Turan Research Center

The role of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan has once again sparked diplomatic tensions, prompting familiar reassurances from both Kyrgyz and Kazakh leaders.

Russian officials remain highly attentive to language policies in former Soviet republics, frequently voicing concerns over any perceived threats to the status of Russian. Most recently, Moscow has directed particular scrutiny toward developments in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Allegations of discrimination against Russian speakers have long been a sore point for the Kremlin. Such claims were among the justifications cited for the occupation of eastern Ukraine in 2014—and again for the full-scale invasion launched in February 2022.

A Renewed Push for Kyrgyz Language

In the most recent flareup over language, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed amendments in June requiring fluency in the Kyrgyz language for key government officials including: parliamentary deputies, ministers, judges, and National Bank employees.

The new legislation also includes mandates that at least 60 percent of all television and radio broadcasts be in Kyrgyz.

With Kyrgyzstan preparing to celebrate 34 years of independence from the Soviet Union on August 31, such decisions may appear long overdue. But these statutes are building on a previous law passed in 2023, which made Kyrgyz mandatory across government institutions, court proceedings, geographic names and educational materials. 

Not surprisingly, the day after that 2023 legislation passed, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Moscow had “repeatedly” raised the issue with Kyrgyz officials, warning that such laws could “undesirably affect” the rights of the non-titular population, including “our [Russian] compatriots.”

Now, the same concern hangs over the June amendments.

Less than a week after Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed the new language mandates, President Sadyr Japarov flew to Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

Upon returning to Bishkek, Japarov told the Kyrgyz state news agency Kabar that, “We need the Russian language.

Colonial Sensitivity 

According to Russian state news agency TASS, at the July 2 meeting with Japarov, Putin said, “the fact that the Russian language has a special status in Kyrgyzstan… allows us to work more efficiently in a number of other areas, including the economy.”

Putin linking Russian language in Kyrgyzstan with economic cooperation seems like a thinly-veiled message to Japarov.

Russia is Kyrgyzstan’s second largest trade partner after China and in 2024, Kyrgyz-Russian trade turnover accounted for more than $3 billion. Bishkek's economy is also dependent upon Russia for key imports. Up to 90 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s petroleum products come from Russia, and in 2014, Russian state energy giant Gazprom purchased 100 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s natural gas company which it continues to own and operate.

Russian nationalism is growing since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Several Russian officials, including President Putin, have spoken in the last three years about “historic” Russian lands, which according to Putin, includes the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Kremlin views perceived insults to, or diminishment of, Russian language use in areas that were part of the Tsarist Empire, later the Soviet Union, as a loss of influence, a sign of the ending of the Russian empire.

Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian officials made it clear to Kyrgyzstan that in the presence of the former colonial master’s officials, only one language is to be spoken.

On October 23, 2020, then-Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Ruslan Kazakhbayev was in Moscow and met with Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Kyrgyz media was present at two foreign ministers’ joint press conference and when a Kyrgyz journalist asked Kazakbayev questions in Kyrgyz, Lavrov grew impatient and finally said, “Excuse me, you still have to respect the host, OK?”

Support Continues for Russian

For more than 30 years, Kyrgyz authorities have consistently reassured Moscow about their commitment to preserving the role of Russian. Nonetheless, each time new policies elevate the status of the Kyrgyz language, Russian officials react fearfully. And each time, Kyrgyz leaders routinely offer guarantees that Russian’s status is not at risk. In fact, Russian remains the second-most prominent language in the country, officially recognized and widely used. It enjoys a status second only to Kyrgyz. In 1995, then-President Askar Akayev proposed making Russian a state language alongside Kyrgyz. That proposal faced local pushback. In 1996, parliament moved to give Russian “official,” but not” state” status and later that year, Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Court approved a parliamentary initiative to designate Russian as an official language.

Akayev consistently called for Russian to be granted state language status. Yet his efforts were met with resistance from segments of the population who believed Kyrgyz should take precedence as the national language. That sentiment still resonates 30 years later.

Despite his support for Russian, Akayev also sought to strengthen the role of Kyrgyz. In 1998, he signed a decree aimed at increasing its official usage across public institutions.

However, in 2000, Akayev changed course, formally proposing to grant official status to Russian. The Kyrgyz parliament swiftly passed the measure, and Akayev signed it into law.

Since Akayev, Kyrgyzstan has had six successive presidents -- each of whom has affirmed the importance of Russian, particularly among the nation’s diverse population, which includes more than 80 ethnic groups who use Russian as a lingua franca.

