Turan Research Center

As Armenia approaches its June 7, 2026, parliamentary elections, Russia has launched a multi-front campaign to reverse Yerevan's Western pivot and destroy the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the transit corridor at the heart of the U.S.-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Moscow is deploying the full spectrum of hybrid warfare — direct political pressure, economic coercion, disinformation, institutional subversion through the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the mobilization of both domestic and diaspora opposition. The campaign mirrors tactics Russia has used in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and across Central Asia, but the stakes in Armenia are uniquely high: the outcome of the June vote will determine whether the South Caucasus integrates into the Western-aligned Middle Corridor or reverts to Russian-managed frozen conflict. Washington has a narrow window to act.

Introduction: The Iran War as a Smokescreen

The ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran has dominated Washington's foreign policy bandwidth since its escalation in early 2026. The conflict's consequences — disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the destruction of Iran's Ras Laffan-area strike capabilities, the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, and the broader realignment of Gulf security — have rightly commanded attention. But the Iran war has also created a permissive environment for Russian adventurism in theaters Washington is not watching.

The South Caucasus is chief among them. While American policymakers focused on Tehran, Vladimir Putin moved to exploit the distraction, escalating pressure on Armenia in ways that threaten not only the peace process with Azerbaijan but American strategic interests across Central Asia. The June 7 elections represent a critical inflection point. If Moscow succeeds in installing a compliant government in Yerevan, it will unravel the single most consequential American diplomatic achievement in the region.

TRIPP and the Geopolitical Stakes

To understand why Russia is investing so heavily in Armenia's elections, one must start with TRIPP. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, initialed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the White House on August 8, 2025, envisions a twenty-five-mile corridor linking Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. On its own, this is a modest piece of infrastructure. In context, it is transformational.

TRIPP is the missing link in the Middle Corridor — the trans-Caspian trade route connecting Central Asia and China to European and global markets while bypassing both Russia and Iran. Currently, the Middle Corridor runs through Georgia, but this route carries two serious vulnerabilities. First, the East-West Highway that carries most overland freight and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that carries most of the region's energy exports both pass within one and 42 kilometers, respectively, of Russian-backed separatist forces in South Ossetia — close enough that BP briefly shut the pipeline during Russia's 2008 invasion. Second, the Georgian government under Georgian Dream has largely abandoned Euro-Atlantic integration and moved closer to Russia, China, and Iran, making the corridor's long-term reliability through Georgia increasingly uncertain. TRIPP offers a southern alternative that would reduce dependence on a single, increasingly compromised transit state.

Central Asia holds vast reserves of rare-earth elements and critical minerals essential to modern technology, from semiconductors to electric vehicles to advanced weapons systems. The United States currently relies on China for roughly 70 percent of its rare-earth imports. Diversifying those supply chains through Central Asian sources requires transit infrastructure that does not pass through Russian or Iranian territory. TRIPP, combined with expanded road and rail links through Armenia to Azerbaijan and Turkey, provides exactly that.

For Russia, this represents an existential threat to its remaining leverage in the post-Soviet space. For three decades, Moscow exploited the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict as a tool of domination, playing both sides to maintain dependence. It sold weapons to both countries, acted as Armenia's nominal security guarantor through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and used the frozen conflict as justification for its military presence and political influence across the region. A genuine peace between Yerevan and Baku — formalized through American mediation, no less — strips Moscow of this leverage entirely.

Direct Political Pressure: The April 1 Kremlin Meeting

The most visible dimension of Russia's campaign is the direct political pressure Putin himself has applied to Pashinyan. The two leaders' April 1, 2026, meeting in Moscow was remarkable for its open hostility, barely concealed behind diplomatic pleasantries.

Putin used the meeting to make several pointed demands. He called for dual Russian-Armenian citizens to be permitted to run in the June elections — a transparent reference to Samvel Karapetyan, the Russia-based billionaire founder of the "Strong Armenia" party, currently under house arrest in Yerevan on money laundering charges and allegations of plotting a coup. Putin stated that Russia would like "all" such individuals "to be able, at the very least, to participate in this domestic political process." He added, with undisguised menace, that Russia has "many friends in Armenia — many."

Putin also told Pashinyan flatly that simultaneous Armenian membership in the European Union and the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is "simply untenable" — a direct challenge to Yerevan's stated policy of pursuing EU integration while maintaining EAEU membership.

Pashinyan pushed back with unusual directness, telling Putin that "only citizens holding an Armenian passport — and no other nationality — can run in these elections." He underscored Armenia's democratic character, noting pointedly that "our social media, for example, is 100 percent free. There are no restrictions at all." He also confronted Putin over Russia's failure to fulfill its CSTO obligations during the Second Karabakh War, stating that Armenia "still has no explanation to offer to our people as to why the CSTO failed to respond."

The Kremlin's reaction was swift and characteristically threatening. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared that Moscow "reserves the right" to discuss Armenia's elections and its future orientation. Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk warned that Armenia is approaching a "point of no return" and threatened to restructure economic relations. In a detailed TASS interview, Overchuk went further, criticizing Armenia's plans for TRIPP — which he referred to as the "Trump Route" — characterizing it from Washington's perspective as "an international transport corridor ensuring the export of critical minerals from Central Asia to the United States, as well as control over Iran's northern border." He insisted that only Russia's participation in regional unblocking could "ensure the necessary balance of interests."

The message from Moscow was unambiguous: Armenia's democratic choice is subject to Russian approval, and the wrong choice will carry consequences.

Economic Coercion: The Tightening Vise

Russia has moved beyond threats to action. The economic pressure campaign against Armenia has escalated steadily since Yerevan froze its CSTO participation and began pursuing deeper ties with the West.

The instruments are familiar from Russia's playbook in other post-Soviet states. Armenian dairy products faced a sweeping import ban in 2023. Broader agricultural restrictions followed in 2024. In 2025, Russia delivered a crippling blow to Armenia's flower export industry. Moscow has also withheld millions in prepaid arms deliveries — weapons Armenia had already purchased but never received.

More recently, Moscow has reportedly moved to ban enterprises, companies, and cultural organizations linked to the Pashinyan government from operating in Russia. Reports have surfaced of the Proshyan Cognac Factory's export license to Russia being suspended. Even Armenia's ambassador to Russia and his circle have reportedly been placed in a "persona non grata" status.

These measures are designed to create tangible economic pain that ordinary Armenians will associate with the Pashinyan government's Western orientation. Armenian Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan acknowledged the dynamic when he stated that Armenia would exit both the CSTO and EAEU if Russia raised gas prices — while expressing confidence that it would not come to that.

Karapetyan, from house arrest, has amplified the economic pressure narrative, warning Armenians that the current government has turned the country into "an arena of geopolitical confrontation" and that continued support for Pashinyan will bring "poverty and enmity with Russia, polarization and economic collapse." His messaging closely mirrors Kremlin talking points, promising that "Strong Armenia" will "befriend all countries" — code for restoring Armenia's position within Russia's orbit.

Information Warfare and the Disinformation Surge

The most potent and least visible dimension of Russia's campaign is information warfare. Since late 2025, Russian-aligned disinformation targeting Armenia has surged dramatically. According to CivilNetCheck, a local fact-checking organization, fake news targeting Armenian authorities spiked sharply in the months leading up to the election. The operations follow a well-established Russian playbook deployed previously in Moldova, Romania, France, Germany, and the United States.

The infrastructure of the campaign includes cloned foreign websites designed to mimic legitimate media outlets, coordinated amplification through anonymous social media accounts, and Russian-language Telegram channels that serve as primary distribution networks. The content is carefully tailored to exploit Armenia's specific political vulnerabilities.

Several narrative threads are particularly prominent. First, allegations that Pashinyan's government has made secret territorial concessions to Azerbaijan, designed to stoke nationalist anger. Second, claims that Western countries are conducting dangerous medical experiments on Armenian women and children, or that French companies are burying nuclear waste in Armenian national parks — fabrications designed to discredit Western partnership. Third, and most strategically significant, narratives that amplify friction between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The Armenian Apostolic Church as an Institutional Lever

The weaponization of the Armenian Apostolic Church represents perhaps the most sophisticated element of Russia's hybrid campaign — and it draws on a deep institutional history. Throughout the Soviet period and into the post-Soviet era, Moscow cultivated influence over religious institutions across its periphery, using them as instruments of political control, intelligence collection, and social mobilization. The Russian Orthodox Church's role as an arm of Kremlin policy is well documented, but Moscow's reach extended to other confessions as well, including the Armenian Apostolic Church.

At the center of the current crisis is Catholicos Karekin II, the Supreme Patriarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church since 1999. Karekin II studied at the Russian Orthodox Academy in Zagorsk and was awarded the Russian Order of Friendship by Putin. His brother, Archbishop Yezras Nersisyan, serves as the Primate of the Armenian Church's Diocese of Russia and New Nakhijevan — appointed to the Moscow post by Karekin II himself in 2004. According to declassified documents from the Armenian National Security Service provided to Armenian media in late 2025, Archbishop Yezras was recruited by the Soviet KGB and cooperated with the agency from 1986 to 1988. The Vice Speaker of Armenia's Parliament, Ruben Rubinyan, described Yezras as a "KGB agent" and accused Karekin II of "using his agent brother to invite foreign churches to interfere in the affairs of our centuries-old independent and autonomous Church."

Amid the government-church confrontation, Putin awarded Nersisyan a state honor in November 2025 — a gesture widely interpreted as a signal of Russian backing. Nersisyan has since escalated dramatically. In an interview with the Russian state-run outlet TASS, he threatened any Armenian judge who might sentence Karekin II — who has been under criminal investigation since February 2026 for obstructing a court ruling — with excommunication. "This person will be excommunicated, and the people will curse his entire family," Nersisyan told TASS. He went further, claiming that a "coup d'état" had taken place in Armenia and that the authorities were using administrative resources "to discredit the clergy for political purposes, inciting intolerance toward the Church in society." That the head of the Armenian Church's Russian diocese is issuing threats against Armenian judicial officials from Moscow, through Russian state media, while under investigation for KGB ties, illustrates the degree to which the church has become a direct extension of Russian influence operations.

The confrontation has deep roots. Following Armenia's defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Karekin II repeatedly called on Pashinyan to resign. In spring 2024, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, a senior cleric, led the largest anti-government protests and positioned himself as a candidate for prime minister. Armenian authorities have since barred Karekin II from leaving the country, and multiple high-ranking priests have been arrested on various charges — actions the church describes as political persecution.

The Russian Orthodox Church has openly taken sides. In January 2026, Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate's Department for External Church Relations, met with Archbishop Yezras at the Moscow Armenian Church. The Russian Orthodox Church subsequently accused the Armenian government of "engineering a schism" within the Armenian Church — an extraordinary intervention by a foreign religious institution into Armenia's internal affairs, and one that aligned precisely with the Kremlin's political objectives.

Church leaders who have turned against the Pashinyan government provide Moscow with an institutional lever within Armenian civil society that operates independently of direct Russian state control. The pattern mirrors Russia's use of the Moscow-aligned branch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the years before the 2022 invasion. In Ukraine, the church served as a vehicle for pro-Russian sentiment, an intelligence collection platform, and a source of institutional legitimacy for narratives that undermined the government's sovereignty and Western orientation. Ukrainian journalist Oleksii Platonov described these clerics as the "Kremlin's agents in robes."

In Armenia, the church confrontation reached a dramatic peak on Palm Sunday 2026, when a church service led to a public confrontation as a congregant attempted to strike Pashinyan. The church has become a rallying point for opposition forces that frame the election as a civilizational choice between Armenia's Christian identity (implicitly aligned with Russia) and secular Western integration.

The church dynamic is particularly dangerous because it operates at the level of identity rather than policy. Economic coercion can be countered with alternative trade relationships. Disinformation can be debunked. But when a nation's oldest institution positions itself as the guardian of identity against a government it characterizes as selling out to foreign powers, the political effect is far more durable and difficult to combat.

Western Amplifiers: ANCA, Amsterdam, and Carlson

Moscow does not operate in isolation. The Kremlin's core narratives — that Pashinyan is a traitor, that peace with Azerbaijan means capitulation, that TRIPP is a vehicle for foreign exploitation — find ready amplifiers among actors in the West who, for their own reasons, oppose the peace process. The strategy of targeting U.S. domestic opinion to erode support for a foreign partner is not new. Russia deployed the same approach against Ukraine, using sympathetic media figures and lobbying networks to undermine Congressional support for Kyiv. A similar playbook has been directed at Israel, with narratives designed to fracture the bipartisan consensus on U.S. security partnerships. In Armenia, the operation is smaller in scale but involves some of the same actors — and the same objective: convincing Americans that supporting a democratic ally is not worth the cost.

The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), Washington's most prominent Armenian diaspora lobby, has long opposed normalization with Azerbaijan and routinely echoes the same grievances that Russian disinformation exploits. ANCA's leadership has gone further, denouncing TRIPP as a "neo-colonial U.S.-backed corporate consortium" — language that positions America's signature regional initiative as a predatory enterprise rather than a pathway to peace and prosperity. Whether or not ANCA coordinates with Moscow is beside the point. The functional effect is identical: undermining American policy and reinforcing the Kremlin's narrative that Western engagement is a trap.

Karapetyan has retained the lobbyist Robert Amsterdam, whose professional history raises questions that deserve scrutiny. Amsterdam's previous client was Vadim Novinsky, а pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch with ties to the Moscow-aligned faction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Amsterdam's involvement suggests a professionalized influence pipeline connecting Russian-aligned interests across the post-Soviet space to Washington's lobbying ecosystem.

Meanwhile, Tucker Carlson — who has a well-documented record of amplifying Kremlin, Chinese, and Iranian narratives, and who has been instrumental in efforts to undermine U.S. support for Ukraine and Israel alike — has lent his platform to anti-Pashinyan voices, including Amsterdam and Karapetyan’s nephew Narek Karapetyan, whose messaging dovetails with Moscow's line on Armenia. In an interview with Narek, Carlson's guest accused Pashinyan of waging "a war against Christianity" and pushing an "LGBTQ agenda" — rhetoric that mirrors precisely the civilizational framing Moscow uses across Eastern Europe. Carlson's audience reach means that narratives crafted for Armenian domestic consumption can be laundered through American media and returned to Armenian social media as evidence of "Western" skepticism of Pashinyan.

The combined effect is a pincer: Russian pressure from the East and opposition amplification from the West squeezing the Armenian government from every direction simultaneously. This convergence — whether coordinated or organic — represents a significant force multiplier for Moscow's campaign.

The Moldovan and Ukrainian Parallels

Russia's approach to Armenia is not novel. It follows a template Moscow has refined over two decades of interference in the domestic politics of its neighbors and beyond.

In Moldova, Russia spent hundreds of millions of euros on political meddling, according to President Maia Sandu. Moscow bankrolled opposition parties, deployed disinformation campaigns, and used economic leverage — particularly energy dependence — to punish governments that pursued European integration. Russian analysts have explicitly compared Armenia's trajectory to Moldova's. Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of research programs at the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, has stated that the "Moldovan scenario" represents a "voluntary renunciation of sovereignty and statehood" and warned that such an outcome for Armenia would be "extremely unfavorable."

In Ukraine, the template was even more destructive. Russia cultivated oligarchs like Viktor Medvedchuk, weaponized Russian-speaking populations, deployed the Orthodox Church as a political instrument, and waged a sustained information war before ultimately invading. The progression from soft influence to hard power is not inevitable, but the early stages in Armenia — the oligarch candidate, the church mobilization, the disinformation surge, the economic coercion — are disturbingly familiar.

A confidential 2024 report delivered to senior Russian officials by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin reportedly warnedthat Moscow is losing ground in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The June 7 election is the Kremlin's most immediate opportunity to reverse that trajectory. If Pashinyan falls and a pro-Russian government takes power, Moscow regains leverage over the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, TRIPP stalls or dies, and the Middle Corridor's development is set back by years.

The Electoral Landscape: Polling, Kocharyan, and the Pro-Russian Opposition

Understanding the effectiveness of Russia's campaign requires examining Armenia's domestic political landscape. The picture is one of widespread disillusionment with all political actors — but with important asymmetries that Moscow is trying to exploit.

Polling data paints a complex picture. According to the most recent EVN Report Armenian Election Study (second wave, conducted February–March 2026), Pashinyan's approval rating has risen to 47.2 percent, up from 36 percent in the first wave, and his Civil Contract party leads with 26.1 percent of vote intention. The opposition remains fragmented: Karapetyan's Strong Armenia comes second at 11.9 percent, while no other party approaches the parliamentary threshold. An earlier IRI survey showed just 13 percent trusting Pashinyan — but only 4 percent trusting his closest rival at the time, former President Robert Kocharyan. A staggering 61 percent of respondents said they trusted no political leader at all. Roughly 37 percent of voters remain undecided, making the election's outcome highly sensitive to the information environment and external events in the final weeks of the campaign.

Critically, Russia's standing in Armenia has plummeted since the 2020 Second Karabakh War and especially since 2023, when Russian peacekeepers stood aside as Azerbaijan retook Karabakh and its entire ethnic Armenian population was forced to flee. Public trust in Russia as a security guarantor — once the bedrock of the bilateral relationship — has collapsed. Polls show the Armenian public split on whether EU accession is achievable, but the old consensus that Russia provides reliable protection is gone. This is the paradox Moscow faces: its own perceived betrayal of Armenia created the conditions for Pashinyan's Western pivot, and now Moscow must use coercion rather than persuasion to reverse it.

Among the opposition candidates, Kocharyan is the most explicitly pro-Moscow figure with a realistic political base. Kocharyan, who leads the Hayastan (Armenia) Alliance, held his first press conference in three years in February 2025, ruling out retirement and declaring his intention to defeat Pashinyan. His framing of the conflict was revealing — and closely tracked the Kremlin's line. Asked why Russia failed to defend Armenia during the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive, Kocharyan defended Moscow, arguing that Pashinyan's recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh had "nullified Russia's mediating mandate" and asking, "Would any of you get in a fight for a friend who betrayed you?" A ruling party representative dismissed the performance, noting that "this press conference looked more like a press conference by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson than by a former president." Kocharyan has also praised Iran's role in containing Azerbaijan, stating that without Tehran's opposition to an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia's Syunik province, "Aliyev wouldn't have any obstacles" to military action.

While polls show the Hayastan Alliance well below the parliamentary threshold, its votes have largely bled to Karapetyan's Strong Armenia — suggesting that the pro-Russian electorate is consolidating around the Kremlin's preferred candidate rather than dispersing. The political contest is thus between a weakened but leading Pashinyan and a fragmented but increasingly consolidated pro-Russian opposition backed by Moscow's full hybrid toolkit.

Implications for U.S. Strategy

The implications for American interests are significant and direct.

The peace process. Pashinyan has warned that his defeat would mean the collapse of the peace process with Azerbaijan. A Kremlin-aligned government would have every incentive to revive territorial disputes, freeze normalization, and return to the status quo ante in which Moscow brokered temporary truces while maintaining leverage over both sides. The White House's August 2025 achievement would be undone.

TRIPP and the Middle Corridor. Without a cooperative Armenian government, TRIPP cannot be built. Without TRIPP, the Middle Corridor remains incomplete, and Central Asian rare-earth resources remain accessible primarily through Russian and Chinese transit routes. This has direct implications for American supply chain diversification at a time of intensifying competition with Beijing.

The broader regional architecture. Armenia's elections do not occur in isolation. Georgia has already tilted back toward Russia. Kazakhstan faces its own Russian destabilization threats. If Armenia falls back into Moscow's orbit, the entire Western-aligned regional architecture — painstakingly built through the peace deal, TRIPP, and expanded bilateral relationships — begins to collapse. The signal to other post-Soviet states would be devastating: align with the West, and Washington will not protect you.

Conclusion

Russia's hybrid warfare campaign against Armenia is not a peripheral issue. It is a direct test of whether the United States can sustain its diplomatic achievements in the face of Russian subversion. The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, TRIPP, and the broader Western-aligned architecture in the South Caucasus and Central Asia represent significant strategic assets. Moscow's campaign to destroy them — through a combination of political pressure, economic coercion, disinformation, institutional subversion, and the mobilization of Western amplifiers — is comprehensive and escalating.

The Iran war has created both a distraction and an opportunity. With Tehran weakened and the broader Middle East in flux, the South Caucasus matters more, not less. But the window is closing. If Washington looks away for two more months, it may find that Putin has already won — not through tanks and missiles, but through the quieter and cheaper tools of hybrid warfare that Russia has spent decades perfecting.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an Expert at the N7 Foundation, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

As the war in Iran spreads beyond the Middle East, it is reshaping the South Caucasus, bringing rising proxy threats, refugee pressures, and shifting alliances to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Georgian Service, Joseph Epstein, Director of the Turan Research Center and expert on Eurasia and the Middle East, explains that Azerbaijan faces direct attacks and pipeline threats, Georgia contends with pro-Iranian sentiment and security risks, and Armenia may gain room for Western-oriented initiatives. At the same time, Tehran’s regional aggression and Georgia’s pivot toward Russia, China, and Iran challenge US influence. Yet ongoing American engagement, sanctions, and strategic transit corridors give Washington leverage to shape Tbilisi’s decisions and protect its role in the Middle Corridor.

Read the full article on Georgia Today.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with Bahrain's Al Bilad newspaper on how Ukraine's battlefield experience in counter-drone warfare, electronic warfare, and asymmetric defense is creating new opportunities for strategic cooperation with Gulf states facing Iranian aerial threats. Epstein assessed that Kyiv's low-cost, field-proven interception solutions could fundamentally reshape Gulf air defense architecture, including multi-layered defense systems and civilian infrastructure protection.

Read the full interview on Al Bilad (Arabic).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Five weeks into “Operation Epic Fury,” the war with Iran shows no end in sight. Some 1,500 miles to the north, however, a far more effective peace process is underway. Last week, the foreign ministers of Armeniaand Azerbaijan praised “positive developments” in their normalization process. Buried inside the two sides’ peace deal is a 27-mile corridor that may be the most consequential piece of infrastructure the United States has built abroad in a generation—and the war in Iran is proving why.

American power has historically followed the world’s narrowest passages. The Panama Canal is the defining example: a 50-mile strip across the Isthmus of Panama that reshaped global trade, projected US influence across the Western Hemisphere, and remained under American control for nearly nine decades.

The US-backed “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) follows the pattern. The TRIPP is a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its exclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, near the Iranian border. Initialed at the White House last August after 32 years of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, TRIPP has the potential to become a new Eurasian chokepoint.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Russia and Iran were supposed to be strategic partners. They signed a comprehensive partnership treaty last year, pledging deeper defense cooperation and economic integration. When the United States struck Iran, some predicted Russia would stand by its ally. Instead, Moscow has treated Tehran's war as a business opportunity—pocketing oil windfalls, leveraging Western desperation for energy and bleeding U.S. military resources through covert intelligence sharing, all while risking nothing of its own.

