Turan Research Center

Five years after the Abraham Accords reshaped Middle Eastern diplomacy, a new and unexpected player has joined the circle. On Thursday, the White House announced that Kazakhstan, a Muslim-majority nation of twenty million on the Central Asian steppe, will become the first post-Soviet state to join the pact with Israel. The move reinvigorates an initiative that had slowed in recent years—and hints at a broader US strategy linking the Middle East and Eurasia.

US President Donald Trump officially announced the news in a Truth Social post. By joining the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, Kazakhstan is signaling its commitment to the principles of the accords. But it likely won’t be the last to join. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are in talks to join the pact.

The move highlights Central Asia’s somewhat quiet, but unusually strong, diplomatic ties with Israel, which are likely to increase should more regional nations follow in Kazakhstan’s footsteps. While some have dismissed an expansion to Central Asia as “largely symbolic,” this interpretation overlooks deeper implications.

Extending the Abraham Accords into Central Asia marks a new phase—building a coalition of pro-US Muslim nations committed to tolerance and engagement with Israel. Such a coalition strengthens efforts to counter extremism, particularly state-sponsored ideology from Iran, and fosters cooperation among US partners across a region vital to US interests.

Read the full article on Atlantic Council's MENASource.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev will reportedly hold a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to announce Kazakhstan's intention to join, although Astana has already maintained full diplomatic ties with Israel for more than 30 years.

But Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL that while the move by Kazakhstan may appear symbolic, it could hold diplomatic weight moving forward.

“Astana’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marks the beginning of a new phase, transforming the accords from a Middle East peace initiative to a pro-US coalition of moderate Muslim countries devoted to tolerance and prosperity,” Epstein said.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

"The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor," Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL, referring to the emerging 6,500-kilometer-long trade routethat connects China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus by bypassing Russia.

"Both Beijing and Washington are set to use the pause to create an advantage from their side to have more leverage in the next round of trade tensions," Epstein said. "That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies."

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Russian warplanes buzzing into NATO and European Union airspace — prompting the top diplomat in Brussels to accuse Moscow of “gambling with war” — have reignited fears of escalation beyond Ukraine. Yet while attention is fixed on the Baltic, Moscow has waged an information war in its backyard: Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Finland raced into NATO; Moldova braced for hybrid attacks; Poland fortified its eastern flank. This was all for good reason, but seizing and holding territory is far more costly than Kremlin planners seemed to assume. Unable to replicate Ukraine-style invasions elsewhere, at least while engaged in a full-scale war, Russia is falling back on the tools it knows best — covert influence campaigns, disinformation, destabilization and military and intelligence probing.

Moldova remains Moscow’s prime laboratory, where, according to President Maia Sandu, hundreds of millions of euros have been spent on political meddling. Russia has also interfered in elections in both the Czech Republic and Romania. Now, similar warning signs are flashing farther east — in Kazakhstan and Armenia.

Read the full article on the Washington Post.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute. Seth Cropsey is President of the Yorktown Institute.

For millennia, whoever controlled the Silk Road controlled the wealth and influence of Central Asia. Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane were among the great figures who left an indelible mark on the region. Today, the Silk Road’s legacy presents a different kind of opportunity—one of diplomacy. President Donald Trump can become the first United States president to visit Central Asia, demonstrating that America is prepared to play a significant role in the region for the first time since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

Once overlooked, Central Asia is now commanding attention. Its vast mineral wealth and strategic location make it a critical arena for US interests. As leaders from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan gather in Washington, DC, for the C5+1 summit, a presidential visit to the region would signal that the United States is committed to being a central player in its economic and geopolitical future.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

But the biggest trigger for Iran, pun not necessarily intended, is the news that Azerbaijan has emerged as a leading candidate to join the U.S.-backed international mission to stabilize Gaza, with proposed roles ranging from peacekeeping to reconstruction support. Its involvement is still being negotiated with Washington and other partners.

An Azeri role in Gaza “would strengthen Israel through its long-standing partnership and shared strategic interests with regard to Iran,” Joseph Epstein, an expert on Iran’s relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia and director of the Turan Research Center, told the Jerusalem Post.

Israel and Azerbaijan share a common threat in Iran and their cooperation goes back 30 years, Epstein added in a call with me Tuesday. Azerbaijan supplies most of Israel’s oil.“But the cooperation goes much farther,” he added. “Azerbaijan has long acted as Israel’s advocate in the Muslim world. Israel for its part has lobbied for Azerbaijani interests in Washington.”

Read the whole analysis on the Middle East Broadcasting Networks' Iran Briefing.

The U.N.-patrolled demilitarized zone separating Cyprus from the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is unlike any other buffer zone in the world. Unlike the heavily fortified strip dividing the Koreas or the few small villages in the no-man’s-land between Israel and Syria, Cyprus’s “Green Line” hosts several thousand inhabitants, bustling tavernas, a four-star hotels,and even a university.

Until 1960, Cyprus was a British colony. Like so many of Britain’s multiethnic territories—from India to Nigeria to the Mandate of Palestine—London employed a divide-and-rule strategy that caused or deepened intercommunal rifts. After independence, tensions between the island’s Greek and Turkish communities flared into sporadic violence. But what ultimately cemented Cyprus’s partition was a 1974 Greek-backed coup that overthrew President Makarios III and installed a hardline nationalist, Nikos Sampson, who sought union with Greece. Within days, Turkey invaded, leading to the current borders.

The invasion reshaped the island’s map. Once a mosaic of mixed villages, Cyprus became split with a Greek south and a Turkish north, separated by the 180-kilometer Green Line. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared independence—a move recognized only by Ankara.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The political survival of Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan has been nothing short of remarkable. Since rising to power during Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, the embattled prime minister has withstood the fallout from the 2020 Karabakh war, open hostility from the Kremlin-backed Armenian Apostolic Church, and alleged coup attempts. His pursuit of peace with Azerbaijan and closer ties with the West has earned him powerful enemies—from the Russian government to diaspora organizations to Armenia’s former leaders.

With a final peace deal on the horizon and parliamentary elections looming next year, the stakes could not be higher. If Pashinyan holds on, he may guide Armenia into a long-sought era of peace. If he falls, the country risks sliding back into Moscow’s orbit, as its neighbor Georgia has, and could reignite conflict in the South Caucasus.

At the August 8 Washington Peace Summit, US president Donald Trump praised Pashinyan’s courage. After 30 years of bitter conflict over Karabakh, pursuing peace with Azerbaijan—especially after Baku’s battlefield victory—was politically difficult. If Washington wants to secure that peace, it must also secure Pashinyan’s political survival. Despite remaining Armenia’s most popular politician, he now polls at just 17 percent,reflecting widespread disillusionment and apathy.

Read the full article on the National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Washington must urgently diversify its rare earth supply chains. China’s new export restrictions will essentially choke off all supply to the U.S. when they are implemented next month. That will leave a massive hole in U.S. supply—70% of which is currently sourced from China.

Ironically, one of the most promising opportunities for supply diversification lies in China’s own backyard: Central Asia.

Few Americans could find Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan on a map. Yet these countries have quietly shaped the modern world for centuries. Kazakhstan was the site of the first space launch. Uzbekistan’s medieval astronomer Ulugh Beg built the most advanced observatory of his time, charting the stars with uncanny precision long before Galileo. It is fitting, then, that this region now sits at the frontier of another scientific and technological revolution: the race for rare earth elements.

Read the full article on Barron's.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an attempt to reassert dominance over a post-Soviet space that had been steadily asserting greater independence. Ironically, by becoming bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow has created an opening for other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to distance themselves further from Russian influence. As the war drags on, the Turkic states on Russia’s periphery have taken advantage of this new freedom to maneuver.

For these countries, the goal is not to sever all ties with Russia — it remains a powerful neighbor and vital trading partner — but to redefine relations on the basis of mutual respect as well as to carve out their own space in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment. Many are wary of the paternalistic and often tense relationship with a Russia that continues to see them as part of its dominion.

To achieve this new balance, some states in the region are pursuing two complementary strategies: deepening engagement with the United States and expanding regional cooperation through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) — an intergovernmental forum linking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers.

Russian narratives about its “Near Abroad” vary by country but share recurring themes. Chief among them is the belief that these states should remain within Moscow’s sphere of influence and comply with its strategic interests. Those that do not are quickly branded as “ungrateful” or even as “threats.” Russia perceives itself as entitled not only to shape its neighbors’ foreign policies but also to influence their domestic affairs — frequently criticizing efforts to promote national languages over Russian or to revise history curricula in ways that challenge Moscow’s preferred narratives.

This persistent sense of entitlement has defined Russia’s relations with much of the post-Soviet world for decades. Yet as Moscow’s coercive tactics grow more visible — from meddling in internal politics to outright military aggression — its neighbors have become increasingly determined to assert autonomy and recalibrate their ties with the Kremlin.

Seeking Deeper Cooperation with the United States

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have remained peripheral to U.S. foreign policy. Washington’s focus on the Middle East, Afghanistan, China, Russia, and Europe consistently overshadowed the non-European CIS. However, growing U.S. interest in alternative transit routes such as the Middle Corridor  —and in access to rare earth elements (REEs) and critical minerals — has recently brought renewed attention to the region.

For regional governments long frustrated by Washington’s moralizing tone on democracy and human rights, former President Donald Trump’s transactional, business-first approach offered a refreshing change.

Azerbaijan, in particular, has long faced image problems in Washington, largely due to its wars with Armenia and lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora. Despite cooperation during the war in Afghanistan, the United States often found itself preferring to partner with Armenia. But following Baku’s victory in Karabakh and its serious peace talks with Yerevan, a new opportunity for rapprochement has emerged. For Washington, Azerbaijan could become a key partner along the Middle Corridor — a strategic bridge between Europe and Central Asia. Its close ties with U.S. allies Turkey and Israel coupled with its complicated relations with both Russia and Iran, strengthen that case.

