Turan Research Center

On February 15, 2026, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told Radio Iran's Pashto service that Kabul would be prepared to cooperate with the Islamic Republic in the event of a U.S. military attack — if Tehran formally requested assistance. He added that Iran had emerged victorious from its June 2025 war with Israel and would prevail again against Washington. The statement was extraordinary on its face: the world's most prominent Sunni jihadist movement publicly offering military solidarity to a Shia theocracy it once nearly went to war with. Yet the declaration was less a rupture than a culmination — the latest expression of a pragmatic alignment that has been deepening for over a decade, driven not by ideological convergence but by shared adversaries, mutual dependence, and the strategic logic of survival under pressure.

Iran’s engagement with the Taliban has evolved from tactical coordination during the insurgency to a pragmatic working relationship since the group’s return to power in August 2021. Despite deep ideological differences and a history of confrontation, Tehran has prioritized strategic interests over sectarian or doctrinal considerations. This relationship has yielded tangible benefits for both sides, while remaining transactional, asymmetric, and subject to significant constraints.

Origins of Tactical Cooperation

Evidence of Iran–Taliban engagement surfaced publicly in May 2016, when a a U.S. drone strike killed Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour then leader of the Taliban near the Iranian-Pakistani border. U.S. Intelligence agencies later indicated that Mansour had been returning from Iran. At the time, Mansour was widely regardedas the Taliban’s arms and narcotics czar, overseeing the group’s finances and transnational networks. According to the U.S. intelligence assessment, his trip to Iran was intended to facilitate tactical coordination. Mansour’s assassination publicly exposed the depth of Iran-Taliban engagement in the context of their shared opposition to Western influence in Afghanistan.

Subsequent developments reinforced these assessments. In October 2017, the Taliban launched a large-scale offensive on Farah City, the capital of Farah Province bordering Iran, effectively besieging the city until U.S. air support enabled Afghan forces to repel the offensive. Afghan security officials later Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, acting through Taliban proxies. The Taliban again demonstrated increased operational capacity in Farah Province in 2018, briefly capturing parts of the provincial capital.

This episode underscored Iran’s willingness to engage the Taliban as a means of countering U.S. and Western influence in Afghanistan, even as ideological tensions persisted.

Historical Background: Ideological Hostility and Early Confrontation

The relationship between Iran and the Taliban has been shaped by deep sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical divides. The Taliban's rise in the mid-1990s as a Pashtun-dominated, ultra-conservative Sunni movement — backed primarily by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia — directly challenged Iran's interests. Tehran viewed the group as an ideological rival aligned with its regional adversaries, hostile to Shia communities, and threatening to create an unstable, anti-Iranian regime on its eastern border. The Taliban's persecution of the Shia Hazara minority and its disruption of Iranian influence routes into Central Asia further heightened tensions.

Unlike Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which recognized the Taliban regime that came to power in 1996, Iran refused to do so and instead provided military, financial, and logistical support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (United Islamic Front). Qasem Soleimani, who assumed command of the IRGC Quds Force around 1998, played a central role in this effort, advocating for intensified proxy support — including arms shipments, training, intelligence, and operational coordination — to sustain Northern Alliance resistance without risking direct Iranian military confrontation. This approach allowed Iran to counter the Taliban at lower cost while preserving regional leverage.

Relations reached their nadir in August 1998 when Taliban forces overran the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, killing eight to eleven Iranian diplomats and a journalist, and carried out large-scale massacres of Hazara civilians. Iran mobilized some 200,000 troops along the Afghan border, and war was averted only through UN mediation and diplomatic pressure. The episode reinforced Iran's view of the Taliban as an existential regional threat, while also illustrating a pattern that would define future engagement: despite their ideological extremism, Taliban leaders have repeatedly shown a readiness to accept tactical support from former adversaries and ideologically distant powers — including Iran, Russia, and China — when it serves their goals of survival, reducing isolation, and consolidating power.

Following the U.S.-led intervention in late 2001, Iran initially cooperated with Washington, providing intelligence support and facilitating the Bonn process for forming a new Afghan government. However, as the U.S. and NATO presence became a long-term fixture perceived as encirclement, elements of the IRGC shifted to a hedging strategy. While maintaining ties with the Kabul government, Iran began offering limited tactical support — weapons, training, and safe passage — to Taliban insurgents fighting coalition forces. The Taliban pragmatically accepted such assistance despite doctrinal differences, prioritizing battlefield gains and diplomatic breathing room over ideological consistency.

Cultivating Influence Across Ideological Lines

Iran’s approach was notable for its focus on cultivating relationships with senior Taliban figures associated with the movement’s Kandahar-based leadership, traditionally regarded as its most doctrinaire faction.

According to reporting by the Rand Corporation, the IRGC concentrated its engagement with the Taliban in the border provinces of Farah, Nimruz, and Herat. Iran invested heavily in cultivating relationships with Key Taliban leaders who today occupy senior positions within the regime, including Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir (Deputy Minister of Defense), Mohammad Ibrahim Sadar (Deputy Minister of Interior), and Mullah Mohammad Shirin Akhund (Governor of Kandahar Province). All three are considered close associates of the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hebatullah Akhundzada.

Iran’s success in building durable ties with this faction reflects a strategic calculation that influence over core leadership networks would yield greater long-term leverage than outreach to peripheral or more pragmatic elements.

Engagement After the Fall of Kabul

Iran openly welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. Unlike most foreign missions, Iran kept its embassy and consulate in Herat operational after the Taliban took Kabul. Iranian officials publicly framed the U.S, withdrawal as an opportunity for regional stabilization and peace.

In February 2023, Iran became the second neighboring country after Pakistan to formally hand over the Afghan embassy to Taliban representatives. Although relations experienced periodic tensions — particularly over border incidents, water rights, and the refugee crisis — Tehran has consistently avoided steps that would fundamentally alienate the Taliban, a posture largely reciprocated by Kabul.

High-level exchanges continued throughout 2023 and beyond, with Taliban delegations visiting Tehran, and Iranian officials travelling to Kabul. To date, Tehran has derived tangible benefits from this relationship, particularly in the areas of trade, border security, and intelligence cooperation against ISIS-K and other militant groups. The Taliban, in turn, have benefited from Iran’s political engagement, diplomatic legitimacy, and economic access — most notably through full use of Iran’s Chabahar port.

Trade, Leverage, and Strategic Opportunity

Sanctions have pushed both Tehran and the Taliban into a shared strategic corner. Isolated financially and diplomatically, both actors are now incentivized to innovate methods of evasion. For the Taliban, the objective is straightforward: survival and regime consolidation. For Tehran, however, Afghanistan represents something more strategic — a relatively under-monitored space where it can quietly advance regional ambitions.

A recent report by Israel’s Channel 14 suggests that this convergence may be deepening. Tehran is allegedly building a covert network through Taliban channels to facilitate financial transfers to Hezbollah and to establish contingency escape routes for senior Iranian officials in the event of a major military confrontation with the United States or Israel.

The alleged involvement of Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian-Fard, an experienced IRGC-QF operative with deep familiarity in Afghanistan, indicates that this initiative may be structured and strategic rather than opportunistic. The reported participation of Kamaluddin Nabizada, an Afghan businessman already sanctioned by Washington for facilitating IRGC and Hezbollah financial operations, further underscores the sanctions-evasion dimension.

Channel 14 has since reported an additional dimension to this relationship. According to senior Iran analyst Dror Balazada, the regime covertly dispatched Nabizada — already facing corruption charges — to approach the Taliban about assisting Tehran in suppressing internal uprisings. The Taliban leader reportedly refused, instead demanding a formal request from Tehran. The episode is revealing on multiple levels: it illustrates the regime's growing desperation over domestic unrest, its willingness to seek help from an ideologically alien partner, and the limits of its leverage over Kabul. The Taliban's insistence on a formal request suggests a movement increasingly conscious of its bargaining position — willing to cooperate, but not to be instrumentalized quietly.

If substantiated, these developments would illustrate how sanctioned actors increasingly cooperate not out of ideological alignment alone, but out of shared necessity — reshaping Afghanistan into a potential logistical rear base for Iran’s regional security architecture.

Economic engagement has become a central pillar of Iran’s Taliban policy. As Taliban–Pakistan relations deteriorated over disputes related to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and border management, Tehran moved to position itself as Afghanistan’s primary economic partner.

During his November 2025 visit to Kabul, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi announced that bilateral trade between Iran and Afghanistan had surpassed Iran’s total trade volume with all European countries combined. For Iran, which remains under extensive international sanctions, Afghanistan offers a nearby and relatively accessible market for oil, industrial goods, and manufactured products.