By every short-term measure, Russia is winning a war it is not fighting. But the Middle East that Russia spent two decades inserting itself into is being reshaped by forces Moscow can neither direct nor contain, and the long-term costs may outweigh the dividends.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with RFE/RL's Azattyq Asia about the implications of the Strait of Hormuz crisis for Central Asia's energy producers. Below is an English translation of his comments, which appeared in the original Russian-language article.

On the scale of the crisis:

"In terms of the volume of supply under threat, this crisis is potentially larger than the 1973 embargo. The Arab oil embargo of that year removed roughly 4–5 million barrels per day from the market. According to JPMorgan estimates, the reduction in production and exports due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could exceed 4 million barrels per day within weeks, and if Persian Gulf states exhaust their storage capacity and are forced to shut in production — which is already happening in Kuwait and Iraq — the cumulative scale of supply disruption could reach levels the modern oil market has never faced."

On the duration factor:

"If Iran's naval and missile capabilities are sufficiently degraded and the strait reopens, markets will begin to normalize. For Asia, however — especially India, Japan, South Korea, and LNG-importing countries across South and Southeast Asia — the short-term pain is very real. The situation much more closely resembles the 1973 experience: a physical supply deficit compounded by price inflation. And it is precisely in this context that the strategic significance of Central Asia rises sharply — as a landlocked alternative dependent on no maritime strait."

On the insurance dimension:

"Iran didn't need to mine the strait — it only needed to make oil and gas transit uninsurable. We are watching in real time as roughly 20 percent of global oil trade and approximately 20 percent of LNG trade is effectively removed from the market — not by a naval blockade, but by cheap drones and the insurance market's reaction to them."

On Kazakhstan's paradox:

"This is one of the great ironies of the moment. Oil prices surged roughly 35 percent in a week — Brent exceeded $92 per barrel — and Kazakhstan, as a major oil producer, should theoretically have reaped enormous revenue gains. But it cannot, because its export infrastructure is paralyzed. Around 80 percent of Kazakhstan's oil exports flow through the CPC pipeline to the Black Sea terminal at Novorossiysk, and that infrastructure has been seriously damaged by Ukrainian drone strikes since November 2025. Currently, only one of the terminal's three single-point moorings is operational. In other words, the price windfall exists on paper, but Kazakhstan physically cannot bring sufficient volumes to market to capitalize on it."

On the structural vulnerability:

"What is happening underscores Kazakhstan's structural vulnerability — its windfall revenues remain in the ground due to critical dependence on a single export corridor."

On the China factor:

"China, which imported roughly 40 percent of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, is now extremely interested in locking in supplies from Central Asia — primarily from Kazakhstan via the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline. This is a powerful combination — push from Kazakhstan and pull from China. However, the scale is limited: even at full capacity, Atasu–Alashankou can transport only a fraction of CPC volumes. Moreover, the supporting infrastructure — refining, spur lines, rail connections — is not yet ready for a rapid large-scale shift. The direction of travel is clear, but the pace of change is measured in years, not months."

On Turkmenistan and European gas:

"Theoretically, yes — and the political momentum has never been stronger. Turkmenistan holds the world's fourth-largest proven gas reserves, and Turkmen gas began flowing to Turkey last year through swap agreements via Iran. Turkey's ambassador to Ashgabat explicitly called for accelerating construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline as a medium- and long-term solution. But there are real constraints. Most of Turkmenistan's untapped production capacity is concentrated at the Galkynysh field in the southeast — far from the Caspian coast. Turkmenistan has committed to more than doubling its gas exports to China, bringing them to 65 billion cubic meters per year, which means direct competition for Turkmen gas between Chinese and European demand."

On Turkmen gas volumes for Europe:

"Turkmen gas could become a meaningful supplement to European supplies — on the order of 5–15 billion cubic meters per year through the Southern Gas Corridor — but it will not replace Russian or Qatari volumes on a large scale. Moreover, Turkmenistan's own policies sometimes limit its export potential. For instance, its 'delivery to the border' policy, which requires importers to build pipelines to the Turkmen border, is a serious obstacle."

On the collapse of Iran transit:

"If Iranian infrastructure degrades or transit becomes impossible, the only significant gas export route remaining for Turkmenistan will be the pipeline to China — which only deepens the dependence it has been trying to escape."

On the systemic risk:

"This crisis clearly demonstrates that Central Asia's energy infrastructure was built for a geopolitical reality that no longer exists. Every major export route runs through a country that is either involved in a war or under serious pressure — Russia, Iran, or regions where they can influence maritime routes. This is a systemic risk that cannot be solved by a single pipeline. This crisis is a strategic turning point, but whether Central Asia can capitalize on it depends entirely on infrastructure investment decisions made in the next 2–3 years."

On the three conditions for real change:

"The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline moves from concept to construction; Kazakhstan diversifies its export routes beyond the CPC; and Western — above all American — capital begins to treat the region's infrastructure as a strategic priority rather than merely a commercial project."

On the historical pattern:

"History shows that energy diversification projects not launched during a crisis are almost never launched afterward."

Read the full article on RFE/RL's Azattyq Asia (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Arun Anand of the Nationalist view to discuss details of the Iran operation and how it effects Central Asia. In the interview, Epstein examines several critical questions: How are Central Asian states rerouting trade to global markets amid the connectivity crisis? Has the war weakened the Middle Corridor and pushed regional countries closer to Russia? Could instability in Iran trigger refugee flows or extremist spillover into the region? And with oil prices surging, what economic impact will the conflict have on Central Asian economies?

Watch the full interview here.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

On Thursday morning, Iranian drones struck the passenger terminal of Nakhchivan International Airport and landed near a school in the village of Shakarabad, injuring four civilians in Azerbaijan's western exclave. President Ilham Aliyev called it "an act of terror against the territory of Azerbaijan" and placed his armed forcesat full combat readiness. Tehran denied involvement — however, Azerbaijan's Ministry of Defense stated that its technical monitoring systems confirmed four unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran's armed forces were directed toward the Nakhchivan region, with one neutralized by Azerbaijani forces and others targeting civilian infrastructure.

Shortly after the strikes, IRGC-linked Telegram channels went further than Tehran's official denials. The channel Sepah Pasdaran, which tracks and amplifies IRGC operations, published a post taking credit for the Nakhchivan attack and framing it as a warning shot — a signal that worse would follow if Azerbaijan continued its strategic alignment with Israel and the United States.

Separately, reports of strikes near Shamkir, a village close to the Georgian border through which the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline runs, raised the specter of an even graver escalation: a direct Iranian attack on the energy infrastructure that delivers Caspian oil to Europe and Israel, bypassing both Russia and Iran.

These are not stray rounds from a chaotic battlefield. They are the logical culmination of months of escalating Iranian threats against Azerbaijan — and the clearest evidence yet that Tehran's decision-making apparatus has crossed from strategic calculation into self-destructive overreach.

A Pattern, Not an Accident

Since the US-Israeli joint strikes on Iran began on February 28, Tehran has lashed out at an extraordinary range of targets. Iranian missiles and drones have hit Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and British sovereign territory in Cyprus. The Strait of Hormuz is functionally closed: tanker traffic has collapsed to near zero, major shipping companies have suspended transits, and more than 150 vessels are anchored outside the strait. Oil prices, already in the mid- to high-$70s before the escalation, have surged into the $80s.

Iran struck Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura refinery and hit facilities in Qatar including Ras Laffan, temporarily halting LNG production. The US consulate in Dubai was hit by drones. The CIA headquarters in Riyadh was reportedly struck. An Amazon Web Services data center in the UAE lost power after being hit by Iranian munitions. Qatar shot down two Iranian Su-24 bombers — becoming the first nation to down Iranian aircraft in the conflict.

Against this backdrop, the strikes on Azerbaijan are not an aberration. They are the northern front of a regime-wide strategy to maximize damage to every node of the US-aligned regional order. Azerbaijan is a legitimate target in Tehran's eyes: it cooperates closely with Israel on defense and intelligence, supplies a significant share of Israel's crude oil through the BTC pipeline, and signed a US-brokered peace deal that granted Washington exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor on Iran's northern border. But understanding why Iran struck Azerbaijan is not the same as concluding that doing so was wise. To the contrary, the decision to attack Baku reveals a regime so consumed by the impulse to punish perceived enemies that it has lost the ability to weigh consequences.

Telegraphed Aggression

The attacks on Nakhchivan did not emerge from a vacuum. Tehran spent months publicly signaling that Azerbaijan was in the crosshairs — warnings that Western analysts largely dismissed.

In August 2025, days after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a US-brokered peace treaty at the White House, Ali Akbar Velayati — a senior adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader — issued an extraordinary threat. "Mr. Trump thinks the Caucasus is a piece of real estate he can lease for 99 years," he told the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency. "This passage will not become a gateway for Trump's mercenaries — it will become their graveyard." The passage in question was the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the US-backed land corridor through southern Armenia linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and, by extension, to Turkey and Europe.

Velayati described TRIPP not as a trade route but as "a political plot" designed to position NATO "like a viper" between Iran and Russia. The IRGC's political deputy, Yadollah Javani, compared Aliyev and Pashinyan to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — a leader who, in Tehran's framing, invited hostile foreign forces into a neighbor's security zone and reaped catastrophe.

By January 2026, the threats had sharpened from geopolitical rhetoric to operational doctrine. Fars News Agency, an IRGC-affiliated outlet, published an explicit targeting framework. Israel's growing energy dependence on Azerbaijani oil, it argued, "transforms Azerbaijan into part of the security chain of the Zionist regime and places it on the front line of Iran's targeting." The piece articulated what it called a strategy of "preemptive regional defense": in any conflict, strikes would fall not only on the primary adversary but on the military bases, infrastructure, and interests of any country providing territory or capabilities for operations against Iran. "The red line has been drawn," Fars warned, "and crossing it will place Azerbaijan directly in Tehran's crosshairs."

On March 3 — just two days before the Nakhchivan strikes — the Masaf Institute, an IRGC-linked think tank, published a call to action on Telegram: "Tehran is being bombed from the Baku direction and the northern corridor... Now that we've gone all in, why are we still showing consideration for Baku? Strike that cursed Aliyev and dress him in mourning."

Simultaneously, an adviser to the IRGC commander warned that Tehran would target "the enemy's oil supply lines" and would not allow oil exports benefiting its adversaries to continue. Middle East Eye reported that senior Arab sources interpreted this as a direct reference to the BTC pipeline, one of the largest suppliers of Israel's crude oil.

The progression is unmistakable: from Velayati's August rhetoric to Fars News's January doctrine to Masaf Institute's March incitement to actual drone strikes within 48 hours. Each statement moved closer to operational language. Each was published through channels with direct IRGC connections — institutional organs of the security state.

Why the Strikes Are Suicidal

Iran has grievances against Azerbaijan. Some are real: Baku's deepening defense partnership with Israel, the flow of Caspian oil to Israeli refineries, and Washington's growing strategic footprint on Iran's northern border. But attacking Azerbaijan is the geopolitical equivalent of throwing a Molotov Cocktail while standing in gasoline. The risks are not proportional to any conceivable gain — and they threaten to accelerate the very encirclement Tehran fears.

Start with military reality. Azerbaijan's 2025 defense budget reached approximately $5 billion, and — as I wrote previously for the Turan Research Center — the money has gone overwhelmingly into systems designed for precisely the kind of threat Iran now poses. Post-2020, Baku has acquired Israeli-supplied Ice Breaker long-range standoff missiles, LORA ballistic missiles, Barak-8 and Barak MX air-defense systems, Harop and SkyStriker loitering munitions, Hermes 900 and Heron MALE-class drones, and advanced coastal and maritime surveillance platforms. This is not a force built for another campaign in Karabakh. It is a force built for Iranian contingencies — maritime denial in the Caspian, protection of offshore energy platforms, and defense of infrastructure corridors. Iran is now provoking a military that has spent years preparing for this exact scenario. Tehran also has a history of cultivating proxy infrastructure inside Azerbaijan — the Husseiniyyun, a Hezbollah-modeled group created under Qassem Soleimani's supervision in 2015, which has carried out assassination attempts, plotted attacks on the Israeli embassy, and runs an extensive propaganda network from Qom. But whatever disruptive potential these networks once held, the current crisis may have neutralized their utility: Baku's security services are now on maximum alert, and the political climate has turned overwhelmingly against Iran.

Then there is Turkey. The 2021 Shusha Declaration commits Ankara and Baku to consult and take joint action if either country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, or security is threatened by a third state. Turkey's foreign minister immediately called his Azerbaijani counterpart after the Nakhchivan strike and issued a statement "strongly" condemning the attack, adding that "Turkey will continue to stand by Azerbaijan, as it has historically." Turkey has demonstrated its willingness to project military power — in Libya, Syria, and the 2020 Karabakh war. So far, Ankara has stayed out of the Iran conflict. Striking Azerbaijani territory is the single fastest way to change that calculus, potentially drawing NATO's second-largest military into the war — a threshold Tehran has every reason to avoid but seems incapable of respecting.

Perhaps most dangerously for the regime, the strikes risk catalyzing Iran's own internal fault lines. An estimated third of Iran's 90 million population are ethnic Azerbaijanis, concentrated in the northwest — the country's second-largest ethnic group after Persians. Aliyev's statement during the Security Council meeting following the strikes that "the independent Azerbaijani state today is a source of hope for many Azerbaijanis living in Iran" is not rhetorical posturing. It reflects a genuine and long-standing Iranian vulnerability. Tehran has tried for years to cultivate Khomeinist loyalty among its Azerbaijani population, with mixed results: many remain hostile to the regime due to ethnic discrimination and systematic cultural repression. A shooting war with Baku could transform latent grievance into active destabilization at the worst possible moment for a regime already battered by US-Israeli strikes and facing a leadership vacuum after the killing of Khamenei.

The diplomatic optics compound the damage. Aliyev recounted in his Security Council address that on the morning of the strikes, Iran's deputy foreign minister called Baku requesting assistance evacuating Iranian embassy personnel stranded in Lebanon. Aliyev ordered an aircraft dispatched immediately and declined Iran's offer to cover costs. Hours later, drones hit Nakhchivan. "To disregard such a gesture, to belittle it, and to conduct themselves in a base and ungrateful manner brings honor to no one," Aliyev said. The sequence frames Iran not merely as aggressive but as erratic and faithless — a narrative that resonates across the region and beyond.

Loss of Strategic Coherence

The pattern of Iranian retaliation since February 28 does not resemble escalation dominance. It resembles a regime that has lost the ability to distinguish between deterrence and self-destruction.

Striking Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar — countries that host US military infrastructure — is aggressive but follows a recognizable strategic logic: raise the costs for America's regional partners until they pressure Washington to stop. Striking Cyprus, where British bases supported operations, is reckless but at least tracks a military rationale. Striking Azerbaijan — a country with a powerful military, a mutual defense pact with Turkey, and demographic leverage over a third of Iran's own population — follows no rational cost-benefit analysis. The potential blowback dwarfs any tactical benefit.

The IRGC's role in this escalation is central. The Guards are not merely a military force; they are a parallel state. Through entities such as the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the IRGC controls major infrastructure — railways, gas pipelines, dams, oil fields, ports, and energy projects — often through no-bid contracts. The bonyads, quasi-charitable foundations under Supreme Leader patronage, operate as vast conglomerates with tax exemptions, opaque finances, and dominance across industries from agriculture to banking to real estate. This institutional architecture creates powerful incentives for escalation: the IRGC's legitimacy and economic position depend on demonstrating potency and relevance, even — perhaps especially — when doing so is strategically counterproductive. The Guards' survival is inseparable from the narrative of resistance, and in a moment of existential crisis, institutional momentum overtakes rational cost-benefit analysis.

There are no visible defections within the security forces. The political system remains cohesive under pressure. But cohesion is not the same as competence. The regime is unified around a course of action that is simultaneously isolating it from every potential partner and neutral party in the region. As one Israeli analyst observed: Iran is uniting the Arab world, Europe, Turkey, and the Caucasus against itself, while handing its adversaries the legitimacy they previously lacked.

What This Means for US Policy

Iran's attacks on Nakhchivan and near the BTC pipeline should be understood as direct strikes on American strategic interests. TRIPP is not merely a trade route — it is the physical manifestation of US strategy to bypass Russian and Iranian chokepoints in Eurasia, connect Central Asian energy and critical minerals to European markets, and anchor American influence in a region where Washington has historically been a secondary player.

The vulnerability of BTC and TRIPP infrastructure to Iranian strikes now demands a policy response. Integrated air and missile defense along the corridor — potentially involving US, Turkish, and Israeli systems — should be elevated from a theoretical discussion to an operational priority. Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry has already stated that "these acts of aggression will not go unanswered." Baku is preparing response measures. Washington must decide whether to support its corridor partner's response or risk the perception — in Baku, Ankara, and across Central Asia — that American commitments evaporate under pressure.

Most critically, the terms of any future ceasefire must account for what the past week has revealed. Any deal that relieves pressure on the regime without addressing its capacity to strike regional infrastructure will leave TRIPP and BTC permanently vulnerable. Iran's nuclear program, its long-range missile arsenal, and its proxy networks must be treated as a single, indivisible package. Partial concessions would merely postpone the problem, allowing a battered but surviving regime to regroup and threaten the region again. The "maximum pressure" strategy loses its edge the moment relief arrives prematurely.

Iran's horizontal escalation is not a sign of strength. It is the flailing of a regime whose supreme leader is dead, whose military infrastructure is being systematically degraded, and whose institutional reflexes have overwhelmed whatever remains of strategic reason. Attacking Azerbaijan — a well-armed, Turkish-allied state with leverage over Iran's own ethnic fault lines — is the most self-defeating move in a week of self-defeating moves. The question now is not whether Iran's recklessness will be checked, but whether the international community will seize the moment to ensure it cannot regenerate.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an Expert at the N7 Foundation, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

With the Iranian regime decapitated by a joint U.S.-Israeli strike that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several top commanders, and with a resurgent Sunni extremist axis led by Turkey and Qatar gaining ground, the United States faces a pivotal choice in the Middle East. It should proceed by building a coalition of moderates — anchored by Israel, Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates — that is capable of countering both Iranian aggression and the rising tide of Sunni radicalism.

That emerging extremist Sunni axis, fueled by Muslim Brotherhood ideology, Turkish military ambition and Qatari money, is pulling in cautious allies such as Saudi Arabia — nations whose recent surges in anti-Jewish rhetoric signal an ideological drift that should alarm Washington.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s answer is essentially a revival of the “Periphery Doctrine” that aimed to counter hostile Arab nationalism through clandestine alliances with non-Arab states and minority groups in the Middle East. Netanyahyu has proposed a counterweight coalition, mentioning India, Greece and Cyprus. But the key to any alliance fighting extremist Islam is Muslim countries that can put forward a contrasting and appealing vision.

Read the full article on The Washington Post.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

On February 15, 2026, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told Radio Iran's Pashto service that Kabul would be prepared to cooperate with the Islamic Republic in the event of a U.S. military attack — if Tehran formally requested assistance. He added that Iran had emerged victorious from its June 2025 war with Israel and would prevail again against Washington. The statement was extraordinary on its face: the world's most prominent Sunni jihadist movement publicly offering military solidarity to a Shia theocracy it once nearly went to war with. Yet the declaration was less a rupture than a culmination — the latest expression of a pragmatic alignment that has been deepening for over a decade, driven not by ideological convergence but by shared adversaries, mutual dependence, and the strategic logic of survival under pressure.

Iran’s engagement with the Taliban has evolved from tactical coordination during the insurgency to a pragmatic working relationship since the group’s return to power in August 2021. Despite deep ideological differences and a history of confrontation, Tehran has prioritized strategic interests over sectarian or doctrinal considerations. This relationship has yielded tangible benefits for both sides, while remaining transactional, asymmetric, and subject to significant constraints.

Origins of Tactical Cooperation

Evidence of Iran–Taliban engagement surfaced publicly in May 2016, when a a U.S. drone strike killed Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour then leader of the Taliban near the Iranian-Pakistani border. U.S. Intelligence agencies later indicated that Mansour had been returning from Iran. At the time, Mansour was widely regardedas the Taliban’s arms and narcotics czar, overseeing the group’s finances and transnational networks. According to the U.S. intelligence assessment, his trip to Iran was intended to facilitate tactical coordination. Mansour’s assassination publicly exposed the depth of Iran-Taliban engagement in the context of their shared opposition to Western influence in Afghanistan.

Subsequent developments reinforced these assessments. In October 2017, the Taliban launched a large-scale offensive on Farah City, the capital of Farah Province bordering Iran, effectively besieging the city until U.S. air support enabled Afghan forces to repel the offensive. Afghan security officials later Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, acting through Taliban proxies. The Taliban again demonstrated increased operational capacity in Farah Province in 2018, briefly capturing parts of the provincial capital.

This episode underscored Iran’s willingness to engage the Taliban as a means of countering U.S. and Western influence in Afghanistan, even as ideological tensions persisted.

Historical Background: Ideological Hostility and Early Confrontation

The relationship between Iran and the Taliban has been shaped by deep sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical divides. The Taliban's rise in the mid-1990s as a Pashtun-dominated, ultra-conservative Sunni movement — backed primarily by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia — directly challenged Iran's interests. Tehran viewed the group as an ideological rival aligned with its regional adversaries, hostile to Shia communities, and threatening to create an unstable, anti-Iranian regime on its eastern border. The Taliban's persecution of the Shia Hazara minority and its disruption of Iranian influence routes into Central Asia further heightened tensions.

Unlike Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which recognized the Taliban regime that came to power in 1996, Iran refused to do so and instead provided military, financial, and logistical support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (United Islamic Front). Qasem Soleimani, who assumed command of the IRGC Quds Force around 1998, played a central role in this effort, advocating for intensified proxy support — including arms shipments, training, intelligence, and operational coordination — to sustain Northern Alliance resistance without risking direct Iranian military confrontation. This approach allowed Iran to counter the Taliban at lower cost while preserving regional leverage.

Relations reached their nadir in August 1998 when Taliban forces overran the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, killing eight to eleven Iranian diplomats and a journalist, and carried out large-scale massacres of Hazara civilians. Iran mobilized some 200,000 troops along the Afghan border, and war was averted only through UN mediation and diplomatic pressure. The episode reinforced Iran's view of the Taliban as an existential regional threat, while also illustrating a pattern that would define future engagement: despite their ideological extremism, Taliban leaders have repeatedly shown a readiness to accept tactical support from former adversaries and ideologically distant powers — including Iran, Russia, and China — when it serves their goals of survival, reducing isolation, and consolidating power.

Following the U.S.-led intervention in late 2001, Iran initially cooperated with Washington, providing intelligence support and facilitating the Bonn process for forming a new Afghan government. However, as the U.S. and NATO presence became a long-term fixture perceived as encirclement, elements of the IRGC shifted to a hedging strategy. While maintaining ties with the Kabul government, Iran began offering limited tactical support — weapons, training, and safe passage — to Taliban insurgents fighting coalition forces. The Taliban pragmatically accepted such assistance despite doctrinal differences, prioritizing battlefield gains and diplomatic breathing room over ideological consistency.