A breakthrough came with the August 8 peace agreement, signed in Washington, where Azerbaijan and Armenia chose the United States — not Russia — as mediator. The accords dovetailed neatly with Trump’s emphasis on “ending wars” and signaled Baku’s growing preference for partnership with Washington.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also sought to capture Washington’s attention. In the early months of Trump’s second term, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reportedly financed a special flight to repatriate Central Asian nationals living illegally in the United States — a goodwill gesture toward Washington. At the UN General Assembly, Trump announced major business deals: a $4 billion locomotive contract with Kazakhstan and an $8 billion Boeing agreement with Uzbekistan.

As Carnegie analyst Temur Umarov observed, “only Washington can serve as a sufficient counterweight to both Moscow and Beijing.” Yet, for Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, fostering regional cohesion has been another essential path toward greater independence.

The Rise of the Organization of Turkic States

Situated between Russia, China, and Iran, the Turkic states have long pursued a “multi-vector” foreign policy — balancing relations among competing powers. Yet since independence, many Turkic leaders have also emphasized unity as a safeguard of sovereignty.

Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev, and Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akayev all championed the idea of Turkic solidarity. Only Uzbekistan’s former leader Islam Karimov resisted, fearing that pan-Turkic sentiment might undermine his domestic authority.

This vision culminated in the founding of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2009. Initially dismissed as a symbolic project, the OTS has gained new momentum in recent years — spurred by Russia’s military quagmire in Ukraine and Iran’s growing weakness. That vacuum has enabled Turkish and Azerbaijani influence to surge.

Indeed, Baku has spearheaded efforts to promote Turkic cohesion. At the October OTS Summit in Gabala, President Aliyev declared, “It is very important for the Turkic States to act as a single power center.” He highlighted military cooperation as a key element of integration, arguing that “in today’s world, military power is the fundamental guarantee of territorial integrity and independence.”

Aliyev has backed his words with action — participating in trilateral summits with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, offering to quadruple Kazakh oil exports via Azerbaijan (at Russia’s expense), and joining the ‘Unity 2025’ military exercises in Samarkand involving Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

For its part, Turkey has reinforced this momentum by becoming one of the region’s primary arms suppliers, promoting the Middle Corridor, and easing labor rules for Turkic citizens to work and do business in Turkey without special permits or visas.

This growing cooperation has strengthened the hand of Baku and Central Asia in negotiations with Moscow. Previously, Russia may have attempted to break up such cooperation — but it no longer can. Following a ten-month rift over Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft in December 2024, Vladimir Putin was compelled to personally apologize to Aliyev during a CIS summit in Dushanbe. As regional expert Arkadiy Dubnov told Novaya Gazeta, “Russia was forced to accept Azerbaijan as practically an equal partner.”

Russian Narratives on OTS Ambitions

Moscow, meanwhile, has watched the growing cohesion among Turkic states with mounting unease. Pro-Kremlin commentators and media outlets increasingly portray the OTS as a geopolitical project designed to erode Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The tone of Russian coverage has shifted from condescension to alarm, with some voices warning that Ankara and Baku are building a “proxy NATO” on Russia’s southern flank.

Aliyev’s calls for joint OTS military exercises appear to validate those fears. Pro-Kremlin outlets accused Turkey of using the OTS to establish military and political dominance over fellow members, while mocking the bloc as a “Turkic sultanate” driven by “empty declarations and inflated ambitions.” Nezavisimaya Gazetacolumnist Viktoria Panfilova went further, alleging that Ankara was “usurping” the foreign-policy agenda of Central Asian governments under the banner of Turkic unity.

Benearth the ridicule, however, lies genuine anxiety. The pro-Kremlin website PolitNavigator linked Putin’s recent visit to Tajikistan — home to Russia’s 201st Military Base — to the perceived rise of a “military-political bloc under Turkish and NATO auspices.” The article depicted Dushanbe as Moscow’s last reliable foothold in Central Asia, vital for countering “non-aligned” forces and preventing what they called Western-backed encroachment.

Similar rhetoric has circulated on Telegram channels aligned with the Kremlin, which described Tajikistan as a “forward outpost” to contain the “Turkic unification project” allegedly orchestrated by the United States and United Kingdom. Pro-Russian Central Asian expert Igor Shestakov even warned that proposals for regular OTS intelligence and security summits signaled “genuine bloc formation” and the gradual emergence of a “Turan army.”

These narratives are exaggerated and conspiratorial — reflecting a Kremlin that perceives threats and plots in every assertion of national identity or foreign policy moves not involving it. But more importantly, they show that Moscow now views the OTS not merely as an economic experiment but as a strategic challenge.

Yet pro-Russian commentators rarely acknowledge the obvious: the OTS’s rising influence is partly a direct consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian officials are well aware of this. A leaked internal presentation in a strategy session led by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin last year, attended by senior Kremlin figures and advisers such as Alexander Dugin and Sergei Karaganov, outlined how Western pressure and economic incentives had eroded Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. The presentation specifically mentioned that the region was taking advantage of Moscow’s “vulnerability” to “integrate without Russia” through groups such as the OTS. It highlighted that these countries were “changing their worldview” through “rethinking our collective history,” promoting English instead of Russian as a second language, adopting Western educational standards, and sending the children of elites to be schooled in the West. It concluded that the countries would have to “make a decision on their stance towards Russia” without further detail.

The irony is clear: Moscow’s colonial mindset of the region as a wayward colony is precisely what pushes these countries away from it. If Russia wants to maintain influence, it must treat Central Asia and the Caucasus as partners, not subordinates — refraining from interfering in domestic affairs, including language policy, minority rights, and education, as Moscow has often done in the past.

Central Asia’s Cautious Calculus

Putin’s apology underscored Azerbaijan’s elevated regional standing. Having regained Karabakh, strengthened alliances with Turkey and Israel, expanded its role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, and hosted major international negotiations, Baku has emerged as a significant power in the post-Soviet space.

Central Asia, by contrast, remains more cautious. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are deepening regional integration but avoid open confrontation with Moscow. Both maintained neutrality during the Azerbaijan–Russia dispute. However, in recent months, both have drawn increasingly closer to Baku. In July, during the pinnacle of the rift, Mirziyoyev said, “never in history have our relations been at such a high level as today.” Likewise, Tokayev recently said that increasing ties with Azerbaijan was a “top priority.” Their statements reflect unprecedented cooperation: both countries have boosted transit through Azerbaijan, expanded trade, and intensified coordination across transport, logistics, and energy.

Meanwhile, tensions with Russia often persist. Kazakhstan continues to face threats of destabilization in its ethnic-Russian north. Uzbekistan has clashed diplomatically with Moscow over language policy such as promoting Uzbek and using English as a second language over Russian. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, both have learned that Russia is an unreliable partner — sanctions have disrupted trade routes and energy exports, and domestic anger has grown as Moscow deports Central Asian migrants and xenophobia rises in Russia.

Over the long term, Moscow’s tendency to treat its neighbors as vassal states rather than sovereign partners will only drive them further away — especially as the war in Ukraine drains Russia’s economic and political capacity. The Kremlin’s ten-month rift with Azerbaijan should serve as a warning: the region’s patience is finite. Today, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have alternatives. China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are investing billions across the region, giving local governments unprecedented leverage and options. While the region still currently relies on Russia, this dependence may diminish as these alternatives expand. If Russia wishes to preserve influence, it must learn to engage as a respectful partner — not an overbearing patron.

As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon pointedly told Putin in 2022, “we respect the interests of our largest strategic partner — but we also want to be respected.”

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Foreign reports suggest Azerbaijan may join a multinational stabilization force in Gaza. Analysts argue that the Muslim-majority nation is a credible, widely accepted partner whose military and economic experience could serve Israel’s interests.

Following the end of the Israel-Hamas War, international discussions have gained momentum around forming a stabilization force to restore order and rebuild infrastructure. Israel is seeking partners for postwar security, and Azerbaijan’s name has repeatedly surfaced as one of the leading candidates.

According to foreign sources, Baku is being considered alongside other Muslim-majority countries. Experts believe its participation could bring Israel strategic, diplomatic, and economic benefits. Joseph Epstein, director of the Turan Research Center in Washington, said Azerbaijan’s inclusion “would strengthen Israel through its long-standing partnership and shared strategic interests with regard to Iran.”

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Post.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

According to Joseph Epstein, a political analyst on Middle Eastern affairs who writes for Newsweek and Foreign Policy, “the Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement does not guarantee peace or stability.” He argues that “the core of the crisis remains within the Palestinian side, where there is still no genuine leadership capable of achieving lasting peace.”

Speaking to us, Epstein noted that one of the most remarkable developments in recent days — both during the negotiations over Gaza and the Sharm el-Sheikh summit — was “President Trump’s ability to bring together every major regional country except Iran around a rational plan for the Palestinian issue.” This, he said, “is unprecedented,” adding that the decline in regional support for groups such as Hamas could open the door to meaningful change and to the emergence of leaders capable of reaching real peace agreements.

Read the full article on the Independent (Arabic).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

‘Azerbaijan has been involved in the Middle East for some time’, Joseph Epstein, head of the Turan Research Centre, told OC Media.

From Epstein’s view, Azerbaijan’s interest in the Middle East has grown substantially since 2020, saying that ‘Baku has increased cooperation with the Gulf and has been particularly active in Syria’.

Speaking of Azerbaijan’s regional approach, Epstein argued that while ‘the motivations differ by country, there is a clear overall trend: Baku is positioning itself as a trusted regional mediator’.

‘The resolution of the [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict has freed political and diplomatic bandwidth for Baku’, Epstein said.

‘Azerbaijan is now seeking to shift from a singular focus on territorial recovery to a broader foreign-policy agenda’.

Read the full article on OC Media.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

When an Almaty court handed blogger Temirlan Ensebek a five-year sentence of restricted freedom this spring, it wasn’t for a speech or a protest but for posting to an audience of 34,000 the song “Yo Russians” — a crude, anonymously written rap from the early 2000s that hurls vulgar insults at Russians, and briefly, Uzbeks. Revived online after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recast by some as an anti-war anthem, the track has become a lightning rod in Kazakhstan, where Russians make up roughly half the population in the northern regions. Ensebek was prosecuted under Act 174, the law against inciting ethnic hatred — a case that illustrates how easily cultural flashpoints can spill into politics in a country trying to preserve its multiethnic harmony while fending off Moscow’s claims to its territory.