The increasing use of Iran’s Chabahar port as Afghanistan’s primary maritime outlet — displacing Karachi — has further deepened Kabul’s economic dependence on Tehran. The shift has enhanced Iran’s structural leverage over the Taliban, particularly at a time when normalization with Pakistan appears unlikely.

Constraints and Frictions

Despite these gains, Iran’s influence over the Taliban remains limited. Tehran recognizes that distancing itself from the Taliban would create opportunities for rival regional actors. Nevertheless, its efforts to position itself as a mediator between the Taliban and Afghan opposition groups have met resistance. The Taliban recently declined to participate in a regional dialogue hosted in Tehran, underscoring the limits of Iranian diplomatic leverage.

Water security remains another major point of friction. The Taliban’s continued construction of dams on rivers flowing toward Iran’s arid eastern provinces has triggered public outrage among Iranian parliamentarians and analysts. Farhad Shahraki and Ahmad Bakhshayesh Urdestani, prominent Iranian MPs, denounced the Taliban’s water policy and questioned the Iranian government’s complacency while calling for the use of force to ensure Iran’s fair water share. However, official Tehran has largely downplayed the issue to avoid escalating tensions with Kabul.

Security cooperation has helped stabilize much of Iran’s eastern border, but vulnerabilities persist. ISIS-K, Jaysh al-Adl, narcotics trafficking, and irregular migration remain enduring challenges. These shared threats continue to incentivize tactical coordination between Tehran and Kabul.

Afghan Opposition Figures and Growing Concerns

Iran continues to host several prominent Afghan political and military figures opposed to the Taliban, including former Herat governor Mohammad Ismail Khan and Shiite Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq. Iran is also home to large numbers of former Afghan National Security Forces personnel.

However, Iran’s deportation of undocumented Afghan refugees has raised concerns among opposition figures. According to a UN report, 1.8 million Afghans were deported from Iran in 2025. Most of these deportations took place around the 12-Day War, with Iranian officials accusing some Afghan refugees of spying for Israel.These mass deportations followed a previous crackdown, in which Afghan refugees were blamed for social disorder, representing a security threat, and increasing unemployment among. Reports suggest that some former Afghan security personnel have been forcibly returned to Afghanistan and subsequently detained or killed. In August 2025, The Telegraph reported that the IRGC is cooperating with Taliban intelligence to identify and track Afghan nationals who assisted the United Kingdom.

Concerns intensified following the assassinations of two prominent anti-Taliban figures in Iran in 2025. In September, Maroof Ghulami, head of the Council of Jihadi Commanders in western Afghanistan and a close associate of Ismail Khan, was killed in his office in Mashhad. In December, General Ikramuddin Saree, a former senior police general and outspoken Taliban critic, was shot dead near his home in Tehran.

Opposition groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) swiftly blamed the Taliban for the latter attack. Leaders of both the NRF and the Afghanistan Freedom Front called on Iranian authorities to conduct a transparent investigation. Iranian authorities issued limited public responses, and no findings have been released. For many Afghan opposition figures, such developments signal that Iran.

Conclusion: Iranian Goals, Influence, and Mutual Utility

Iran’s policy toward the Taliban is driven primarily by strategic considerations. Tehran seeks to prevent renewed U.S. or hostile regional influence in Afghanistan, secure its eastern borders, counter ISIS-K, manage refugee flows, ensure access to water resources, and expand economic leverage under sanctions. Engagement with the Taliban has proven more effective in advancing these objectives than confrontation.

Iran’s influence is substantial but not decisive. It is strongest in economic interdependence, border security coordination, intelligence cooperation, and selective political legitimacy. However, Tehran lacks the ability to fundamentally shape Taliban governance or compel concessions on sensitive issues such as water rights, internal repression, or engagement with opposition groups.

For the Taliban, the relationship offers diplomatic recognition, economic lifelines, trade access, and a powerful regional patron capable of balancing Pakistan. Yet this engagement also deepens Kabul’s dependence on Tehran and constrains the Taliban’s strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, Iran–Taliban relations reflect a pragmatic alignment driven by converging interests rather than trust or ideological convergence. While mutually beneficial in the short term, the relationship remains fragile, transactional, and vulnerable to shifting regional dynamics.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.
Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Introduction

In January 2025, reports emerged that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had assured U.S. envoy Steven Witkoff that Tehran would not carry out 800 executions of protesters. According to multiple accounts, this assurance may have led President Donald Trump to halt a planned military strike against Iran. The episode raises a question with serious implications for both Iranian society and U.S. policy: Will the Islamic Republic follow through on mass executions, or will strategic considerations stay its hand?

The answer lies not in diplomatic assurances — which Tehran has broken before — but in understanding the regime's internal calculus when ideology collides with survival. For over four decades, the Islamic Republic has navigated between revolutionary principle and strategic necessity, sometimes sacrificing enormous national interests for ideological purity, and at other times shelving sacred commitments to preserve the system itself. The historical record reveals clear patterns about when each imperative prevails, offering insights into whether the current wave of protesters faces the gallows or a reprieve.

This paper examines the ideological and strategic factors that will determine the fate of Iran's detained protesters. It analyzes past episodes when the regime prioritized revolutionary doctrine over national interest, contrasts these with moments when survival imperatives forced ideological compromise, and applies these patterns to assess the likelihood of mass executions. The conclusion challenges conventional Western assumptions about both Iranian decision-making and the efficacy of external pressure.

The Doctrine of System Preservation

To understand Iran's approach to domestic dissent, one must first grasp the theological framework that governs the Islamic Republic. The regime operates on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurist, which transforms political survival into religious obligation. Protecting the Islamic government is not merely a matter of state security — it is a divine duty that supersedes conventional ethical constraints.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's founder, articulated this principle with stark clarity. In various speeches, he declared that preserving the Islamic system constitutes the highest religious obligation, particularly when facing internal or external threats. In a 1983 address to officials, Khomeini went further, stating that maintaining the Islamic Republic "takes precedence over the life of any single person, even Imam Mahdi" — the twelfth Shi'a Imam revered as the promised redeemer. The statement is theologically radical: it places the political system above the most sacred figure in Shi'a eschatology.

After 1979, the regime systematically subordinated Iran's traditional religious establishment to political control, monopolizing the interpretation of Shi'ism and defining what constitutes proper Islamic governance. No religious authority could challenge these definitions without risking persecution. This consolidation meant that threats to the regime could be framed as threats to Islam itself, requiring a religious response from all faithful Muslims in Iran.

The doctrine has been implemented with brutal consistency. In April 1979, security forces suppressed an uprising in Khuzestan province, killing more than a hundred Arab Iranians seeking autonomy. The Kurdish revolt, which began in March 1979 and lasted over four years, claimed 5,000 Kurdish fighters and resulted in 1,200 executions. But the most chilling application came in the summer of 1988, when Khomeini ordered the mass execution of political prisoners — including leftists, Kurdish activists, and Baha'is — even as the Iran-Iraq War was ending and the country desperately needed reconstruction. Between July and December of that year, between 2,800 and 5,000 people were executed without trial in Iranian prisons.

These principles remain operative today. Following the suppression of the 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests, then-President Ebrahim Raisi visited the Fatehin Special Unit — an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) formation responsible for crushing dissent — and reiterated that "preserving the Islamic system is the highest religious obligation."

The Legal Machinery of Religious Repression

The regime's willingness to execute protesters rests on two complementary concepts embedded in the Islamic Republic's criminal law: Mohareb and Baghi. These categories transform political dissent into capital offenses while cloaking state violence in religious legitimacy.

Mohareb, defined as "someone who wages war against God and society," and Baghi, defined as "a rebel who takes up arms against the legitimate government," provide the legal and Islamic framework for executing those who challenge the system. Crucially, Shi'a jurists aligned with Velayat-e Faqih perceive domestic protesters not as citizens with grievances but as existential threats to the Islamic order. The judiciary has consistently labeled mass protesters under these categories, transforming demands for reform into acts of war against God.

During the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the judicial system characterized protesters as engaged in "armed rebellion" against God and society. Following the 2026 protests, Asghar Jahangir, spokesperson for the judiciary, again invoked the Mohareb designation. For the regime, enforcing capital punishment in these cases is not discretionary — it is a religious obligation. Failure to act would constitute defiance of divine command, a grave sin in the regime's theological framework.