Cultivating Influence Across Ideological Lines

Iran’s approach was notable for its focus on cultivating relationships with senior Taliban figures associated with the movement’s Kandahar-based leadership, traditionally regarded as its most doctrinaire faction.

According to reporting by the Rand Corporation, the IRGC concentrated its engagement with the Taliban in the border provinces of Farah, Nimruz, and Herat. Iran invested heavily in cultivating relationships with Key Taliban leaders who today occupy senior positions within the regime, including Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir (Deputy Minister of Defense), Mohammad Ibrahim Sadar (Deputy Minister of Interior), and Mullah Mohammad Shirin Akhund (Governor of Kandahar Province). All three are considered close associates of the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hebatullah Akhundzada.

Iran’s success in building durable ties with this faction reflects a strategic calculation that influence over core leadership networks would yield greater long-term leverage than outreach to peripheral or more pragmatic elements.

Engagement After the Fall of Kabul

Iran openly welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. Unlike most foreign missions, Iran kept its embassy and consulate in Herat operational after the Taliban took Kabul. Iranian officials publicly framed the U.S, withdrawal as an opportunity for regional stabilization and peace.

In February 2023, Iran became the second neighboring country after Pakistan to formally hand over the Afghan embassy to Taliban representatives. Although relations experienced periodic tensions — particularly over border incidents, water rights, and the refugee crisis — Tehran has consistently avoided steps that would fundamentally alienate the Taliban, a posture largely reciprocated by Kabul.

High-level exchanges continued throughout 2023 and beyond, with Taliban delegations visiting Tehran, and Iranian officials travelling to Kabul. To date, Tehran has derived tangible benefits from this relationship, particularly in the areas of trade, border security, and intelligence cooperation against ISIS-K and other militant groups. The Taliban, in turn, have benefited from Iran’s political engagement, diplomatic legitimacy, and economic access — most notably through full use of Iran’s Chabahar port.

Trade, Leverage, and Strategic Opportunity

Sanctions have pushed both Tehran and the Taliban into a shared strategic corner. Isolated financially and diplomatically, both actors are now incentivized to innovate methods of evasion. For the Taliban, the objective is straightforward: survival and regime consolidation. For Tehran, however, Afghanistan represents something more strategic — a relatively under-monitored space where it can quietly advance regional ambitions.

A recent report by Israel’s Channel 14 suggests that this convergence may be deepening. Tehran is allegedly building a covert network through Taliban channels to facilitate financial transfers to Hezbollah and to establish contingency escape routes for senior Iranian officials in the event of a major military confrontation with the United States or Israel.

The alleged involvement of Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian-Fard, an experienced IRGC-QF operative with deep familiarity in Afghanistan, indicates that this initiative may be structured and strategic rather than opportunistic. The reported participation of Kamaluddin Nabizada, an Afghan businessman already sanctioned by Washington for facilitating IRGC and Hezbollah financial operations, further underscores the sanctions-evasion dimension.

Channel 14 has since reported an additional dimension to this relationship. According to senior Iran analyst Dror Balazada, the regime covertly dispatched Nabizada — already facing corruption charges — to approach the Taliban about assisting Tehran in suppressing internal uprisings. The Taliban leader reportedly refused, instead demanding a formal request from Tehran. The episode is revealing on multiple levels: it illustrates the regime's growing desperation over domestic unrest, its willingness to seek help from an ideologically alien partner, and the limits of its leverage over Kabul. The Taliban's insistence on a formal request suggests a movement increasingly conscious of its bargaining position — willing to cooperate, but not to be instrumentalized quietly.

If substantiated, these developments would illustrate how sanctioned actors increasingly cooperate not out of ideological alignment alone, but out of shared necessity — reshaping Afghanistan into a potential logistical rear base for Iran’s regional security architecture.

Economic engagement has become a central pillar of Iran’s Taliban policy. As Taliban–Pakistan relations deteriorated over disputes related to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and border management, Tehran moved to position itself as Afghanistan’s primary economic partner.

During his November 2025 visit to Kabul, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi announced that bilateral trade between Iran and Afghanistan had surpassed Iran’s total trade volume with all European countries combined. For Iran, which remains under extensive international sanctions, Afghanistan offers a nearby and relatively accessible market for oil, industrial goods, and manufactured products.

The increasing use of Iran’s Chabahar port as Afghanistan’s primary maritime outlet — displacing Karachi — has further deepened Kabul’s economic dependence on Tehran. The shift has enhanced Iran’s structural leverage over the Taliban, particularly at a time when normalization with Pakistan appears unlikely.

Constraints and Frictions

Despite these gains, Iran’s influence over the Taliban remains limited. Tehran recognizes that distancing itself from the Taliban would create opportunities for rival regional actors. Nevertheless, its efforts to position itself as a mediator between the Taliban and Afghan opposition groups have met resistance. The Taliban recently declined to participate in a regional dialogue hosted in Tehran, underscoring the limits of Iranian diplomatic leverage.

Water security remains another major point of friction. The Taliban’s continued construction of dams on rivers flowing toward Iran’s arid eastern provinces has triggered public outrage among Iranian parliamentarians and analysts. Farhad Shahraki and Ahmad Bakhshayesh Urdestani, prominent Iranian MPs, denounced the Taliban’s water policy and questioned the Iranian government’s complacency while calling for the use of force to ensure Iran’s fair water share. However, official Tehran has largely downplayed the issue to avoid escalating tensions with Kabul.

Security cooperation has helped stabilize much of Iran’s eastern border, but vulnerabilities persist. ISIS-K, Jaysh al-Adl, narcotics trafficking, and irregular migration remain enduring challenges. These shared threats continue to incentivize tactical coordination between Tehran and Kabul.

Afghan Opposition Figures and Growing Concerns

Iran continues to host several prominent Afghan political and military figures opposed to the Taliban, including former Herat governor Mohammad Ismail Khan and Shiite Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq. Iran is also home to large numbers of former Afghan National Security Forces personnel.

However, Iran’s deportation of undocumented Afghan refugees has raised concerns among opposition figures. According to a UN report, 1.8 million Afghans were deported from Iran in 2025. Most of these deportations took place around the 12-Day War, with Iranian officials accusing some Afghan refugees of spying for Israel.These mass deportations followed a previous crackdown, in which Afghan refugees were blamed for social disorder, representing a security threat, and increasing unemployment among. Reports suggest that some former Afghan security personnel have been forcibly returned to Afghanistan and subsequently detained or killed. In August 2025, The Telegraph reported that the IRGC is cooperating with Taliban intelligence to identify and track Afghan nationals who assisted the United Kingdom.

Concerns intensified following the assassinations of two prominent anti-Taliban figures in Iran in 2025. In September, Maroof Ghulami, head of the Council of Jihadi Commanders in western Afghanistan and a close associate of Ismail Khan, was killed in his office in Mashhad. In December, General Ikramuddin Saree, a former senior police general and outspoken Taliban critic, was shot dead near his home in Tehran.

Opposition groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) swiftly blamed the Taliban for the latter attack. Leaders of both the NRF and the Afghanistan Freedom Front called on Iranian authorities to conduct a transparent investigation. Iranian authorities issued limited public responses, and no findings have been released. For many Afghan opposition figures, such developments signal that Iran.

Conclusion: Iranian Goals, Influence, and Mutual Utility

Iran’s policy toward the Taliban is driven primarily by strategic considerations. Tehran seeks to prevent renewed U.S. or hostile regional influence in Afghanistan, secure its eastern borders, counter ISIS-K, manage refugee flows, ensure access to water resources, and expand economic leverage under sanctions. Engagement with the Taliban has proven more effective in advancing these objectives than confrontation.

Iran’s influence is substantial but not decisive. It is strongest in economic interdependence, border security coordination, intelligence cooperation, and selective political legitimacy. However, Tehran lacks the ability to fundamentally shape Taliban governance or compel concessions on sensitive issues such as water rights, internal repression, or engagement with opposition groups.

For the Taliban, the relationship offers diplomatic recognition, economic lifelines, trade access, and a powerful regional patron capable of balancing Pakistan. Yet this engagement also deepens Kabul’s dependence on Tehran and constrains the Taliban’s strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, Iran–Taliban relations reflect a pragmatic alignment driven by converging interests rather than trust or ideological convergence. While mutually beneficial in the short term, the relationship remains fragile, transactional, and vulnerable to shifting regional dynamics.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.
Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Director Joseph Epstein comments on Vice President J.D. Vance's visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“TRIPP didn’t emerge from a vacuum — it became possible because the geopolitical architecture Russia spent thirty years constructing has begun to collapse. The contrast is stark: three decades of Russian-led mediation produced no peace, only managed hostility and isolation. Less than a year of serious U.S. engagement has produced a Strategic Partnership Charter, a civil nuclear framework, and the contours of a transformative regional corridor. TRIPP is the architecture of a post-Russian South Caucasus and this visit shows how much of a priority it is for Washington.”

Read the full interview on the N7 Foundation.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

A fresh round of US-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine is taking place this week as the Trump administration seeks to reach a deal by early summer. While pro-Ukrainian voices warn that any agreement lacking ironclad security guarantees for Kyiv could embolden Moscow to go further into Moldova or test NATO in the Baltics, the biggest threat may be to countries elsewhere in the former Soviet space.

There are already signs that Russia is turning its imperial appetite toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where the groundwork for destabilization appears to be well underway. Any negotiated settlement in Ukraine that ignores these regions will not end the current war; it will merely relocate it.   

Russian nationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin, who is often called “Putin’s brain,” declared last month that no post-Soviet state should possess sovereignty. Instead, he argued, Moscow “has no choice but to restore the Russian Empire.” Days earlier, leading Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov called for Russia to conduct “special military operations” similar to the invasion of Ukraine in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Read the full article on the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Iran may have a new weapon in its shadow war against the West—and it’s one that Tehran spent decades fighting: Sunni jihadists.

Last week, Azerbaijani security forces arrested three men planning to attack the Israeli embassy in Baku. The suspects claimed allegiance to ISIS-K, the Afghan branch of the Islamic State responsible for the devastating Crocus City Hall massacre in Moscow that killed 145 people in 2024. On its face, this looks like another data point in ISIS-K’s expanding campaign of global terror.

But look closer, and a more troubling picture emerges—one that should concern policymakers in Washington. The South Caucasus is becoming a new front in the shadow war between Iran and its enemies, and the Islamic Republic may be using Sunni extremists as a cover for its own malign activities.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Joseph Epstein comments for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's upcoming trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“It’s noteworthy that it’s Vance on this trip,” Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL. “He represents a more isolationist part of the White House, but he’s going to be championing deals on this trip that weaken Russian and Iranian influence -- and the throughline is critical minerals.”

Vance will be the most senior US official to ever visit Armenia and is the first to visit Azerbaijan since former US Vice President Dick Cheney in 2008.

“There hasn’t been engagement with the region of this kind since the Bush administration, and that was largely all through Georgia,” said Epstein.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Iran is facing a water emergency that hydrologists and environmental experts warn may now be irreversible. Major reservoirs are depleted, groundwater reserves are collapsing, and senior officials are openly warning of citizens rationing water and even evacuating the capital due to water shortages. While the crisis is often attributed to drought or climate change, experts stress that it is overwhelmingly man-made—the cumulative result of decades of over-extraction, mismanagement, and failure to modernize water governance.

Paradoxically, many of the most effective technical solutions to Iran’s water crisis have already been developed by its regional adversary, Israel. Through innovations in drip irrigation, wastewater recycling, desalination, and integrated water management, Israel has achieved water security under harsher natural constraints than Iran faces today. This article argues that Iran’s crisis is no longer a problem of awareness or technology, but of political, financial, and institutional barriers—and that proven Israeli approaches, if accessed indirectly, could still mitigate the most destabilizing consequences of a crisis experts say can no longer be fully reversed.

Read the full article on the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center. Dalga Khatinoglu is an independent energy expert.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein shares his thoughts on the latest U.S.-India trade deal for an N7 Brief.

“The linkage of tariff relief to India curbing Russian oil purchases underscores how energy geopolitics can shape trade agendas, but it also risks oversimplifying New Delhi’s nuanced balancing act. Nevertheless, a meaningful reduction — or halt — in Indian imports of Russian oil would repreent a significant strategic and economic win for the United States and its allies.”

Read the full article on the N7 Foundation.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

On January 27, 2026, Azerbaijan's State Security Service announced the arrest of three young men for plotting an attack on a foreign embassy in Baku. The timing was striking: Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar had concluded meetings with President Ilham Aliyev just one day earlier. While Azerbaijani authorities did not officially name the target, multiple Israeli outlets confirmed it was their embassy.

Azerbaijani security services attributed the plot to Islamic State-Khorasan Province, or ISIS-K — the Afghan offshoot that has executed some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of recent years, including the March 2024 Crocus City Hall massacre in Moscow that killed 149 people. The suspects had allegedly obtained weapons and finalized their plans before security forces intercepted them.

The announcement received modest international attention. It should not have. The incident represents either a significant expansion of ISIS-K's operational reach into the South Caucasus or — more likely — evidence of a strategic shift in how Iran conducts covert operations in the South Caucasus.

A Pattern of Threats

This was not an isolated incident. Israeli and Jewish targets in Azerbaijan have faced a troubling series of threats in recent months. Despite close ties between Jerusalem and Baku and low levels of societal antisemitism, foreign operatives have historically managed to recruit locals for terrorist attacks. In October, an Azerbaijani court sentenced an ISIS-K affiliate to thirteen years in prison for plotting a Molotov cocktail attack on a Baku synagogue. The Conference of European Rabbis, scheduled to convene in Baku in November, was canceled over security concerns; organizers declined to provide further details.

Historically, such threats emanated from a different source: the Husseiniyyun, an ethnic Azerbaijani Shia militia created by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. While Azerbaijan's government is staunchly secular and a majority of the population is Shia Muslim, roughly a third adheres to Sunni Islam — a demographic reality that complicates assumptions about sectarian allegiance. The recent appearance of Sunni extremists allegedly operating at ISIS-K's direction marks a departure that demands explanation.

Two hypotheses present themselves. The first accepts the official attribution at face value: ISIS-K, emboldened by successful high-profile attacks, has expanded its ambitions to the Caucasus. The second posits that Iranian intelligence services recruited the cell, using the ISIS-K banner to obscure Tehran's fingerprints. An examination of both ISIS-K's recent trajectory and Iran's documented methods suggests the latter to be more likely.

Marginal, But Exploitable

Jihadist networks in Azerbaijan are not new, though they remain small compared to other Muslim-majority countries. Salafist communities took root in northern districts like Ismayilli and Sheki in the 1990s, later becoming modest recruitment hubs. When ISIS declared its caliphate in 2014, an estimated 200 to 300 Azerbaijanis — many of them Sunni radicals from these northern regions — traveled to fight in Syria and Iraq. The government responded with criminal code amendments and waves of arrests, and the country's strong secular identity and robust security apparatus have kept extremist networks marginal.

Yet ISIS-K's recent focus on Azerbaijan suggests even limited infrastructure can be exploited. In May 2025, Azerbaijani authorities extradited four nationals who had attended training camps on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border — an area strongly associated with ISIS-K activity — two others were arrested for financing. The December 2024 synagogue plot and the January 2026 embassy conspiracy indicate the group — or someone using its banner — has identified Azerbaijan as operational territory.

The Tajikistan Template

Iran's willingness to collaborate with Sunni extremists when geopolitical interests align is well-documented. Palestinian factions including Hamas and Islamic Jihad have received sustained Iranian support despite their Sunni affiliation. Tehran has maintained tactical relationships with the Taliban, providing limited assistance since the U.S. invasion in 2001 and expanding cooperation after the Taliban's return to power in 2021. Even Al-Qaeda senior leaders have received safe havenin Iran and been allowed to use the country as a base to organize terrorist activities.

But Tajikistan offers the most relevant precedent. Materials released by Tajik authorities reveal a systematic pattern of Iranian intelligence operations on Tajik territory, encompassing recruitment, proxy deployment, and the organization of terrorist attacks.

Consider the July 2018 ISIS attack in Tajikistan's Khatlon region that killed four foreign cyclists — two Americans, one Dutch national, and one Swiss citizen. According to testimony from the sole surviving detained suspect, key participants had undergone ideological indoctrination and military training between 2014 and 2015 in the Iranian city of Qom and at a camp in Mazandaran province. The attack's organizer had studied at religious institutions in Iran and received training at IRGC facilities before recruiting Tajik labor migrants in Russia on behalf of Iranian intelligence. The banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan reportedly served as a convenient cover for these recruitment activities.

A pattern emerges from Tajik security files: the IRGC has used the ISIS flag to conceal Iranian involvement in terrorist operations. Using ISIS also gives access to Tajik extremists, as the country’s significantly smaller Shia population has been traditionally shaped by the pro-Western influence of Aga Khan. In 2018, Tajik security services prevented an attacknear the Russian 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, detaining thirteen individuals who had trained with Iranian instructors. Subsequent investigations revealed that the operation's coordinator had been recruited in Moscow by Iranian intelligence, trained near Tehran, and dispatched with twenty-two other Tajik nationals to carry out attacks on government officials and foreign installations. The method proved effective — ISIS received blame while Iran preserved deniability.

Risks and Rewards

This strategy carries obvious dangers. ISIS-K maintains a violent hostility toward Shia Islam and Iranian interests. The January 2024 bombing at General Qassem Soleimani's memorial in Kerman — which killed at least 95 people — demonstrated ISIS-K's willingness to strike at the Islamic Republic's symbolic heart. Deploying such groups as proxies risks catastrophic blowback.

Yet the benefits may outweigh the risks from Tehran's perspective. Iran has consistently used proxy forces to maintain distance from operations that could trigger international retaliation. By employing groups nominally opposed to Iranian interests, it achieves an additional layer of deniability. This consideration has grown more pressing as Iran's regional position has deteriorated.

Iran's strategic interests in the South Caucasus are substantial and under threat. The Aliyev government is secular, maintaining close relationships with both Turkey and Israel — a posture that alarms Tehran on multiple fronts. The deepening Azerbaijan-Israel relationship, encompassing weapons sales, intelligence cooperation, and energy partnerships, represents a security concern on Iran's northern border. More fundamentally, Azerbaijan's existence as a prosperous, secular homeland to the Azerbaijani people presents an uncomfortable example to Iran's large ethnic Azerbaijani minority: a vision of what might be possible without rule by religious ideologues.

The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, if concluded, would remove a source of regional instability that Tehran has historically exploited. Most significantly, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), backed by the United States, threatens to diminish Iranian influence and expand American engagement in a region Tehran considers its sphere of interest. As details of TRIPP emerge and agreements take shape, these strategic imperatives have become more pressing.

An attack on the Israeli embassy during a high-profile ministerial visit would have served multiple Iranian objectives simultaneously. It would demonstrate that Jews and Israelis are not safe even in allied countries. It would intimidate Azerbaijan and other Muslim-majority nations that maintain ties with Israel. And it would signal to the Azerbaijani population that their government cannot maintain basic security — all while the ISIS-K attribution shielded Tehran from direct accountability.

The Alternative Hypothesis

While unlikely, the possibility that ISIS-K acted independently cannot be dismissed. The group has demonstrated both the capability and intent to conduct high-profile transnational attacks. The March 2024 assault on Crocus City Hall, which left 149 dead and more than 600 wounded, established ISIS-K as the most lethal transnational terrorist threat in years. The Kerman bombing three months earlier had already demonstrated the group's reach into Iran itself.

ISIS-K has pursued a deliberate strategy of internationalizing its operations since the Taliban's 2021 return to power created a more permissive environment. The group has targeted interests from Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, and Russia, marking a calculated expansion beyond its traditional Afghanistan-Pakistan base. Just last week, an ISIS-K suicide bomber killed seven people, including a Chinese national, at a restaurant in Kabul — part of a sustained campaign against Chinese citizens in retaliation for Beijing's treatment of Uyghur Muslims.

Expanding to the Caucasus would fit this pattern. The group has cultivated relationships with Uyghur militant organizations and published propaganda in Tajik and other Central Asian languages. Its leader, Sanaullah Ghafari, is himself reportedly an ethnic Tajik. High-profile attacks generate recruitment, funding, and influence across the jihadist spectrum — commodities ISIS-K actively seeks.

Weighing the Evidence

Several factors tip the balance toward Iranian involvement. The target selection — the Israeli embassy during a ministerial visit — aligns precisely with Iran's documented priorities in Azerbaijan. The suspects were local Azerbaijanis, not the Central Asian migrants who typically execute ISIS-K operations abroad. Iran possesses established recruitment networks in Azerbaijan through the Husseiniyyun and related Shia networks. And the operational pattern mirrors the Tajikistan template: local recruits, ISIS cover, strategic benefit to Tehran.

The decentralized nature of organizations like ISIS-K makes them vulnerable to exactly this kind of exploitation. Iran does not need to coordinate with ISIS-K leadership in Afghanistan to recruit sympathetic individuals, provide training and weapons, and assign targets — all while allowing the recruits to believe they are serving the caliphate's cause.

None of this constitutes proof. Azerbaijani authorities have not released details of the investigation that would clarify the chain of command or expose any Iranian role. What can be said with confidence is that the incident deserves more scrutiny than it has received. If Iran has indeed adopted Sunni extremist cover for operations in the South Caucasus, the implications extend well beyond this single foiled plot. It would represent an evolution in Iranian tradecraft with significant consequences for regional security.

Policy Implications

For Azerbaijan, the incident underscores the complexity of its security environment. The country must contend not only with traditional Iranian pressure through Shia proxies but potentially with Sunni extremist cells that may or may not operate at Tehran's direction. Enhanced intelligence cooperation with Israel and Western partners becomes more valuable under these circumstances.

For the United States and its allies, the incident reinforces the importance of tracking ISIS-K's external operations while remaining alert to the possibility of state manipulation. The line between independent jihadist violence and state-sponsored terrorism has never been bright; it may be growing dimmer.

For Iran, the foiled attack — regardless of who ordered it — represents a setback. The Azerbaijani government has demonstrated the capability to detect and prevent such plots. The public attribution to ISIS-K, whether accurate or a diplomatic convenience, spares direct Iranian-Azerbaijani confrontation while putting Tehran on notice that its options for covert action are narrowing.

The three young men in Azerbaijani custody may have believed they were soldiers of the caliphate. They may have been pawns in a larger game they did not fully understand. The distinction matters less than the outcome: a plot disrupted, an attack prevented, and a reminder that in the murky space where terrorism and statecraft intersect, the most important questions often go unanswered.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Introduction

In January 2025, reports emerged that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had assured U.S. envoy Steven Witkoff that Tehran would not carry out 800 executions of protesters. According to multiple accounts, this assurance may have led President Donald Trump to halt a planned military strike against Iran. The episode raises a question with serious implications for both Iranian society and U.S. policy: Will the Islamic Republic follow through on mass executions, or will strategic considerations stay its hand?

