits" during its military operation.

Indeed, Iran security intelligence -- including Vezarat–e–Ettelaat (the Ministry of Intelligence) and Ettelaat–e –Sepah, (the Intelligence Department of the IRGC) -- was caught off guard and suffered extensive, system-wide damage. At least 30 IRGC senior commanders were killed during the Israeli strikes, three core nuclear sites were destroyed, along with major IRGC infrastructure, and what remained of Iran's air defense systems after Israeli strikes in October of last year. To date -- Operation Rising Lion is the largest failure experienced by Tehran's intelligence apparatus since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

As the Iranian security apparatus grappled with the embarrassment and internal breach, one question continued to resonate, among the public. Who is aiding Israeli intelligence from within Iran?

While some blame the occult and Shakdam, the security forces have largely scapegoated four groups: Kurds, Baluch, Azerbaijanis, and Afghan refugees. 

The Kurdish Connection

Historically, the Iranian regime has perceived its Kurdish citizens as separatists aligned with Israel’s strategic interests, particularly the push for Kurdish independence -- a movement Tehran fears could destabilize its western borders. Iranian authorities suspect that the Mossad maintains covert cells within Kurdistan, capable of facilitating intelligence operations inside Iran.

Immediately following Operation Rising Lion, Kurdish forces intercepted a drone launched at the Erbil airport by an Iranian proxy. On July 15 and 16, drone attacks targeted Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oilfields, with suspicions falling on pro-Iranian militias.

Hengaw, a Norwegian-based Kurdish human rights organization, says Iranian security forces have already arrested more than 140 Kurds for aiding Israel during the 12-day war. These arrests have likely increased since.

Targeting Iraqi Kurdistan is just as much about Iran's Kurdish minority population as Erbil's relations with Washington. The regime remains deeply uneasy about the U.S. presence in northern Iraq, viewing it as a potential threat to its national security and regional influence. The U.S.’s largest consulate in the world is in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Attacks on the KRG are not without precedent. In 2023, Iran launched ten ballistic missile toward Erbil, in response to the 2023 killing of Sayed Razi Mosavi, the commander of the Quds Force in Syria, in an Israeli airstrike. The missile strikes killed prominent businessman Peshraw Dizayee, his daughter, Karam Mikhail, and three other people.  The IRGC justified the attack, saying Iran had targeted a “Mossad espionage center.”

In 2020, Iranian security forces arrested three Kurdish Iranians after the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an Iranian nuclear physicist and chief of Iran’s nuclear program. He was reportedly killed in a road ambush by an autonomous satellite-operated gun. In June, the three men were executed for killing Fakhrizadeh as part of a crackdown on Israeli spies.

Baluchistan under Fire

The Baluch make up the majority of Iran's poorest province -- Sistan and Baluchistan. For decades, Baluch separatists have been waging a low-intensity insurgency against Tehran that claims the lives of security forces on a monthly basis. During the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests, Zahedan—the capital of the region—witnessed the deadliest crackdown, with security forces killing over 100 people.

On July 1, the IRGC launched a “counterterrorism” operation in the Baluch-majority province of Sistan-Baluchistan, claiming to target “mercenaries of the Zionist regime”—despite no Israeli operations taking place in the region.

Azerbaijanis as Alleged Operatives

Iranian officials have historically portrayed Azerbaijan as a close ally of Israel, suggesting that that its neighbor serves as a strategic sanctuary for Israeli operations. Authorities have accused Iranian-Azerbaijanis  -- Iran’s largest minority of some 30 million inhabitants-- of working for the Mossad during the 12-day war. More than 90 have been arrested for cooperating with Israel, according to Hengaw.

Iranian officials also claim that Israeli drones were launched from Azerbaijan. Notably, the Khorasan newspaper, an outlet linked to the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader, noted that “a collection of reports, field evidence, and credible speculations” indicates that Baku assisted Israel in conducting its attack against Iran.

Refugees Turned Suspects

For the first time, Iranian authorities have alleged that Afghan refugees – most of whom fled to Iran following the collapse of the U.S.-backed government in 2021-- are connected to the Mossad and assisted in the attacks on such sensitive sites as the nuclear facilities. Amid Israel’s recent operations inside Iran, the Iranian government issued an order for Afghan refugees to leave the country by July 6. Since January, around 1.4 million Afghans have been deported, with around 500,000 of those deportations following the 12 Day War.