At the same time, each leader has also stressed the need to promote and expand the use of Kyrgyz.

In Kazakhstan – where Russian holds official language status -- authorities have consistently dismissed accusations of discriminatory practices against Russian, similar to the defenses made by Kyrgyz officials.

In fact, Russian is widely spoken in Kazakhstan, even though ethnic Russians, make up only 14.6 percent of the population, especially since minority populations that make up an additional 15 percent of the population, like in Kyrgyzstan, often do not speak Kazakh. In its attempts to promote Kazakh, Astana has endured the same sorts of criticism as Bishkek, perhaps to even a greater degree in the first decade after independence when the ethnic Russian population of Kazakhstan was larger.

In Kyrgyzstan, the picture is slightly different. As of early 2025, the population stood at 7.3 million. According to the 2022 data from Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee, there were 335,237 ethnic Russians living in the country. For comparison, the ethnic Uzbek community is roughly three times larger, yet the Uzbek language does not enjoy any special status.

Although Kazakhstan speaks the most Russian, according to one report from 2017, “the use of Russian [as a first language] has retreated fastest in Kazakhstan, where in 2016 just 20.7 percent of people said they typically spoke Russian at home, compared with 33.7 percent in 1994.” While Kazakh authorities have offered assurances that the Russian language is respected and necessary, Russian officials and pundits often complain that Astana discriminates against it. Russian television news presenter Tina Kandelaki summed up Moscow’s concerns after Kazakhstan changed the names of two railway stations into Kazakh in January 2024. Kandelaki wrote on her Telegram channel that Russian was “slowly but surely being pushed out on the state level.” She warned that like with the Baltic nations, such tendencies could snowball into the “closing of Russian schools, the removal of Soviet statues, banning of the Russian language and, finally, [Russian] retirees will be thrown out into the cold.”

Kandelaki was referring to Moscow’s worst nightmare – the Latvia scenario. Not only did Riga strip the Russian language of any official status but insists that all its citizens must demonstrate proficiency in the Latvian language. Russian permanent residents who fail to pass required language exams have even been deported to Russia.

For Moscow, the Russian language is not merely a matter of ethnic minority rights—it is a key instrument of soft power. It not only connects Russian-speaking populations across these countries but also facilitates the spread of Russian-language media and pop culture. More importantly, it symbolizes these countries' inclusion in Russia’s sphere of influence, a status that Moscow is both sensitive to and eager to protect. For Russia, each move toward a distinct national identity represents a departure from the shared Russian-Soviet legacy.

But this process may be unavoidable. Russian language proficiency has been steadily declining across Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Precise data on how many people in the region can speak Russian at a basic or higher level is hard to obtain. Many individuals over the age of 45 grew up using Russian as their primary language, and millions of younger people have acquired varying degrees of fluency through migrant work in Russia over the past 25 years. Nevertheless, the overall trend is clear: fewer individuals from non-Russian ethnic groups in Central Asia speak Russian today. Despite this, Russian often still serves as a lingua franca among different ethnic minority communities, as well as in interactions between these groups and the titular nationalities.

In Central Asia, only Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan grant the Russian language special status. Interestingly, the Kremlin has shown little concern over Russian's diminished standing in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Still, the growing preference for English over Russian can occasionally provoke irritation among Russian officials. In April, for example, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed discontent after seeing a World War II memorial in Uzbekistan that featured inscriptions in Uzbek and English—but not in Russian. The overall lack of formal protest may be tied to demographics: ethnic Russians make up just 0.5 percent of the population in Tajikistan, around 2 percent in Turkmenistan, and less than 2 percent in Uzbekistan.

Back in Kyrgyzstan, Russian television channels have remained widely accessible since the country gained independence in 1991.

The Russian language is spoken throughout Kyrgyzstan and remains a significant medium of communication in education, media and daily life.

 Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, reinforcing close strategic and economic ties with Russia. Additionally, Russia maintains a military base in Kyrgyzstan, further reflecting the depth of bilateral cooperation between the two nations.

Despite close ties, Kyrgyz authorities are still unable to promote the Kyrgyz language without provoking a sense of threat from Russia. As a result, Bishkek is often compelled to offer reassurances to Moscow.

The enduring need for such assurances reflects the delicate balancing act Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet republics must maintain -- between reviving its national identify through its own language and navigating geopolitical sensitivities surrounding the Russian language.

Bruce Pannier is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. Before joining the TRC, he was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.