The answer lies not in diplomatic assurances — which Tehran has broken before — but in understanding the regime's internal calculus when ideology collides with survival. For over four decades, the Islamic Republic has navigated between revolutionary principle and strategic necessity, sometimes sacrificing enormous national interests for ideological purity, and at other times shelving sacred commitments to preserve the system itself. The historical record reveals clear patterns about when each imperative prevails, offering insights into whether the current wave of protesters faces the gallows or a reprieve.

This paper examines the ideological and strategic factors that will determine the fate of Iran's detained protesters. It analyzes past episodes when the regime prioritized revolutionary doctrine over national interest, contrasts these with moments when survival imperatives forced ideological compromise, and applies these patterns to assess the likelihood of mass executions. The conclusion challenges conventional Western assumptions about both Iranian decision-making and the efficacy of external pressure.

The Doctrine of System Preservation

To understand Iran's approach to domestic dissent, one must first grasp the theological framework that governs the Islamic Republic. The regime operates on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurist, which transforms political survival into religious obligation. Protecting the Islamic government is not merely a matter of state security — it is a divine duty that supersedes conventional ethical constraints.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's founder, articulated this principle with stark clarity. In various speeches, he declared that preserving the Islamic system constitutes the highest religious obligation, particularly when facing internal or external threats. In a 1983 address to officials, Khomeini went further, stating that maintaining the Islamic Republic "takes precedence over the life of any single person, even Imam Mahdi" — the twelfth Shi'a Imam revered as the promised redeemer. The statement is theologically radical: it places the political system above the most sacred figure in Shi'a eschatology.

After 1979, the regime systematically subordinated Iran's traditional religious establishment to political control, monopolizing the interpretation of Shi'ism and defining what constitutes proper Islamic governance. No religious authority could challenge these definitions without risking persecution. This consolidation meant that threats to the regime could be framed as threats to Islam itself, requiring a religious response from all faithful Muslims in Iran.

The doctrine has been implemented with brutal consistency. In April 1979, security forces suppressed an uprising in Khuzestan province, killing more than a hundred Arab Iranians seeking autonomy. The Kurdish revolt, which began in March 1979 and lasted over four years, claimed 5,000 Kurdish fighters and resulted in 1,200 executions. But the most chilling application came in the summer of 1988, when Khomeini ordered the mass execution of political prisoners — including leftists, Kurdish activists, and Baha'is — even as the Iran-Iraq War was ending and the country desperately needed reconstruction. Between July and December of that year, between 2,800 and 5,000 people were executed without trial in Iranian prisons.

These principles remain operative today. Following the suppression of the 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests, then-President Ebrahim Raisi visited the Fatehin Special Unit — an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) formation responsible for crushing dissent — and reiterated that "preserving the Islamic system is the highest religious obligation."

The Legal Machinery of Religious Repression

The regime's willingness to execute protesters rests on two complementary concepts embedded in the Islamic Republic's criminal law: Mohareb and Baghi. These categories transform political dissent into capital offenses while cloaking state violence in religious legitimacy.

Mohareb, defined as "someone who wages war against God and society," and Baghi, defined as "a rebel who takes up arms against the legitimate government," provide the legal and Islamic framework for executing those who challenge the system. Crucially, Shi'a jurists aligned with Velayat-e Faqih perceive domestic protesters not as citizens with grievances but as existential threats to the Islamic order. The judiciary has consistently labeled mass protesters under these categories, transforming demands for reform into acts of war against God.

During the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the judicial system characterized protesters as engaged in "armed rebellion" against God and society. Following the 2026 protests, Asghar Jahangir, spokesperson for the judiciary, again invoked the Mohareb designation. For the regime, enforcing capital punishment in these cases is not discretionary — it is a religious obligation. Failure to act would constitute defiance of divine command, a grave sin in the regime's theological framework.

This creates a powerful internal logic: regime officials face religious pressure to execute those deemed threats to the system. Any hint of leniency risks being interpreted as weakness before God, potentially undermining an official's standing within the ideological hierarchy. The question, then, is whether strategic considerations can override this theological imperative.

When Ideology Trumps Strategy: Six Cases

The Islamic Republic's history reveals multiple instances when the regime chose ideological purity over obvious strategic advantage, often at devastating cost. These cases establish a pattern: when core ideological commitments or clerical authority are at stake, Tehran has repeatedly sacrificed national interests.

The Rushdie Fatwa: Permanent Diplomatic Damage for Clerical Authority

Perhaps no decision better illustrates this pattern than Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against novelist Salman Rushdie. The timing revealed its strategic irrationality. The Iran-Iraq War had just ended after eight years of devastating conflict. Iran's economy lay shattered, its cities damaged, its population exhausted. The regime desperately needed reconstruction aid and normalized trade relations with Europe.

The fatwa destroyed these prospects immediately. Britain severed diplomatic ties. European investment evaporated. Iran's image as a potentially normalizing state collapsed overnight. Yet the regime never formally rescinded the fatwa, despite repeated opportunities over subsequent decades to do so at minimal political cost.

The logic was ideological, not strategic. Revoking the fatwa would have implied clerical fallibility and undermined the foundational claim that the Supreme Leader's religious rulings carry divine authority. The regime chose long-term ideological credibility over short-term diplomatic and economic gain. Decades later, despite warming relations with Europe at various points, the fatwa remains in force — one of the clearest examples of ideology trumping strategy in modern statecraft.

Hostility Toward Israel: The Enemy That Justifies Everything

Iran's uncompromising stance toward Israel operates on similar logic. While Tehran has at times modulated its approach to the United States, engaging in backchannel negotiations and even cooperation, it has consistently refused to soften its position on Israel. The regime will not recognize the Israeli state, continues to deny Israel's legitimacy in official rhetoric, and maintains maximalist positions even when unnecessary for deterrence.

At multiple junctures — particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s — reducing rhetorical hostility toward Israel could have eased international pressure at minimal internal cost. The regime chose otherwise. Anti-Zionism is foundational to Iran's revolutionary narrative, and Israel functions as the symbolic enemy that legitimizes militarization, regional proxy networks, and domestic repression. Retreat on this front would risk unraveling the regime's ideological coherence, a cost Tehran has refused to pay.

The Hostage Crisis: Revolutionary Consolidation Through Catastrophe

The 1979-1981 seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its 52 hostages followed similar logic. The crisis paralyzed Iran's economy, undermined moderate factions, triggered sanctions, and established a framework of U.S.-Iranian hostility that persists today. Strategically, it was catastrophic. Yet the leadership allowed it to continue for 444 days, even after the costs became undeniable.

The hostage crisis served ideological purposes: it consolidated revolutionary power, destroyed liberal and nationalist rivals within Iran's fractured post-revolutionary elite, and established the regime's anti-imperialist credentials. Ideological mobilization mattered more than international standing or economic welfare. The pattern would repeat: ideology as a tool of internal consolidation, deployed even at enormous external cost.

Exporting the Revolution: Inviting Invasion

In its early years, Iran openly called for overthrowing neighboring regimes, supported subversive movements throughout the Gulf, and rejected basic norms of state sovereignty. These actions directly endangered Iran's security and helped trigger Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion, which would claim hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives over eight years.

The regime persisted because it was still defining itself, and leaders believed revolutionary expansion was necessary for survival. Retreat would have signaled weakness at this formative moment. Only when survival itself became threatened did expansion give way to defensive consolidation. During the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini doubled down on revolutionary export, claiming the “road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala.”

The 1988 Prison Massacres: Purification During Vulnerability

Even as Iran was ending the catastrophic war with Iraq and desperately needed reconstruction, the regime carried out mass executions of political prisoners in 1988. Strategically, this was unnecessary and damaging, inviting international condemnation at precisely the moment Iran needed to rehabilitate its image.

But the leadership feared ideological contamination more than external pressure. Internal enemies were perceived as existential threats regardless of cost. The regime prioritized ideological purification during a moment of maximum vulnerability — a decision that presaged its approach to future domestic unrest.

Mandatory Hijab: The Symbol That Cannot Bend

Despite repeated waves of unrest — including the massive 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests triggered by Mahsa Amini's death — the regime has refused to abolish mandatory hijab laws. The strategic costs are clear: continuous protests, alienation of youth, loss of legitimacy among educated urbanites, and international condemnation.

Yet ideology prevails. The hijab represents clerical authority over public life. Backing down would signal that mass protest can rewrite Islamic law, establishing a precedent the regime fears more than ongoing unrest. As with the Rushdie fatwa, retreat would imply clerical fallibility — an admission the system cannot afford.

When Survival Trumps Ideology: Seven Cases

The Islamic Republic's willingness to compromise ideology is less well understood but equally consistent. When the regime has faced genuine existential threats, it has demonstrated remarkable flexibility, shelving core revolutionary principles to preserve the system. These cases establish the conditions under which ideological compromise becomes possible.

The "Poisoned Chalice": Khomeini's Strategic Retreat

In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini accepted UN Resolution 598, ending the Iran-Iraq War on terms he had spent years rejecting. He had insisted the war must continue until Saddam Hussein was overthrown, framing it as a sacred struggle. By 1988, however, Iran faced military exhaustion, economic collapse, U.S. naval intervention in the Gulf, and real risk of elite fracture and popular uprising.

Khomeini described accepting the ceasefire as "drinking a poison chalice" — an unusually candid admission of ideological defeat. The statement established a template: preserve the Islamic Republic even if revolutionary ideals must be shelved. The survival of the system superseded the maximalist goals that had justified eight years of war.

Post-Khomeini Pragmatism: Abandoning Revolutionary Economics

After Khomeini's death in 1989, the regime faced economic ruin and a legitimacy crisis. President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani abandoned radical economic policies including aggressive nationalization and war economy measures, prioritizing reconstruction, foreign investment, and oil revenue. Iran quietly sought better relations with Europe and regional states.

This wasn't ideological liberalization — it was technocratic survivalism. The revolution's form was preserved, but much of its early economic content was softened or discarded. The flexibility demonstrated that revolutionary doctrine could be reinterpreted when the alternative was systemic collapse.

Scaling Back Revolutionary Export: Going Underground

After incidents like the 1992 Mykonos restaurant assassinations in Berlin nearly collapsed Iran's ties with Europe, the regime recalibrated its approach to exporting the revolution. Tehran scaled back overt assassinations abroad, reduced rhetorical calls for overthrowing regional governments, and rebranded its foreign policy language while maintaining proxy networks through less visible means.

The ideology didn't disappear — it went underground and became more deniable. The regime demonstrated it could modulate revolutionary zeal when faced with severe international isolation and intelligence warfare that threatened its security.

The Taliban's Enemy: Post-9/11 Cooperation

Perhaps most striking was Iran's quiet cooperation with the United States after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Despite "Death to America" being a foundational revolutionary slogan, Iran shared intelligence against the Taliban, helped shape the post-Taliban Afghan government, and facilitated U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

This cooperation occurred because Iran feared becoming the next target after Afghanistan, especially with U.S. forces building up on its borders. The Taliban were Sunni extremists hostile to Shi'a Iran, making cooperation strategically logical, but it required temporarily deprioritizing ideological hostility to America — a significant compromise.

The "Grand Bargain" That Wasn't: 2003 Panic

In 2003, as U.S. forces swept through Iraq, Iran reportedly offered comprehensive negotiations covering nuclear transparency, implicit recognition of Israel, and limits on support for militant groups. Whether this offer was fully authorized at the highest levels remains disputed, but its existence reflects genuine elite panic.

The regime was willing to discuss previously untouchable ideological red lines when it believed its survival was directly threatened by U.S. military force. The episode reveals how regime-change fears can override even core revolutionary commitments.

"Heroic Flexibility": The 2015 Nuclear Deal

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) required Iran to accept severe limits on enrichment, intrusive inspections, and rhetorical softening toward diplomacy — all contradicting the regime's narrative of nuclear "resistance" and defiance of Western pressure. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei justified the compromise as "heroic flexibility," a revealing phrase that signals doctrine: ideology is flexible when the system faces existential risk.

The regime calculated that economic strangulation posed a greater threat than ideological concession. The JCPOA demonstrated that even core strategic programs could be constrained when the alternative was internal unrest driven by economic collapse.

Brutal Repression: Sacrificing Islamic Legitimacy

Paradoxically, the regime's repeated brutal suppression of mass protests — in 1999, 2009, 2017-18, 2019, 2022, and 2026 — represents another form of ideological compromise. By killing large numbers of protesters, lying transparently about casualties, and sidelining religious rhetoric in favor of raw coercion, the regime undercuts its own ideological self-image as a just Islamic state.

Yet survival trumps legitimacy. When faced with serious unrest, Tehran has consistently chosen violent repression over accommodation, accepting the damage to its Islamic credentials in exchange for maintaining control. This pattern suggests the regime views immediate survival as more important than long-term ideological consistency.

The Protester's Calculus: Four Determining Factors

Whether Iran executes hundreds of detained protesters depends on how the regime weighs four competing pressures. Each has historical precedent, and their interaction will determine the outcome.

Factor 1: Threat Perception—Existential or Manageable?

The regime's response will depend critically on whether it perceives the recent protests as an existential threat or a manageable challenge. The historical record suggests a clear pattern: when the system itself appears threatened, the regime responds with maximum force regardless of cost.

The 1988 prison massacres occurred precisely because the regime, exhausted from war, feared that surviving political prisoners represented an ideological contagion that could unravel revolutionary authority. The 2019 protests, which saw several hundred killed, were suppressed with exceptional brutality because they spread to working-class areas and included attacks on banks and government buildings — suggesting deeper social rage beyond middle-class reformism.

If regime elites conclude that current protesters represent a broader revolutionary movement rather than contained unrest, the ideological imperative to eliminate "enemies of God" will intensify. Conversely, if they assess the threat as manageable through imprisonment and selective punishment, mass executions become less likely.

Factor 2: International Pressure—Credible or Performative?

The reported Trump administration threat to strike Iran if executions proceed represents an unusual form of external pressure. Historically, Western criticism has rarely deterred Iranian repression, but credible military threats have occasionally altered regime calculations.

The key word is "credible." Tehran has extensive experience managing international condemnation and has shown willingness to accept severe diplomatic costs for ideological goals, as the Rushdie fatwa demonstrates. However, when faced with immediate, concrete threats to regime survival — as in 1988 with the ceasefire, or 2015 with the JCPOA — the regime has proven capable of tactical flexibility.

The challenge for external actors is that threats must be both credible and proportionate. If Tehran believes that refraining from executions will not fundamentally alter its relationship with the United States or spare it from regime-change pressure, the incentive to show restraint diminishes. The regime may calculate that it will face American hostility regardless, making the domestic imperative to execute "enemies of God" more salient than foreign policy considerations.

Factor 3: Internal Elite Cohesion—United or Fractured?

The regime's approach to political violence has historically depended on elite consensus. The 1988 prison massacres required coordination between the judiciary, the IRGC, and clerical authorities. The 2019 crackdown succeeded because hardliners dominated all key institutions.

If elements within the regime question the wisdom of mass executions — whether for pragmatic reasons or concern about long-term legitimacy — implementation becomes more difficult. However, there is little evidence of such dissent currently. President Ebrahim Raisi, who himself is linked to the 1988 executions, represented the ascendancy of hardliners committed to uncompromising repression. His death in 2024 and the selection of Masoud Pezeshkian as president potentially introduces uncertainty, though Pezeshkian operates within severe constraints imposed by hardline institutions.

More important is the IRGC's assessment. If the Guards leadership views executions as necessary for deterrence and system preservation, they will likely proceed regardless of diplomatic costs. The IRGC's increasing dominance over Iranian politics since 2009 means that revolutionary ideology, rather than pragmatic statecraft, increasingly drives decision-making on internal security matters.

Factor 4: Precedent and Deterrence—The Moral Hazard of Restraint

From the regime's perspective, showing mercy creates a dangerous precedent. If protesters believe they can challenge the system without facing capital punishment, the cost of dissent decreases and future unrest becomes more likely. This logic has driven previous waves of executions: the regime seeks to establish that certain forms of opposition carry an absolute, non-negotiable penalty.

The theological framework of Mohareb and Baghi reinforces this calculus. If the regime designates protesters as enemies of God, failing to execute them amounts to defying divine command. This creates internal pressure within the judiciary and security apparatus to follow through on death sentences, independent of external considerations.

However, the regime must also weigh whether mass executions will trigger even larger protests or potentially fracture its own support base. The Woman, Life, Freedom movement demonstrated that excessive repression can generate sustained domestic and international backlash. If executions risk catalyzing a broader revolutionary movement, they become counterproductive even from a pure survival perspective.

The Verdict: Between Ideology and Survival

The historical evidence points toward a grim conclusion: the Islamic Republic is more likely to execute significant numbers of protesters than to show systematic clemency, but the scale will depend on its threat assessment and the credibility of international consequences.

Three factors support the likelihood of executions:

First, theological imperative. The regime has consistently demonstrated that when core ideological principles — particularly clerical authority and the inviolability of the Islamic system — are at stake, it prioritizes ideology over strategic cost. The Rushdie fatwa, mandatory hijab enforcement, and the 1988 massacres all demonstrate this pattern. Designated as Mohareb, protesters represent not political opponents but enemies of God. The religious obligation to punish them creates powerful internal momentum toward execution.

Second, precedent and deterrence. The regime fears that restraint will encourage future unrest. Every major protest wave since 2009 has been met with escalating violence precisely because the regime concluded that insufficient repression in one cycle emboldened protesters in the next. From this perspective, executions serve a functional purpose beyond punishment: they raise the cost of dissent to prohibitive levels.

Third, hardline dominance. The current configuration of Iranian politics favors uncompromising repression. The IRGC, hardline judiciary, and conservative clerical establishment control all key institutions and have shown no indication of questioning the necessity of severe punishment for protesters. The ideological infrastructure that enabled the 1988 massacres remains firmly in place.

However, three factors could limit the scale of executions:

First, regime survival calculus. If mass executions threaten to trigger a broader revolutionary movement or risk catalyzing international military action that endangers the regime itself, Tehran has demonstrated capacity for tactical restraint. The 1988 ceasefire, post-Khomeini economic reforms, and 2015 nuclear deal all show that when survival is genuinely threatened, ideology can be shelved.

Second, international leverage. While Western diplomatic criticism alone has rarely deterred Iranian repression, concrete and credible threats — particularly military action — have occasionally altered regime behavior. The reported Trump administration warning, if backed by clear and proportional consequences, could influence Tehran's calculus. However, this influence is likely to result in reduced numbers rather than wholesale clemency.

Third, tactical flexibility. The regime may opt for a mixed approach: executing a significant but not catastrophic number to establish deterrence while showing selective mercy to manage international pressure and avoid the appearance of mass slaughter. This would allow Tehran to satisfy its ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" while maintaining plausible deniability about systematic repression.

Policy Implications: The Limits of Engagement

For policymakers in Washington and European capitals, the analysis yields sobering conclusions about leverage and limits. Four implications merit emphasis:

Diplomatic assurances should be treated with extreme skepticism. Foreign Minister Araghchi's reported promise to forgo 800 executions should be understood as tactical rather than binding. The regime has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to mislead international interlocutors when core ideological commitments are at stake. Any claims that executions have been "abrogated" likely represent strategic attempts to manage international pressure rather than genuine policy shifts.

External pressure works only when survival is threatened. The regime has proven willing to endure enormous costs — economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, international condemnation — for ideological goals. Pressure becomes effective only when it credibly threatens the system's existence, as during the 1988 war exhaustion or 2015 economic crisis. Short of such threats, Tehran can absorb external criticism while proceeding with domestic repression.

Ideology and survival are not mutually exclusive. Western analysis often treats these as distinct categories, but the regime views them as integrated. From Tehran's perspective, failing to execute designated enemies of God threatens the ideological foundations that legitimate the system, making such executions a form of survival strategy. Convincing the regime otherwise requires demonstrating that repression endangers the system more than restraint does.

Long-term engagement requires acknowledging immovable positions. Certain ideological commitments — clerical authority, the nature of Islamic governance, and the right to eliminate perceived existential threats — have proven non-negotiable across four decades. Effective policy must work around rather than through these obstacles, focusing leverage on areas where the regime has demonstrated flexibility rather than core theological principles.

Conclusion: The Probability of Tragedy

Will Iran execute the protesters? The weight of historical evidence suggests yes, though likely in calibrated rather than wholesale fashion. The regime will almost certainly proceed with significant numbers of executions, framing them as religious obligations under Mohareb and Baghi designations, while attempting to manage international blowback through strategic ambiguity about precise numbers and limited clemency in high-profile cases.

The theological framework of Velayat-e Faqih, the historical pattern of prioritizing ideology over strategy when clerical authority is at stake, and the current dominance of hardline institutions all point toward repression. Foreign Minister Araghchi's assurances to American envoys should be understood as tactical rather than definitive — a pattern consistent with the regime's historical approach to managing international pressure while pursuing domestic imperatives.

Yet the regime retains capacity for strategic calculation. If executions genuinely risk triggering a broader revolutionary movement or invite military action that threatens system survival, Tehran has demonstrated it can modulate its approach. The question is not whether the regime will show mercy — it will not, in any systematic sense — but rather how many must die before the ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" is satisfied.

For the protesters awaiting judgment in Iranian prisons, this analysis offers little comfort. They have become pawns in a larger contest between revolutionary ideology and strategic survival, their individual fates determined by calculations that treat human life as instrumental to regime preservation. The Islamic Republic's 45-year history suggests that when this contest plays out, survival wins only when genuinely threatened — and ideology extracts a terrible price along the way.

The international community's ability to alter this trajectory remains limited. Without credible threats to regime survival or genuine willingness to fundamentally alter Iran's strategic environment, external pressure will likely affect the scale but not the fact of repression. The protesters' best hope lies not in diplomatic assurances or Western criticism, but in the regime's own cold calculus: that mass executions might trigger the very revolutionary crisis they are meant to prevent.

That is a thin reed on which to rest the lives of hundreds, but it is the only one history provides.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Intelligence.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

WASHINGTON—A twenty-seven-mile stretch of land running through southern Armenia is poised to reshape the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. On January 13, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan announced a detailed framework to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This US-brokered corridor, which promises to become a vital connectivity link between Europe and Asia, could go down as one of US President Donald Trump’s most impressive foreign policy achievements of his second term.

TRIPP’s connectivity potential

The idea for a US-brokered transport route in southern Armenia that would link the main part of Azerbaijan to Baku’s Nakhchivan exclave grew out of 2025 peace talks between the two countries coordinated by US officials. Azerbaijan wanted to implement a crucial element of its 2020 cease-fire agreement with Armenia—unfettered transport access to Nakhchivan. At the same time, Armenia sought to maintain control over its sovereign territory along the proposed twenty-seven-mile route across its land.

In stepped Trump and his team with a creative solution: a US-led consortium would construct and manage the route, in concert with Armenian authorities, that would in turn safeguard Azerbaijani access to Nakhchivan. At a summit at the White House this past August, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Trump agreed to implement TRIPP with a view toward a comprehensive Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. This was a significant achievement: Armenia and Azerbaijan had clashed for more than thirty years, and they had fought a handful of wars in that time that killed tens of thousands.