For Kazakhstan, the most diverse country in Central Asia with over 124 ethnicities, maintaining tolerance is enshrined in the country’s constitution. Ethnic minorities have representation in both the Majles and the Senate as well as through the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, created by presidential decree in 1995 as an advisory body to promote interethnic harmony and support the development of national policy on ethnic relations. While closely linked to the president, the Assembly’s primary role is consultative, helping to mediate interethnic issues and ensure that diverse communities have representation.

The largest minority is Russian, making up around 14 percent of the population and roughly half of the residents in the North Kazakhstan Region (NKR), with majorities in some border cities and villages. Kazakhstan is home to the largest Russian diaspora in the world and Russian is an official language. For most Kazakhstanis, Russians have become a crucial part of the country’s social fabric. Kazakhs will refer to Kazakhstani Russians as “bizdin orystar” or our Russians, emphasizing their distinct identity from Russians in Russia through shared history and regional values such as hospitality and respect for elders. In some respects, the bonds between Kazakhs and Russians are closer than between Kazakhs and other Central Asian nationalities. As the poet Ramil Niyazov noted, if a Kazakh fights a Uyghur, any drunk scuffle can escalate into an interethnic conflict, but if a Kazakh fights a Russian, then the Kazakh’s Russian friends will fight on his side as will the Russian’s Kazakh friends.

At same time, Kazakhstan must balance relations with its ethnic Russians and the watchful eye of the Kremlin as it seeks to become more Kazakh through promoting the use of the Kazakh language, renaming Russian cities to Kazakh ones – often returning the historical toponymics, and promoting the country’s separate history.

For now, interethnic relations remain largely stable and officials are keen to maintain that balance. Besides the understanding that Kazakhstan will best succeed by embracing its cultural mosaic, authorities worry of a repeat of an Eastern Ukrainian scenario in the country’s north.

Russian Separatist Movements in the Post-Independence Years

As the titular republics declared their independence from the Soviet Union, Moscow began supporting breakaway republics such Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Republic of Artsakh in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and Transnistria in Moldova. By the end of the active parts of these conflicts, Russian troops were sent to “keep the peace” – with the exception of Karabakh, these peacekeepers never left. Such a scenario almost played out in the oil-rich Northwestern Kazakhstan.

In September 1991, tensions in Oral — also known as Uralsk — erupted when local Russian Cossacks sought to celebrate the 400th anniversary of serving the Russian crown, despite opposition from Kazakh nationalists with the support of regional authorities. Some of the Cossacks voiced territorial claims and links to Moscow, and according to Orynbai Zhakibaev, a leader of the Azat movement of Kazakh activists, had undergone secret military training and formed brigades should conflict break out. According to Najmeddin Eskaliev, then-leader of the Oral region, a column of Russian tanks under the command of General Albert Makashov waited on the Russian-Kazakh border to assist the Cossacks, should the confrontation turn violent. However, the conflict, later to be known as the “Uralsk Events” was quickly contained and then largely forgotten in the backdrop of the quick unraveling of history in the Soviet Union at the time.

The Uralsk Events were not unique. In 1994, 10,000 Russians gathered in Oskemen, also known as Ust-Kamenogorsk, in Kazakhstan’s northeast to demand Russian autonomy, dual citizenship rights and the elevation of Russian to state language. Oskemen, then a majority-Russian city, became a flash point, seeing a minor Cossack uprising in 1996-1997 followed by a coup attempt against the local government in 1999 led mainly by Russian citizens later referred to as “Pugachev’s Rebellion” in honor of Emilian Pugachev, a Cossack who led a revolt against Catherine the Great in the 18th century. The masterminds of Pugachev’s Rebellion sought to separate from Kazakhstan and establish a “Russian Altai” in the Eastern Kazakhstan province.

To counter the threat of Russian secessionism, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev took steps to change the demographics of the north. In 1994, Nazarbayev moved Kazakhstan’s capital from the largest city and cultural center Almaty to a small city in the northern steppe of Akmola, later renamed to Astana. By moving the government, he was able to attract migrants from the country’s largely ethnic Kazakh south. Additionally, he settled kandas, or ethnic Kazakh repatriates from nearby countries such as China, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan, in the north, slowly changing the demographics. In general, the repatriation of kandas along with ethnic Russian emigration has helped increased the ethnic Kazakh population from 44 percent at independence to 66 percent in 2024.

Historical Ties and Contemporary Claims

The history of Russian involvement in the Kazakh steppe dates to the early 18th century. Following the collapse of the Kazakh Khanate into three juz or hordes. These juz, weak and rather young entities, sought protection from St. Petersburg, which was formally granted in 1738. After the Russian Empire tightened its control in the 19th century — through forts, settlements, and the abolition of the khanates — Kazakh resistance flared, most famously in uprisings such as Kenesary Qasymuly’s rebellion in the mid 19th century. Continued land seizures and conscription policies sparked further revolts, including the massive 1916 Central Asian uprising against Tsarist rule. From the mid-19th century especially, Tsarist authorities encouraged the migration of ethnic Russians to Kazakhstan through building forts and administrative centers that would then become the nuclei for Russian settlements and land policies such as the Stolypin Reforms. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the region was drawn into the civil war, and by the early 1920s Soviet power had been consolidated, leading to the creation of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) in 1925.

While many are familiar with the Holodomor, or the mass starvation in Ukraine in the 1930’s as a result of collectivization, few realize that the same policies killed over one third of the Kazakh population – mainly nomads in what Kazakhs refer to as Aharshylyq. Over the following two decades, Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin deported various ethnic groups that he deemed a threat from throughout the country to Kazakhstan. Then, in 1954, new General Secretary Nikita Khruschev began his “Virgin Lands” campaign, recruiting hundreds of thousands of Russian and Ukrainian farmers to plow and settle Siberia and Kazakhstan. These events dramatically altered the republic’s demographics. In 1897, the Kazakh population was around 82 percent and the Russian population was around 10 percent, but after the Virgin Lands campaign, the Russian population of Kazakhstan was above 40 percent while the Kazakh population dropped to only 30 percent.

In the 1960’s, Khruschev proposed to dissolve the KSSR into the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and renaming the five Kazakh regions the Tseliny Krai or “Virgin Lands Territory.” Then KSSR Chairman Zhumabek Tashenov openly opposed the idea, which would later cost him his job, but stopped the handover of Kazakh lands.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, various Russian politicians have made claim to Kazakhstan’s north. In 2020, Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov said that Kazakhstan’s north was historically uninhabited, and the south was given “as a gift” to the Kazakh people by the Soviet Union. As Turan Research Fellow Bruce Pannier noted at the time, “it would be easy to consider the statements by the Russian deputies simply as bluster and dismiss them as fringe sentiments. But this is far from the first time Russian officials have made comments that brought into question Kazakhstan’s claim to statehood and sovereignty.”

The idea of Russia “gifting” Kazakhstan its land has been a reoccurring theme. The late ultranationalist Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, originally from Almaty, proposed annexing Kazakhstan; esteemed Soviet dissident and author Aleksandr Solzhenitskyn wrote in a famous essay “How to Build Russia” that Russia could take the northern half of Kazakhstan; and political activist Eduard Limonov was jailed in Russia in 2001 on charges of plotting a coup in northern Kazakhstan (the charges were later dropped). Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin ominously said that Nazarbayev “created a state on a territory that never had a state…Kazakhs never had any statehood, [Nazarbayev] created it.”

It was the 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russian-backed separatist movements in Donetsk in Luhansk that drove home the real potential of such a scenario playing out in Kazakhstan. In response, authorities began incentivizing migration from the largely ethnic Kazkh south to the north under the guise of balancing the job market. From 2017 to 2024, this program saw the settlement of 58 thousand people in the NKR.

Acts 174 and 180: The Legal Edge of Kazakhstan’s Interethnic Policy

Under the same Act 174 used to prosecute Ensebek, Kazakh authorities launched an investigation into the Director of the major Russian-language radio station Europe Plus Kazakhstan. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, she responded on Facebook to a supposed Kazakh nationalist by threatening to “call Uncle Vlad” for help and telling him to “shut his toxic, nationalist mouth.” Although she was fired from her post at the radio, she was not charged with any crimes. However, under Kazakhstani law, her statement could’ve been tried under the harsher Act 180.

Act 180 relates to propaganda, public calls and actions related to separatism or threats to the country’s territorial integrity. According to the NKR Police Chief Ruslan Zharasbaev, cases of prosecution under both acts 174 and 180 rose sharply in 2023. Many cases in the north stem from online tirades and social media posts. Some involve insulting ethnic Kazakhs or calling for Russian annexation, but the prosecutions are not one-sided. In June, a pregnant Kazakh teacher was prosecuted under Act 174 for posting a TikTok video declaring, “there is no place for [Russians] here. Those Kazakhs who can hear me now, teach Russians, because they are stupid and dumb.”

Other cases are more concerning. In April 2023, a video at a college in Petropavlovsk went viral showing around twenty members of the so-called “People’s Committee of the Workers” declaring “independence, self-sufficiency and sovereignty.” While such declarations alone are unlikely to be serious, they occurred amid statements by Russian politicians and political experts calling for the need to “defend the Russian-speaking population” and questioning Kazakhstan’s statehood, echoing rhetoric used in Ukraine. Last year, Russian TV and popular telegram channels criticized alleged Russophobia in Central Asian school systems, accusing Kazakhstan in particular of “training a new generation of Russophobes” for including Kazakh suffering under tsarism and soviet rule in the syllabus.

In a possible sign of Astana’s sensitivity to Russian criticism, Kazakhstani authorities opened an investigation under Act 174 in August against Aibek Abdrakhmanov, who runs a YouTube channel on Kazakh history challenging Soviet stereotypes and as he describes it the notion that Kazakhs  “didn’t have writing, statehood, or civilization and were savages” before joining the Russian empire. Investigators cited not the content of the videos themselves, but the anti-Russian comments they allegedly inspired. Just a month earlier, Aslan Tolegenov, an ethnic Kazakh blogger who purportedly “exposed Russophobia” in Kazakhstan, was placed under administrative arrest for 10 days under the same law. Unlike typical prosecutions under Act 174, which target the content itself, these cases were pursued because of the discussions they generated. Together, they illustrate Astana’s approach: curbing public debate on topics that could threaten interethnic harmony.