Following Israel’s strike, Iran arrested Afghan refugees and blamed them for surveillance and building drones to target Iranian facilities. Tasnim, the Iranian news agency,  released a video, claiming  Iranian police found a small drone factory in Shahr-e-Rey, in southern Tehran, a neighborhood with a significant population of Afghan refugees. Moreover, Iranian security officials claimed that they arrested an Afghan university student who had files on making bombs and drones on his cellphone, accusing him of assisting Israeli drone strikes.

In 2021, a surge of anti-Afghan rhetoric flooded social media, fueled by misinformation and disinformation. The campaign centered around the Farsi hashtag of “Deportation of Afghans, National Demand.” Notably, these X accounts fell silent during the Israeli strikes on Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s intelligence branch – avoiding any anti-Afghan posts throughout the 12-day conflict. This coordinated silence suggested that the smear campaign was orchestrated by elements within the intelligence apparatus, aiming to incite public hostility and ultimately facilitate the removal of Afghan refugees from Iran.  After the Israeli attacks, these same accounts reemerged, accusing refugees of being the primary culprits and calling for their expulsion.

Israel’s strike provided Iranian officials with a pretext to label Afghan refugees as Mossad operatives or collaborators, resulting in the expulsion or departure of more than 700,000 Afghan refugees, according to the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs. However, the credibility of the accusations quickly unraveled. In an interview with Iranian state media, Member of Parliament Mannan Raeesi, said that precise intelligence and assessments had found no Afghan refugees among alleged Israeli spies. “This is mostly a defamation campaign,” Raisi asserted.

These accusations also carry a strong sense of hypocrisy.

Both long-term Afghan residents – who have lived in Iran for nearly four decades -  and those who fled the Taliban regime, have consistently faced systemic discrimination, including being denied access to such fundamental rights as opening bank accounts or even obtaining SIM cards. This level of scrutiny and control have placed them in a precarious situation under constant surveillance by Iranian authorities. Yet, despite these restrictions, Iranian officials have accused Afghans of collaborating with Israeli intelligence – alleging they’ve shared sensitive information, including the locations of IRGC commanders, strategic sites, and military bases.

Internal Crackdowns as a Deterrent

The Iranian regime’s treatment of its ethnic minorities -- Kurds, Baluch, Azerbaijanis, and Afghan refugees – bears striking resemblance to the oppressive tactics of Saddam Hussein, who ruthlessly cracked down on Shia populations in southern Iraq and on Kurds in the north following his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam responded with internal repression to reassert his control.

Iranian allies across the region have echoed this playbook. For example, when mass protests swept across Syria in 2011 during the Arab Spring, President Bashar al-Assad responded with indiscriminate violence against Sunni civilians, particularly in the northern regions of Homs and Idlib. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Houthis movement launched a brutal campaign of arrests and executions, accusing civilians of colluding with Saudi forces and revealing strategic Houthis positions.

Iran’s post-conflict actions suggest a regime grappling more with psychological defeat than with strategic recovery. Following Israel’s unexpected strike, which contradicted years of Iranian bravado about swift retaliation and impenetrable defenses, the Islamic Republic appears to have turned its frustration inward. The sudden crackdown on ethnic minorities seems less about uncovering espionage networks and more about asserting control in the face of humiliation. For Tehran, it is essential to maintain deterrence over its own citizens.

For decades, Tehran has positioned itself as a regional powerhouse, relentlessly threatening Israel with annihilation and projecting an image of unshakeable strength. But the surprise attack dismantled that illusion. In its aftermath, the regime scrambled to restore authority – not by identifying real culprits – but by targeting marginalized communities who already face institutional discrimination and surveillance.

The effectiveness of Israeli intelligence operations in Iran reveals not only its capabilities but also sheds light on the disposition of the Iranian people—especially among Iran’s oppressed groups, each for their own reasons. No successful intelligence effort is possible without a network of human assets. The fact that Israel has managed to build such networks suggests that many Iranians are willing to cooperate with Israeli intelligence. In some cases, these individuals may not have even known they were working for Israel; their main motivation was simply to strike at the regime.

This willingness to undermine the Islamic Republic underscores the moral and economic bankruptcy of the revolution. A regime that fears spies around every corner is not just facing a capable enemy—it is facing a crisis of legitimacy. When citizens are open to aiding foreign intelligence against their own rulers, it says more about the regime than its adversaries.