Read the full article on the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Iran's domestic turmoil is usually viewed through the lens of Middle Eastern politics or Tehran's standoff with the West. But hundreds of miles to the northeast, the ripples from Iran's crisis could reshape a cornerstone of Central Asian statecraft: the carefully cultivated strategy of playing multiple powers against one another while maintaining independence from any single patron.

For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors, Iran is more than another regional state. It's a neighboring country, a potential transit route, and a fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. More importantly, it represents access to the Indian Ocean — a key component of Central Asia's strategy to diversify economic ties and reduce dependence on any single major power. Whether that access becomes a liability or an opportunity depends entirely on what emerges from Iran's current crisis.

The Southern Corridor Dreams

For decades, Central Asian leaders have pursued a vision of connectivity that would liberate them from geographic fate. Hemmed in by mountains, steppe, and desert, these former Soviet republics have long depended on routes through Russia to reach global markets. One alternative they envisioned ran south through Iran and Pakistan to warm-water ports like Chabahar and Bandar Abbas.

This wasn't merely about logistics. The southern corridor embodied a broader diplomatic philosophy that Central Asian governments call "multi-vectorism" — the art of cultivating relationships in all directions simultaneously, never becoming too dependent on Moscow, Beijing, or Washington. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, have styled themselves as pragmatic middle powers more interested in infrastructure deals than ideological camps.

The Turgundi-Herat railway, specialized cargo terminals in Iranian ports, promised transit times slashed by days and shipping costs cut dramatically. Central Asian exporters saw a pathway to South Asian and African markets that bypassed both Russian territory and Chinese-controlled routes.

But infrastructure ambitions are only as solid as the ground they're built on. Persistent violence along the Afghan-Pakistani border has already exposed the brittleness of the southern strategy. Iran's deepening instability adds a new dimension of risk. Climbing insurance premiums, unreliable shipping schedules, and a lack of foreign investment all serve as major barriers. Even without a full regional conflagration, prolonged uncertainty is enough to make the southern route a gamble few companies want to take.

Two Futures, Two Outcomes

The trajectory of Iran's crisis profoundly affects Central Asia, though not in the ways typically discussed. The most important factor is not whether Iran experiences instability, but rather, the direction ultimately chosen by the government that controls Tehran.

If the current period of turmoil results in a continuation of the status quo — where ideological rigidity and international isolation prevail — Central Asia faces a difficult scenario. The years of diplomatic effort and infrastructure investment risked being sidelined, leaving the region's southern corridor as a project of unfulfilled potential.

However, should Tehran emerge from this crisis by recalibrating its priorities toward a more pragmatic, growth-oriented model, the calculus changes entirely. If the leadership moves away from regional ideological pursuits in favor of economic integration, Iran could transform from a source of uncertainty into a cornerstone partner. For Central Asia, a stable and commercially focused Iran would provide the missing piece for a truly independent multi-vector policy, turning a theoretical alternative into a viable reality.

When Neutrality Becomes Impossible

Central Asian states have perfected the art of diplomatic discretion, usually responding to international crises with studied silence or bland calls for stability. Iran, however, defies that playbook. It's not Venezuela or Libya — some faraway trouble spot that can be safely ignored. It's a neighbor, a transit partner, and a fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

That proximity is forcing uncomfortable choices. The SCO has in the past issued the occasional statement expressing concern about external pressure on Iran, but when it comes to Iran's internal breakdown, the organization has made no statements. This exposes an awkward truth that Central Asian governments would prefer not to acknowledge: the multilateral security frameworks they participate in provide diplomatic cover but almost no practical crisis management.

The result is a widening gap between rhetoric and reality. Officially, Central Asian states remain committed to collective security arrangements and principled non-alignment. In practice, they're falling back on bilateral deals and improvised solutions to protect their interests. Multi-vectorism, once an active strategy of diversification, increasingly resembles a reactive scramble to avoid picking sides — unless Iran's political transformation creates the stable partner they've been waiting for.

The Afghanistan Connection

One of the least appreciated dimensions of this crisis involves Afghanistan. Despite Iran's larger economy, Central Asian states trade more with Afghanistan. But repeated closures of the Afghan-Pakistani border have altered commercial ties.

Iran has steadily expanded its economic role in Afghanistan, becoming a vital supplier of fuel, food, and consumer goods. This growing interdependence means Iran's fate and Afghanistan's are now intertwined in ways that directly affect Central Asia. Disruptions in Iran ripple through Afghanistan and ultimately compromise Central Asian access to the south.

If the current regime persists or is replaced by another ideological government, even contained instability in Iran could trigger a collapse in Afghanistan, leading to a potential rise in cross-border terrorism and narcotics smuggling. But a stable, economically focused Iran could help anchor Afghanistan, creating a genuine southern corridor that extends Central Asian reach into South Asia and beyond.

China's Conditional Windfall

While Iran's troubles close doors to the south, they're quietly opening others to the east — but only if those doors stay closed. China's influence in Central Asia may grow not through aggressive expansion but through simple arithmetic: as alternative corridors remain unreliable under continued instability or ideological governance, Beijing's routes look increasingly essential.

China's long-standing interest in stable overland connections that avoid maritime chokepoints aligns neatly with Central Asia's need for predictable partners. As southern uncertainty mounts under the current scenario, Central Asian governments risk becoming more dependent on eastward trade, not less — precisely the outcome multi-vectorism was designed to prevent.

This shift won't announce itself with dramatic summits or treaty signings. It will emerge gradually, visible only in logistics contracts, investment patterns, and the accumulated weight of thousands of small decisions by government officials and business executives reassessing their options.

However, this outcome is not inevitable. If Iran transitions to a growth-oriented government focused on regional integration rather than ideological projects, Central Asia gains precisely what it needs to resist overdependence on any single power. A commercially reliable Iran would give these countries genuine leverage in negotiations with Beijing and Moscow.

The Cost of Miscalculation

Iran's crisis reveals a vulnerability in Central Asian foreign policy that few officials want to confront. Multi-vectorism does not only depend on diplomatic dexterity but also on the physical reliability of transport networks and the stability of neighboring states. When those foundations crack, strategic flexibility evaporates.

The difference between Iran as a persistent problem and Iran as a solution is the difference between Central Asia gradually sliding into Beijing's economic orbit and Central Asia achieving the genuine independence its leaders have long proclaimed. Should non-economic priorities continue to take precedence, the southern gateway may remain a project of unfulfilled potential. However, a pivot toward regional connectivity and mutual growth would provide the stability necessary to turn these strategic aspirations into a functional reality.

For Central Asian governments, this moment demands more than optimistic infrastructure announcements. It requires honest reckoning with the fragility of southern connectivity and greater investment in redundancy over ambition. But it also demands recognition that Iran's political evolution could be the most consequential variable in the region's strategic future.

For Western policymakers debating Iran strategy, the implications extend beyond the Middle East. Pressure on Tehran creates spillover effects that flow through Afghanistan and into Central Asia. But the question isn't just whether to pressure Iran — it's what outcomes that pressure might produceProlonged instability, or the continued survival of ideological priorities over economic pragmatism, drives these countries closer to Beijing at a time when Washington claims to want to expand its options in the region. A transition to pragmatic governance in Tehran, however unlikely, would create genuine opportunities for Central Asian independence that currently exist only on paper.

Iran's internal struggles may seem peripheral to Central Asia's core concerns. However, whatever emerges from Iran will have the potential to redraw the region's economic geography and constrain its strategic choices in ways that could define the next decade. Whether that reshaping pushes Central Asia into deeper dependence on China or liberates it into genuine multi-alignment depends almost entirely on what kind of government ultimately emerges in Tehran.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Eldaniz Gusseinov is a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Heydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at the Ibn Khaldun University and co-founder of Nightingale Int., a political forecasting consultancy. He specializes in European and international studies, focusing on the European Union's foreign policy and its interaction with Central Asian countries, as well as analyzing foreign policy processes in Central Asia.

Turan Reserach Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Alex Vatanka and Alan Eyre on a panel moderated by Negar Mojtahedi to discuss the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and what it means for US-Iran relations.

Watch the full interview here.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Azerbaijan sits in one of the world’s roughest neighborhoods, squeezed between Russia to the north and Iran to the south. 

Over the past few years, the small, secular but Muslim-majority nation has faced tensions with both Russia and Iran. Relations with Moscow cooled after Russian air defenses accidentally downed an Azerbaijani airliner last December, killing 38. Meanwhile, repeated Iranian threats—including support for the Husseiniyyun, a radical Shia proxy operating terrorist cells in the country and large-scale military exercises on the border—have kept the nation on edge.

Yet Azerbaijan is more than a country at the mercy of large neighbors. It also offers a rare strategic opening for Washington with immediate payoffs in trade, energy security, and regional deterrence.

Baku controls a key stretch of the Middle Corridor—the only land route from Europe to Asia that bypasses both Russia and Iran. It already supplies natural gas to Europe and has helped ease tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara. It has become a bridge to Central Asia, a region the United States has recently prioritized as it seeks alternatives to Chinese rare earths.

Read the full article on the National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

On the day after the Taliban seized Kabul in 2021, a Turkish Airlines flight carrying 234 passengers arrived in Istanbul. Among them was Sarwar Danish, Afghanistan’s Second Vice President, and two members of President Ashraf Ghani’s fleeing cabinet.

Danish, became the highest-ranking Hazara official of the Afghan government to flee the Taliban without seeking refuge in Iran, despite having lived and studied there for many years. Like many educated Hazara elites, he spent much of the 1980s and 1990s in Iran, pursuing religious studies in Qom, home to the world’ s largest Shiite theological seminary.

Hazara Shiites and Iranian Shiites share the Twelver branch of Shia Islam but differ ethnically. The Hazaras have Mongol-Turkic roots and speak Hazaragi, a Farsi-based language. Iranian Shiites are ethnic Persians who speak Farsi.

Iran’s deepening relations with the Taliban convinced Danish that it was too risky to seek refuge there. Ultimately, he resettled in New Zealand.

In the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom brought about the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001. The subsequent Bonn Agreement established a power-sharing framework that reshaped Afghanistan’s political order. Within this arrangement, the Hazaras — the second most powerful opposition to the Taliban after the Tajiks — secured 20 percent of Cabinet positions. Their representation was led by Islamic Unity Party (Hizb-e-Wahdat) leader Mohammad Karim Khalili, who assumed the role of Second Vice President Today, Khalili lives in exile in Turkey.

Following the U.S. intervention in 2001, the Hazaras community has pursued gradual yet consistent efforts to define an identity that extends beyond its Shiite religious affiliation. This process has contributed to a degree of distancing from Iran’s Islamic regime. In their search for a broader cultural and political framework, Hazara political and academic elites have taken tangible steps to cultivate ties with Turkey, positioning themselves as leading actors within the Turkic world. Such outreach has resonated with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s promotion of Pan-Turkism.

Within this context, Turkey’s reception of prominent Hazara political leaders such as Khalili and Mohammad Mohaqqiq, the long-time leader of the People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (PIUPA), appears strategically coherent. Both figures, together with Danish, have played active roles in exile politics, most notably through the establishment of the National Resistance Council for Salvation of Afghanistan in Turkey in 2022. The council has formed a political opposition coalition against the Taliban. Both Mohaqqiq and Danish are the among the organization’s founders.

Iran’s relationship with the Taliban has steadily deepened over the past decade, diminishing its appeal as a refuge for Hazara leaders. From 2015 onward, reports indicate that Iran began engaging both diplomatically and militarily with the Taliban, with some analysts noting the establishment of Taliban training infrastructure inside Iran. This alignment was not merely pragmatic but political: Iran appeared intent on cultivating influence with the Taliban, even at the expense of marginalized Afghan groups. In return, Iran secures its eastern border, gains access to the Afghan market, uses the Taliban’s anti-West sentiments as its global P.R., and can stay influential in regional dynamics. In 2023, the relationship was formalized further when Tehran transferred control of the Afghan embassy to Taliban-appointed diplomats.

The Hazara community’s historical experience with Iran is more complex than shared Shiite identity might suggest. During the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, Iran provided support to Hazara jihadist groups, but this assistance weakened Hazara political cohesion after the Soviet withdrawal, some analysts argue.

Moreover, within Hazara narratives, Iran is remembered as having prioritized other Afghan factions — such as the Tajik mujahideen group, Jamiat-e Islami. during the early 1990s civil war that erupted after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, offering more military support, while limiting aid to Hazara groups. Although archival evidence remains sparse, these perceptions left a legacy of mistrust among some Hazara elites toward Tehran.

One of the most significant sources of Hazara mistrust toward Iran stems from Iran’s use of Hazara refugees in its regional military engagements. The Fatemiyoun Brigade, backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), recruited large numbers of Afghan Hazaras — including minors — to fight in Syria. Human Rights Watch documented cases of Afghan children as young as 14 who were deployed and killed in Syria under Fatemiyoun’s banner.

Beyond such recruitment, reports highlight coercive practices: Hazara refugees allegedly pressured through economic vulnerability or promises of legal residency for fighting in the Fatemiyoun. Human Rights and migrant-rights groups argue that the IRGC exploited refugees’ precarious lives for geopolitical gain. In a 2020 report by the Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights, IRGC Qud’s Force recruited thousands of Afghans Shias mainly from the Hazara community to fight in Syria. One Afghan described being approached at a mosque in Efsahan, “They suggested we go to Syria to help defend the Shi’a holy shrines from Daesh’, adding that ‘we’d get passports and have an easy life afterwards. We’d be like Iranian citizens and could buy cars, houses…”

For Hazara leaders, these practices transformed Iran from a potential sanctuary into a place of exploitation, casting serious doubts about Tehran’s willingness to protect the broader Hazara community.

Throughout the two-decades of the Afghan Republic, Western governments played a dominant role in the nation’s political institutions, development funding, and security architecture. Hazara leaders actively cultivated these relationships to avoid political marginalization and to ensure external backing. During this period, hundreds of Hazara youth obtained scholarships to leading universities in the U.S. and Europe, with many returning to Afghanistan to occupy senior positions within the Republic’s bureaucracy.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Western actors continued to influence Afghan realities primarily through humanitarian aid. According to a UNOCHA, approximately $6.7 billion in humanitarian funding was directed to Afghanistan between 2021 and 2024. This sustained support reinforced the perception that Western countries would remain influential players in any future Afghan political landscape. For Hazara leaders, relocation to the West offered not only physical safety but also continued political relevance and access to resources.

Over the past two decades, Hazara diaspora communities have flourished across Western countries — particularly in Europe, Australia, and Canada. These communities have become hubs for political mobilization, advocacy, fundraising, and civil society initiatives. For exiled Hazara leaders, relocation to these countries provides access to established networks, enabling them to maintain influence and engage in transnational activism.

 By contrast, the political space for Hazaras in Iran has remained considerably more constrained limiting the role of any diaspora there as a platform for political leadership. Iran’s domestic political system imposes strict limits on independent political organizing, particularly for refugees. Hazara leaders attempting to operate politically in Iran risk surveillance, repression, and legal obstacles. It is highly unlikely that figures like Mohammad Mohaqqiq, Sarwar Danesh, or Karim Khalili could freely participate in anti-Taliban groups if based in Iran.

Moreover, Iran’s political climate is far less permissive toward the formation of independent political parties or coalitions — especially those that might challenge Tehran’s strategic interests. For Hazara leaders seeking political agency and a long-term voice, Western democracies offer far greater freedom and opportunity than Iran’s restrictive environment.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was as a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

The dictum that foreign policy doesn’t win elections has long been a part of the conventional wisdom of American politics. Yet as the Republican Party enters an ideological civil war, with the MAGA movement splintering into competing factions, foreign policy has become a major battlefield. 

At the center of the new divide, which will determine what MAGA will stand for after Trump, is Tucker Carlson, who has positioned himself as the leader of an isolationist, grievance-driven bloc. Mixing conspiracy theories, antisemitic tropes, and sympathetic treatment of authoritarian governments hostile to the United States, Carlson has repeatedly worked to undermine Trump-aligned foreign policy goals.

The struggle is less about specific policies, however, than about who will ultimately control the movement. Trump built MAGA and remains its most powerful figure, yet by not policing his message, he has left space for Carlson to shape the narrative. Although Trump once called him “Kooky Tucker Carlson” in response to Carlson’s hysterical warnings that bombing Iran could trigger World War III, he has largely avoided confronting him directly. Carlson has been open about his intent, saying after a recent interview with white nationalist Nick Fuentes, “What happens after Trump goes? That’s what this is about.” If Trump does not draw clear boundaries, he risks allowing the movement he built to be defined by its most extreme elements.

Read the full article on the National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Over the past few years, Azerbaijan has dramatically scaled up its military, setting a 2025 record of roughly $5 billion in defense spending. This build-up includes modern multirole jets like the JF-17 Block III, upgraded land forces, enhanced air-defense networks, advanced drones, precision artillery, and missile systems.

Azerbaijan’s modernization has been strongly supported by Israeli systems. This November, Dr. Daniel Gold, the architect of many of Israel’s most advanced systems, made a high-level visit to Baku, signaling what Israeli publication Maariv described as “cooperation at the deepest levels.”

According to the Israeli media Gold’s visit is connected to Azerbaijan's major tender to build a high-end communication satellite, potentially worth up to $800 million. Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is a finalist, alongside SpaceX, Thales Alenia, and Turkish Aerospace (TAI).

During a Victory Day parade on November 9, Azerbaijan unveiled Rafael’s Ice Breaker long-range stand-off missile, which boasts AI-assisted precision and bolsters maritime and coastal deterrence.

In the past decade, Israel has increasingly intensified its defense cooperation with Azerbaijan, solidifying Baku’s position as one of its most important security partners. Azerbaijan has acquired an expanding range of Israeli systems—especially drones, loitering munitions, surveillance platforms, and air-defense technology—that have helped modernize its armed forces and strengthen its strategic posture. This deepening partnership reflects converging geopolitical interests, sustained energy ties, and Israel’s broader effort to maintain reliable partners along Iran’s periphery. As a result, the Israel-Azerbaijan military relationship has become an increasingly influential factor in the evolving security landscape of the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan’s 2025 military parade in Baku showcased the growing share of Israeli high-tech systems in its arsenal, from loitering munitions such as Harop and SkyStriker to long-range missile systems like Ice Breaker and LORA. Complementing these are MALE-class drones (Hermes 900, Heron) and advanced air-defense systems including Barak-8 and Barak MX, integrated with sophisticated radar networks. Beyond conventional weaponry, Baku has expanded into space-based reconnaissance and cybersecurity, in cooperation with Israeli institutions, highlighting that the partnership extends well beyond a traditional buyer-seller relationship and reflects strategic, technological, and geopolitical considerations.

While Azerbaijani military buildups are often chocked up to preparations against Armenia, when viewed through the lens of technical characteristics, geographic logic, procurement patterns, and regional strategic incentives, Azerbaijan’s force development since 2020 points overwhelmingly in a different direction. What emerges is not an Armenian-focused war plan, but a broader transformation: a shift toward a precision-driven, multi-domain deterrent posture designed to manage the challenges posed by Iran, protect critical infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, and secure the emerging Middle Corridor that links Central Asia to Europe through Azerbaijani territory.

Understanding this requires disaggregating political narrative from empirical military analysis. Armenia-centered interpretations rely heavily on the visibility of the Israel–Azerbaijan relationship and on memories of Israeli drones used in the 2020 Karabakh war and following 2023 offensive. But they fail to engage the reality that the overwhelming majority of new systems Azerbaijan has acquired since that conflict are not relevant to the Armenian theater. no plausible application in a campaign to seize Armenian territory. Instead, they map neatly onto Azerbaijan’s anxieties about Iran’s expanding role in the Caspian, the vulnerability of offshore energy assets, and the geopolitical value of trans-Caspian infrastructure.

Azerbaijan’s pre-2020 acquisitions from Israel were dominated by precision-strike and reconnaissance systems—loitering munitions like Harop and Harpy, the Orbiter series, SkyStriker drones, and a suite of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) tools. These are instruments of targeted warfare, not the backbone of mass-maneuver operations required for larger territorial conquest. If Azerbaijan had intended to invade Armenia proper, it already possessed by 2020 the tools to neutralize much of Armenia’s air defense and armor, as demonstrated in Karabakh. Yet Baku did not pursue a deep offensive into Armenian territory even at moments when Armenian defenses were disorganized and depleted. This restraint is often explained through political factors, but it also highlights a central analytical point: precision-guided strike systems alone are insufficient to mount and sustain a high-casualty, high-logistics invasion across mountainous terrain. What Azerbaijan possessed, and continues to acquire, are technologies suited to deterrence and defense, not an offensive war.

Importantly, Israeli arms transfers did not stop with the 2023 Karabakh offensive. Open-source reporting indicates that throughout 2024 and into 2025, Azerbaijani cargo flights continued arriving from Israel, delivering drones, munitions, and other advanced military equipment. These post-offensive acquisitions demonstrate that Baku’s military modernization is ongoing and reflect strategic priorities beyond Armenia, particularly maritime security and the protection of critical infrastructure.

Post-2020 acquisitions are even more revealing. Investigations by outlets such as Haaretz, along with open-source analyses of systems displayed at military parades, show that many of Azerbaijan’s new imports emphasize electronic warfare, long-range air-surveillance radars, naval drones, and maritime and coastal and observation technologies. DefenseArabia experts note that Azerbaijan now maintains an unusually robust air-defense network, particularly for a country of its size.

These complement systems optimized for detecting low-altitude aircraft over water, tracking small maritime vessels, monitoring littoral electromagnetic activity, and reconnaissance across the Caspian. Armenia, as a landlocked state with no navy and no coastline, simply does not present a target set for these capabilities. Their operational logic is rooted in the Caspian basin, where Azerbaijan faces both natural vulnerabilities—offshore oil and gas fields, export terminals, and critical maritime trade routes—and an increasingly assertive Iranian presence.

Iran maintains a significant naval footprint in the southern Caspian, has expanded drone reconnaissance, and has introduced new destroyers to the Caspian sea fleet. Just two years ago, tensions between the Islamic Republic and Azerbaijan have risen to the point where analysts openly speculated about the possibility of war. As Baku and Yerevan partner with the Trump administration to implement TRIPP, Iranian senior officials have threatened to turn the region into a “graveyard of the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” In this context, Azerbaijan’s pursuit of advanced coastal radars, maritime-capable ISR, and unmanned surface vessel technologies becomes far more intelligible. They are the essential ingredients of a littoral defense and maritime-denial posture—precisely the kind of force architecture a state would build if it feared asymmetric Iranian pressure, sabotage of offshore platforms, or interference with commercial shipping. None of these systems contribute meaningfully to an Armenian scenario, yet they are indispensable in a Caspian-centered strategic environment.

A second driver is safeguarding the Middle Corridor. As European and Central Asian governments seek alternatives to routes dominated by Russia, Azerbaijan has become the linchpin of a trans-Eurasian trade artery connecting Kazakhstan, across the Caspian, to Baku and then onward through the South Caucasus to Turkey and Europe. Securing this corridor requires more than road and rail protection; it demands full-spectrum maritime situational awareness, cross-Caspian security coordination, and protection of energy nodes that underpin the corridor’s economic viability. Azerbaijan has, for this purpose, expanded cooperation with regional actors such as Kazakhstan, which relies on Azerbaijan’s ports and maritime security for access to Western markets. A significant portion of the systems Baku is acquiring are precisely the tools necessary to guarantee the safety of the cross-Caspian link, not to fight a land war in the mountains of the Armenian plateau.