This creates a powerful internal logic: regime officials face religious pressure to execute those deemed threats to the system. Any hint of leniency risks being interpreted as weakness before God, potentially undermining an official's standing within the ideological hierarchy. The question, then, is whether strategic considerations can override this theological imperative.

When Ideology Trumps Strategy: Six Cases

The Islamic Republic's history reveals multiple instances when the regime chose ideological purity over obvious strategic advantage, often at devastating cost. These cases establish a pattern: when core ideological commitments or clerical authority are at stake, Tehran has repeatedly sacrificed national interests.

The Rushdie Fatwa: Permanent Diplomatic Damage for Clerical Authority

Perhaps no decision better illustrates this pattern than Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against novelist Salman Rushdie. The timing revealed its strategic irrationality. The Iran-Iraq War had just ended after eight years of devastating conflict. Iran's economy lay shattered, its cities damaged, its population exhausted. The regime desperately needed reconstruction aid and normalized trade relations with Europe.

The fatwa destroyed these prospects immediately. Britain severed diplomatic ties. European investment evaporated. Iran's image as a potentially normalizing state collapsed overnight. Yet the regime never formally rescinded the fatwa, despite repeated opportunities over subsequent decades to do so at minimal political cost.

The logic was ideological, not strategic. Revoking the fatwa would have implied clerical fallibility and undermined the foundational claim that the Supreme Leader's religious rulings carry divine authority. The regime chose long-term ideological credibility over short-term diplomatic and economic gain. Decades later, despite warming relations with Europe at various points, the fatwa remains in force — one of the clearest examples of ideology trumping strategy in modern statecraft.

Hostility Toward Israel: The Enemy That Justifies Everything

Iran's uncompromising stance toward Israel operates on similar logic. While Tehran has at times modulated its approach to the United States, engaging in backchannel negotiations and even cooperation, it has consistently refused to soften its position on Israel. The regime will not recognize the Israeli state, continues to deny Israel's legitimacy in official rhetoric, and maintains maximalist positions even when unnecessary for deterrence.

At multiple junctures — particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s — reducing rhetorical hostility toward Israel could have eased international pressure at minimal internal cost. The regime chose otherwise. Anti-Zionism is foundational to Iran's revolutionary narrative, and Israel functions as the symbolic enemy that legitimizes militarization, regional proxy networks, and domestic repression. Retreat on this front would risk unraveling the regime's ideological coherence, a cost Tehran has refused to pay.

The Hostage Crisis: Revolutionary Consolidation Through Catastrophe

The 1979-1981 seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its 52 hostages followed similar logic. The crisis paralyzed Iran's economy, undermined moderate factions, triggered sanctions, and established a framework of U.S.-Iranian hostility that persists today. Strategically, it was catastrophic. Yet the leadership allowed it to continue for 444 days, even after the costs became undeniable.

The hostage crisis served ideological purposes: it consolidated revolutionary power, destroyed liberal and nationalist rivals within Iran's fractured post-revolutionary elite, and established the regime's anti-imperialist credentials. Ideological mobilization mattered more than international standing or economic welfare. The pattern would repeat: ideology as a tool of internal consolidation, deployed even at enormous external cost.

Exporting the Revolution: Inviting Invasion

In its early years, Iran openly called for overthrowing neighboring regimes, supported subversive movements throughout the Gulf, and rejected basic norms of state sovereignty. These actions directly endangered Iran's security and helped trigger Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion, which would claim hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives over eight years.

The regime persisted because it was still defining itself, and leaders believed revolutionary expansion was necessary for survival. Retreat would have signaled weakness at this formative moment. Only when survival itself became threatened did expansion give way to defensive consolidation. During the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini doubled down on revolutionary export, claiming the “road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala.”

The 1988 Prison Massacres: Purification During Vulnerability

Even as Iran was ending the catastrophic war with Iraq and desperately needed reconstruction, the regime carried out mass executions of political prisoners in 1988. Strategically, this was unnecessary and damaging, inviting international condemnation at precisely the moment Iran needed to rehabilitate its image.

But the leadership feared ideological contamination more than external pressure. Internal enemies were perceived as existential threats regardless of cost. The regime prioritized ideological purification during a moment of maximum vulnerability — a decision that presaged its approach to future domestic unrest.

Mandatory Hijab: The Symbol That Cannot Bend

Despite repeated waves of unrest — including the massive 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests triggered by Mahsa Amini's death — the regime has refused to abolish mandatory hijab laws. The strategic costs are clear: continuous protests, alienation of youth, loss of legitimacy among educated urbanites, and international condemnation.

Yet ideology prevails. The hijab represents clerical authority over public life. Backing down would signal that mass protest can rewrite Islamic law, establishing a precedent the regime fears more than ongoing unrest. As with the Rushdie fatwa, retreat would imply clerical fallibility — an admission the system cannot afford.

When Survival Trumps Ideology: Seven Cases

The Islamic Republic's willingness to compromise ideology is less well understood but equally consistent. When the regime has faced genuine existential threats, it has demonstrated remarkable flexibility, shelving core revolutionary principles to preserve the system. These cases establish the conditions under which ideological compromise becomes possible.

The "Poisoned Chalice": Khomeini's Strategic Retreat

In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini accepted UN Resolution 598, ending the Iran-Iraq War on terms he had spent years rejecting. He had insisted the war must continue until Saddam Hussein was overthrown, framing it as a sacred struggle. By 1988, however, Iran faced military exhaustion, economic collapse, U.S. naval intervention in the Gulf, and real risk of elite fracture and popular uprising.

Khomeini described accepting the ceasefire as "drinking a poison chalice" — an unusually candid admission of ideological defeat. The statement established a template: preserve the Islamic Republic even if revolutionary ideals must be shelved. The survival of the system superseded the maximalist goals that had justified eight years of war.

Post-Khomeini Pragmatism: Abandoning Revolutionary Economics

After Khomeini's death in 1989, the regime faced economic ruin and a legitimacy crisis. President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani abandoned radical economic policies including aggressive nationalization and war economy measures, prioritizing reconstruction, foreign investment, and oil revenue. Iran quietly sought better relations with Europe and regional states.

This wasn't ideological liberalization — it was technocratic survivalism. The revolution's form was preserved, but much of its early economic content was softened or discarded. The flexibility demonstrated that revolutionary doctrine could be reinterpreted when the alternative was systemic collapse.

Scaling Back Revolutionary Export: Going Underground

After incidents like the 1992 Mykonos restaurant assassinations in Berlin nearly collapsed Iran's ties with Europe, the regime recalibrated its approach to exporting the revolution. Tehran scaled back overt assassinations abroad, reduced rhetorical calls for overthrowing regional governments, and rebranded its foreign policy language while maintaining proxy networks through less visible means.

The ideology didn't disappear — it went underground and became more deniable. The regime demonstrated it could modulate revolutionary zeal when faced with severe international isolation and intelligence warfare that threatened its security.

The Taliban's Enemy: Post-9/11 Cooperation

Perhaps most striking was Iran's quiet cooperation with the United States after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Despite "Death to America" being a foundational revolutionary slogan, Iran shared intelligence against the Taliban, helped shape the post-Taliban Afghan government, and facilitated U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

This cooperation occurred because Iran feared becoming the next target after Afghanistan, especially with U.S. forces building up on its borders. The Taliban were Sunni extremists hostile to Shi'a Iran, making cooperation strategically logical, but it required temporarily deprioritizing ideological hostility to America — a significant compromise.

The "Grand Bargain" That Wasn't: 2003 Panic

In 2003, as U.S. forces swept through Iraq, Iran reportedly offered comprehensive negotiations covering nuclear transparency, implicit recognition of Israel, and limits on support for militant groups. Whether this offer was fully authorized at the highest levels remains disputed, but its existence reflects genuine elite panic.

The regime was willing to discuss previously untouchable ideological red lines when it believed its survival was directly threatened by U.S. military force. The episode reveals how regime-change fears can override even core revolutionary commitments.

"Heroic Flexibility": The 2015 Nuclear Deal

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) required Iran to accept severe limits on enrichment, intrusive inspections, and rhetorical softening toward diplomacy — all contradicting the regime's narrative of nuclear "resistance" and defiance of Western pressure. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei justified the compromise as "heroic flexibility," a revealing phrase that signals doctrine: ideology is flexible when the system faces existential risk.

The regime calculated that economic strangulation posed a greater threat than ideological concession. The JCPOA demonstrated that even core strategic programs could be constrained when the alternative was internal unrest driven by economic collapse.