There’s also a deeper layer to the regime’s behavior. Its repression of ethnic and religious minorities reveals the moral degradation of a state that claims to defend the “oppressed” (mostazafin) against the “oppressors” (mostakberin). In reality, those lofty revolutionary slogans are used to justify the systematic oppression of Iran’s most vulnerable communities.

Paradoxically, the regime is compelled to act against its own fundamental interests. Although it has no desire to further alienate minority populations, it feels obligated to demonstrate a show of force. In doing so, it traps itself in a self-defeating cycle with narrowing room for maneuver.

However, there is some short-term pragmatism in Iran's actions. Israeli intelligence has clearly penetrated the highest echelons of Iranian power; otherwise, the precision targeting of senior military officials would not be possible. These are not just formal high-ranking officers but also insiders known in Iranian political slang as khodiha—members of the inner circle.

Instead of investigating the security breaches, the regime prioritizes protecting these insiders from suspicion. As a result, its harsh crackdowns on dissidents and vulnerable populations are not just acts of repression—they are diversions, meant to shield the system’s own insiders from accountability for its growing internal failures.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence.

Introduction

Tajikistan, the only Persian-speaking republic amidst a sea of Turkic Central Asian states, has emerged as the latest arena in a quiet yet consequential contest. At the heart of this geopolitical struggle are two rival forces: on one side, Iran, aiming to reassert cultural and strategic dominance over what it sees as the broader Persianate world; on the other side, Turkey and Azerbaijan, spearheading the Turkic revival through institutions like the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This contest is less overtly militaristic and more ideological, infrastructural, and economic. Yet, the implications extend far beyond the immediate neighbors, also affecting players like Israel and the United States, who have significant interests in the alignment of Central Asia.

Historical and Cultural Foundations

Tajikistan’s connection to Iran is grounded in what Sayyid Amir Arjomand termed the “Persianate society”—a sphere defined by Persian linguistic and cultural influence. Though the Soviet project created a distinct Tajik nation in 1929, the underlying language and heritage remained resolutely Persian. The Tajik variant of Persian, shaped by Russian and Uzbek overlays and written in the Cyrillic script, retains a closer resemblance to classical Persian literature than even modern-day Persian of Iran. This linguistic bridge offers Iran an organic opening for cultural diplomacy and ideological exportation

Despite this affinity, relations between the two countries have been tumultuous since Tajikistan’s independence in 1992. During the civil war, Iran backed the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), offering both political and possible financial support. This drew the ire of the Tajik government, which viewed Iranian involvement with deep suspicion. Tensions thawed after the 1997 peace treaty, and for over a decade, Iran became a significant economic partner, investing in hydroelectric plants, tunnels, and media initiatives.

That all changed in 2013 when Iranian billionaire Babak Zanjani was accused of money laundering through Tajik banks, causing a rupture in trust. The situation deteriorated further in 2015 when Iran hosted Muhiddin Kabiri, the exiled leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), then banned by the Tajik authorities. Kabiri met with Ayatollah Khamenei, prompting Tajikistan to veto Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and freeze bilateral cooperation. Tajik street protests followed, and Tajikistan accused Iran of organizing war crimes and preparing Islamic terrorists. The Tajik leader referred to a “so-called friendly country” and claimed IRPT members had converted to Shi’ism, reinforcing the narrative of the IRPT being an extension of Iranian influence. Iran accused the National Bank of Tajikistan of money laundering, which was later confirmed to be false. All cooperation programs were curtailed.

Economic Resurgence and Strategic Positioning

The diplomatic chill began to thaw in the second half of 2024, when Iran and Tajikistan found common cause in addressing regional instability. Shared fears of Taliban resurgence and ISIS-Khorasan terrorism catalyzed renewed dialogue. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s January 2025 visit to Dushanbe marked a turning point, resulting in the signing of 23 memoranda of understanding across energy, infrastructure, and cultural sectors.

Iran sees Tajikistan as a key partner for expanding access to Central Asian markets. Among its most significant offers is the proposal to link Tajikistan to the Chabahar Port, developed with India. This port would allow Tajikistan direct access to international waters. Iran’s goal is to undermine the appeal of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and the Middle Corridor, both championed by Azerbaijan and Turkey.