The mere size of Azerbaijani defense spending also signals deterrence. Baku spends 2.7 times more on its military than Yerevan and has massive qualitative and quantitative edges. But recent purchases are overwhelmingly composed of systems that enhance standoff striking power, electromagnetic dominance, and domain awareness, not the heavy engineering, mechanized lift, armored mass, and logistics infrastructure that any invasion of Armenia would require. A state preparing to occupy another country builds combat brigades, transport and supply networks, gendarmerie forces for post-conflict stabilization, and engineering units capable of sustaining advances through narrow valleys and mountainous passes. Azerbaijan is not doing this. Instead, it is building a force capable of managing escalation with a larger neighbor, deterring maritime threats, and protecting infrastructure far from the Armenian border.

The final piece of the puzzle is political logic. An invasion of Armenia carries risks Azerbaijan has never been willing to accept: driving Armenia back to Russia, unpredictable Western reactions, and the potential for a broader regional conflagration involving Iran. The political costs of such a war dwarf the strategic value of Armenian territory. By contrast, the benefits of securing the Middle Corridor, insulating energy exports, and countering Iranian leverage are substantial and tied directly to Azerbaijan’s long-term economic and geopolitical position. It is therefore rational—indeed expected—that Baku would invest heavily in capabilities suited to these missions.

Azerbaijan’s evolving military posture is shaped by the need to deter asymmetric Iranian pressure, safeguard offshore and trans-Caspian infrastructure, and protect the country’s role as a regional trade hub. The focus is maritime and multi-domain deterrence, not territorial expansion into Armenia. Understanding these acquisitions in their proper strategic context clarifies that Baku is building a modern, precision-oriented force designed to defend its most vulnerable interests—across the Caspian and along critical corridors—not to wage a war across mountainous borders.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Few Central Asia observers were surprised by the recent and unanimous decision to include Azerbaijan as a full-fledged member in the Consultative Format of Central Asian nations, given its longstanding role in fostering regional connectivity and energy cooperation. The forum—originally composed of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—is a platform for cooperation among Central Asian states. Baku’s accession to the format signals both Central Asia and Azerbaijan want to be seen as part of a single region. 

Building on that expansion, the United States should now add Azerbaijan to the C5+1 format and consider inviting Israel to join the framework, creating a C6+2. Incorporating Israel would provide Washington with the expertise of a trusted partner that maintains diplomatic, economic, and security relationships across the region. Coordinated engagement would enhance the ability of the United States and Israel to shape outcomes and expand their influence—particularly as they compete with entrenched powers such as Russia and China that remain broadly opposed to U.S. involvement in the region. 

An Israeli role will also help secure U.S. strategic interests. Namely, by supporting the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route or Middle Corridor, a trade route through Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe bypassing both Russia and Iran as well as helping develop critical mineral processing abilities. Jerusalem could also support the region in strategic initiatives such as water management and cybersecurity.  

Read the full article on the N7 Foundation.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Amidst ongoing progress on Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization and Yerevan’s regional integration, Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan made an underreported but significant visit to Israel. He met with Eden Bar-Tal, Director-General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, to discuss a new chapter in bilateral relations and explore opportunities for cooperation in political and economic spheres, highlighting high tech, tourism, agriculture, and medicine as sectors of mutual interest.

The visit marked a first public step toward improving historically strained relations between the two countries, but it was also notable given Kostanyan’s portfolio. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan tasked him with overseeing progress on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave via Armenia’s Syunik Province. Israeli and Armenian media reports suggest TRIPP was the main item on the agenda.

Kostanyan’s involvement signals that Yerevan is serious about realigning with the West and is willing to risk Iran’s ire. Israel has two strategic interests in TRIPP: supporting U.S. and Azerbaijani initiatives and bypassing Iran, which could place Tehran’s border with Armenia effectively under U.S. control. Iran has repeatedly warned against such a passage, previously known as the Zangezur Corridor. In 2022, Tehran conducted large-scale military exercises near the Azerbaijani border over a perceived Azerbaijani threat to the Syunik province, while senior officials repeatedly labeled the route a “red line.” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reaffirmed Iran’s opposition during a meeting with Pashinyan last year.

For Pashinyan, however, TRIPP is essential. Armenia agreed to provide Azerbaijan with transport access to Nakhichevan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire. During the August 8 Washington Peace Summit, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev granted the U.S. exclusive development rights over the route. The summit provoked a slew of criticism in Iranian state media. The most searing response came from senior advisor to Khamenei Ali Akbar Velayati, who called the corridor a threat to national security and threatened to turn the region into a “graveyard of the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” Simultaneously, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reported that Armenia assured it would “observe all of Iran’s red lines.”

Given these sensitivities, Pashinyan’s decision to assign TRIPP oversight to Kostanyan was deliberate. A Persian speaker who studied in the United States and Iran, Kostanyan participated in multiple high-level delegations to Iran, including an August visit after the Washington summit, meeting with Velayati, Araghchi, and other officials. His appointment signaled Armenia’s recognition of Iran’s importance to TRIPP’s success.

Kostanyan’s visit to Israel, therefore, is strategically significant. It suggests Yerevan is willing to risk Iranian displeasure to advance TRIPP and accelerate alignment with the U.S. and its allies. How Tehran will respond—through cooperation, pressure, or confrontation—remains an open question.

Adversaries by Proxy

Armenian-Israeli relations have long been tense. At the heart of the dispute are the close connections with the other adversaries. Since the 1990’s, Israel has developed close relations with Azerbaijan in the military, political, and economic spheres. Jerusalem was one of the largest weapons exporters to Baku before and during the Second Karabakh War when Azerbaijan took back over 70 percent of territory occupied by Armenian-backed separatists. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Israel supplied 69 percent of Azerbaijan’s weapon imports from 2016-2020.Following the war, Yerevan recalled its ambassador to Israel over the arms sales, only to restore relations two years later. Israeli-Azerbaijan relations continue to develop, with Israeli Prime Minister pursuing trilateral cooperation with the United States and Azerbaijan this year and Azerbaijan buying large stakes in Israeli gas fields.

Meanwhile, Iran has cultivated close relations with Armenia since its independence in 1991. Tehran provided discreet support during the First Karabakh War in 1992, and over the decades, successive Armenian administrations have maintained extensive ties with the Islamic Republic. In recent years, Iranian support has become increasingly visible, manifesting in major arms agreements, intelligence collaboration, high-level meetings with Khamenei, and public assurances of Iran’s commitment to Armenia’s defense. Bilateral trade recently surpassed $700 million, with both sides aspiring to reach $3 billion. The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control has reported that Iran uses Armenia to circumvent sanctions.

However, friendly relations with the others’ adversaries are not the only grievances. Israeli media has highlighted the rise in antisemitism in Armenia, largely related to Israel’s ties with Azerbaijan, as a barrier to improved relations. Since 2020, perpetrators have vandalized, graffitied, and even attempted to burn down Yerevan’s synagogue and Jewish Center. The Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs has reported an uptick in antisemitism over the past five years, corroborated by groups such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism.

Another flashpoint is the “Cow Gardens” controversy in Jerusalem’s Armenian Quarter. Several years ago, the Armenian Patriarchate agreed to lease land to an Israeli developer for a hotel, but community backlash led it to unilaterally attempt to annul the agreement. Activists have framed enforcement as akin to “ethnic cleansing”and pressured the Armenian government to intervene.

Tensions also stem from U.S.-based Armenian diaspora groups taking anti-Israel stances, particularly since the Second Karabakh War. Israel’s perception of the diaspora is complicated by comparisons to organizations like AIPAC. Unlike AIPAC, whose singular goal is promoting Israeli-U.S. relations, Armenian diaspora groups often pursue agendas at odds with Yerevan. For instance, one of the largest diaspora groups critical of Israel, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) has also repeatedly criticized the Pashinyan administration. Following the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive reclaiming the remaining Karabakh territories, ANCA President Aram Hamparian accused Armenians protecting Pashinyan of “fighting against [their] own people,” while Policy Director Alex Galitsky called the August 8 Peace Summit a surrender of Armenia’s “sovereign rights to a neo-colonial U.S.-backed corporate consortium.” Ilan Berman, Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Center argued the Armenian diaspora has joined Russia and Iran in a “three-front war” against Pashinyan.

While diaspora hostility, antisemitism, and the Cow Gardens controversy create friction, these issues are solvable. Likewise, as Azerbaijan and Armenia inch closer to a final normalization deal, Israel’s ties with Baku should no longer threaten Yerevan nor oppose improved Israeli-Armenian ties. Still, Israel has been careful to account for Azerbaijani sensitivities: before Kostanyan’s visit, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economy, Mikhayil Jabbarov, co-chaired the fourth Azerbaijan-Israel Joint Commission. Following the meeting, the Israeli Ministry of Defense sent a delegation to Baku

The most serious obstacle to improved Armenia-Israel relations remains Armenian-Iranian ties—but even this is not insurmountable.

Strains in the Armenian-Iranian Partnership

Over the past thirty years, Armenia’s largest strategic mistake has been relying entirely on Russia for security. While Moscow provided patronage, the cost was Armenian independence. Russia monopolized basic goods and prevented Yerevan from joining Western regional alliances, including the European Union. Its role as security guarantor allowed it to manipulate the conflict with Azerbaijan, keeping both parties submissive.

Similarly, Iran has leveraged its ties with Armenia to exert pressure on Azerbaijan. Tehran views Azerbaijan as a threat due to its influence on Iran’s large Azerbaijani minority and its close ties with regional competitor Turkey and nemesis Israel. Now that Armenia is pursuing peace with Azerbaijan, it can no longer check Azerbaijani influence in the region, much to Tehran’s displeasure.

Iran has expressed its discontent cautiously. While most officials avoid direct criticism of Pashinyan, state media linked to the security services has become increasingly critical. In August, Kayhan, a hardline outlet tied to the Supreme Leader’s office, accused both Pashinyan and Aliyev of betraying Iran by involving the United States in establishing TRIPP. IRGC Deputy for Political Affairs Yadollah Javani published an article titled, “Aliyev and Pashinyan on Zelensky’s Path to Misery.” IRGC-linked Tasnim frequently amplifies Armenian voices accusing Pashinyan of “betrayal” and “surrendering territory.”

Pashinyan has long stressed that Armenia must diversify partnerships to maintain independence. While closer ties with Israel may have limited economic or political payoff, sending Kostanyan demonstrates that Armenia will not repeat the mistake of relying entirely on Russia—or Iran. Iran is currently weakened: its proxy network is fractured, the economy is near collapse, deterrence has been undermined by joint Israeli-U.S. strikes, and a water crisis has prompted warnings of potential evacuations in Tehran. Kostanyan’s visit to Israel reflects Pashinyan’s broader approach: hedging Armenia’s security and diplomatic bets by aligning more closely with American-backed regional actors while pursuing normalization with Azerbaijan and maintaining pragmatic ties with Tehran.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Russia is intensifying its attempts to destabilize Kazakhstan and Armenia, according to analysts Seth Cropsey and Joseph Epstein. In an article for The Washington Post, they describe the operations the Kremlin is conducting in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and propose measures to defend against its aggression — currently hybrid, but possibly military in the future.

Read the full article on the Republic (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center. Seth Cropsey is President of the Yorktown Institute.

Five years after the Abraham Accords reshaped Middle Eastern diplomacy, a new and unexpected player has joined the circle. On Thursday, the White House announced that Kazakhstan, a Muslim-majority nation of twenty million on the Central Asian steppe, will become the first post-Soviet state to join the pact with Israel. The move reinvigorates an initiative that had slowed in recent years—and hints at a broader US strategy linking the Middle East and Eurasia.

US President Donald Trump officially announced the news in a Truth Social post. By joining the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, Kazakhstan is signaling its commitment to the principles of the accords. But it likely won’t be the last to join. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are in talks to join the pact.

The move highlights Central Asia’s somewhat quiet, but unusually strong, diplomatic ties with Israel, which are likely to increase should more regional nations follow in Kazakhstan’s footsteps. While some have dismissed an expansion to Central Asia as “largely symbolic,” this interpretation overlooks deeper implications.

Extending the Abraham Accords into Central Asia marks a new phase—building a coalition of pro-US Muslim nations committed to tolerance and engagement with Israel. Such a coalition strengthens efforts to counter extremism, particularly state-sponsored ideology from Iran, and fosters cooperation among US partners across a region vital to US interests.

Read the full article on Atlantic Council's MENASource.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev will reportedly hold a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to announce Kazakhstan's intention to join, although Astana has already maintained full diplomatic ties with Israel for more than 30 years.

But Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL that while the move by Kazakhstan may appear symbolic, it could hold diplomatic weight moving forward.

“Astana’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marks the beginning of a new phase, transforming the accords from a Middle East peace initiative to a pro-US coalition of moderate Muslim countries devoted to tolerance and prosperity,” Epstein said.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Joseph Epstein, director of the Yorktown Institute’s Research Center, told Radio Free Europe that Central Asia is “well-positioned” to meet American demand and give the U.S. “more leverage in the next round” of trade talks with China.

“The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor,” Epstein said in a statement. “That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies.”

Read the full article on the Washington Examiner.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

"The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor," Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL, referring to the emerging 6,500-kilometer-long trade routethat connects China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus by bypassing Russia.

"Both Beijing and Washington are set to use the pause to create an advantage from their side to have more leverage in the next round of trade tensions," Epstein said. "That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies."

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Russian warplanes buzzing into NATO and European Union airspace — prompting the top diplomat in Brussels to accuse Moscow of “gambling with war” — have reignited fears of escalation beyond Ukraine. Yet while attention is fixed on the Baltic, Moscow has waged an information war in its backyard: Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Finland raced into NATO; Moldova braced for hybrid attacks; Poland fortified its eastern flank. This was all for good reason, but seizing and holding territory is far more costly than Kremlin planners seemed to assume. Unable to replicate Ukraine-style invasions elsewhere, at least while engaged in a full-scale war, Russia is falling back on the tools it knows best — covert influence campaigns, disinformation, destabilization and military and intelligence probing.

Moldova remains Moscow’s prime laboratory, where, according to President Maia Sandu, hundreds of millions of euros have been spent on political meddling. Russia has also interfered in elections in both the Czech Republic and Romania. Now, similar warning signs are flashing farther east — in Kazakhstan and Armenia.

Read the full article on the Washington Post.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute. Seth Cropsey is President of the Yorktown Institute.

For millennia, whoever controlled the Silk Road controlled the wealth and influence of Central Asia. Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane were among the great figures who left an indelible mark on the region. Today, the Silk Road’s legacy presents a different kind of opportunity—one of diplomacy. President Donald Trump can become the first United States president to visit Central Asia, demonstrating that America is prepared to play a significant role in the region for the first time since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

Once overlooked, Central Asia is now commanding attention. Its vast mineral wealth and strategic location make it a critical arena for US interests. As leaders from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan gather in Washington, DC, for the C5+1 summit, a presidential visit to the region would signal that the United States is committed to being a central player in its economic and geopolitical future.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

But the biggest trigger for Iran, pun not necessarily intended, is the news that Azerbaijan has emerged as a leading candidate to join the U.S.-backed international mission to stabilize Gaza, with proposed roles ranging from peacekeeping to reconstruction support. Its involvement is still being negotiated with Washington and other partners.

An Azeri role in Gaza “would strengthen Israel through its long-standing partnership and shared strategic interests with regard to Iran,” Joseph Epstein, an expert on Iran’s relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia and director of the Turan Research Center, told the Jerusalem Post.

Israel and Azerbaijan share a common threat in Iran and their cooperation goes back 30 years, Epstein added in a call with me Tuesday. Azerbaijan supplies most of Israel’s oil.“But the cooperation goes much farther,” he added. “Azerbaijan has long acted as Israel’s advocate in the Muslim world. Israel for its part has lobbied for Azerbaijani interests in Washington.”

Read the whole analysis on the Middle East Broadcasting Networks' Iran Briefing.

The U.N.-patrolled demilitarized zone separating Cyprus from the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is unlike any other buffer zone in the world. Unlike the heavily fortified strip dividing the Koreas or the few small villages in the no-man’s-land between Israel and Syria, Cyprus’s “Green Line” hosts several thousand inhabitants, bustling tavernas, a four-star hotels,and even a university.

Until 1960, Cyprus was a British colony. Like so many of Britain’s multiethnic territories—from India to Nigeria to the Mandate of Palestine—London employed a divide-and-rule strategy that caused or deepened intercommunal rifts. After independence, tensions between the island’s Greek and Turkish communities flared into sporadic violence. But what ultimately cemented Cyprus’s partition was a 1974 Greek-backed coup that overthrew President Makarios III and installed a hardline nationalist, Nikos Sampson, who sought union with Greece. Within days, Turkey invaded, leading to the current borders.

The invasion reshaped the island’s map. Once a mosaic of mixed villages, Cyprus became split with a Greek south and a Turkish north, separated by the 180-kilometer Green Line. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared independence—a move recognized only by Ankara.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The political survival of Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan has been nothing short of remarkable. Since rising to power during Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, the embattled prime minister has withstood the fallout from the 2020 Karabakh war, open hostility from the Kremlin-backed Armenian Apostolic Church, and alleged coup attempts. His pursuit of peace with Azerbaijan and closer ties with the West has earned him powerful enemies—from the Russian government to diaspora organizations to Armenia’s former leaders.

With a final peace deal on the horizon and parliamentary elections looming next year, the stakes could not be higher. If Pashinyan holds on, he may guide Armenia into a long-sought era of peace. If he falls, the country risks sliding back into Moscow’s orbit, as its neighbor Georgia has, and could reignite conflict in the South Caucasus.

At the August 8 Washington Peace Summit, US president Donald Trump praised Pashinyan’s courage. After 30 years of bitter conflict over Karabakh, pursuing peace with Azerbaijan—especially after Baku’s battlefield victory—was politically difficult. If Washington wants to secure that peace, it must also secure Pashinyan’s political survival. Despite remaining Armenia’s most popular politician, he now polls at just 17 percent,reflecting widespread disillusionment and apathy.

Read the full article on the National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Washington must urgently diversify its rare earth supply chains. China’s new export restrictions will essentially choke off all supply to the U.S. when they are implemented next month. That will leave a massive hole in U.S. supply—70% of which is currently sourced from China.

Ironically, one of the most promising opportunities for supply diversification lies in China’s own backyard: Central Asia.

Few Americans could find Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan on a map. Yet these countries have quietly shaped the modern world for centuries. Kazakhstan was the site of the first space launch. Uzbekistan’s medieval astronomer Ulugh Beg built the most advanced observatory of his time, charting the stars with uncanny precision long before Galileo. It is fitting, then, that this region now sits at the frontier of another scientific and technological revolution: the race for rare earth elements.

Read the full article on Barron's.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an attempt to reassert dominance over a post-Soviet space that had been steadily asserting greater independence. Ironically, by becoming bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow has created an opening for other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to distance themselves further from Russian influence. As the war drags on, the Turkic states on Russia’s periphery have taken advantage of this new freedom to maneuver.

For these countries, the goal is not to sever all ties with Russia — it remains a powerful neighbor and vital trading partner — but to redefine relations on the basis of mutual respect as well as to carve out their own space in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment. Many are wary of the paternalistic and often tense relationship with a Russia that continues to see them as part of its dominion.

To achieve this new balance, some states in the region are pursuing two complementary strategies: deepening engagement with the United States and expanding regional cooperation through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) — an intergovernmental forum linking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers.

Russian narratives about its “Near Abroad” vary by country but share recurring themes. Chief among them is the belief that these states should remain within Moscow’s sphere of influence and comply with its strategic interests. Those that do not are quickly branded as “ungrateful” or even as “threats.” Russia perceives itself as entitled not only to shape its neighbors’ foreign policies but also to influence their domestic affairs — frequently criticizing efforts to promote national languages over Russian or to revise history curricula in ways that challenge Moscow’s preferred narratives.

This persistent sense of entitlement has defined Russia’s relations with much of the post-Soviet world for decades. Yet as Moscow’s coercive tactics grow more visible — from meddling in internal politics to outright military aggression — its neighbors have become increasingly determined to assert autonomy and recalibrate their ties with the Kremlin.

Seeking Deeper Cooperation with the United States

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have remained peripheral to U.S. foreign policy. Washington’s focus on the Middle East, Afghanistan, China, Russia, and Europe consistently overshadowed the non-European CIS. However, growing U.S. interest in alternative transit routes such as the Middle Corridor  —and in access to rare earth elements (REEs) and critical minerals — has recently brought renewed attention to the region.

For regional governments long frustrated by Washington’s moralizing tone on democracy and human rights, former President Donald Trump’s transactional, business-first approach offered a refreshing change.

Azerbaijan, in particular, has long faced image problems in Washington, largely due to its wars with Armenia and lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora. Despite cooperation during the war in Afghanistan, the United States often found itself preferring to partner with Armenia. But following Baku’s victory in Karabakh and its serious peace talks with Yerevan, a new opportunity for rapprochement has emerged. For Washington, Azerbaijan could become a key partner along the Middle Corridor — a strategic bridge between Europe and Central Asia. Its close ties with U.S. allies Turkey and Israel coupled with its complicated relations with both Russia and Iran, strengthen that case.

A breakthrough came with the August 8 peace agreement, signed in Washington, where Azerbaijan and Armenia chose the United States — not Russia — as mediator. The accords dovetailed neatly with Trump’s emphasis on “ending wars” and signaled Baku’s growing preference for partnership with Washington.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also sought to capture Washington’s attention. In the early months of Trump’s second term, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reportedly financed a special flight to repatriate Central Asian nationals living illegally in the United States — a goodwill gesture toward Washington. At the UN General Assembly, Trump announced major business deals: a $4 billion locomotive contract with Kazakhstan and an $8 billion Boeing agreement with Uzbekistan.

As Carnegie analyst Temur Umarov observed, “only Washington can serve as a sufficient counterweight to both Moscow and Beijing.” Yet, for Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, fostering regional cohesion has been another essential path toward greater independence.

The Rise of the Organization of Turkic States

Situated between Russia, China, and Iran, the Turkic states have long pursued a “multi-vector” foreign policy — balancing relations among competing powers. Yet since independence, many Turkic leaders have also emphasized unity as a safeguard of sovereignty.

Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev, and Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akayev all championed the idea of Turkic solidarity. Only Uzbekistan’s former leader Islam Karimov resisted, fearing that pan-Turkic sentiment might undermine his domestic authority.

This vision culminated in the founding of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2009. Initially dismissed as a symbolic project, the OTS has gained new momentum in recent years — spurred by Russia’s military quagmire in Ukraine and Iran’s growing weakness. That vacuum has enabled Turkish and Azerbaijani influence to surge.