Brutal Repression: Sacrificing Islamic Legitimacy

Paradoxically, the regime's repeated brutal suppression of mass protests — in 1999, 2009, 2017-18, 2019, 2022, and 2026 — represents another form of ideological compromise. By killing large numbers of protesters, lying transparently about casualties, and sidelining religious rhetoric in favor of raw coercion, the regime undercuts its own ideological self-image as a just Islamic state.

Yet survival trumps legitimacy. When faced with serious unrest, Tehran has consistently chosen violent repression over accommodation, accepting the damage to its Islamic credentials in exchange for maintaining control. This pattern suggests the regime views immediate survival as more important than long-term ideological consistency.

The Protester's Calculus: Four Determining Factors

Whether Iran executes hundreds of detained protesters depends on how the regime weighs four competing pressures. Each has historical precedent, and their interaction will determine the outcome.

Factor 1: Threat Perception—Existential or Manageable?

The regime's response will depend critically on whether it perceives the recent protests as an existential threat or a manageable challenge. The historical record suggests a clear pattern: when the system itself appears threatened, the regime responds with maximum force regardless of cost.

The 1988 prison massacres occurred precisely because the regime, exhausted from war, feared that surviving political prisoners represented an ideological contagion that could unravel revolutionary authority. The 2019 protests, which saw several hundred killed, were suppressed with exceptional brutality because they spread to working-class areas and included attacks on banks and government buildings — suggesting deeper social rage beyond middle-class reformism.

If regime elites conclude that current protesters represent a broader revolutionary movement rather than contained unrest, the ideological imperative to eliminate "enemies of God" will intensify. Conversely, if they assess the threat as manageable through imprisonment and selective punishment, mass executions become less likely.

Factor 2: International Pressure—Credible or Performative?

The reported Trump administration threat to strike Iran if executions proceed represents an unusual form of external pressure. Historically, Western criticism has rarely deterred Iranian repression, but credible military threats have occasionally altered regime calculations.

The key word is "credible." Tehran has extensive experience managing international condemnation and has shown willingness to accept severe diplomatic costs for ideological goals, as the Rushdie fatwa demonstrates. However, when faced with immediate, concrete threats to regime survival — as in 1988 with the ceasefire, or 2015 with the JCPOA — the regime has proven capable of tactical flexibility.

The challenge for external actors is that threats must be both credible and proportionate. If Tehran believes that refraining from executions will not fundamentally alter its relationship with the United States or spare it from regime-change pressure, the incentive to show restraint diminishes. The regime may calculate that it will face American hostility regardless, making the domestic imperative to execute "enemies of God" more salient than foreign policy considerations.

Factor 3: Internal Elite Cohesion—United or Fractured?

The regime's approach to political violence has historically depended on elite consensus. The 1988 prison massacres required coordination between the judiciary, the IRGC, and clerical authorities. The 2019 crackdown succeeded because hardliners dominated all key institutions.

If elements within the regime question the wisdom of mass executions — whether for pragmatic reasons or concern about long-term legitimacy — implementation becomes more difficult. However, there is little evidence of such dissent currently. President Ebrahim Raisi, who himself is linked to the 1988 executions, represented the ascendancy of hardliners committed to uncompromising repression. His death in 2024 and the selection of Masoud Pezeshkian as president potentially introduces uncertainty, though Pezeshkian operates within severe constraints imposed by hardline institutions.

More important is the IRGC's assessment. If the Guards leadership views executions as necessary for deterrence and system preservation, they will likely proceed regardless of diplomatic costs. The IRGC's increasing dominance over Iranian politics since 2009 means that revolutionary ideology, rather than pragmatic statecraft, increasingly drives decision-making on internal security matters.

Factor 4: Precedent and Deterrence—The Moral Hazard of Restraint

From the regime's perspective, showing mercy creates a dangerous precedent. If protesters believe they can challenge the system without facing capital punishment, the cost of dissent decreases and future unrest becomes more likely. This logic has driven previous waves of executions: the regime seeks to establish that certain forms of opposition carry an absolute, non-negotiable penalty.

The theological framework of Mohareb and Baghi reinforces this calculus. If the regime designates protesters as enemies of God, failing to execute them amounts to defying divine command. This creates internal pressure within the judiciary and security apparatus to follow through on death sentences, independent of external considerations.

However, the regime must also weigh whether mass executions will trigger even larger protests or potentially fracture its own support base. The Woman, Life, Freedom movement demonstrated that excessive repression can generate sustained domestic and international backlash. If executions risk catalyzing a broader revolutionary movement, they become counterproductive even from a pure survival perspective.

The Verdict: Between Ideology and Survival

The historical evidence points toward a grim conclusion: the Islamic Republic is more likely to execute significant numbers of protesters than to show systematic clemency, but the scale will depend on its threat assessment and the credibility of international consequences.

Three factors support the likelihood of executions:

First, theological imperative. The regime has consistently demonstrated that when core ideological principles — particularly clerical authority and the inviolability of the Islamic system — are at stake, it prioritizes ideology over strategic cost. The Rushdie fatwa, mandatory hijab enforcement, and the 1988 massacres all demonstrate this pattern. Designated as Mohareb, protesters represent not political opponents but enemies of God. The religious obligation to punish them creates powerful internal momentum toward execution.

Second, precedent and deterrence. The regime fears that restraint will encourage future unrest. Every major protest wave since 2009 has been met with escalating violence precisely because the regime concluded that insufficient repression in one cycle emboldened protesters in the next. From this perspective, executions serve a functional purpose beyond punishment: they raise the cost of dissent to prohibitive levels.

Third, hardline dominance. The current configuration of Iranian politics favors uncompromising repression. The IRGC, hardline judiciary, and conservative clerical establishment control all key institutions and have shown no indication of questioning the necessity of severe punishment for protesters. The ideological infrastructure that enabled the 1988 massacres remains firmly in place.

However, three factors could limit the scale of executions:

First, regime survival calculus. If mass executions threaten to trigger a broader revolutionary movement or risk catalyzing international military action that endangers the regime itself, Tehran has demonstrated capacity for tactical restraint. The 1988 ceasefire, post-Khomeini economic reforms, and 2015 nuclear deal all show that when survival is genuinely threatened, ideology can be shelved.

Second, international leverage. While Western diplomatic criticism alone has rarely deterred Iranian repression, concrete and credible threats — particularly military action — have occasionally altered regime behavior. The reported Trump administration warning, if backed by clear and proportional consequences, could influence Tehran's calculus. However, this influence is likely to result in reduced numbers rather than wholesale clemency.

Third, tactical flexibility. The regime may opt for a mixed approach: executing a significant but not catastrophic number to establish deterrence while showing selective mercy to manage international pressure and avoid the appearance of mass slaughter. This would allow Tehran to satisfy its ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" while maintaining plausible deniability about systematic repression.

Policy Implications: The Limits of Engagement

For policymakers in Washington and European capitals, the analysis yields sobering conclusions about leverage and limits. Four implications merit emphasis:

Diplomatic assurances should be treated with extreme skepticism. Foreign Minister Araghchi's reported promise to forgo 800 executions should be understood as tactical rather than binding. The regime has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to mislead international interlocutors when core ideological commitments are at stake. Any claims that executions have been "abrogated" likely represent strategic attempts to manage international pressure rather than genuine policy shifts.

External pressure works only when survival is threatened. The regime has proven willing to endure enormous costs — economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, international condemnation — for ideological goals. Pressure becomes effective only when it credibly threatens the system's existence, as during the 1988 war exhaustion or 2015 economic crisis. Short of such threats, Tehran can absorb external criticism while proceeding with domestic repression.

Ideology and survival are not mutually exclusive. Western analysis often treats these as distinct categories, but the regime views them as integrated. From Tehran's perspective, failing to execute designated enemies of God threatens the ideological foundations that legitimate the system, making such executions a form of survival strategy. Convincing the regime otherwise requires demonstrating that repression endangers the system more than restraint does.

Long-term engagement requires acknowledging immovable positions. Certain ideological commitments — clerical authority, the nature of Islamic governance, and the right to eliminate perceived existential threats — have proven non-negotiable across four decades. Effective policy must work around rather than through these obstacles, focusing leverage on areas where the regime has demonstrated flexibility rather than core theological principles.

Conclusion: The Probability of Tragedy

Will Iran execute the protesters? The weight of historical evidence suggests yes, though likely in calibrated rather than wholesale fashion. The regime will almost certainly proceed with significant numbers of executions, framing them as religious obligations under Mohareb and Baghi designations, while attempting to manage international blowback through strategic ambiguity about precise numbers and limited clemency in high-profile cases.