However, trade volumes still reflect Iran’s limited role. While trade increased by nearly 50% in 2024, it only amounted to $378 million—significantly less than Tajikistan’s $1.12 billion trade with Russia. Iran remains an ambitious but junior partner in economic terms.

The Cultural Playbook and Its Limitations

Iran continues to pour resources into cultural diplomacy. Initiatives include establishing Persian-speaking associations, funding cultural festivals, offering scholarships for Tajik students, and attempting to revive Persian script usage. It even opened branches of Iranian universities in Tajikistan and invested in joint cultural productions. But the results have been mixed.

Tajikistan’s secular elite remains wary. Cultural efforts often double as soft propaganda campaigns, and Iran’s religious conservatism clashes with Tajikistan’s more secular governance. The attempt to launch a joint TV channel was blocked, with authorities citing concerns that it would serve as a vehicle for Iranian ideological messaging.

One glaring example of this cultural friction was the Iranian TV series Paytakht. Produced with participation from Tajik actresses, the series became controversial when the actresses revealed that Iranian producers attempted to enforce hijab and promote Islamic themes, reflecting the values of the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.

President Rahmon himself has pushed back against Iranian cultural dominance, emphasizing Tajikistan’s Aryan heritageand rejecting the idea that Tajiks are merely part of a broader Iranian identity. This divergence in worldview makes long-term Iranian cultural integration a hard sell.

Propaganda, Indoctrination, and the Israeli Connection

One of the more controversial aspects of Iran’s cultural outreach in Tajikistan is its covert ideological influence, particularly the promotion of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment. Educational institutions like Al-Mostafa University in Qom serve not only as centers for religious education but also as potential recruitment hubs for the IRGC Quds Force.

In October 2023, the Association of Tajik Muslim Youth issued a letter condemning the “child-killing Zionist regime” and expressing support for the Palestinian resistance, referencing Quranic verses about just war. The statement, published less than two weeks after the October 7 Hamas massacre, employed language that mirrored classic Iranian euphemisms— “global Zionism” as a stand-in for global Jewry. While the letter didn’t explicitly justify the massacre, it echoed the regime’s usual denial-and-deflect tactic: ignore the atrocities, blame the victim.

The statement linked directly to Al-Mostafa University, suggesting a concerted effort to propagate Iranian ideological narratives through Tajik proxies. Tajik officials, fully aware of this dynamic, have cracked down on book distributions and scrutinized educational exchanges.

Proxy Networks and Sectarian Outreach

Iran’s involvement in Tajikistan extends beyond traditional diplomacy and ideological messaging. It reflects a broader strategy Tehran has refined since 1979: cultivating influence through proxies. This tactic, while more visible in the Middle East, is increasingly present in Central Asia, particularly where Shi’a populations offer an opening.

Tehran has turned its attention to Tajikistan’s small but symbolically useful Shi’a minority. While Twelver Shi’a are few, Iran has focused on Ismailis, also known as Sevener Shi’a, as a potential ideological constituency. Iranian actors view this community as receptive to messaging that promotes Islamic unity under Tehran’s spiritual and political umbrella.

Security Collaboration and the Double Game

Security concerns offer Iran and Tajikistan common ground. Both nations regard radical Sunni groups like ISIS-Khorasan as existential threats. Iran labels such actors “Takfiri”—a pejorative for violent Sunnis who view Shi’ites as apostates. But Iran’s engagement in the security domain is far from one-dimensional.

The IRGC’s Quds Force has been caught recruiting Tajik nationals for regional operations. Muhammad Ali Burhanov, also known as Samad al-Tajiki, was recruited by the IRGC and later linked to multiple foiled terror attacks in Central Asia, including arson attempts on Jewish and Western targets.

Military collaboration continues, nonetheless. In May 2022, Iran inaugurated a factory in Dushanbe to produce Ababil-2 drones—an answer to Turkey’s widely successful Bayraktar drone diplomacy across the region. These efforts aim to counterbalance Ankara’s growing sway in places like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The Turkic Push: Pragmatism Over Propaganda

While Iran continues to build its engagement with Tajikistan through the language of shared heritage and Islamic identity, Turkey and Azerbaijan are charting a course that speaks in terms of roads, railways, ports, and pipelines. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), formerly seen as a ceremonial gathering of linguistic cousins, has transformed into a dynamic mechanism for geopolitical coordination. Its expansion has alarmed Tehran, which now describe it as a “Turkic NATO,” developed by the “Zionist entity” and designed to advance its interests in Central Asia. This framing highlights the growing effectiveness of Turkic cooperation, particularly in contrast to Iran’s often ideological outreach.