Indeed, Baku has spearheaded efforts to promote Turkic cohesion. At the October OTS Summit in Gabala, President Aliyev declared, “It is very important for the Turkic States to act as a single power center.” He highlighted military cooperation as a key element of integration, arguing that “in today’s world, military power is the fundamental guarantee of territorial integrity and independence.”

Aliyev has backed his words with action — participating in trilateral summits with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, offering to quadruple Kazakh oil exports via Azerbaijan (at Russia’s expense), and joining the ‘Unity 2025’ military exercises in Samarkand involving Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

For its part, Turkey has reinforced this momentum by becoming one of the region’s primary arms suppliers, promoting the Middle Corridor, and easing labor rules for Turkic citizens to work and do business in Turkey without special permits or visas.

This growing cooperation has strengthened the hand of Baku and Central Asia in negotiations with Moscow. Previously, Russia may have attempted to break up such cooperation — but it no longer can. Following a ten-month rift over Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft in December 2024, Vladimir Putin was compelled to personally apologize to Aliyev during a CIS summit in Dushanbe. As regional expert Arkadiy Dubnov told Novaya Gazeta, “Russia was forced to accept Azerbaijan as practically an equal partner.”

Russian Narratives on OTS Ambitions

Moscow, meanwhile, has watched the growing cohesion among Turkic states with mounting unease. Pro-Kremlin commentators and media outlets increasingly portray the OTS as a geopolitical project designed to erode Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The tone of Russian coverage has shifted from condescension to alarm, with some voices warning that Ankara and Baku are building a “proxy NATO” on Russia’s southern flank.

Aliyev’s calls for joint OTS military exercises appear to validate those fears. Pro-Kremlin outlets accused Turkey of using the OTS to establish military and political dominance over fellow members, while mocking the bloc as a “Turkic sultanate” driven by “empty declarations and inflated ambitions.” Nezavisimaya Gazetacolumnist Viktoria Panfilova went further, alleging that Ankara was “usurping” the foreign-policy agenda of Central Asian governments under the banner of Turkic unity.

Benearth the ridicule, however, lies genuine anxiety. The pro-Kremlin website PolitNavigator linked Putin’s recent visit to Tajikistan — home to Russia’s 201st Military Base — to the perceived rise of a “military-political bloc under Turkish and NATO auspices.” The article depicted Dushanbe as Moscow’s last reliable foothold in Central Asia, vital for countering “non-aligned” forces and preventing what they called Western-backed encroachment.

Similar rhetoric has circulated on Telegram channels aligned with the Kremlin, which described Tajikistan as a “forward outpost” to contain the “Turkic unification project” allegedly orchestrated by the United States and United Kingdom. Pro-Russian Central Asian expert Igor Shestakov even warned that proposals for regular OTS intelligence and security summits signaled “genuine bloc formation” and the gradual emergence of a “Turan army.”

These narratives are exaggerated and conspiratorial — reflecting a Kremlin that perceives threats and plots in every assertion of national identity or foreign policy moves not involving it. But more importantly, they show that Moscow now views the OTS not merely as an economic experiment but as a strategic challenge.

Yet pro-Russian commentators rarely acknowledge the obvious: the OTS’s rising influence is partly a direct consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian officials are well aware of this. A leaked internal presentation in a strategy session led by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin last year, attended by senior Kremlin figures and advisers such as Alexander Dugin and Sergei Karaganov, outlined how Western pressure and economic incentives had eroded Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. The presentation specifically mentioned that the region was taking advantage of Moscow’s “vulnerability” to “integrate without Russia” through groups such as the OTS. It highlighted that these countries were “changing their worldview” through “rethinking our collective history,” promoting English instead of Russian as a second language, adopting Western educational standards, and sending the children of elites to be schooled in the West. It concluded that the countries would have to “make a decision on their stance towards Russia” without further detail.

The irony is clear: Moscow’s colonial mindset of the region as a wayward colony is precisely what pushes these countries away from it. If Russia wants to maintain influence, it must treat Central Asia and the Caucasus as partners, not subordinates — refraining from interfering in domestic affairs, including language policy, minority rights, and education, as Moscow has often done in the past.

Central Asia’s Cautious Calculus

Putin’s apology underscored Azerbaijan’s elevated regional standing. Having regained Karabakh, strengthened alliances with Turkey and Israel, expanded its role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, and hosted major international negotiations, Baku has emerged as a significant power in the post-Soviet space.

Central Asia, by contrast, remains more cautious. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are deepening regional integration but avoid open confrontation with Moscow. Both maintained neutrality during the Azerbaijan–Russia dispute. However, in recent months, both have drawn increasingly closer to Baku. In July, during the pinnacle of the rift, Mirziyoyev said, “never in history have our relations been at such a high level as today.” Likewise, Tokayev recently said that increasing ties with Azerbaijan was a “top priority.” Their statements reflect unprecedented cooperation: both countries have boosted transit through Azerbaijan, expanded trade, and intensified coordination across transport, logistics, and energy.

Meanwhile, tensions with Russia often persist. Kazakhstan continues to face threats of destabilization in its ethnic-Russian north. Uzbekistan has clashed diplomatically with Moscow over language policy such as promoting Uzbek and using English as a second language over Russian. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, both have learned that Russia is an unreliable partner — sanctions have disrupted trade routes and energy exports, and domestic anger has grown as Moscow deports Central Asian migrants and xenophobia rises in Russia.

Over the long term, Moscow’s tendency to treat its neighbors as vassal states rather than sovereign partners will only drive them further away — especially as the war in Ukraine drains Russia’s economic and political capacity. The Kremlin’s ten-month rift with Azerbaijan should serve as a warning: the region’s patience is finite. Today, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have alternatives. China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are investing billions across the region, giving local governments unprecedented leverage and options. While the region still currently relies on Russia, this dependence may diminish as these alternatives expand. If Russia wishes to preserve influence, it must learn to engage as a respectful partner — not an overbearing patron.

As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon pointedly told Putin in 2022, “we respect the interests of our largest strategic partner — but we also want to be respected.”

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Foreign reports suggest Azerbaijan may join a multinational stabilization force in Gaza. Analysts argue that the Muslim-majority nation is a credible, widely accepted partner whose military and economic experience could serve Israel’s interests.

Following the end of the Israel-Hamas War, international discussions have gained momentum around forming a stabilization force to restore order and rebuild infrastructure. Israel is seeking partners for postwar security, and Azerbaijan’s name has repeatedly surfaced as one of the leading candidates.

According to foreign sources, Baku is being considered alongside other Muslim-majority countries. Experts believe its participation could bring Israel strategic, diplomatic, and economic benefits. Joseph Epstein, director of the Turan Research Center in Washington, said Azerbaijan’s inclusion “would strengthen Israel through its long-standing partnership and shared strategic interests with regard to Iran.”

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Post.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

According to foreign reports, Baku is being considered for participation alongside other Muslim countries. Experts estimate that Azerbaijan’s involvement would give Israel security, diplomatic, and economic advantages. Joseph Epstein, director of the Turan Research Center, notes that including Azerbaijan in the force could benefit Israel thanks to the close relations and shared interests the two countries have regarding Iran. Prof. Ze’ev Hanin from the Begin–Sadat Center adds that the partnership between the countries has remained stable even in tense times, and that their security and technological cooperation has only deepened.

Read the full article on Maariv (Hebrew).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

According to Joseph Epstein, a political analyst on Middle Eastern affairs who writes for Newsweek and Foreign Policy, “the Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement does not guarantee peace or stability.” He argues that “the core of the crisis remains within the Palestinian side, where there is still no genuine leadership capable of achieving lasting peace.”

Speaking to us, Epstein noted that one of the most remarkable developments in recent days — both during the negotiations over Gaza and the Sharm el-Sheikh summit — was “President Trump’s ability to bring together every major regional country except Iran around a rational plan for the Palestinian issue.” This, he said, “is unprecedented,” adding that the decline in regional support for groups such as Hamas could open the door to meaningful change and to the emergence of leaders capable of reaching real peace agreements.

Read the full article on the Independent (Arabic).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

‘Azerbaijan has been involved in the Middle East for some time’, Joseph Epstein, head of the Turan Research Centre, told OC Media.

From Epstein’s view, Azerbaijan’s interest in the Middle East has grown substantially since 2020, saying that ‘Baku has increased cooperation with the Gulf and has been particularly active in Syria’.

Speaking of Azerbaijan’s regional approach, Epstein argued that while ‘the motivations differ by country, there is a clear overall trend: Baku is positioning itself as a trusted regional mediator’.

‘The resolution of the [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict has freed political and diplomatic bandwidth for Baku’, Epstein said.

‘Azerbaijan is now seeking to shift from a singular focus on territorial recovery to a broader foreign-policy agenda’.

Read the full article on OC Media.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

When an Almaty court handed blogger Temirlan Ensebek a five-year sentence of restricted freedom this spring, it wasn’t for a speech or a protest but for posting to an audience of 34,000 the song “Yo Russians” — a crude, anonymously written rap from the early 2000s that hurls vulgar insults at Russians, and briefly, Uzbeks. Revived online after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recast by some as an anti-war anthem, the track has become a lightning rod in Kazakhstan, where Russians make up roughly half the population in the northern regions. Ensebek was prosecuted under Act 174, the law against inciting ethnic hatred — a case that illustrates how easily cultural flashpoints can spill into politics in a country trying to preserve its multiethnic harmony while fending off Moscow’s claims to its territory.

For Kazakhstan, the most diverse country in Central Asia with over 124 ethnicities, maintaining tolerance is enshrined in the country’s constitution. Ethnic minorities have representation in both the Majles and the Senate as well as through the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, created by presidential decree in 1995 as an advisory body to promote interethnic harmony and support the development of national policy on ethnic relations. While closely linked to the president, the Assembly’s primary role is consultative, helping to mediate interethnic issues and ensure that diverse communities have representation.

The largest minority is Russian, making up around 14 percent of the population and roughly half of the residents in the North Kazakhstan Region (NKR), with majorities in some border cities and villages. Kazakhstan is home to the second largest Russian diaspora in the world and Russian is an official language. For most Kazakhstanis, Russians have become a crucial part of the country’s social fabric. Kazakhs will refer to Kazakhstani Russians as “bizdin orystar” or our Russians, emphasizing their distinct identity from Russians in Russia through shared history and regional values such as hospitality and respect for elders. In some respects, the bonds between Kazakhs and Russians are closer than between Kazakhs and other Central Asian nationalities. As the poet Ramil Niyazov noted, if a Kazakh fights a Uyghur, any drunk scuffle can escalate into an interethnic conflict, but if a Kazakh fights a Russian, then the Kazakh’s Russian friends will fight on his side as will the Russian’s Kazakh friends.

At same time, Kazakhstan must balance relations with its ethnic Russians and the watchful eye of the Kremlin as it seeks to become more Kazakh through promoting the use of the Kazakh language, renaming Russian cities to Kazakh ones – often returning the historical toponymics, and promoting the country’s separate history.

For now, interethnic relations remain largely stable and officials are keen to maintain that balance. Besides the understanding that Kazakhstan will best succeed by embracing its cultural mosaic, authorities worry of a repeat of an Eastern Ukrainian scenario in the country’s north.

Russian Separatist Movements in the Post-Independence Years

As the titular republics declared their independence from the Soviet Union, Moscow began supporting breakaway republics such Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Republic of Artsakh in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and Transnistria in Moldova. By the end of the active parts of these conflicts, Russian troops were sent to “keep the peace” – with the exception of Karabakh, these peacekeepers never left. Such a scenario almost played out in the oil-rich Northwestern Kazakhstan.

In September 1991, tensions in Oral — also known as Uralsk — erupted when local Russian Cossacks sought to celebrate the 400th anniversary of serving the Russian crown, despite opposition from Kazakh nationalists with the support of regional authorities. Some of the Cossacks voiced territorial claims and links to Moscow, and according to Orynbai Zhakibaev, a leader of the Azat movement of Kazakh activists, had undergone secret military training and formed brigades should conflict break out. According to Najmeddin Eskaliev, then-leader of the Oral region, a column of Russian tanks under the command of General Albert Makashov waited on the Russian-Kazakh border to assist the Cossacks, should the confrontation turn violent. However, the conflict, later to be known as the “Uralsk Events” was quickly contained and then largely forgotten in the backdrop of the quick unraveling of history in the Soviet Union at the time.

The Uralsk Events were not unique. In 1994, 10,000 Russians gathered in Oskemen, also known as Ust-Kamenogorsk, in Kazakhstan’s northeast to demand Russian autonomy, dual citizenship rights and the elevation of Russian to state language. Oskemen, then a majority-Russian city, became a flash point, seeing a minor Cossack uprising in 1996-1997 followed by a coup attempt against the local government in 1999 led mainly by Russian citizens later referred to as “Pugachev’s Rebellion” in honor of Emilian Pugachev, a Cossack who led a revolt against Catherine the Great in the 18th century. The masterminds of Pugachev’s Rebellion sought to separate from Kazakhstan and establish a “Russian Altai” in the Eastern Kazakhstan province.

To counter the threat of Russian secessionism, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev took steps to change the demographics of the north. In 1994, Nazarbayev moved Kazakhstan’s capital from the largest city and cultural center Almaty to a small city in the northern steppe of Akmola, later renamed to Astana. By moving the government, he was able to attract migrants from the country’s largely ethnic Kazakh south. Additionally, he settled kandas, or ethnic Kazakh repatriates from nearby countries such as China, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan, in the north, slowly changing the demographics. In general, the repatriation of kandas along with ethnic Russian emigration has helped increased the ethnic Kazakh population from 44 percent at independence to 66 percent in 2024.

Historical Ties and Contemporary Claims

The history of Russian involvement in the Kazakh steppe dates to the early 18th century. Following the collapse of the Kazakh Khanate into three juz or hordes. These juz, weak and rather young entities, sought protection from St. Petersburg, which was formally granted in 1738. After the Russian Empire tightened its control in the 19th century — through forts, settlements, and the abolition of the khanates — Kazakh resistance flared, most famously in uprisings such as Kenesary Qasymuly’s rebellion in the mid 19th century. Continued land seizures and conscription policies sparked further revolts, including the massive 1916 Central Asian uprising against Tsarist rule. From the mid-19th century especially, Tsarist authorities encouraged the migration of ethnic Russians to Kazakhstan through building forts and administrative centers that would then become the nuclei for Russian settlements and land policies such as the Stolypin Reforms. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the region was drawn into the civil war, and by the early 1920s Soviet power had been consolidated, leading to the creation of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) in 1925.

While many are familiar with the Holodomor, or the mass starvation in Ukraine in the 1930’s as a result of collectivization, few realize that the same policies killed over one third of the Kazakh population – mainly nomads in what Kazakhs refer to as Aharshylyq. Over the following two decades, Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin deported various ethnic groups that he deemed a threat from throughout the country to Kazakhstan. Then, in 1954, new General Secretary Nikita Khruschev began his “Virgin Lands” campaign, recruiting hundreds of thousands of Russian and Ukrainian farmers to plow and settle Siberia and Kazakhstan. These events dramatically altered the republic’s demographics. In 1897, the Kazakh population was around 82 percent and the Russian population was around 10 percent, but after the Virgin Lands campaign, the Russian population of Kazakhstan was above 40 percent while the Kazakh population dropped to only 30 percent.

In the 1960’s, Khruschev proposed to dissolve the KSSR into the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and renaming the five Kazakh regions the Tseliny Krai or “Virgin Lands Territory.” Then KSSR Chairman Zhumabek Tashenov openly opposed the idea, which would later cost him his job, but stopped the handover of Kazakh lands.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, various Russian politicians have made claim to Kazakhstan’s north. In 2020, Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov said that Kazakhstan’s north was historically uninhabited, and the south was given “as a gift” to the Kazakh people by the Soviet Union. As Turan Research Fellow Bruce Pannier noted at the time, “it would be easy to consider the statements by the Russian deputies simply as bluster and dismiss them as fringe sentiments. But this is far from the first time Russian officials have made comments that brought into question Kazakhstan’s claim to statehood and sovereignty.”

The idea of Russia “gifting” Kazakhstan its land has been a reoccurring theme. The late ultranationalist Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, originally from Almaty, proposed annexing Kazakhstan; esteemed Soviet dissident and author Aleksandr Solzhenitskyn wrote in a famous essay “How to Build Russia” that Russia could take the northern half of Kazakhstan; and political activist Eduard Limonov was jailed in Russia in 2001 on charges of plotting a coup in northern Kazakhstan (the charges were later dropped). Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin ominously said that Nazarbayev “created a state on a territory that never had a state…Kazakhs never had any statehood, [Nazarbayev] created it.”

It was the 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russian-backed separatist movements in Donetsk in Luhansk that drove home the real potential of such a scenario playing out in Kazakhstan. In response, authorities began incentivizing migration from the largely ethnic Kazkh south to the north under the guise of balancing the job market. From 2017 to 2024, this program saw the settlement of 58 thousand people in the NKR.

Acts 174 and 180: The Legal Edge of Kazakhstan’s Interethnic Policy

Under the same Act 174 used to prosecute Ensebek, Kazakh authorities launched an investigation into the Director of the major Russian-language radio station Europe Plus Kazakhstan. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, she responded on Facebook to a supposed Kazakh nationalist by threatening to “call Uncle Vlad” for help and telling him to “shut his toxic, nationalist mouth.” Although she was fired from her post at the radio, she was not charged with any crimes. However, under Kazakhstani law, her statement could’ve been tried under the harsher Act 180.

Act 180 relates to propaganda, public calls and actions related to separatism or threats to the country’s territorial integrity. According to the NKR Police Chief Ruslan Zharasbaev, cases of prosecution under both acts 174 and 180 rose sharply in 2023. Many cases in the north stem from online tirades and social media posts. Some involve insulting ethnic Kazakhs or calling for Russian annexation, but the prosecutions are not one-sided. In June, a pregnant Kazakh teacher was prosecuted under Act 174 for posting a TikTok video declaring, “there is no place for [Russians] here. Those Kazakhs who can hear me now, teach Russians, because they are stupid and dumb.”

Other cases are more concerning. In April 2023, a video at a college in Petropavlovsk went viral showing around twenty members of the so-called “People’s Committee of the Workers” declaring “independence, self-sufficiency and sovereignty.” While such declarations alone are unlikely to be serious, they occurred amid statements by Russian politicians and political experts calling for the need to “defend the Russian-speaking population” and questioning Kazakhstan’s statehood, echoing rhetoric used in Ukraine. Last year, Russian TV and popular telegram channels criticized alleged Russophobia in Central Asian school systems, accusing Kazakhstan in particular of “training a new generation of Russophobes” for including Kazakh suffering under tsarism and soviet rule in the syllabus.

In a possible sign of Astana’s sensitivity to Russian criticism, Kazakhstani authorities opened an investigation under Act 174 in August against Aibek Abdrakhmanov, who runs a YouTube channel on Kazakh history challenging Soviet stereotypes and as he describes it the notion that Kazakhs  “didn’t have writing, statehood, or civilization and were savages” before joining the Russian empire. Investigators cited not the content of the videos themselves, but the anti-Russian comments they allegedly inspired. Just a month earlier, Aslan Tolegenov, an ethnic Kazakh blogger who purportedly “exposed Russophobia” in Kazakhstan, was placed under administrative arrest for 10 days under the same law. Unlike typical prosecutions under Act 174, which target the content itself, these cases were pursued because of the discussions they generated. Together, they illustrate Astana’s approach: curbing public debate on topics that could threaten interethnic harmony.

While the government’s approach may seem extreme, Kazakhstani authorities have reason to fear such societal trends. Last month, leaked documents from Russian military intelligence (GRU) detailed influence operations in Kazakhstan. The documents outlined strategies to destabilize the country, starting in the north, including plans to bribe elites, weaponize Russophobia, and promote pro-Russian propaganda under the guise of a research center.

However, in recent times, the potential for a Crimea or East Ukraine scenario that at least appears grassroots is diminishing. Kazakhstan has largely reshaped the demographics of its northern regions: many Russians have left due to a lack of opportunities, poor infrastructure and a harsh climate. The Kazakh Agrotechnical University estimates the northern population will drop by 20-25%. Additionally, the remaining Russian population is aging, as the youth often move to Astana, Almaty or Russia in search of better work opportunities. While local support and even plausible deniability will not stop a Russian invasion, changing facts on the ground may mitigate the risk.

Managing Multiculturalism

Of the total Russian population, separatists represent a small minority. Russians are not only accepted by Kazakhs, but they have also forged a distinct Kazakhstani Russian identity since the fall of the Soviet Union. It is common to see videos of ethnic Kazakhs jumping in the water with Russians during the Christian Orthodox Epiphany or ethnic Russians greeting their Kazakh neighbors with salam aleikum. Populations are mixed not only in major cities like Astana and Almaty but also in smaller towns such as Zharkent, Balkhash, and Taldykorgan. Self-segregation is rare, and intermarriage is not uncommon.

Kazakhstani Russians have pushed back against Russian politicians who claim that ethnic Russians or the Russian language is under attack. In 2022, when Duma Deputy Genadii Zyuganov made such a claim, Kazakhstani Russians responded en masse with the hashtag blending Russian and Kazakh, “Kazakhstan Moy Zheruik” or “Kazakhstan is my Land.”

Yet in northern Kazakhstan, social cohesion is more fragile. Many residents watch Russian state media and are dissatisfied with initiatives to promote the Kazakh language, the renaming of cities, limited local opportunities, and government policies aimed at altering the region’s demographics. Occasional incidents of Russophobia, such as a sign in Oral reading “Russians have no place in Oral” further alienate local Russians.

Should Russia attempt to seize part of northern Kazakhstan, it would face few immediate military obstacles. The border is vast, mostly undefended, and sparsely populated. However, Kazakhstani political expert Gaziz Abishev warns that annexation could cost Russia diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan and provoke the establishment of foreign bases — “whether they be American or Chinese” — along the new border. Already spread out and isolated over the war in Ukraine, these political consequences may outweigh any short-term gains. An invasion could also prompt other Central Asian nations and Azerbaijan to reassess their ties with Moscow in response to the emerging Russian threat. While China and the United States are unlikely to provide security guarantees, Kazakhstan may seek increased relations with countries of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) to deter Russian annexation.

Kazakhstani analyst Dosym Satpayev cautions that Kazakhstan’s fate is linked to Ukraine. "If Ukraine can be easily sacrificed to appease Putin, what does that mean for Kazakhstan? Should serious problems arise here [in Kazakhstan], no one will pay attention.” He notes that Kazakhstan’s security depends on a fragile geopolitical balance that could “collapse at any moment.”