While the government’s approach may seem extreme, Kazakhstani authorities have reason to fear such societal trends. Last month, leaked documents from Russian military intelligence (GRU) detailed influence operations in Kazakhstan. The documents outlined strategies to destabilize the country, starting in the north, including plans to bribe elites, weaponize Russophobia, and promote pro-Russian propaganda under the guise of a research center.

However, in recent times, the potential for a Crimea or East Ukraine scenario that at least appears grassroots is diminishing. Kazakhstan has largely reshaped the demographics of its northern regions: many Russians have left due to a lack of opportunities, poor infrastructure and a harsh climate. The Kazakh Agrotechnical University estimates the northern population will drop by 20-25%. Additionally, the remaining Russian population is aging, as the youth often move to Astana, Almaty or Russia in search of better work opportunities. While local support and even plausible deniability will not stop a Russian invasion, changing facts on the ground may mitigate the risk.

Managing Multiculturalism

Of the total Russian population, separatists represent a small minority. Russians are not only accepted by Kazakhs, but they have also forged a distinct Kazakhstani Russian identity since the fall of the Soviet Union. It is common to see videos of ethnic Kazakhs jumping in the water with Russians during the Christian Orthodox Epiphany or ethnic Russians greeting their Kazakh neighbors with salam aleikum. Populations are mixed not only in major cities like Astana and Almaty but also in smaller towns such as Zharkent, Balkhash, and Taldykorgan. Self-segregation is rare, and intermarriage is not uncommon.

Kazakhstani Russians have pushed back against Russian politicians who claim that ethnic Russians or the Russian language is under attack. In 2022, when Duma Deputy Genadii Zyuganov made such a claim, Kazakhstani Russians responded en masse with the hashtag blending Russian and Kazakh, “Kazakhstan Moy Zheruik” or “Kazakhstan is my Land.”

Yet in northern Kazakhstan, social cohesion is more fragile. Many residents watch Russian state media and are dissatisfied with initiatives to promote the Kazakh language, the renaming of cities, limited local opportunities, and government policies aimed at altering the region’s demographics. Occasional incidents of Russophobia, such as a sign in Oral reading “Russians have no place in Oral” further alienate local Russians.

Should Russia attempt to seize part of northern Kazakhstan, it would face few immediate military obstacles. The border is vast, mostly undefended, and sparsely populated. However, Kazakhstani political expert Gaziz Abishev warns that annexation could cost Russia diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan and provoke the establishment of foreign bases — “whether they be American or Chinese” — along the new border. Already spread out and isolated over the war in Ukraine, these political consequences may outweigh any short-term gains. An invasion could also prompt other Central Asian nations and Azerbaijan to reassess their ties with Moscow in response to the emerging Russian threat. While China and the United States are unlikely to provide security guarantees, Kazakhstan may seek increased relations with countries of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) to deter Russian annexation.

Kazakhstani analyst Dosym Satpayev cautions that Kazakhstan’s fate is linked to Ukraine. "If Ukraine can be easily sacrificed to appease Putin, what does that mean for Kazakhstan? Should serious problems arise here [in Kazakhstan], no one will pay attention.” He notes that Kazakhstan’s security depends on a fragile geopolitical balance that could “collapse at any moment.”

Kazakhstan’s leadership thus walks a narrow path between affirming a distinct national identity and preserving the multiethnic fabric that has helped keep the country stable since independence. The demographic shifts in the north, the strict enforcement of laws against hate speech and separatism, and the careful public messaging around history and language are all parts of this balancing act. Yet these measures can only mitigate, not eliminate, the risks posed by an assertive Russia and domestic grievances. Whether Kazakhstan continues to be seen by its citizens — Kazakh, Russian and others alike — as a shared homeland will depend not only on government policy but also on the everyday choices of communities to resist polarization. In that sense, the contest over “our Russians” or “Moscow’s Russians” is less about passports than about belonging, and how Kazakhstan manages that question may define its sovereignty for decades to come.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

When the leaders of long-warring Armenia and Azerbaijan met at the White House on August 8, they initialed a peace agreement—not a final treaty, but a gateway to one. They also signed a joint declaration establishing the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a twenty-five-mile corridor designed to link Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenia. Together, these moves mark major wins for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States. At the same time, Russia emerges as the biggest loser.

The Trump administration deserves credit for arbitrating the sensitive talks over a brutal conflict that displaced more than a million people and left more than 35,000 dead. But the diplomatic breakthrough was also made possible by a series of Russian miscalculations and by Moscow’s disregard for the sovereignty of its neighbors.

If the United States wants to build on this achievement, then it should promote Armenia’s regional integration, move quickly to transform the TRIPP from an idea into a reality, and deepen its ties with other countries in the region. Doing so would weaken Russia’s grip on the South Caucasus, which Moscow has long treated as part of its own domain, much like it has with Ukraine. Despite the independence of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to view their borders as fluid markers of power, subject to revision at will. 

Read the full article, co-written with Sheila Paylan, at the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center at the Yorktown Institute.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations.

Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein joined Arun Anand, host of the Nationalist View podcast for a discussion on the Israeli attack on Doha, the focus of the Turan Research Center, Iran's reaction to Operation Rising Lion, exposed cracks in Iran’s regional military and intelligence apparatus, the future of the Iranian nuclear program and more.

Watch on Youtube here.

When President Trump hosted the signing ceremony of the peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia last week, celebrations weren’t limited to Washington, Baku and Yerevan.

In Jerusalem, Israeli officials welcomed the initiative led by one of their closest allies, Azerbaijan, in partnership with the U.S. The trilateral cooperation had been a shared strategic goal. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, recognizing the ineffectiveness of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group as peace arbiters, opted instead for direct negotiations with Washington, supported by Jerusalem.

Now, Mr. Trump has an opportunity to reshape the Middle East and Eurasia by expanding the Abraham Accords to include Azerbaijan and Central Asian nations such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A strategic enlargement of the accords would counter adversaries, diversify supply chains, and build a bloc of moderate, pro-Western Muslim-majority nations aligned with the U.S. and Israel. It would also showcase Israeli outreach, helping counter the anti-Israel global narrative.

Read more at the Wall Street Journal.

Recently, Reuters reported that U.S. President Donald Trump was considering expanding the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein breaks down what this would offer Uzbekistan.

Watch the full interview on Radio Ozodlik.

In an article for OC Media, Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein discusses Azerbaijan's relationship with its Jewish community and Israel, the potential for a trilateral partnership, and more.

Read the full article on OC Media.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Joseph Epstein of the Turan Research Center at the Yorktown Institute argues that bringing Azerbaijan into the Accords would signal to Muslim majority states in Central Asia such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan that open cooperation with Israel is both possible and worthwhile. It would also squeeze Tehran which sees a secular Shia state aligned with Israel and Turkey as a strategic problem.

Epstein also cautions against tying Azerbaijan’s entry to unrelated conditions like a peace deal with Armenia because that would undercut the spirit of the Accords and risk a fragile process in the South Caucasus. The Accords were built to unite Muslim countries that choose tolerance and reject extremism. Armenia is not part of that track and forcing it in would be counterproductive.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Post.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

In an interview with Arutz Sheva, Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein explains why Baku's decades-long partnership with Israel and Washington positions it as the next candidate for the Abraham Accords.

Read the full article on Arutz 7 Israel National News.

Turan Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Professor Tim Milosch of Biola University to discuss recent events in the Middle East. They covered renewed Israeli offensives in Gaza to Operation Midnight Hammer to the rush to rehabilitate Syria as a member of the international system to the possibility of a Kurdish peace, and the expansion of the Abraham Accords.

Listen on the Tim Talks Politics Podcast.

Israel’s military strike on Iran in mid-June, “Operation Rising Lion,” alongside U.S. attacks on nuclear sites, exposed the Islamic Republic’s military vulnerabilities and proved the regime to be a paper tiger. But this success has triggered a dangerous response: Tehran is now striking back—not just with missiles and threats toward its neighbors, but with mass arrests, executions and repression at home.

From Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan to the streets of Tehran and Baluchistan, Iran’s targets are not random. They are chosen to signal strength, distract from weakness and restore control—whether through violence, propaganda or both. The regime sees its enemies as foreign and domestic, and often treats them the same way.

To prevent a wider crisis, Washington and Jerusalem must act quickly to deter further repression and aggression.

Read more at the Jewish News Syndicate.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Five years after the Abraham Accords normalized relations between four Arab nations and Israel, the historic agreements are in murky waters.

Its many proponents have been waiting for Saudi Arabia to join the pact, which is unlikely as long as the war in Gaza continues. However, even if Riyadh joins tomorrow, a larger question remains: What is the future of the accords after peace?

The Abraham Accords were much more than a peace agreement with Israel. They were the culmination of a regional pivot—the choice to pursue a policy of tolerance and regional stability rather than continue the hatred and sectarianism that have wrought so much havoc in the Middle East and the Muslim world.

To continue this movement, the accords must evolve beyond warm bilateral ties into a multilateral alliance—a bloc of Muslim-majority countries with warm relations with Israel, united not just by shared interests, but by shared values. Specifically, a commitment to tolerance, peace, and fighting Islamic extremism.

A first move should be to include Muslim-majority countries that already have warm ties with Israel, like Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Uzbekistan.

With US support, the bloc could help the Abraham Accords movement reach its full potential. The created alliance could then serve as the nucleus for a powerful global movement grounded in tolerance, modernization, and strategic cooperation.

Read more at the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Joseph Epstein, Director of the Turan Research Center, joins i24 News to break down the recent meeting between Israeli and Syrian officials in Baku. Why is Azerbaijan playing host? What does it stand to gain?