Tajikistan has become an unexpected but central target in this new Turkic orientation. Despite not being a Turkic-speaking country, its participation is actively sought by Ankara and Baku. President Emomali Rahmon’s 2024 visit to Azerbaijan was treated as a major breakthrough, culminating in the signing of numerous bilateral agreements. These agreements, spanning trade, energy, infrastructure, and technological collaboration, indicated a clear pivot toward practical alignment rather than linguistic or ethnic solidarity. While Iran made moves to counter this engagement, hosting Tajik delegations and offering alternatives like the Chabahar Port corridor, the scale and pace of Turkish and Azerbaijani activity were difficult to match.

Trans-Caspian Strategy and the Middle Corridor

One of the core instruments of the Turkic states’ regional strategy is the Middle Corridor—a transcontinental route linking China to Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Tajikistan’s involvement in this framework would represent a major redirection of its external economic orientation. The complementary Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor offers logistical passage across the Caspian and onward into the Caucasus, further reducing the role of Iranian or Russian transit options. From Baku to Istanbul, the vision is clear: integrate Tajikistan into a web of infrastructure that is modern, efficient, and geopolitically autonomous.

The vision is already being translated into concrete partnerships. Azerbaijan has opened discussions with Dushanbe on energy cooperation, with potential collaboration in fossil fuel extraction and transit. These moves are more than speculative. Analysts inside Iran expressed concern that if Tajikistan develops domestic hydrocarbon resources and partners with Azerbaijan, it could soon become part of the Trans-Caspian energy framework. The long-term implication, from Iran’s standpoint, is the loss of a vital frontier—one that might instead become a gateway for Turkic, and possibly Western-aligned, influence.

Why the Turkic Offer Resonates

What should make the Turkic offer especially appealing to Dushanbe is its strategic flexibility. Unlike Iranian cultural diplomacy, which often carries religious or ideological weight, the Turkic model is pointedly non-prescriptive. While Turkey certainly promotes its soft power and historical ties in the Turkic world, there is no requirement for Tajikistan to adopt linguistic changes, religious alignment, or political messaging. The deal on the table is practical: access to energy networks, infrastructure funding, regional platforms, and logistical integration. For a state like Tajikistan, governed by a largely secular regime and focused on stability and development, the minimalist, transactional style of Turkic engagement would be far easier to absorb.

Furthermore, Turkish and Azerbaijani engagement increasingly overlaps with Western technical and commercial interests, enhancing its attractiveness. These corridors—both transport and energy—serve not only regional purposes but also larger geo-economic strategies stretching to Europe and beyond. Tajikistan’s involvement in the Turkic routes would effectively insert it into a Eurasian trade architecture that favors diversification and strategic autonomy. While Iran speaks of shared civilization and Islamic awakening, the Turkic world presents ports, pipelines, and predictable partnerships.

Conclusion

Iran’s initiatives during recent official visits to Tajikistan demonstrate a strategic effort to counter the influence of Turkic powers, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan, in Central Asia. The Islamic Republic is increasingly concerned about the growing investments by Turkic states, which threaten to diminish its regional influence. To counter this, Iran is actively seeking to expand its influence in Tajikistan, leveraging shared Persian cultural and linguistic ties to strengthen bilateral relations, despite the strained relationship between the two countries and Iran’s alleged support for the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). This strategy includes economic initiatives, such as promoting Tajikistan’s access to the Chabahar Port, and military cooperation, exemplified by the 2022 establishment of an Ababil-2 drone factory in Dushanbe. By fostering these ties, Iran aims to position Tajikistan as a strategic partner in Central Asia, potentially countering the influence of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) led by Turkey and Azerbaijan, and observes Tajikistan as a proxy in Central Asia. However, Tajikistan’s secular governance, its ban on the IRPT, with which Iran has extensive ties with, since 2015, and its participation in the 2023 Dushanbe summit alongside Turkic states suggest that it is unlikely to become a mere proxy for Iran, complicating Tehran’s efforts to shape regional dynamics.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a professor of the Persian language at Ariel University, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence.

Hussain Ehsani is a researcher focused on the Middle East, previously serving as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.