The theological framework of Velayat-e Faqih, the historical pattern of prioritizing ideology over strategy when clerical authority is at stake, and the current dominance of hardline institutions all point toward repression. Foreign Minister Araghchi's assurances to American envoys should be understood as tactical rather than definitive — a pattern consistent with the regime's historical approach to managing international pressure while pursuing domestic imperatives.

Yet the regime retains capacity for strategic calculation. If executions genuinely risk triggering a broader revolutionary movement or invite military action that threatens system survival, Tehran has demonstrated it can modulate its approach. The question is not whether the regime will show mercy — it will not, in any systematic sense — but rather how many must die before the ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" is satisfied.

For the protesters awaiting judgment in Iranian prisons, this analysis offers little comfort. They have become pawns in a larger contest between revolutionary ideology and strategic survival, their individual fates determined by calculations that treat human life as instrumental to regime preservation. The Islamic Republic's 45-year history suggests that when this contest plays out, survival wins only when genuinely threatened — and ideology extracts a terrible price along the way.

The international community's ability to alter this trajectory remains limited. Without credible threats to regime survival or genuine willingness to fundamentally alter Iran's strategic environment, external pressure will likely affect the scale but not the fact of repression. The protesters' best hope lies not in diplomatic assurances or Western criticism, but in the regime's own cold calculus: that mass executions might trigger the very revolutionary crisis they are meant to prevent.

That is a thin reed on which to rest the lives of hundreds, but it is the only one history provides.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Intelligence.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

“In Iran’s political psychology, two factors are traditionally essential for a fundamental transformation: first, the bazaar must enter into sustained strikes and protests; second, the army or national armed forces must side with the people against the ruling power,” said Hussain Ehsani, a research fellow at the Turan Research Center, a Washington, D.C.–based think tank. “At this stage, the first condition has partially materialized. However, it remains unclear whether the bazaar strikes will continue or fade.”

Read the full interview on the National Post.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persia to discuss the US strikes on ISIS position in Syria following the killing of two US soldiers and an interpreter. According to CENTCOM, several militants were killed in the strikes.

Watch the full interview here (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On the day after the Taliban seized Kabul in 2021, a Turkish Airlines flight carrying 234 passengers arrived in Istanbul. Among them was Sarwar Danish, Afghanistan’s Second Vice President, and two members of President Ashraf Ghani’s fleeing cabinet.

Danish, became the highest-ranking Hazara official of the Afghan government to flee the Taliban without seeking refuge in Iran, despite having lived and studied there for many years. Like many educated Hazara elites, he spent much of the 1980s and 1990s in Iran, pursuing religious studies in Qom, home to the world’ s largest Shiite theological seminary.

Hazara Shiites and Iranian Shiites share the Twelver branch of Shia Islam but differ ethnically. The Hazaras have Mongol-Turkic roots and speak Hazaragi, a Farsi-based language. Iranian Shiites are ethnic Persians who speak Farsi.

Iran’s deepening relations with the Taliban convinced Danish that it was too risky to seek refuge there. Ultimately, he resettled in New Zealand.

In the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom brought about the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001. The subsequent Bonn Agreement established a power-sharing framework that reshaped Afghanistan’s political order. Within this arrangement, the Hazaras — the second most powerful opposition to the Taliban after the Tajiks — secured 20 percent of Cabinet positions. Their representation was led by Islamic Unity Party (Hizb-e-Wahdat) leader Mohammad Karim Khalili, who assumed the role of Second Vice President Today, Khalili lives in exile in Turkey.

Following the U.S. intervention in 2001, the Hazaras community has pursued gradual yet consistent efforts to define an identity that extends beyond its Shiite religious affiliation. This process has contributed to a degree of distancing from Iran’s Islamic regime. In their search for a broader cultural and political framework, Hazara political and academic elites have taken tangible steps to cultivate ties with Turkey, positioning themselves as leading actors within the Turkic world. Such outreach has resonated with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s promotion of Pan-Turkism.

Within this context, Turkey’s reception of prominent Hazara political leaders such as Khalili and Mohammad Mohaqqiq, the long-time leader of the People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (PIUPA), appears strategically coherent. Both figures, together with Danish, have played active roles in exile politics, most notably through the establishment of the National Resistance Council for Salvation of Afghanistan in Turkey in 2022. The council has formed a political opposition coalition against the Taliban. Both Mohaqqiq and Danish are the among the organization’s founders.

Iran’s relationship with the Taliban has steadily deepened over the past decade, diminishing its appeal as a refuge for Hazara leaders. From 2015 onward, reports indicate that Iran began engaging both diplomatically and militarily with the Taliban, with some analysts noting the establishment of Taliban training infrastructure inside Iran. This alignment was not merely pragmatic but political: Iran appeared intent on cultivating influence with the Taliban, even at the expense of marginalized Afghan groups. In return, Iran secures its eastern border, gains access to the Afghan market, uses the Taliban’s anti-West sentiments as its global P.R., and can stay influential in regional dynamics. In 2023, the relationship was formalized further when Tehran transferred control of the Afghan embassy to Taliban-appointed diplomats.

The Hazara community’s historical experience with Iran is more complex than shared Shiite identity might suggest. During the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, Iran provided support to Hazara jihadist groups, but this assistance weakened Hazara political cohesion after the Soviet withdrawal, some analysts argue.

Moreover, within Hazara narratives, Iran is remembered as having prioritized other Afghan factions — such as the Tajik mujahideen group, Jamiat-e Islami. during the early 1990s civil war that erupted after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, offering more military support, while limiting aid to Hazara groups. Although archival evidence remains sparse, these perceptions left a legacy of mistrust among some Hazara elites toward Tehran.

One of the most significant sources of Hazara mistrust toward Iran stems from Iran’s use of Hazara refugees in its regional military engagements. The Fatemiyoun Brigade, backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), recruited large numbers of Afghan Hazaras — including minors — to fight in Syria. Human Rights Watch documented cases of Afghan children as young as 14 who were deployed and killed in Syria under Fatemiyoun’s banner.

Beyond such recruitment, reports highlight coercive practices: Hazara refugees allegedly pressured through economic vulnerability or promises of legal residency for fighting in the Fatemiyoun. Human Rights and migrant-rights groups argue that the IRGC exploited refugees’ precarious lives for geopolitical gain. In a 2020 report by the Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights, IRGC Qud’s Force recruited thousands of Afghans Shias mainly from the Hazara community to fight in Syria. One Afghan described being approached at a mosque in Efsahan, “They suggested we go to Syria to help defend the Shi’a holy shrines from Daesh’, adding that ‘we’d get passports and have an easy life afterwards. We’d be like Iranian citizens and could buy cars, houses…”

For Hazara leaders, these practices transformed Iran from a potential sanctuary into a place of exploitation, casting serious doubts about Tehran’s willingness to protect the broader Hazara community.

Throughout the two-decades of the Afghan Republic, Western governments played a dominant role in the nation’s political institutions, development funding, and security architecture. Hazara leaders actively cultivated these relationships to avoid political marginalization and to ensure external backing. During this period, hundreds of Hazara youth obtained scholarships to leading universities in the U.S. and Europe, with many returning to Afghanistan to occupy senior positions within the Republic’s bureaucracy.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Western actors continued to influence Afghan realities primarily through humanitarian aid. According to a UNOCHA, approximately $6.7 billion in humanitarian funding was directed to Afghanistan between 2021 and 2024. This sustained support reinforced the perception that Western countries would remain influential players in any future Afghan political landscape. For Hazara leaders, relocation to the West offered not only physical safety but also continued political relevance and access to resources.

Over the past two decades, Hazara diaspora communities have flourished across Western countries — particularly in Europe, Australia, and Canada. These communities have become hubs for political mobilization, advocacy, fundraising, and civil society initiatives. For exiled Hazara leaders, relocation to these countries provides access to established networks, enabling them to maintain influence and engage in transnational activism.

 By contrast, the political space for Hazaras in Iran has remained considerably more constrained limiting the role of any diaspora there as a platform for political leadership. Iran’s domestic political system imposes strict limits on independent political organizing, particularly for refugees. Hazara leaders attempting to operate politically in Iran risk surveillance, repression, and legal obstacles. It is highly unlikely that figures like Mohammad Mohaqqiq, Sarwar Danesh, or Karim Khalili could freely participate in anti-Taliban groups if based in Iran.

