Turan Research Center

The war in Iran that began on February 28, 2026, has posed a range of political and economic challenges for the states of Central Asia. This analysis examines how these countries are navigating the crisis within the framework of their multi-vector foreign policies — and why Kazakhstan, in particular, has emerged as the region's most active diplomatic player.

Kazakhstan as a Potential Mediator

The states of Central Asia have long pursued multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to maintain broad cooperation with all major external actors. In times of international crisis, this approach typically produces either deliberately vague statements designed to appear friendly toward all parties, or silence altogether. The outbreak of the Iran war has been no exception — but Kazakhstan's response has stood out.

Astana officially called for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the conflict, consistent with its established practice. Yet the emphasis of its statements placed it closer to the main European positions emphasizing Iranian aggression towards the Gulf than to those of the Global South. While most Central Asian states issued maximally neutral formulations, and China-led countries directed criticism primarily at the United States and Israel without examining Tehran's own role in the escalation, Kazakhstan chose to foreground Iran's aggressive actions toward its Gulf neighbors.

This alignment reflects a clear strategic logic. In recent years, Kazakhstan has refrained from full participation in BRICS, the principal institutional platform of the Global South. In November 2025, Astana announced it would join the Abraham Accords, laying the groundwork for deeper economic cooperation with both the United States and Israel. At the inaugural summit of the Board of Peace on February 19, 2026, Kazakhstan agreed to participate in Gaza's reconstruction, undertook financial commitments, and expressed readiness to deploy peacekeepers. Astana’s position in the conflict with Iran suggests it is prioritizing preserving the special relationships it has begun to develop with the United States and Israel.

After Iran carried out strikes against neighboring countries, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent official messages of support and solidarity to the leaders of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He also held personal telephone conversations with the emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the president of the UAE Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and the king of Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. The United Arab Emirates, as the country most severely affected by the Iranian attacks, was offered humanitarian assistance.

These steps reflect diplomatic, religious, and economic considerations alike. Although Kazakhs are predominantly Sunni Muslims, Kazakhstan, as a secular state, generally avoids framing its foreign policy in religious terms. Nevertheless, expressions of solidarity with Sunni-majority Arab states may be politically less sensitive domestically than overt support for Iran, the leading Shiite power, particularly in moments of regional polarization. The economic rationale is equally clear: the Arab states of the Gulf rank among the largest investors in Kazakhstan's economy.

Given Astana's prior experience coordinating fundamentally divergent actors through the Syria peace process — in which Iran was a participant — and its simultaneously constructive relations with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and Jerusalem, Kazakhstan could emerge as an additional channel of international communication should Oman's mediation efforts falter. In this context, Tokayev's diplomatic activism also strengthens the case for a possible nomination to the position of UN Secretary-General, a prospect some local analysts consider credible given his experience, competencies, and knowledge of Russian, English, and Chinese.

One further nuance deserves attention. While Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed condolencesto Iran over civilian casualties, there was no separate presidential message of condolence following the death of Ali Khamenei — unlike the statements issued by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The omission was noted with dissatisfaction by the Iranian ambassador in Astana.

Responses Across the Region

Kyrgyzstan adhered to its customary approach of maximum distance from the conflict. Its Foreign Ministry issued a brief statement expressing concern, calling for restraint and a return to dialogue in accordance with the UN Charter. Bishkek remained officially silent on the death of Khamenei, although a pro-Iran rally is expected to take place.

The situation is more complex in the southern tier of Central Asia, where geographic proximity to Iran, higher levels of Islamic religiosity, and — in Tajikistan's case — cultural and linguistic affinity with Iran all complicate the diplomatic calculus. In the case of Dushanbe, rising Iranian influence in the country factors into the political calculus.

Uzbekistan expressed serious concern and called on all parties to exercise restraint. On March 3, the Uzbek foreign minister held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart and expressed condolences over civilian deaths. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent a condolence message following Khamenei's death, though it was carefully worded so as not to provoke tensions with Washington or Jerusalem. Already in the summer of 2025, during the Iran–Israel war, Tashkent had called on its population to exercise caution when commenting publicly on the conflict. Uzbek press coverage has accordingly been limited to factual reporting and the practical implications for Uzbek citizens in the Middle East.

Among Central Asian states, Tajikistan maintains the closest and most multi-layered ties with Iran, grounded incultural and linguistic kinship, Iranian investment, and a degree of political influence. President Emomali Rahmon was the first regional leader to send a telegram of condolence following Khamenei's death, describing the two nations as "brotherly." Yet Rahmon, like Mirziyoyev, refrained from any sharp words of condemnation directed at the United States or Israel.