Watch the full interview here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=liF9dlZN0yA

Turan Research Center’s Joseph Epstein was quoted in Iran International’s analysis of Tucker Carlson’s interview of Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian:

Tucker Carlson’s interview with Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian was all Tehran could wish for, experts told Iran International: a global stage, no pushback, and a direct line to Donald Trump’s base.

“This was a major victory for Iranian information warfare operations,” said Marcus Kolga, a leading expert on foreign disinformation. “Whether intentionally or not, Carlson is acting as a significant conduit and amplifier for Iranian government information operations.”

The interview was recorded remotely, unlike the one Carlson did with Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in February 2024.

“(Carlson) offers Pezeshkian and the Iranian regime a platform—without context or pushback—allowing Tehran to shape the record to Carlson’s viewers and listeners unopposed,” Kolga added.

A moment highlighted by many critics was when Pezeshkian asserted that Israel had tried to assassinate him without offering any evidence.

“He was trying to… put forward the message that this is Israel tricking America into getting involved in this. This really isn’t America’s war. Iran and America, we have nothing to fight about.” director of the Yorktown Institute’s Turan Research Center Joseph Epstein said.

Epstein argued the interview fit Carlson’s broader pattern of offering authoritarian figures a platform to rewrite narratives without scrutiny—an approach that often blurs the line between journalistic curiosity and ideological alignment.

For over 150 years, Russia ruled the South Caucasus, the mountainous region between Europe and Asia, through exploitation, domination and a colonialist divide-and-conquer policy. Moscow’s most recent pressure-point has been the conflict over the Armenia-backed separatist Karabakh, where Russia both fueled the conflict and acted as a mediator.

Now, Armenia and Azerbaijan are setting clear boundaries — and America has a historic opening to help them.  

Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have been in a freefall after Russian police allegedly tortured to death two Azerbaijani citizens amid a greater crackdown on ethnic Azerbaijani in the industrial city of Yekaterinburg. Azerbaijan authorities said the killings were “ethnically motivated,” and they likely were.  

In response, Azerbaijan arrested the chief and managing editors of the Russian state media outlet Sputnik, accusing them of working with Russian intelligence. Baku then arrested eight more Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime.  

This latest escalation comes amid tensions between the two countries that have simmered since December, when Moscow shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane, killing 38. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev demanded a public apology and compensation, but Moscow initially ignored him. This set in motion a spiraling escalation that included the ordered closing of Russian state media and cultural centers in Azerbaijan and a massive cyberattack against Azerbaijani state media.

Read more on The Hill.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Photo of Arrested Sputnik Journalists by the Azerbaijani Press Agency

Over the past 48 hours, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have been in a free fall. This latest crisis in ties comes after Russian police launched a major operation against ethnic Azerbaijanis in the city of Yekaterinburg on June 30, which ended up in multiple serious injuries and two deaths amid allegations of torture. Officially, Azerbaijan called the killings “ethnically motivated” and “unlawful.” Influential Azerbaijanis such as former presidential aid Eldar Namazov have referred to the incident as a “pogrom.”

In response, Azerbaijani police arrested two journalists in Baku at Russian state media Sputnik headquarters– that authorities had officially ordered to close earlier this year — accusing themof working with Russian intelligence. Baku also cancelled any cultural events in partnership with Russian state and private organizations. On July 1, Russia continued its offensive on the Azerbaijani diaspora, arresting two influential figures. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reaffirming support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

While Russia and Azerbaijan have periodically had their issues, the latest row has been particularly long and has lasted about six months. It started in December of last year, when an Azerbaijani jet flying from Baku to Grozny crash landed in Kazakhstan, killing 38 civilians. Following a preliminary investigation, Azerbaijan accused Russian air defenses of shooting down the plane and demanded a public apology admitting guilt as well as compensation.

In February, Azerbaijan hinted it may appeal to the International Court of Justice and orderedthe closing of the “Russian House,” a local branch of the Russian state-funded cultural diplomacy agency Rossotrudnichestvo, due to a “lack of legal registration.” Dating to Soviet times, cultural diplomacy was often a thin cover for intelligence gathering and Azerbaijani state media repeatedly accused the Russian House of housing spies. Baku simultaneously announced the closure of Russia Today and Sputnik Azerbaijan offices. In response, Russian Deputy Nikolay Valuyev — from President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party — recommended cracking down on the Azerbaijani diaspora, causing Azerbaijan to declare him persona non grata.

Later that month, a massive cyber-attack targeted Azerbaijani pro-government media using the logo of the Iranian-backed ethnic Azerbaijani proxy Husseiniyyun and verses from the Quran. Some Azerbaijani sources suspected a false flag operation and immediately blamed Russia. But it was only earlier last month that an Azerbaijani parliamentary commission revealed the cyberattack originated from the Russian hacker group Cozy Bear.

Days later, an Azerbaijani MP who had been critical of Russia was deported from Moscow airport and barred from entering the country after having been invited as part of a delegation. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry labeled the move as “an unfriendly step.”

On May 9, President Ilham Aliyev skipped the annual Russian military parade celebrating the 80th year anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. For Russia, Victory Day is much more than a holiday but an affirmation to the world that Moscow was and is an important global power. Worse than his absence was that the Azerbaijani leader canceled at the last minute.

To save face when Aliyev canceled his trip to Moscow, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov explained that the Azerbaijani president did so to take part in an event dedicated to his father and former president Heydar Aliyev. Not long after, Azerbaijani state media declared that Aliyev’s decision was due to tension in the relations.

Deeper tensions

The current rift has brought to the surface a deeper tension between Azerbaijan and Russia. Baku still holds a grudge against Moscow for its historic support of Armenia in the conflict over the Armenian separatist territory of Karabakh. Many of the recent anti-Russian articles in Azerbaijani media brought up Russia’s ties with both Armenia and Karabakh. Moscow often exerted more influence over the enclave than Yerevan did. It also used the conflict to maintain leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan while selling weapons to both sides.

This policy allowed Russia to keep both countries under heel to a certain degree, much like how it has used the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova to pressure Tbilisi and Chisinau. While tensions would occasionally bubble to the surface, Baku had to be much more tactful in how much it could alienate Russia.

An example is in 2009, when Azerbaijani media reported that Russia had transferred approximately $800 million in weapons to Armenia the year prior. While Moscow officially denied the transfer, according to leaked American diplomatic cables, then-Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov admitted it to this Azerbaijani counterpart “after the second bottle of vodka.” The incident caused Azerbaijan to summon the Russian ambassador for clarification as well as some critical op-eds in the media, but there was not much else Baku could do.

Compare that to today, when Azerbaijan has insisted for over six months for what Russia likely sees as a display of public capitulation. Despite Moscow clearly not accepting its new role in relations, it does not have the same leverage over Baku as it had before.

Shifts in Power Dynamics

In the past, such open defiance would have been unthinkable for a small post-Soviet state on Russia’s borders. Azerbaijan’s behavior is due to two factors – Russia’s loss of influence in the region and Azerbaijan’s strengthened position.

Russia’s position in the South Caucasus weakened significantly following the 2020 Second Karabakh War, in which Azerbaijan returned most of the territory occupied by Armenian separatists.

Another blow came in 2022 when Russian invaded Ukraine. Earlier this year, а leaked report showed that Russian officials believed the war in Ukraine and resulting western pressure has significantly hampered its influence in the post-Soviet space. Russia’s diversion of resources from the South Caucasus helped lead to the successful Azerbaijani operation that took back complete control of Karabakh in 2023.

Without the leverage of Karabakh, Russia lost its trump card over Azerbaijan. And given that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sees removing Yerevan’s reliance on Russia as necessary for its independence, Russia’s role in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan became superfluous.

Azerbaijan’s Russia Strategy

Since gaining independence, Azerbaijan has tried to maintain friendly relations with Moscow, but at a distance. Having been under direct Russian rule during the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, Baku seeks to maintain its independence while avoiding both conflicts and reliance in its relations with Russia.

Azerbaijan’s approach has always differed from its neighbors. Georgia under President Mikheil Saakashvili attempted to move the country West, causing direct conflict with Russia culminating in the 2008 invasion. Armenia, on the other hand, completely relied on Russia, which caused it to become a vassal state. Ironically, both countries have since changed course, with Georgia under Georgian Dream party rule falling back into Russia’s zone of influence and Armenia under Pashinyan trying to decrease Yerevan’s reliance on Russia.

Baku instead always took the middle route – seeking cooperation with Russia without overreliance. It achieved its goal through diversifying its military and economic relations. Azerbaijan has partnered closely militarily with Turkey and Israel, while its top economic partners in total import-export volumes are Italy, Turkey, Israel, India and Greece, respectively.

These partnerships have given Azerbaijan the freedom to challenge Russia when necessary, such as during the latest rift over the past six months.

But Azerbaijan simultaneously works with Russia when cooperation is mutually beneficial and does not create dependence. Moscow provides Baku with almost 20% of its imports and both have worked on developing the North-South transport corridor as an alternative to transport through the Suez canal. But even the latter has created Russian dependence on Azerbaijan and not the other way around. Moscow now relies on Baku to ship products to Iran and the Gulf.

Additionally, as Europe began drastically cutting down on Russian oil and gas exports following the invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan proved key for Brussels to find a makeshift way of importing Russian oil without losing face. That is why the oil rich Azerbaijan quadrupled its imports of Russian oil in 2023 while significantly increasing its exports to Europe.

Through such policy, Azerbaijan has achieved what other South Caucasus nations have not been able to – not only is Baku independent from Russia, but Moscow relies on Azerbaijan. This became apparent after the ahead-of-time withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers after Baku returned the occupied Karabakh region in 2023. As journalist Kiril Krivosheev pointed out, the presence of Russian peacekeepers whether in Transnistria, South Ossetia or Abkhazia is meant to be permanent. The new power dynamic is also proven by recent events — despite Russia’s current anger at Azerbaijan, all it has been capable of doing is punishing the Azerbaijani diaspora.