Moreover, Iran’s political climate is far less permissive toward the formation of independent political parties or coalitions — especially those that might challenge Tehran’s strategic interests. For Hazara leaders seeking political agency and a long-term voice, Western democracies offer far greater freedom and opportunity than Iran’s restrictive environment.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persian to discuss the terror attack against a Hannukah celebration in Bondi Beach, Australia.

Watch the interview on BBC (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

UN experts have recently warned that Afghanistan has become a hub for foreign terrorists -- including those from Central Asia. Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani discusses the Islamic State's current standing in Afghanistan.

Watch the full interview here on Afghanistan International (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

United Nations experts say that the Taliban has used forces from Tajikistan’s Jamaat Ansarullah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Imam Bukhari Brigade, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, especially in Northern Afghanistan. Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani comments for BBC Persian.

Watch the interview on BBC Persian.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The twelve-day war between Israel and Iran, marked by targeted strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), nuclear scientists, and key state infrastructure, including IRIB broadcasting headquarters and intelligence centers, triggered a paradigmatic shift in the security landscape of the Middle East. Israel’s focused strategy of precision strikes on predetermined targets, coupled with superior intelligence and operational acumen, allowed Tel Aviv’s security apparatus to swiftly gain and expand its intelligence and tactical superiority over Iran’s security domain. For a period, Israel even maintained de facto control over Iran’s airspace. The situation reached a point where certain Iranian officials, including the foreign minister, reportedly required Israel’s approval to exit the country, an unprecedented revelation that starkly underscored Iran’s diminished deterrent capacity in the region after 46 years of aggressive security posturing.

However, this paradigm shift extended beyond military and intelligence dynamics or the mere weakening of Iran’s regional axis. It heralded a broader behavioral transformation among key players across the Middle East. One notable example was Hezbollah’s conspicuous inaction during the twelve-day conflict. Despite its foundational purpose, established by Iran in 1982 to pursue Tehran’s regional objectives and serve as a strategic lever against Israel, Hezbollah refrained from any military engagement. This restraint was striking, particularly given Hezbollah’s traditional role in responding to escalations involving Israel.

On a regional level, one of the most telling post-war developments was the political discourse and social reactions from segments of Afghanistan’s intellectual elite concerning the Iran-Israel war. Afghan political figures, cultural leaders, poets, intellectuals, and university professors expressed varied reactions on social media, voicing support for the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Israeli state. This stance seemingly stemmed from a belief system rooted in shared linguistic, religious, cultural, and geographical ties between the Afghan and Iranian peoples. For these Afghan elites, endorsing Iran in its confrontation with Israel was perceived as a dual test, both cultural and political, through which they sought to reaffirm a sense of regional solidarity and emerge morally vindicated.

Read the original Persian article on 8am Media.
Read the English translation here.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

After the ceasefire that ended Israel’s 12-day war against Iran, Iranian officials were stunned by the sophistication of the Mossad’s operation and alarmed by the revelation of where the security breach had occurred.

Despite mounting evidence of a high-level intelligence breach, some Iranian officials deflected blame by targeting a French journalist named Catherine Shakdam. In an interview with state media, Mostafa Kavakebian, a former member of the Iranian parliament, said “the breach came from Catherine Shakdam, an Israeli spy, who shared her bed with 120 officials in the country.” Javad Zarif, a former foreign minister, added: “We need to understand how Catherine Shakdam infiltrated the country.”

For the record, Shakdam, a Jew who converted to Islam, traveled to Iran in 2017 for less than a month. She interviewed candidate Ebrahim Raisi, wrote several articles for the supreme leader’s website, took photos with the daughters of two military men assassinated by Israel -- Emad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s chief of staff and Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force -- and participated in a conference about Palestine. She now identifies as a Zionist and a Jew.

Aside from Kavakebian’s allegations of Shakdam’s espionage activities, a range of speculation went farther and stranger on who was responsible for helping the Israelis. Abullah Ganji, an Iranian conservative activist, posted on X, “After the recent war, a few sheets of paper were found on the streets of Tehran containing talismans with Jewish symbols." Meanwhile, a senior Iranian official accused Jerusalem of using "the occult and supernatural spirits" during its military operation.

Indeed, Iran security intelligence -- including Vezarat–e–Ettelaat (the Ministry of Intelligence) and Ettelaat–e –Sepah, (the Intelligence Department of the IRGC) -- was caught off guard and suffered extensive, system-wide damage. At least 30 IRGC senior commanders were killed during the Israeli strikes, three core nuclear sites were destroyed, along with major IRGC infrastructure, and what remained of Iran's air defense systems after Israeli strikes in October of last year. To date -- Operation Rising Lion is the largest failure experienced by Tehran's intelligence apparatus since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

As the Iranian security apparatus grappled with the embarrassment and internal breach, one question continued to resonate, among the public. Who is aiding Israeli intelligence from within Iran?

While some blame the occult and Shakdam, the security forces have largely scapegoated four groups: Kurds, Baluch, Azerbaijanis, and Afghan refugees. 

The Kurdish Connection

Historically, the Iranian regime has perceived its Kurdish citizens as separatists aligned with Israel’s strategic interests, particularly the push for Kurdish independence -- a movement Tehran fears could destabilize its western borders. Iranian authorities suspect that the Mossad maintains covert cells within Kurdistan, capable of facilitating intelligence operations inside Iran.

Immediately following Operation Rising Lion, Kurdish forces intercepted a drone launched at the Erbil airport by an Iranian proxy. On July 15 and 16, drone attacks targeted Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oilfields, with suspicions falling on pro-Iranian militias.

Hengaw, a Norwegian-based Kurdish human rights organization, says Iranian security forces have already arrested more than 140 Kurds for aiding Israel during the 12-day war. These arrests have likely increased since.

Targeting Iraqi Kurdistan is just as much about Iran's Kurdish minority population as Erbil's relations with Washington. The regime remains deeply uneasy about the U.S. presence in northern Iraq, viewing it as a potential threat to its national security and regional influence. The U.S.’s largest consulate in the world is in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Attacks on the KRG are not without precedent. In 2023, Iran launched ten ballistic missile toward Erbil, in response to the 2023 killing of Sayed Razi Mosavi, the commander of the Quds Force in Syria, in an Israeli airstrike. The missile strikes killed prominent businessman Peshraw Dizayee, his daughter, Karam Mikhail, and three other people.  The IRGC justified the attack, saying Iran had targeted a “Mossad espionage center.”

In 2020, Iranian security forces arrested three Kurdish Iranians after the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an Iranian nuclear physicist and chief of Iran’s nuclear program. He was reportedly killed in a road ambush by an autonomous satellite-operated gun. In June, the three men were executed for killing Fakhrizadeh as part of a crackdown on Israeli spies.

Baluchistan under Fire

The Baluch make up the majority of Iran's poorest province -- Sistan and Baluchistan. For decades, Baluch separatists have been waging a low-intensity insurgency against Tehran that claims the lives of security forces on a monthly basis. During the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests, Zahedan—the capital of the region—witnessed the deadliest crackdown, with security forces killing over 100 people.

On July 1, the IRGC launched a “counterterrorism” operation in the Baluch-majority province of Sistan-Baluchistan, claiming to target “mercenaries of the Zionist regime”—despite no Israeli operations taking place in the region.

Azerbaijanis as Alleged Operatives

Iranian officials have historically portrayed Azerbaijan as a close ally of Israel, suggesting that that its neighbor serves as a strategic sanctuary for Israeli operations. Authorities have accused Iranian-Azerbaijanis  -- Iran’s largest minority of some 30 million inhabitants-- of working for the Mossad during the 12-day war. More than 90 have been arrested for cooperating with Israel, according to Hengaw.

Iranian officials also claim that Israeli drones were launched from Azerbaijan. Notably, the Khorasan newspaper, an outlet linked to the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader, noted that “a collection of reports, field evidence, and credible speculations” indicates that Baku assisted Israel in conducting its attack against Iran.

Refugees Turned Suspects

For the first time, Iranian authorities have alleged that Afghan refugees – most of whom fled to Iran following the collapse of the U.S.-backed government in 2021-- are connected to the Mossad and assisted in the attacks on such sensitive sites as the nuclear facilities. Amid Israel’s recent operations inside Iran, the Iranian government issued an order for Afghan refugees to leave the country by July 6. Since January, around 1.4 million Afghans have been deported, with around 500,000 of those deportations following the 12 Day War.