Kazakhstan’s leadership thus walks a narrow path between affirming a distinct national identity and preserving the multiethnic fabric that has helped keep the country stable since independence. The demographic shifts in the north, the strict enforcement of laws against hate speech and separatism, and the careful public messaging around history and language are all parts of this balancing act. Yet these measures can only mitigate, not eliminate, the risks posed by an assertive Russia and domestic grievances. Whether Kazakhstan continues to be seen by its citizens — Kazakh, Russian and others alike — as a shared homeland will depend not only on government policy but also on the everyday choices of communities to resist polarization. In that sense, the contest over “our Russians” or “Moscow’s Russians” is less about passports than about belonging, and how Kazakhstan manages that question may define its sovereignty for decades to come.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

When the leaders of long-warring Armenia and Azerbaijan met at the White House on August 8, they initialed a peace agreement—not a final treaty, but a gateway to one. They also signed a joint declaration establishing the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a twenty-five-mile corridor designed to link Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenia. Together, these moves mark major wins for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States. At the same time, Russia emerges as the biggest loser.

The Trump administration deserves credit for arbitrating the sensitive talks over a brutal conflict that displaced more than a million people and left more than 35,000 dead. But the diplomatic breakthrough was also made possible by a series of Russian miscalculations and by Moscow’s disregard for the sovereignty of its neighbors.

If the United States wants to build on this achievement, then it should promote Armenia’s regional integration, move quickly to transform the TRIPP from an idea into a reality, and deepen its ties with other countries in the region. Doing so would weaken Russia’s grip on the South Caucasus, which Moscow has long treated as part of its own domain, much like it has with Ukraine. Despite the independence of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to view their borders as fluid markers of power, subject to revision at will. 

Read the full article, co-written with Sheila Paylan, at the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center at the Yorktown Institute.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations.

Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein joined Arun Anand, host of the Nationalist View podcast for a discussion on the Israeli attack on Doha, the focus of the Turan Research Center, Iran's reaction to Operation Rising Lion, exposed cracks in Iran’s regional military and intelligence apparatus, the future of the Iranian nuclear program and more.

Watch on Youtube here.

When President Trump hosted the signing ceremony of the peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia last week, celebrations weren’t limited to Washington, Baku and Yerevan.

In Jerusalem, Israeli officials welcomed the initiative led by one of their closest allies, Azerbaijan, in partnership with the U.S. The trilateral cooperation had been a shared strategic goal. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, recognizing the ineffectiveness of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group as peace arbiters, opted instead for direct negotiations with Washington, supported by Jerusalem.

Now, Mr. Trump has an opportunity to reshape the Middle East and Eurasia by expanding the Abraham Accords to include Azerbaijan and Central Asian nations such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A strategic enlargement of the accords would counter adversaries, diversify supply chains, and build a bloc of moderate, pro-Western Muslim-majority nations aligned with the U.S. and Israel. It would also showcase Israeli outreach, helping counter the anti-Israel global narrative.

Read more at the Wall Street Journal.

Recently, Reuters reported that U.S. President Donald Trump was considering expanding the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein breaks down what this would offer Uzbekistan.

Watch the full interview on Radio Ozodlik.

In an article for OC Media, Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein discusses Azerbaijan's relationship with its Jewish community and Israel, the potential for a trilateral partnership, and more.

Read the full article on OC Media.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Joseph Epstein of the Turan Research Center at the Yorktown Institute argues that bringing Azerbaijan into the Accords would signal to Muslim majority states in Central Asia such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan that open cooperation with Israel is both possible and worthwhile. It would also squeeze Tehran which sees a secular Shia state aligned with Israel and Turkey as a strategic problem.

Epstein also cautions against tying Azerbaijan’s entry to unrelated conditions like a peace deal with Armenia because that would undercut the spirit of the Accords and risk a fragile process in the South Caucasus. The Accords were built to unite Muslim countries that choose tolerance and reject extremism. Armenia is not part of that track and forcing it in would be counterproductive.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Post.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

In an interview with Arutz Sheva, Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein explains why Baku's decades-long partnership with Israel and Washington positions it as the next candidate for the Abraham Accords.

Read the full article on Arutz 7 Israel National News.

Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Professor Tim Milosch of Biola University to discuss recent events in the Middle East. They covered renewed Israeli offensives in Gaza to Operation Midnight Hammer to the rush to rehabilitate Syria as a member of the international system to the possibility of a Kurdish peace, and the expansion of the Abraham Accords.

Listen on the Tim Talks Politics Podcast.

Israel’s military strike on Iran in mid-June, “Operation Rising Lion,” alongside U.S. attacks on nuclear sites, exposed the Islamic Republic’s military vulnerabilities and proved the regime to be a paper tiger. But this success has triggered a dangerous response: Tehran is now striking back—not just with missiles and threats toward its neighbors, but with mass arrests, executions and repression at home.

From Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan to the streets of Tehran and Baluchistan, Iran’s targets are not random. They are chosen to signal strength, distract from weakness and restore control—whether through violence, propaganda or both. The regime sees its enemies as foreign and domestic, and often treats them the same way.

To prevent a wider crisis, Washington and Jerusalem must act quickly to deter further repression and aggression.

Read more at the Jewish News Syndicate.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Five years after the Abraham Accords normalized relations between four Arab nations and Israel, the historic agreements are in murky waters.

Its many proponents have been waiting for Saudi Arabia to join the pact, which is unlikely as long as the war in Gaza continues. However, even if Riyadh joins tomorrow, a larger question remains: What is the future of the accords after peace?

The Abraham Accords were much more than a peace agreement with Israel. They were the culmination of a regional pivot—the choice to pursue a policy of tolerance and regional stability rather than continue the hatred and sectarianism that have wrought so much havoc in the Middle East and the Muslim world.

To continue this movement, the accords must evolve beyond warm bilateral ties into a multilateral alliance—a bloc of Muslim-majority countries with warm relations with Israel, united not just by shared interests, but by shared values. Specifically, a commitment to tolerance, peace, and fighting Islamic extremism.

A first move should be to include Muslim-majority countries that already have warm ties with Israel, like Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Uzbekistan.

With US support, the bloc could help the Abraham Accords movement reach its full potential. The created alliance could then serve as the nucleus for a powerful global movement grounded in tolerance, modernization, and strategic cooperation.

Read more at the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Joseph Epstein, Director of the Turan Research Center, joins i24 News to break down the recent meeting between Israeli and Syrian officials in Baku. Why is Azerbaijan playing host? What does it stand to gain?

Watch the full interview here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=liF9dlZN0yA

Turan Research Center’s Joseph Epstein was quoted in Iran International’s analysis of Tucker Carlson’s interview of Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian:

Tucker Carlson’s interview with Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian was all Tehran could wish for, experts told Iran International: a global stage, no pushback, and a direct line to Donald Trump’s base.

“This was a major victory for Iranian information warfare operations,” said Marcus Kolga, a leading expert on foreign disinformation. “Whether intentionally or not, Carlson is acting as a significant conduit and amplifier for Iranian government information operations.”

The interview was recorded remotely, unlike the one Carlson did with Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in February 2024.

“(Carlson) offers Pezeshkian and the Iranian regime a platform—without context or pushback—allowing Tehran to shape the record to Carlson’s viewers and listeners unopposed,” Kolga added.

A moment highlighted by many critics was when Pezeshkian asserted that Israel had tried to assassinate him without offering any evidence.

“He was trying to… put forward the message that this is Israel tricking America into getting involved in this. This really isn’t America’s war. Iran and America, we have nothing to fight about.” director of the Yorktown Institute’s Turan Research Center Joseph Epstein said.

Epstein argued the interview fit Carlson’s broader pattern of offering authoritarian figures a platform to rewrite narratives without scrutiny—an approach that often blurs the line between journalistic curiosity and ideological alignment.

For over 150 years, Russia ruled the South Caucasus, the mountainous region between Europe and Asia, through exploitation, domination and a colonialist divide-and-conquer policy. Moscow’s most recent pressure-point has been the conflict over the Armenia-backed separatist Karabakh, where Russia both fueled the conflict and acted as a mediator.

Now, Armenia and Azerbaijan are setting clear boundaries — and America has a historic opening to help them.  

Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have been in a freefall after Russian police allegedly tortured to death two Azerbaijani citizens amid a greater crackdown on ethnic Azerbaijani in the industrial city of Yekaterinburg. Azerbaijan authorities said the killings were “ethnically motivated,” and they likely were.  

In response, Azerbaijan arrested the chief and managing editors of the Russian state media outlet Sputnik, accusing them of working with Russian intelligence. Baku then arrested eight more Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime.  

This latest escalation comes amid tensions between the two countries that have simmered since December, when Moscow shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane, killing 38. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev demanded a public apology and compensation, but Moscow initially ignored him. This set in motion a spiraling escalation that included the ordered closing of Russian state media and cultural centers in Azerbaijan and a massive cyberattack against Azerbaijani state media.

Read more on The Hill.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Photo of Arrested Sputnik Journalists by the Azerbaijani Press Agency

Over the past 48 hours, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have been in a free fall. This latest crisis in ties comes after Russian police launched a major operation against ethnic Azerbaijanis in the city of Yekaterinburg on June 30, which ended up in multiple serious injuries and two deaths amid allegations of torture. Officially, Azerbaijan called the killings “ethnically motivated” and “unlawful.” Influential Azerbaijanis such as former presidential aid Eldar Namazov have referred to the incident as a “pogrom.”

In response, Azerbaijani police arrested two journalists in Baku at Russian state media Sputnik headquarters– that authorities had officially ordered to close earlier this year — accusing themof working with Russian intelligence. Baku also cancelled any cultural events in partnership with Russian state and private organizations. On July 1, Russia continued its offensive on the Azerbaijani diaspora, arresting two influential figures. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reaffirming support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

While Russia and Azerbaijan have periodically had their issues, the latest row has been particularly long and has lasted about six months. It started in December of last year, when an Azerbaijani jet flying from Baku to Grozny crash landed in Kazakhstan, killing 38 civilians. Following a preliminary investigation, Azerbaijan accused Russian air defenses of shooting down the plane and demanded a public apology admitting guilt as well as compensation.

In February, Azerbaijan hinted it may appeal to the International Court of Justice and orderedthe closing of the “Russian House,” a local branch of the Russian state-funded cultural diplomacy agency Rossotrudnichestvo, due to a “lack of legal registration.” Dating to Soviet times, cultural diplomacy was often a thin cover for intelligence gathering and Azerbaijani state media repeatedly accused the Russian House of housing spies. Baku simultaneously announced the closure of Russia Today and Sputnik Azerbaijan offices. In response, Russian Deputy Nikolay Valuyev — from President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party — recommended cracking down on the Azerbaijani diaspora, causing Azerbaijan to declare him persona non grata.

Later that month, a massive cyber-attack targeted Azerbaijani pro-government media using the logo of the Iranian-backed ethnic Azerbaijani proxy Husseiniyyun and verses from the Quran. Some Azerbaijani sources suspected a false flag operation and immediately blamed Russia. But it was only earlier last month that an Azerbaijani parliamentary commission revealed the cyberattack originated from the Russian hacker group Cozy Bear.

Days later, an Azerbaijani MP who had been critical of Russia was deported from Moscow airport and barred from entering the country after having been invited as part of a delegation. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry labeled the move as “an unfriendly step.”

On May 9, President Ilham Aliyev skipped the annual Russian military parade celebrating the 80th year anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. For Russia, Victory Day is much more than a holiday but an affirmation to the world that Moscow was and is an important global power. Worse than his absence was that the Azerbaijani leader canceled at the last minute.

To save face when Aliyev canceled his trip to Moscow, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov explained that the Azerbaijani president did so to take part in an event dedicated to his father and former president Heydar Aliyev. Not long after, Azerbaijani state media declared that Aliyev’s decision was due to tension in the relations.

Deeper tensions

The current rift has brought to the surface a deeper tension between Azerbaijan and Russia. Baku still holds a grudge against Moscow for its historic support of Armenia in the conflict over the Armenian separatist territory of Karabakh. Many of the recent anti-Russian articles in Azerbaijani media brought up Russia’s ties with both Armenia and Karabakh. Moscow often exerted more influence over the enclave than Yerevan did. It also used the conflict to maintain leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan while selling weapons to both sides.

This policy allowed Russia to keep both countries under heel to a certain degree, much like how it has used the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova to pressure Tbilisi and Chisinau. While tensions would occasionally bubble to the surface, Baku had to be much more tactful in how much it could alienate Russia.

An example is in 2009, when Azerbaijani media reported that Russia had transferred approximately $800 million in weapons to Armenia the year prior. While Moscow officially denied the transfer, according to leaked American diplomatic cables, then-Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov admitted it to this Azerbaijani counterpart “after the second bottle of vodka.” The incident caused Azerbaijan to summon the Russian ambassador for clarification as well as some critical op-eds in the media, but there was not much else Baku could do.

Compare that to today, when Azerbaijan has insisted for over six months for what Russia likely sees as a display of public capitulation. Despite Moscow clearly not accepting its new role in relations, it does not have the same leverage over Baku as it had before.

Shifts in Power Dynamics

In the past, such open defiance would have been unthinkable for a small post-Soviet state on Russia’s borders. Azerbaijan’s behavior is due to two factors – Russia’s loss of influence in the region and Azerbaijan’s strengthened position.

Russia’s position in the South Caucasus weakened significantly following the 2020 Second Karabakh War, in which Azerbaijan returned most of the territory occupied by Armenian separatists.

Another blow came in 2022 when Russian invaded Ukraine. Earlier this year, а leaked report showed that Russian officials believed the war in Ukraine and resulting western pressure has significantly hampered its influence in the post-Soviet space. Russia’s diversion of resources from the South Caucasus helped lead to the successful Azerbaijani operation that took back complete control of Karabakh in 2023.

Without the leverage of Karabakh, Russia lost its trump card over Azerbaijan. And given that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sees removing Yerevan’s reliance on Russia as necessary for its independence, Russia’s role in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan became superfluous.

Azerbaijan’s Russia Strategy

Since gaining independence, Azerbaijan has tried to maintain friendly relations with Moscow, but at a distance. Having been under direct Russian rule during the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, Baku seeks to maintain its independence while avoiding both conflicts and reliance in its relations with Russia.

Azerbaijan’s approach has always differed from its neighbors. Georgia under President Mikheil Saakashvili attempted to move the country West, causing direct conflict with Russia culminating in the 2008 invasion. Armenia, on the other hand, completely relied on Russia, which caused it to become a vassal state. Ironically, both countries have since changed course, with Georgia under Georgian Dream party rule falling back into Russia’s zone of influence and Armenia under Pashinyan trying to decrease Yerevan’s reliance on Russia.

Baku instead always took the middle route – seeking cooperation with Russia without overreliance. It achieved its goal through diversifying its military and economic relations. Azerbaijan has partnered closely militarily with Turkey and Israel, while its top economic partners in total import-export volumes are Italy, Turkey, Israel, India and Greece, respectively.

These partnerships have given Azerbaijan the freedom to challenge Russia when necessary, such as during the latest rift over the past six months.

But Azerbaijan simultaneously works with Russia when cooperation is mutually beneficial and does not create dependence. Moscow provides Baku with almost 20% of its imports and both have worked on developing the North-South transport corridor as an alternative to transport through the Suez canal. But even the latter has created Russian dependence on Azerbaijan and not the other way around. Moscow now relies on Baku to ship products to Iran and the Gulf.

Additionally, as Europe began drastically cutting down on Russian oil and gas exports following the invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan proved key for Brussels to find a makeshift way of importing Russian oil without losing face. That is why the oil rich Azerbaijan quadrupled its imports of Russian oil in 2023 while significantly increasing its exports to Europe.

Through such policy, Azerbaijan has achieved what other South Caucasus nations have not been able to – not only is Baku independent from Russia, but Moscow relies on Azerbaijan. This became apparent after the ahead-of-time withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers after Baku returned the occupied Karabakh region in 2023. As journalist Kiril Krivosheev pointed out, the presence of Russian peacekeepers whether in Transnistria, South Ossetia or Abkhazia is meant to be permanent. The new power dynamic is also proven by recent events — despite Russia’s current anger at Azerbaijan, all it has been capable of doing is punishing the Azerbaijani diaspora.

In the post-Soviet space, few countries have managed to reverse the power dynamic with Moscow. Azerbaijan now stands as a rare example—not just resisting Russian pressure but leveraging its own geopolitical importance to put the Kremlin on the defensive.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

In a rare diplomatic thaw, Turkey and Israel agreed to establish a hotline to prevent military flare-ups in Syria – a move brokered last month by Azerbaijan after weeks of quiet negotiations in the capital, Baku.[1] This tentative thaw came before escalating regional tensions, particularly following Israel’s unprecedented military campaign inside Iran—Operation Rising Lion—which struck deep into Iranian territory and targeted military and nuclear assets.

Any agreement between Ankara and Jerusalem has been a rare event since Israeli-Turkish relations hit historic lows following the October 7th Hamas-led massacre and ensuing war in Gaza. Ties have not been so low since the 2010 Mavi Marmara Flotilla incident, when Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists who attacked them while trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza.

Since the breakout of war in Gaza, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has likened Israel to the Nazi Third Reich and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler. He has also threatened to invade Israel and decried Israeli actions in Gaza as “genocide.”[2] Furthermore, he halted all trade with Israel last year, [3] hosted Hamas delegations, [4] and led international diplomatic efforts to isolate Israel.[5]

In response, Israeli officials, such as Defense Minister Israel Katz have called Erdoğan an “antisemitic dictator” and “[want-to-be] sultan.”[6] Following Turkey’s halt of trade with Israel, Jerusalem announced that it would restrict Turkish exports to the Palestinian authority and seek sanctions against Turkey in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development over breaches of trade agreements.[7]

Since the launch of Operation Rising Lion, Erdoğan has both offered to mediate the conflict and tried to convince Muslim leaders to denounce Israel’s strikes.[8] Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar has responded by condemning Erdoğan’s “imperial ambitions” in Syria and Northern Cyprus.[9] According to Axios, US President Donald Trump tried to arrange a meeting between US and Iranian officials in Istanbul through Erdoğan to strike a nuclear deal and avoid military intervention in Iran.[10]

Read the rest at the Moshe Dayan Center.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institut.

Photo by Khamenei.ir

Israel’s “Operation Rising Lion” of air and special operations against Iran has been a remarkable success. The Israeli Airforce quickly established complete air superiority, operating over Iranian skies with ease; killed the top brass of the Iranian military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC); inflicted massive damage to Iran’s nuclear program; destroyed over half of the nation’s ballistic missile launchers and caried out crippling strikes on everything from state media headquarters to strategic energy sites. Iran, on the other hand, has only been able to launch some 350 missiles, most of which were intercepted by air defenses.

For Tehran, the Israeli strikes have become an existential threat, especially considering that Israel could well exact much more damage. Israel Defense Forces officials have declared that the operation has just begun and could take weeks to conclude. Moreover, Israel has so far refused to hit certain sensitive but vulnerable targets such as oil refineries and nuclear fuel sites that could lead to radiological contamination. Iranian officials are reportedly desperately seeking a deal with the United States and may have appealed to Russia for asylum should the regime fall, according to Iran International, a London-based Persian news channel.

That little Israel could bring the Islamic Republic to its knees in such a short span of time has embarrassed the Iranian establishment and presented the Iranian propaganda apparatus with a conundrum in explaining the successes of Operation Rising Lion to a domestic audience.

So far, Tehran has used its state information apparatus to minimize the perception of damage inflicted by Jerusalem while exaggerating the damage caused by its missile strikes against Israel. Its propaganda machine has also created an imaginary ring of fire around Iran by claiming that it is fighting not just Israel but a large coalition, which includes the United States, Azerbaijan and Turkey.

For years, Tehran has committed itself to destroying Israel and has bragged about its military superiority while dismissing the Jewish State as a vulnerable colonial outpost reliant on foreign powers for its existence. Now, Israel’s military domination of Iran is turning that narrative on its head.

As a result, it is crucial to save face by convincing Iranians that the mighty Islamic Republic could only be crippled by a coalition of nefarious actors supporting Israel behind the scenes. That message is best summed up by  Ehsan Movahedian, an Iranian political analyst and lecturer at Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran. “Israel is a fake, small country with no strategic depth and infrastructure, and it would not last a week without the support of the United States, Europe, Turkey and Baku,” he said. “If Turkey and Baku do not export oil to Israel, it cannot survive… Israeli fighter jets will not have the fuel to fly to Iran and manage their attacks without help from Baku and Turkey.”

IRGC-linked Telegram channels have claimed that NATO, Turkey and the U.S. are actively helping Israel defend against barrages of ballistic missiles. Iranian state media has also accused Azerbaijan, Qatar and Jordan of helping shoot down Iranian attacks on Israel while claiming that Tehran “managed to gain the upper hand” against a joint U.S. and Israeli aerial attack. Much like the clearly-doctored AI images of downed Israeli F-35s and fake images of the destruction of Israel’s international airport, the claims of outside support for Israel’s offensive are equally dubious. For example, Iran’s information apparatus has accused Israeli drones of being launched from Azerbaijan, relying accounts of a teenager claiming he saw drones cross the border and unsubstantiated claims made by obscure Omani political analysts.

The Iranian information apparatus seeks to convince its domestic population that the mighty Islamic Republic could only be crippled by a coalition of nefarious actors supporting Israel behind the scenes, while simultaneously claiming to not be crippled at all. While this may seem hypocritical, it is key to keep in mind that consistency and coherence is not necessary in propaganda.

To be sure, Iranian officials and official outlets have been careful about upsetting Turkey while threatening Azerbaijan, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Despite its propaganda claiming that Ankara has joined the fight, Tehran understands that the Turkish military is the only other Middle East force capable of projecting power beyond its borders and – and shares a large border with Iran.

According to Mike Doran, Director of the Hudson Institute, Iran is particularly afraid of Turkey because of its influence over Iran’s 30 million strong Turkic minority.

The easiest target for Iranian pundits has been Azerbaijan and its President Ilham Aliyev, who has enjoyed warm bilateral relations with Israel since he assumed power in 2003. For years, Tehran has tried to overthrow his secular government by sponsoring a proxy force to create a Shiite rebellion. In recent months, Iran and Azerbaijan have calmed tensions, however Tehran’s recent accusations are likely to enflame them again. By blaming Baku, Iran has proven again that it cannot accept the existence of Azerbaijan as a secular Shiite-majority nation and ethnic homeland for Iran’s largest minority on its border.

Using alleged foreign interference as a propaganda tool is not new for Iran. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic has often tried to use international meddling as a rallying call for a population that does not necessarily support its theocracy. The theme of the secular nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh who was removed in an American and British backed coup in 1953 is often mentioned by the regime. The revolution itself was largely made possible by over a century of British and then American and Soviet meddling and exploitation of Iran’s oil. By placing the Israeli attacks in the continuity of foreign interference, Iran hopes to elicit a nationalist response from its population while both denying and justifying its military impotence.

These steps exude desperation and are likely to fail. The Islamic Republic is too hated by its own people to create the needed “rally around the flag” effect. Also, distrust for the regime’s narratives such as that Iran is strong and can beat Israel is proven by the millions who fled Tehran after Israeli bombings and President Donald Trump called for their evacuation.

The regime’s messaging, like its defenses, is collapsing under pressure. For a government that has survived decades by projecting strength, the humiliating exposure of its vulnerabilities may prove fatal. Whether by bombs or by truth, the foundations of the Islamic Republic are beginning to crack.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.