In the post-Soviet space, few countries have managed to reverse the power dynamic with Moscow. Azerbaijan now stands as a rare example—not just resisting Russian pressure but leveraging its own geopolitical importance to put the Kremlin on the defensive.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

In a rare diplomatic thaw, Turkey and Israel agreed to establish a hotline to prevent military flare-ups in Syria – a move brokered last month by Azerbaijan after weeks of quiet negotiations in the capital, Baku.[1] This tentative thaw came before escalating regional tensions, particularly following Israel’s unprecedented military campaign inside Iran—Operation Rising Lion—which struck deep into Iranian territory and targeted military and nuclear assets.

Any agreement between Ankara and Jerusalem has been a rare event since Israeli-Turkish relations hit historic lows following the October 7th Hamas-led massacre and ensuing war in Gaza. Ties have not been so low since the 2010 Mavi Marmara Flotilla incident, when Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists who attacked them while trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza.

Since the breakout of war in Gaza, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has likened Israel to the Nazi Third Reich and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler. He has also threatened to invade Israel and decried Israeli actions in Gaza as “genocide.”[2] Furthermore, he halted all trade with Israel last year, [3] hosted Hamas delegations, [4] and led international diplomatic efforts to isolate Israel.[5]

In response, Israeli officials, such as Defense Minister Israel Katz have called Erdoğan an “antisemitic dictator” and “[want-to-be] sultan.”[6] Following Turkey’s halt of trade with Israel, Jerusalem announced that it would restrict Turkish exports to the Palestinian authority and seek sanctions against Turkey in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development over breaches of trade agreements.[7]

Since the launch of Operation Rising Lion, Erdoğan has both offered to mediate the conflict and tried to convince Muslim leaders to denounce Israel’s strikes.[8] Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar has responded by condemning Erdoğan’s “imperial ambitions” in Syria and Northern Cyprus.[9] According to Axios, US President Donald Trump tried to arrange a meeting between US and Iranian officials in Istanbul through Erdoğan to strike a nuclear deal and avoid military intervention in Iran.[10]

Read the rest at the Moshe Dayan Center.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institut.

Photo by Khamenei.ir

Israel’s “Operation Rising Lion” of air and special operations against Iran has been a remarkable success. The Israeli Airforce quickly established complete air superiority, operating over Iranian skies with ease; killed the top brass of the Iranian military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC); inflicted massive damage to Iran’s nuclear program; destroyed over half of the nation’s ballistic missile launchers and caried out crippling strikes on everything from state media headquarters to strategic energy sites. Iran, on the other hand, has only been able to launch some 350 missiles, most of which were intercepted by air defenses.

For Tehran, the Israeli strikes have become an existential threat, especially considering that Israel could well exact much more damage. Israel Defense Forces officials have declared that the operation has just begun and could take weeks to conclude. Moreover, Israel has so far refused to hit certain sensitive but vulnerable targets such as oil refineries and nuclear fuel sites that could lead to radiological contamination. Iranian officials are reportedly desperately seeking a deal with the United States and may have appealed to Russia for asylum should the regime fall, according to Iran International, a London-based Persian news channel.

That little Israel could bring the Islamic Republic to its knees in such a short span of time has embarrassed the Iranian establishment and presented the Iranian propaganda apparatus with a conundrum in explaining the successes of Operation Rising Lion to a domestic audience.

So far, Tehran has used its state information apparatus to minimize the perception of damage inflicted by Jerusalem while exaggerating the damage caused by its missile strikes against Israel. Its propaganda machine has also created an imaginary ring of fire around Iran by claiming that it is fighting not just Israel but a large coalition, which includes the United States, Azerbaijan and Turkey.

For years, Tehran has committed itself to destroying Israel and has bragged about its military superiority while dismissing the Jewish State as a vulnerable colonial outpost reliant on foreign powers for its existence. Now, Israel’s military domination of Iran is turning that narrative on its head.

As a result, it is crucial to save face by convincing Iranians that the mighty Islamic Republic could only be crippled by a coalition of nefarious actors supporting Israel behind the scenes. That message is best summed up by  Ehsan Movahedian, an Iranian political analyst and lecturer at Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran. “Israel is a fake, small country with no strategic depth and infrastructure, and it would not last a week without the support of the United States, Europe, Turkey and Baku,” he said. “If Turkey and Baku do not export oil to Israel, it cannot survive… Israeli fighter jets will not have the fuel to fly to Iran and manage their attacks without help from Baku and Turkey.”

IRGC-linked Telegram channels have claimed that NATO, Turkey and the U.S. are actively helping Israel defend against barrages of ballistic missiles. Iranian state media has also accused Azerbaijan, Qatar and Jordan of helping shoot down Iranian attacks on Israel while claiming that Tehran “managed to gain the upper hand” against a joint U.S. and Israeli aerial attack. Much like the clearly-doctored AI images of downed Israeli F-35s and fake images of the destruction of Israel’s international airport, the claims of outside support for Israel’s offensive are equally dubious. For example, Iran’s information apparatus has accused Israeli drones of being launched from Azerbaijan, relying accounts of a teenager claiming he saw drones cross the border and unsubstantiated claims made by obscure Omani political analysts.

The Iranian information apparatus seeks to convince its domestic population that the mighty Islamic Republic could only be crippled by a coalition of nefarious actors supporting Israel behind the scenes, while simultaneously claiming to not be crippled at all. While this may seem hypocritical, it is key to keep in mind that consistency and coherence is not necessary in propaganda.

To be sure, Iranian officials and official outlets have been careful about upsetting Turkey while threatening Azerbaijan, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Despite its propaganda claiming that Ankara has joined the fight, Tehran understands that the Turkish military is the only other Middle East force capable of projecting power beyond its borders and – and shares a large border with Iran.

According to Mike Doran, Director of the Hudson Institute, Iran is particularly afraid of Turkey because of its influence over Iran’s 30 million strong Turkic minority.

The easiest target for Iranian pundits has been Azerbaijan and its President Ilham Aliyev, who has enjoyed warm bilateral relations with Israel since he assumed power in 2003. For years, Tehran has tried to overthrow his secular government by sponsoring a proxy force to create a Shiite rebellion. In recent months, Iran and Azerbaijan have calmed tensions, however Tehran’s recent accusations are likely to enflame them again. By blaming Baku, Iran has proven again that it cannot accept the existence of Azerbaijan as a secular Shiite-majority nation and ethnic homeland for Iran’s largest minority on its border.

Using alleged foreign interference as a propaganda tool is not new for Iran. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic has often tried to use international meddling as a rallying call for a population that does not necessarily support its theocracy. The theme of the secular nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh who was removed in an American and British backed coup in 1953 is often mentioned by the regime. The revolution itself was largely made possible by over a century of British and then American and Soviet meddling and exploitation of Iran’s oil. By placing the Israeli attacks in the continuity of foreign interference, Iran hopes to elicit a nationalist response from its population while both denying and justifying its military impotence.

These steps exude desperation and are likely to fail. The Islamic Republic is too hated by its own people to create the needed “rally around the flag” effect. Also, distrust for the regime’s narratives such as that Iran is strong and can beat Israel is proven by the millions who fled Tehran after Israeli bombings and President Donald Trump called for their evacuation.

The regime’s messaging, like its defenses, is collapsing under pressure. For a government that has survived decades by projecting strength, the humiliating exposure of its vulnerabilities may prove fatal. Whether by bombs or by truth, the foundations of the Islamic Republic are beginning to crack.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

“Although we still don’t have a complete picture, it appears that the Israeli strikes have been highly successful. According to some Israeli intelligence assessments, they were even more effective than anticipated—especially since the initial wave of strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities, missile factories and platforms, as well as senior military and nuclear personnel. This would significantly constrain Iran’s ability to mount a major retaliatory response,” said Joseph Epstein, a Middle East analyst.

Epstein continued in his interview: “The scenes from the first Israeli strike on Iran reminded me of what happened with Hezbollah in Lebanon last year, when Jerusalem preemptively took out the top brass of Tehran’s most powerful regional ally. At the time, many expected Israel to face a furious response from Hezbollah that would cause unprecedented damage—but that didn’t happen. Israel had simultaneously destroyed major military and missile stockpiles, effectively neutralizing much of Hezbollah’s capacity for retaliation.”

He added, “We must remember that unlike the war in Gaza, which caught Israel’s military and security institutions by surprise, Israel has spent years preparing and planning for major operations against both Hezbollah and Iran. In the coming days, we’ll likely learn more about the extent of those preparations.”

Epstein concluded, “Still, Israeli officials quickly warned that Iran’s response could inflict serious damage. For now, Iran seems to be weighing two main options: continued salvos of ballistic and hypersonic missiles, or attempts to target Jewish and Israeli sites abroad. The key question in the hours and days ahead is whether the United States will intervene to defend Israel, as it has in the past.”

Read more on the Independent Arabic.

A major discovery of rare earth elements in central Kazakhstan earlier this year sent a jolt through global markets and policymaking circles, with early estimates suggesting it could place the country among the world’s top three holders of rare earth reserves. As the Trump administration scrambles to secure alternatives to China’s near-monopoly over these critical materials, used in modern technology such as smartphones, electric cars and computers, the spotlight is once again turning to a region long overlooked by Washington: the post-Soviet Turkic world.

These Turkic nations — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan — are unfamiliar to most Americans. Yet U.S. officials have long recognized the region’s value, measured in energy, strategic minerals, rare earth elements and alternative supply routes.

For many thorny reasons, Washington has failed to establish firm allies there. Diplomatic presence tells the story: while Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have visited Central Asia 14 and 83 times, respectively, since taking office, no U.S. president has visited any Turkic nation besides Turkey.

And now the U.S. has fallen behind.

Read the rest at The Hill.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.ar

Photo via SPA

By Emil Avdaliani and Joseph Epstein

The evolving relationship between the five Central Asian countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—has become an axis of its own in the shifting geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. Geopolitics push them closer, so do untapped trade, investment potential as well as evolving trade routes.

The engagement between the GCC and Central Asia reflects broader realignment in the global order – a shift toward multipolar system. Central Asian states, which have traditionally balanced ties with such powers as Russia, China, Turkey, and the West, now seek new partners, especially since traditional routes through Russia have become less reliable due to the Ukraine war.