Following Israel’s strike, Iran arrested Afghan refugees and blamed them for surveillance and building drones to target Iranian facilities. Tasnim, the Iranian news agency,  released a video, claiming  Iranian police found a small drone factory in Shahr-e-Rey, in southern Tehran, a neighborhood with a significant population of Afghan refugees. Moreover, Iranian security officials claimed that they arrested an Afghan university student who had files on making bombs and drones on his cellphone, accusing him of assisting Israeli drone strikes.

In 2021, a surge of anti-Afghan rhetoric flooded social media, fueled by misinformation and disinformation. The campaign centered around the Farsi hashtag of “Deportation of Afghans, National Demand.” Notably, these X accounts fell silent during the Israeli strikes on Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s intelligence branch – avoiding any anti-Afghan posts throughout the 12-day conflict. This coordinated silence suggested that the smear campaign was orchestrated by elements within the intelligence apparatus, aiming to incite public hostility and ultimately facilitate the removal of Afghan refugees from Iran.  After the Israeli attacks, these same accounts reemerged, accusing refugees of being the primary culprits and calling for their expulsion.

Israel’s strike provided Iranian officials with a pretext to label Afghan refugees as Mossad operatives or collaborators, resulting in the expulsion or departure of more than 700,000 Afghan refugees, according to the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs. However, the credibility of the accusations quickly unraveled. In an interview with Iranian state media, Member of Parliament Mannan Raeesi, said that precise intelligence and assessments had found no Afghan refugees among alleged Israeli spies. “This is mostly a defamation campaign,” Raisi asserted.

These accusations also carry a strong sense of hypocrisy.

Both long-term Afghan residents – who have lived in Iran for nearly four decades -  and those who fled the Taliban regime, have consistently faced systemic discrimination, including being denied access to such fundamental rights as opening bank accounts or even obtaining SIM cards. This level of scrutiny and control have placed them in a precarious situation under constant surveillance by Iranian authorities. Yet, despite these restrictions, Iranian officials have accused Afghans of collaborating with Israeli intelligence – alleging they’ve shared sensitive information, including the locations of IRGC commanders, strategic sites, and military bases.

Internal Crackdowns as a Deterrent

The Iranian regime’s treatment of its ethnic minorities -- Kurds, Baluch, Azerbaijanis, and Afghan refugees – bears striking resemblance to the oppressive tactics of Saddam Hussein, who ruthlessly cracked down on Shia populations in southern Iraq and on Kurds in the north following his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam responded with internal repression to reassert his control.

Iranian allies across the region have echoed this playbook. For example, when mass protests swept across Syria in 2011 during the Arab Spring, President Bashar al-Assad responded with indiscriminate violence against Sunni civilians, particularly in the northern regions of Homs and Idlib. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Houthis movement launched a brutal campaign of arrests and executions, accusing civilians of colluding with Saudi forces and revealing strategic Houthis positions.

Iran’s post-conflict actions suggest a regime grappling more with psychological defeat than with strategic recovery. Following Israel’s unexpected strike, which contradicted years of Iranian bravado about swift retaliation and impenetrable defenses, the Islamic Republic appears to have turned its frustration inward. The sudden crackdown on ethnic minorities seems less about uncovering espionage networks and more about asserting control in the face of humiliation. For Tehran, it is essential to maintain deterrence over its own citizens.

For decades, Tehran has positioned itself as a regional powerhouse, relentlessly threatening Israel with annihilation and projecting an image of unshakeable strength. But the surprise attack dismantled that illusion. In its aftermath, the regime scrambled to restore authority – not by identifying real culprits – but by targeting marginalized communities who already face institutional discrimination and surveillance.

The effectiveness of Israeli intelligence operations in Iran reveals not only its capabilities but also sheds light on the disposition of the Iranian people—especially among Iran’s oppressed groups, each for their own reasons. No successful intelligence effort is possible without a network of human assets. The fact that Israel has managed to build such networks suggests that many Iranians are willing to cooperate with Israeli intelligence. In some cases, these individuals may not have even known they were working for Israel; their main motivation was simply to strike at the regime.

This willingness to undermine the Islamic Republic underscores the moral and economic bankruptcy of the revolution. A regime that fears spies around every corner is not just facing a capable enemy—it is facing a crisis of legitimacy. When citizens are open to aiding foreign intelligence against their own rulers, it says more about the regime than its adversaries.

There’s also a deeper layer to the regime’s behavior. Its repression of ethnic and religious minorities reveals the moral degradation of a state that claims to defend the “oppressed” (mostazafin) against the “oppressors” (mostakberin). In reality, those lofty revolutionary slogans are used to justify the systematic oppression of Iran’s most vulnerable communities.

Paradoxically, the regime is compelled to act against its own fundamental interests. Although it has no desire to further alienate minority populations, it feels obligated to demonstrate a show of force. In doing so, it traps itself in a self-defeating cycle with narrowing room for maneuver.

However, there is some short-term pragmatism in Iran's actions. Israeli intelligence has clearly penetrated the highest echelons of Iranian power; otherwise, the precision targeting of senior military officials would not be possible. These are not just formal high-ranking officers but also insiders known in Iranian political slang as khodiha—members of the inner circle.

Instead of investigating the security breaches, the regime prioritizes protecting these insiders from suspicion. As a result, its harsh crackdowns on dissidents and vulnerable populations are not just acts of repression—they are diversions, meant to shield the system’s own insiders from accountability for its growing internal failures.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence.

Introduction

Tajikistan, the only Persian-speaking republic amidst a sea of Turkic Central Asian states, has emerged as the latest arena in a quiet yet consequential contest. At the heart of this geopolitical struggle are two rival forces: on one side, Iran, aiming to reassert cultural and strategic dominance over what it sees as the broader Persianate world; on the other side, Turkey and Azerbaijan, spearheading the Turkic revival through institutions like the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This contest is less overtly militaristic and more ideological, infrastructural, and economic. Yet, the implications extend far beyond the immediate neighbors, also affecting players like Israel and the United States, who have significant interests in the alignment of Central Asia.

Historical and Cultural Foundations

Tajikistan’s connection to Iran is grounded in what Sayyid Amir Arjomand termed the “Persianate society”—a sphere defined by Persian linguistic and cultural influence. Though the Soviet project created a distinct Tajik nation in 1929, the underlying language and heritage remained resolutely Persian. The Tajik variant of Persian, shaped by Russian and Uzbek overlays and written in the Cyrillic script, retains a closer resemblance to classical Persian literature than even modern-day Persian of Iran. This linguistic bridge offers Iran an organic opening for cultural diplomacy and ideological exportation

Despite this affinity, relations between the two countries have been tumultuous since Tajikistan’s independence in 1992. During the civil war, Iran backed the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), offering both political and possible financial support. This drew the ire of the Tajik government, which viewed Iranian involvement with deep suspicion. Tensions thawed after the 1997 peace treaty, and for over a decade, Iran became a significant economic partner, investing in hydroelectric plants, tunnels, and media initiatives.

That all changed in 2013 when Iranian billionaire Babak Zanjani was accused of money laundering through Tajik banks, causing a rupture in trust. The situation deteriorated further in 2015 when Iran hosted Muhiddin Kabiri, the exiled leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), then banned by the Tajik authorities. Kabiri met with Ayatollah Khamenei, prompting Tajikistan to veto Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and freeze bilateral cooperation. Tajik street protests followed, and Tajikistan accused Iran of organizing war crimes and preparing Islamic terrorists. The Tajik leader referred to a “so-called friendly country” and claimed IRPT members had converted to Shi’ism, reinforcing the narrative of the IRPT being an extension of Iranian influence. Iran accused the National Bank of Tajikistan of money laundering, which was later confirmed to be false. All cooperation programs were curtailed.

Economic Resurgence and Strategic Positioning

The diplomatic chill began to thaw in the second half of 2024, when Iran and Tajikistan found common cause in addressing regional instability. Shared fears of Taliban resurgence and ISIS-Khorasan terrorism catalyzed renewed dialogue. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s January 2025 visit to Dushanbe marked a turning point, resulting in the signing of 23 memoranda of understanding across energy, infrastructure, and cultural sectors.

Iran sees Tajikistan as a key partner for expanding access to Central Asian markets. Among its most significant offers is the proposal to link Tajikistan to the Chabahar Port, developed with India. This port would allow Tajikistan direct access to international waters. Iran’s goal is to undermine the appeal of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and the Middle Corridor, both championed by Azerbaijan and Turkey.

However, trade volumes still reflect Iran’s limited role. While trade increased by nearly 50% in 2024, it only amounted to $378 million—significantly less than Tajikistan’s $1.12 billion trade with Russia. Iran remains an ambitious but junior partner in economic terms.