Turkmenistan maintained its traditional posture of official neutrality, describing the escalation as "regrettable" and calling for diplomatic resolution. For Ashgabat, the conflict raises a specific security concern: the long Turkmen–Iranian border runs in close proximity to the capital and the strategically important Ahal region. As private discussions with representatives of the Turkmen Foreign Ministry suggest, this creates the potential for refugee flows and related challenges, including increased narcotics trafficking.

Challenges and Opportunities

Several common challenges have emerged for the region. The most pressing is the need to maintain foreign policy balance while resisting pressure to adopt the more confrontational stance toward the United States and Israel characteristic of much of the Global South. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan and is led by China, issued a statement emphasizing the need to ensure the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iran — a formulation that implicitly challenges the Western-led military operation.

A less openly discussed risk concerns the potential for terrorist attacks against American or Israeli targets in Central Asia. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has considerable experience conducting covert operations in the region and in neighboring Azerbaijan.

The economic challenges are also significant. The military operation that began on February 28 compounds an already deteriorating transit picture: just days earlier, the long-simmering conflict between Kabul and Islamabad had escalated into armed confrontation on February 21–22, effectively closing another southern route. Growing instability in Iran could also deepen Afghanistan's fragility, given the close economic interdependence between the two countries. Experts across the region also point to the risk of a significant influx of refugees from Iran and the broader Middle East. Kazakh military analyst Karlygash Nugmanova has warned that the conflict could expand geographically and affect Central Asia itself.

For Kazakhstan's authorities, the domestic dimension is particularly acute: a referendum on a new constitution has been scheduled for March 15, and securing a positive outcome is a political priority. President Tokayev has introduced an emergency planning framework to prepare for potential economic and socio-political repercussions from disruptions in global trade and energy markets. Security measures have been strengthened across the region at the law enforcement level.

Yet the situation also presents potential opportunities. The Kazakh economist Yerzhan Yessimkhanov notes that only ninety-six Kazakh citizens were in Iran when the war began — a reflection of how thoroughly previous efforts at bilateral economic cooperation had stalled under the current Iranian system. A change in Tehran's political regime could open the way for expanded cooperation in agriculture, transit, and construction. Almas Chukin, another Kazakh economist, argues that the subsequent lifting of Western sanctions could create new transit and transportation opportunities for all Central Asian nations. Rising oil prices may benefit Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, though for the region's oil-importing states, higher energy costs pose risks to the relatively stable economic growth of recent years.

Underlying these calculations is a broader premise. As Kazakhstan's ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov, has noted, Central Asian states are interested in a stable and predictable Iran. The Islamic Republic's nearly five decades of revolutionary governance, marked by cycles of confrontation, sanctions, and regional destabilization, have consistently frustrated that aspiration — which is precisely why the prospect of regime change, however uncertain, holds a strategic appeal for the region that extends well beyond economics.

Conclusion: Multi-Vector Diplomacy Under Stress

Despite pressure from the Global South, the political elites of Central Asia have largely maintained neutrality and shown little willingness to offer meaningful support to Iran. At most, Tehran can expect symbolic gestures — references to a "brotherly people," in the style of Emomali Rahmon.

The war has generated significant risks for the region, from the disruption of cargo transit routes — compounded by simultaneous crises in Iran and Afghanistan — to the possibility that the IRGC may seek to exploit pro-Iranian sentiment among certain segments of the population to conduct operations, including potential attacks against American or Israeli interests.

Kazakhstan has distinguished itself through its diplomatic activism, with Tokayev placing particular emphasis on solidarity with the Arab states of the Gulf. This positions Astana as a potential alternative negotiating channel should Oman lose its mediating role. At the same time, Kazakhstan's leadership has sent clear signals that — while maintaining its characteristic foreign policy balance — it intends to preserve the special political and economic relationships it has cultivated with the administration of Donald Trump and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center specializing in international relations and security in Eurasia. He is also a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and has held academic appointments at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Eurasian National University in Astana, and Narxoz University in Almaty. During the war on terror in Afghanistan, he directed the Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and served on the Russian–American Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan under the East–West Institute. He is the author of over 100 publications, including 25 peer-reviewed articles indexed in Scopus, and his expert analysis has been cited by major international media including The Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Washington Post, BBC, and Deutsche Welle.