The GCC outreach offers alternative avenues for influence and cooperation. For the Arab states, cooperation with Central Asia provides land access to new markets, strengthens ties in a Muslim-majority region bordering Iran, and entrenches their multi-vectoral foreign policy approach, which builds relations with other nations based on pragmatism and not ideology. As a result,  these growing ties are less about creating blocs and more about hedging relations between two regions with similar geopolitical situations and development goals. Summit meetings have emphasized sovereignty, non-interference, and shared objectives such as energy security and stable supply chains.

Economic diversification is key to these expanding ties. Gulf states seek to reduce dependence on oil, while Central Asia offers natural resources and a growing market. Investments align with national visions. Indeed, both Central Asian governments and the Gulf monarchies have embarked on ambitious long-term development strategies aimed at diversifying their economies beyond hydrocarbons and raw materials. Saudi Vision 2030, the UAE Vision 2031, Kuwait Vision 2035, and Oman Vision 2040 all emphasize investment in high-tech industries, renewable energy, tourism, and logistics.

Similarly, Central Asian states also tout their own grand strategic plans. Kazakhstan has “Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy,” Uzbekistan’s multi-sector development plans which envision economic growth, infrastructure and private sector participation. Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s visions for the next decade stress building manufacturing, agriculture, and modern infrastructure.

The alliance between the GCC and Central Asia is a natural fit.  As so-called “middle powers” – not a superpower but one with regional influence — both regions seek a balanced approach between large powers while maintaining their independence. While this has always been Central Asia’s strategy, the GCC has increasingly sought friendlier ties with global powers since its traditional closest ally, the United States, continues to signal that it wants to disengage from the Middle East

As a reflection of the growing alignment in 2023, the GCC and the Central Asian states launched their first summit, which was followed by a second meeting in 2024. A 2025 conference is due to be held later this year.

The summits also show how increasingly important the regions are to each other. But beyond trade and investments there is also a geopolitical hedging that drives the relations. Central Asia, wary of geopolitical dependence on Russia or China, sees the Gulf as a key partner for diversification of foreign policy. Similarly, the GCC balances relationships with Iran, the U.S., and China, and views Central Asia as part of a broader pivot toward Asia. This deepening partnership has not disrupted the existing alliances. Central Asia remains engaged with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is comprised of six post-Soviet states. While the GCC avoids hard power projection in the region, the trend signals a quiet realignment: Central Asia is moving beyond its post-Soviet dependency, and the Gulf is evolving into a diplomatic and investment hub. Both regions are navigating a multipolar world by building diversified, balanced partnerships—including with each other.

Bilateral relations also share a security component. Both regions align on the need to battle against threats from terrorism and extremism. GCC and Central Asian leaders have pledged to increase intelligence-sharing, training, and counterterrorism coordination. Discussions include regular defense meetings and joint responses to extremism and narcotics.

Both regions also aim to diversify trade routes and adjust to shifting connectivity in Eurasia. For example, the Trans Caspian International Trade Route (TCIT) or Middle Corridor, would connect Central Asia to Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea, avoiding chokepoints like the Suez Canal. The GCC could benefit from participating in the expansion of this route. The Gulf countries are also interested in Central Asia because of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which connects Russian ports on the Baltic and the Caspian seas to Iran and India. Though INSTC’s main branch goes through Azerbaijan, the eastern part of the corridor spans Central Asia. Russia also eyes the Gulf region as southermost point in INSTC’s reach.

Moreover, Central Asian leaders favored the idea of Gulf participation in new transport corridors that would shorten the route from the region to the Gulf through the proposed Trans-Afghan Railway, which would link Kabul with its neighboring countries Moreover, projects such the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway or the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan corridor, could likewise lead to opening of the new trade routes for Gulf exporters.

However, connectivity has still proven a major challenge. While the most obvious trade route geographically would cross through Iran or Afghanistan, the regimes in both countries prevent such a road from being reliable. Likewise, the INSTC’s reliance on transport through Russia would cause the region to depend on both Russia and Iran for expanding trade with the Gulf. One potential alternative could be the Middle Corridor. Goods could then travel through Georgia to Turkey and through Turkey to the Gulf via Iraq. Ankara has been a large proponent of the Iraq Development Road or Dry Canal, which would link Iraq’s southern gulf ports to Turkish ports in the Mediterranean and could handle

significant trade volumes.

Trade and Investment Links

Trade volumes – around $4 billion in 2024— remain modest by global standards, but both have been rising rapidly in recent years. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia rank among Central Asia’s largest Arab trading partners, importing local minerals, grain, and cotton, while exporting consumer goods, machinery, and fuel. Notably, Kazakh exports of grain and aluminum have found buyers in Gulf states. However there is still considerable untapped potential in trade and investments.

Connectivity issues have not prevented the increase of foreign direct investment. GCC FDI in Central Asia has approximately tripled over two years. Saudi Arabia’s energy company. ACWA Power and Abu Dhabi’s energy company Masdar and state investment firm Taqa are prominent examples. ACWA Power, known for its large-scale solar and wind plants, has signed multi-billion dollar deals in the region. In Uzbekistan, ACWA will build three utility-scale solar parks (totaling over 1.4 gigawatts) and battery storage systems. In May, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign investor Mubadala and the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) acquired an 875-megawatt combined-cycle gas-fired power plant in Uzbekistan.

Similarly, in Kazakhstan, ACWA partnered on a 1,000 MW wind and battery project valued at over $1.5 billion. Masdar will build 500 MW “Zarafshan” wind farm in Uzbekistan (the region’s largest), and is developing another 1 GW wind installation in the south of Kazakhstan. At the COP29 summit in late 2024, Masdar signed a $1.4 billion deal to build a wind farm in Kazakhstan’s Jambyl region.

Agriculture and food security have also become subjects of cooperation. The Gulf states import the vast majority of their food, and Central Asian want to turn into a major exporter of food and water to the GCC. For instance, Kazakhstan co-sponsored the international “One Water Summit” in Riyadh in 2024, reflecting a shared concern over water scarcity and a possibility for technology transfer (such as Saudi desert agriculture techniques) to Central Asian contexts. In this way, food and water security link the regions as complementary strands of the emerging partnership.

Central Asia’s fast-growing tech sectors are also drawing Gulf attention.

Uzbekistan has nurtured an IT export industry, and in 2025 Qatar’s state investment promotion agency signed a digital transformation pact with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Digital Technologies. This agreement, signed at a tech summit in Doha, aims to create joint projects, startup funding and skills programs in fields like AI, data centers, and cloud services. In December 2024, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan reached a bilateral partnership covering 5G, digital infrastructure, and tech entrepreneurship, encouraging Saudi tech firms to establish regional offices in Central Asia. These pacts reflect a broader trend of digital diplomacy: Central Asian countries see the Gulf markets as a new customer base and investor pool for their nascent IT industries, while Gulf states invest in digital skills and platforms that fit their diversification agendas.

Deepening Ties, Lingering Hurdles

The upcoming 2025 GCC summit in the Uzbekistan city of Samarkand and ongoing ministerial and business council meetings will be key in watching how expansive the relations between the two regions will become. Establishment of a free trade zone would mark a qualitatively new period

To be sure, growing challenges persist. Not all Central Asian countries are benefitting equally from recent changes —Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan lead in attracting Gulf deals, while others less so. Economic growth matters for the GCC. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are also most populous and therefore have bigger markets  attractive to investors. Also, geography slows down the pace of economic cooperation. The countries lying in between Central Asia and the Gulf – namely Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan – are difficult to traverse due to poor infrastructure, lack of security and coordination over border controls. And last but not least, though the Central Asian state are diversifying their foreign policy portfolios, Russia and China remain dominant powers in the region. This spans security and trade/investment aspects and should the GCC become more active in the region, the Arab countries may face stiffer resistance from the traditional great powers.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

President Trump has been harsh on the Middle East policies of former Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden. He has good reasons for that. The Obama-Biden era saw the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam, the empowerment of Iran, the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the deadly Oct. 7 terrorist attack in Israel and ensuing war in Gaza.

In contrast, Trump’s first term had brought stability to the region. Trump led efforts to destroy the Islamic State, repaired fractured relations with the Gulf States and Israel and restored deterrence to the region through shows of force.

Now, in Trump’s second term, he should make sure he doesn’t make the same mistakes as his predecessors, which could embolden Iran and political Islamist movements. Specifically, the president should avoid public conflicts with the government of Israel, take a strong stance against Iran and restore the deterrence that the Biden administration eroded.

To do this, he must take on the isolationist wing of his own administration.

Read the rest at The Hill.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Recently, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan signed U.N. resolutions calling Northern Cyprus occupied. The announcement was a major blow to Turkey and created a rift in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

Turkey is the only country that recognizes the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which it has controlled militarily since 1974. For years, Turkey has lobbied for international recognition for the TRNC and its efforts have been especially strong in the OTS – made up of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with Hungary, Turkmenistan and the TRNC as observers. These attempts for the most part have been futile and signify a larger pattern – that Turkey is not the leader of the Turkic world that it has sought to become.

While Turkey has enjoyed close economic and sometimes military cooperation with the Turkic world, a united Turkic union led by Ankara has remained a fantasy. Turkey has traditionally prioritized the Middle East and North Africa, other Turkic countries do not want to be a junior partner in a relationship with Turkey, and Turkey’s Islamist and pan-Turkist ideology has pushed away the secular post-Soviet states.

A missed opportunity?

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the newfound independence of five Turkic states – Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – Turkey expected to form a bloc based on ethnolinguistic ties capable of operating as a superpower.

With around 175 million combined inhabitants, a nominal GDP of about $1.9 trillion, and a growth rate two percent higher than the global average, the OTS has potential to become a serious global player.

To be sure, Turkey is the most powerful economic and military leader. It seemed most plausible that Ankara would become the leader of the Turkic world.

Turkish leaders realize the potential of such a union. Former-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel saidTurkey should lead the “Turkic-speaking world stretching from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic.” More recently, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated that the Turkic world would be “most powerful as six states, one nation.”