The Cultural Playbook and Its Limitations

Iran continues to pour resources into cultural diplomacy. Initiatives include establishing Persian-speaking associations, funding cultural festivals, offering scholarships for Tajik students, and attempting to revive Persian script usage. It even opened branches of Iranian universities in Tajikistan and invested in joint cultural productions. But the results have been mixed.

Tajikistan’s secular elite remains wary. Cultural efforts often double as soft propaganda campaigns, and Iran’s religious conservatism clashes with Tajikistan’s more secular governance. The attempt to launch a joint TV channel was blocked, with authorities citing concerns that it would serve as a vehicle for Iranian ideological messaging.

One glaring example of this cultural friction was the Iranian TV series Paytakht. Produced with participation from Tajik actresses, the series became controversial when the actresses revealed that Iranian producers attempted to enforce hijab and promote Islamic themes, reflecting the values of the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.

President Rahmon himself has pushed back against Iranian cultural dominance, emphasizing Tajikistan’s Aryan heritageand rejecting the idea that Tajiks are merely part of a broader Iranian identity. This divergence in worldview makes long-term Iranian cultural integration a hard sell.

Propaganda, Indoctrination, and the Israeli Connection

One of the more controversial aspects of Iran’s cultural outreach in Tajikistan is its covert ideological influence, particularly the promotion of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment. Educational institutions like Al-Mostafa University in Qom serve not only as centers for religious education but also as potential recruitment hubs for the IRGC Quds Force.

In October 2023, the Association of Tajik Muslim Youth issued a letter condemning the “child-killing Zionist regime” and expressing support for the Palestinian resistance, referencing Quranic verses about just war. The statement, published less than two weeks after the October 7 Hamas massacre, employed language that mirrored classic Iranian euphemisms— “global Zionism” as a stand-in for global Jewry. While the letter didn’t explicitly justify the massacre, it echoed the regime’s usual denial-and-deflect tactic: ignore the atrocities, blame the victim.

The statement linked directly to Al-Mostafa University, suggesting a concerted effort to propagate Iranian ideological narratives through Tajik proxies. Tajik officials, fully aware of this dynamic, have cracked down on book distributions and scrutinized educational exchanges.

Proxy Networks and Sectarian Outreach

Iran’s involvement in Tajikistan extends beyond traditional diplomacy and ideological messaging. It reflects a broader strategy Tehran has refined since 1979: cultivating influence through proxies. This tactic, while more visible in the Middle East, is increasingly present in Central Asia, particularly where Shi’a populations offer an opening.

Tehran has turned its attention to Tajikistan’s small but symbolically useful Shi’a minority. While Twelver Shi’a are few, Iran has focused on Ismailis, also known as Sevener Shi’a, as a potential ideological constituency. Iranian actors view this community as receptive to messaging that promotes Islamic unity under Tehran’s spiritual and political umbrella.

Security Collaboration and the Double Game

Security concerns offer Iran and Tajikistan common ground. Both nations regard radical Sunni groups like ISIS-Khorasan as existential threats. Iran labels such actors “Takfiri”—a pejorative for violent Sunnis who view Shi’ites as apostates. But Iran’s engagement in the security domain is far from one-dimensional.

The IRGC’s Quds Force has been caught recruiting Tajik nationals for regional operations. Muhammad Ali Burhanov, also known as Samad al-Tajiki, was recruited by the IRGC and later linked to multiple foiled terror attacks in Central Asia, including arson attempts on Jewish and Western targets.

Military collaboration continues, nonetheless. In May 2022, Iran inaugurated a factory in Dushanbe to produce Ababil-2 drones—an answer to Turkey’s widely successful Bayraktar drone diplomacy across the region. These efforts aim to counterbalance Ankara’s growing sway in places like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The Turkic Push: Pragmatism Over Propaganda

While Iran continues to build its engagement with Tajikistan through the language of shared heritage and Islamic identity, Turkey and Azerbaijan are charting a course that speaks in terms of roads, railways, ports, and pipelines. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), formerly seen as a ceremonial gathering of linguistic cousins, has transformed into a dynamic mechanism for geopolitical coordination. Its expansion has alarmed Tehran, which now describe it as a “Turkic NATO,” developed by the “Zionist entity” and designed to advance its interests in Central Asia. This framing highlights the growing effectiveness of Turkic cooperation, particularly in contrast to Iran’s often ideological outreach.

Tajikistan has become an unexpected but central target in this new Turkic orientation. Despite not being a Turkic-speaking country, its participation is actively sought by Ankara and Baku. President Emomali Rahmon’s 2024 visit to Azerbaijan was treated as a major breakthrough, culminating in the signing of numerous bilateral agreements. These agreements, spanning trade, energy, infrastructure, and technological collaboration, indicated a clear pivot toward practical alignment rather than linguistic or ethnic solidarity. While Iran made moves to counter this engagement, hosting Tajik delegations and offering alternatives like the Chabahar Port corridor, the scale and pace of Turkish and Azerbaijani activity were difficult to match.

Trans-Caspian Strategy and the Middle Corridor

One of the core instruments of the Turkic states’ regional strategy is the Middle Corridor—a transcontinental route linking China to Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Tajikistan’s involvement in this framework would represent a major redirection of its external economic orientation. The complementary Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor offers logistical passage across the Caspian and onward into the Caucasus, further reducing the role of Iranian or Russian transit options. From Baku to Istanbul, the vision is clear: integrate Tajikistan into a web of infrastructure that is modern, efficient, and geopolitically autonomous.

The vision is already being translated into concrete partnerships. Azerbaijan has opened discussions with Dushanbe on energy cooperation, with potential collaboration in fossil fuel extraction and transit. These moves are more than speculative. Analysts inside Iran expressed concern that if Tajikistan develops domestic hydrocarbon resources and partners with Azerbaijan, it could soon become part of the Trans-Caspian energy framework. The long-term implication, from Iran’s standpoint, is the loss of a vital frontier—one that might instead become a gateway for Turkic, and possibly Western-aligned, influence.

Why the Turkic Offer Resonates

What should make the Turkic offer especially appealing to Dushanbe is its strategic flexibility. Unlike Iranian cultural diplomacy, which often carries religious or ideological weight, the Turkic model is pointedly non-prescriptive. While Turkey certainly promotes its soft power and historical ties in the Turkic world, there is no requirement for Tajikistan to adopt linguistic changes, religious alignment, or political messaging. The deal on the table is practical: access to energy networks, infrastructure funding, regional platforms, and logistical integration. For a state like Tajikistan, governed by a largely secular regime and focused on stability and development, the minimalist, transactional style of Turkic engagement would be far easier to absorb.

Furthermore, Turkish and Azerbaijani engagement increasingly overlaps with Western technical and commercial interests, enhancing its attractiveness. These corridors—both transport and energy—serve not only regional purposes but also larger geo-economic strategies stretching to Europe and beyond. Tajikistan’s involvement in the Turkic routes would effectively insert it into a Eurasian trade architecture that favors diversification and strategic autonomy. While Iran speaks of shared civilization and Islamic awakening, the Turkic world presents ports, pipelines, and predictable partnerships.

Conclusion

Iran’s initiatives during recent official visits to Tajikistan demonstrate a strategic effort to counter the influence of Turkic powers, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan, in Central Asia. The Islamic Republic is increasingly concerned about the growing investments by Turkic states, which threaten to diminish its regional influence. To counter this, Iran is actively seeking to expand its influence in Tajikistan, leveraging shared Persian cultural and linguistic ties to strengthen bilateral relations, despite the strained relationship between the two countries and Iran’s alleged support for the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). This strategy includes economic initiatives, such as promoting Tajikistan’s access to the Chabahar Port, and military cooperation, exemplified by the 2022 establishment of an Ababil-2 drone factory in Dushanbe. By fostering these ties, Iran aims to position Tajikistan as a strategic partner in Central Asia, potentially countering the influence of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) led by Turkey and Azerbaijan, and observes Tajikistan as a proxy in Central Asia. However, Tajikistan’s secular governance, its ban on the IRPT, with which Iran has extensive ties with, since 2015, and its participation in the 2023 Dushanbe summit alongside Turkic states suggest that it is unlikely to become a mere proxy for Iran, complicating Tehran’s efforts to shape regional dynamics.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a professor of the Persian language at Ariel University, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence.

Hussain Ehsani is a researcher focused on the Middle East, previously serving as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.