Over the years, Turkic leaders appeared to be interested in a united Turkic union. Former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev said, “200 million brothers live between the Altai [mountains] and the Mediterranean Sea. Should we unite, we will become a very effective global power.” Former Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev added, “if we don’t recreate the Turkic Khaganate, we should at least solidify Turkic unity.” Former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev famously positioned Azerbaijan as a major proponent of Turkic cooperation.

Ideological differences

What draws the Turkic nations besides Turkey together is not just a mutual ethnolinguistic identity. Rather, two factors play a larger role – a shared Soviet legacy, which has created somewhat similar cultures and government types and a close territorial proximity.

All post-Soviet Turkic nations are secular governments wary of mobilizing ideologies like Islamism and pan-Turkism. These countries spent about seven decades under Russian-imposed communism and view such popular ideological movements as a threat to their rule. They also try to balance between larger powers such as Russia and China so as not to become dependent on any one of them.

While the Turkic element is still important in the national identities of these republics, it fits more into a proprietary form of government-promoted nationalism than a one-size-fits-all ideology. This means that while government-promoted Kazakh values and identity will have similarities with government-promoted Uzbek values and identity, it is equally important to promote the differences.

Turkey, on the other hand, has tried to promote pan-Turkism and Islamism in the region. Under Erdogan, Ankara positions itself as a leader of the Islamic world and has spearheaded Islamist causes and has supported Islamist military and political groups such as Hamas, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the Oct. 7 massacre that sparked the Gaza war, Erdogan has led international efforts against Israel including pushing for the Turkic world to take a “decisive stance” against Jerusalem. These attempts were ignored by the member states. In fact, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan only increased cooperation with Jerusalem since the beginning of the war.

Additionally, Turkish foreign politics under Erdogan have been aggressive and isolating. Turkey has involved itself in conflicts and affairs in the Middle East, fraying ties with countries such as the gulf Arab nations, Israel and the United States. Moving towards the Middle East has coincided with a domestic push towards political Islam in civil life and the educational system.

Unlike the Turkish approach, other Turkic states seek to stay out of global conflicts and maintain positive or at least neutral relations with large powers. Also, for the rest of the Turkic world, Islamism is seen as a direct threat to not only their secular governments, but to national unity as well. The post-Soviet Turkic republics consider tolerance and the protection of religious minorities as necessary for societal cohesion and stability. During the first years of their independence, various Arab countries like Saudi Arabia tried to inspire an “Islamic awakening” in the region by funding Wahhabi madrassas and mosques, leading to issues with extremism that added to the local governments’ distrust of global Islamic influence. In Uzbekistan, for example, the first threat to the secular regime of President Islam Karimov were mass protestsled by the Salafist Adolat group followed by the enforcement of Sharia law in the city of Namangan in 1992. By the time Karimov cemented his power, he outlawed Adolat, reestablished control over Namangan and deported Saudi imams.

That is why separate understandings of both nationality and Islam are necessary for these republics. All the Turkic nations have hijab bans in schools. Turkic leaders like President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev have spoken out against what they see as foreign Islamic trends such as the hijab or all black dress for women. These leaders often distinguish between “our Islam” and Arab or other “foreign” versions of Islam.

While pan-Turkism is less dangerous to the region, it still views the ideology with skepticism.

One of the first failures of promoting pan-Turkism came with Uzbekistan. During its first years of independence, Uzbekistan under Karimov was searching to establish a national identity and path to replace communism and considered the Turkish model. However, Karimov quickly understood that Turkey did not seek equal partnership but rather to become a senior partner to Tashkent. Later, relations further deteriorated when Turkey harbored Uzbek opposition figures. It was only after Karimov’s death that Turkey and Uzbekistan mended relations and only in 2019 did Tashkent join the OTS.

Kazakhstan became skeptical of Turkish influence in the early 2000’s when it became clear that Ankara sought to lead the Turkic world. Wary of a “bigger brother” relationship following centuries of Russian domination, Astana decided against close relations with Turkey. Also, the “mutual historic ties” between Kazakhstan and Turkey are often overstated. As Kazakhstani political analyst Marat Shibutov said, “historical connections are minimal. A thousand years have passed since the Seljuks left and the region only reconnected with Turkey after the exile of the Meskhetian Turks under Stalin.”

“Kazakhstan is much less partial to pan-Turkism,” added regional expert Arkady Dubnov. “Nazarbayev played with the idea, but never pursued a true strengthening of ties.”

Of the Turkic states, Azerbaijan is the most embracing of Turkey, with relations between the two countries mutually described as, “one nation, two states.” However, even President Ilham Aliyev hascomplained in private about Turkey’s pro-Islamist policies saying that they were naïve and lost Turkey international support. Recently, Erdogan even sparked mass protests within the TRNC, which is completely reliant on Turkey for its survival– after authorities –allegedly at Ankara’s behalf— lifted a ban on Muslim headscarves in school.

Not a Turkish Priority

The problem is not only with Turkish policies but priorities.

Dating to Ottoman times, the Turks have always been more interested in the Arab world to the south, which they see as the cradle of Islam. Erdogan especially has positioned Turkey as more of a Muslim than a Turkic leader. To that end, influence in the Arab world is much more important.

However, even during the Ottoman times and the early years of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, pan-Turkism, or the uniting of the world’s Turkic nations was more of a weapon to use against Russia than a real political goal. Most of the Turkic world is geographically far from Turkey, which makes it less accessible than the Middle East or the Balkans.

Azerbaijan is the exception to the rule. Both nations share a mutually intelligible language and border. Also, Baku is crucial for energy exports from Central Asia as well as a bulwark to Iran. For Azerbaijan, its partnership with Turkey has allowed it to decrease its dependence on Russia while not falling into the role of “junior partner.”

Just as the Soviet legacy still affects most of the Turkic world, the Ottoman legacy still affects Turkey. While Ataturk built modern Turkey and heavily influenced it, he did not rid it of its past. That is why Turkish leaders like Erdogan may have seemingly conflicting approaches to issues like religion and nationalism and often look to the heart of the Muslim world – the Middle East.

But the Middle East comes with endless problems and Turkey has not been spared. Whether it is through military engagements, threats of terrorism, massive refugee influxes leading to intersocietal clashes, or unneeded conflicts – Turkey has sacrificed a lot to gain influence over Arabs that often resent it.

By contrast, expanding ties with the Turkic world does not carry the same risks and despite setbacks, Ankara does have a way forward. Turkey, with all its challenges, is often seen as a success story and point of pride in the Turkic world.

Still a player

Despite disagreements, Turkey is still an influential player in the region. Ankara maintains strong ties to the rest of the Turkic world through developing economic and military cooperation, especially with Azerbaijan and increasingly with Kyrgyzstan. Ankara also holds significant soft power influence through educational programs, economic partnerships and even popular soap operas.

Azerbaijan has positioned itself closely with Turkey, mainly due to its geographic proximity, shared identity and mutual political support. While Ankara has pressured Baku over ties with Israel, it has not tried to force Azerbaijan to stop its deepening economic, political and military ties with Jerusalem. It has also allowed for the export of Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani oil to reach Israel through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

Turkey has also supported Azerbaijan militarily in its conflict with Armenia as well as when Baku is periodically threatened by Iran. Besides joining Israel to supply Azerbaijan with key weapons that helped it secure the Armenian separatist territory of Karabakh, Turkey held joint large-scale military exercises with the Azerbaijani military on the Iranian border in response to large-scale Iranian military drills on the Azerbaijani border.

Turkey also supported Kyrgyzstan during its border conflicts with Tajikistan in 2021 and 2022, supplying training, drones, and technical support. This year, Turkey successfully mediated between Bishkek and Dushanbe, helping achieve a historic border demarcation deal in March. Recently, both Ankara and Bishkek agreed to mutually produce weapons for export.

While its strongest military partnerships are with Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, Turkey has also sold drones to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and even Turkmenistan. For the region, Ankara has become an important partner in modernizing their militaries.

Economically, Turkey is a major player in Central Asia but is still outpaced by China and Russia in terms of infrastructure and energy investments. It remains limited in its ability to offer the financial support or security guarantees that Russia or China can to the Turkic world beyond Azerbaijan.

The Road Ahead

It is no coincidence that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan decided on recognizing the occupation of Northern Cyprus right after an EU-Central Asia summit in Uzbekistan in which Brussels committed to investing $12 billion in the region. The move was an example of the region choosing its interests over Turkish-backed Turkic solidarity.

But Turkey has not lost the Turkic world— it has just failed to lead it on its own terms. The dream of a cohesive Turkic super-bloc under Turkish guidance has collided with geopolitical realities, diverging national identities and ideological mistrust. Central Asian republics do not reject Turkic cooperation outright; rather, they seek balanced, pragmatic engagement free of ideological pressure or hierarchy.

Ankara’s best chance at expanding influence lies not in rhetoric or revivalist ambitions, but in respecting the autonomy and unique trajectories of its fellow Turkic states. Deepening bilateral ties through trade, infrastructure, defense, and cultural diplomacy—as it has done with Azerbaijan and increasingly with Kyrgyzstan—offers a more sustainable path forward than grand visions of pan-Turkic unity.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

As political commentators speculate when Saudi Arabia will normalize ties with Israel, two other candidates have emerged as potential partners to the Abraham Accords: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Both countries currently enjoy diplomatic relations and cooperation with Israel, which makes them distinct from other Accords countries. However, joining the Accords would still yield tangible benefits for all countries: it would allow Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan access to a network based on promoting investments that bolster regional prosperity and tolerance while strengthening Israel and the United States’ role in the Turkic and broader Muslim world.

Although the Abraham Accords were initially agreements over Israeli-Arab normalization, these pacts have since transcended Arab borders into a high-profile forum that can incorporate Muslim countries committed to shared values of tolerance, peace, and prosperity.

For Azerbaijan, the Accords could provide a path to expanded security cooperation against Iranian threats and, if pursued in coordination with Kazakhstan, progress towards its goal of becoming a bridge to Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, the Accords could help the country reduce its economic dependence on Russia and China at a time when such dependence is proving to be a liability.

Read more at the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.