The recent visit to Kazakhstan by the Taliban’s industry and commerce minister is yet another example of Afghanistan’s growing ties with its Central Asian neighbors. This pragmatic engagement is a far cry from the Taliban’s first try at government when the five Central Asian states sealed off their borders with their southern neighbor. At that time, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan even aided ethnic Tajik and Uzbek groups in fighting the Islamic militants in northern Afghanistan. In response, the Taliban provided safe havens for militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a group determined to overthrow the Uzbek government by staging incursions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000.
It was no surprise that Central Asian governments were relieved after the U.S ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. But when foreign forces began a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban started reclaiming villages and districts throughout Afghanistan, Central Asian governments contemplated a different policy toward the militant Islamic group that they had once scorned.
Back In Power
When the Taliban seized Kabul on August 15, 2021, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were quickly aware that the Ashraf Ghani government had fallen. Military aircrafts from the Western-backed Afghan government began flying across their borders seeking to land in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan early that day.
Uzbekistan’s foreign ministry quickly announced that the Uzbek Embassy in Kabul and consulate in the Afghan northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif would remain open in spite of the change of government. Other Central Asian states, excluding Tajikistan, soon followed suit.
Today, Taliban diplomats occupy embassies in every Central Asian country except for Tajikistan, where representatives of the ousted government of Ashraf Ghani continue to work.
Another hint of a regional policy change has been the disappearance of the word “Taliban” from official statements and state media. Visiting Taliban officials are now described as representatives of the “acting” or “current” government of Afghanistan. Uzbek media refers to the chief diplomat at the Afghan embassy as “ambassador,” while the Taliban envoy in Kazakhstan is referred to as the Chargé d’Affaires.
It’s a stark contrast to 1996 when the Taliban first marched into Kabul. At that time, the five Central Asian governments — except for Turkmenistan — arranged a summit in Kazakhstan with Russia to discuss the Taliban threat and coordinate security measures.
They knew little about the Taliban except that they practiced a strict orthodox form of Islam, which was often brutal. The Central Asian states had existed for only five years in the new post-Soviet era and its leaders had grown up in atheist Soviet Union. They were frightened by militants on their doorstep waging war and rallying the masses under the banner of fundamentalist Islam.
The New Relationship
Twenty nine years later, it’s a significantly different story.
Using their security forces to monitor activity at mosques and in communities, and with state-approved imams giving state-approved sermons, Central Asian governments now have greater control over the practice of Islam in their countries than at any time before. Their leaders are now confident that the vast majority of their residents reject the Taliban’s stern interpretation of Islam.
Also, during the 20 years the Taliban were out of power, ties between Central Asia and Afghanistan had been transformed.
Border crossings with Afghanistan have been established with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. A railway line from the Uzbek port city of Termez had been extended to Mazar-i-Sharif in 2011. In 2016, the first Chinese cargo train arrived at the Afghan city of Hairaton after traveling through Central Asia. Two other railway lines connected Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.
Moreover, new power transmission lines are sending electricity from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Currently, those three Central Asian countries account for nearly 80% of Afghanistan’s electricity imports.
Even Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who publicly views the Taliban as a destabilizing force in the region, hasn’t stopped electricity exports.
And although, like the rest of the world, Central Asian governments have not officially recognized the Taliban governmentthey makes no secret about wanting economic ties.
In 2021, Nodirbek Jalilov, director of Uzbekistan’s Termez Cargo Center, said his international free trade center — located just one mile from the Afghan border — is anxious to resume trade with Afghanistan. Talks between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan about extending the railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and Peshawar have resumed after the Taliban seized control. The Trans-Afghan railway project would give Uzbekistan a route to Pakistan’s ports on the Arabian Sea, and open potential trade not only with the Middle East, East Africa, and India, but Central Asia, Russia and China. Kazakhstan has also expressed interest in joining the Trans-Afghan railway and is partnering with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in a project to extend a railway line from Turkmenistan to Torghundi, Afghanistan. That proposed route would link to Herat, Kandahar, and Spin Boldak, on the Pakistani border.
Further, Turkmenistan still plans to build the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline to ship Turkmen gas to those three countries. The project dates back to the mid-1990s but has been delayed, mostly due to security concerns caused by decades of fighting in Afghanistan.
Today, business forums including Afghanistan have become annual events.
In 2023, Kazakhstan hosted a Kazakh-Afghan business forum in Astana. The next year, a Turkmen-Afghan business forum in Ashgabat was followed by an Uzbek-Afghan business forum in Kabul and an Uzbek-Afghanforum in Tashkent.
Trading houses – business that facilitates transactions between countries — are also on the rise. Turkmenistan has had a trading house in Mazar-i-Sharif since 2017. Kazakhstan opened a trading house in Herat in 2024, and plans to open another in Kabul. Uzbekistan recently opened a trading house in Mazar-i-Sharif. These forums and trading houses have emerged at a time when the Taliban government is offering investment opportunities in mining critical raw materials, oil and gas. Several delegations from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have visited Afghanistan in recent months to discuss such projects.
Afghanistan is also becoming an important market for Central Asian exports. Kazakhstan is Afghanistan’s leading supplier of wheat, grain, and flour. In 2022, Kazakh-Afghan trade amounted to nearly $1 billion, of which some 90 percent was exports to Kazakhstan — a disparity in trade balance common in Central Asian states’ trade with Afghanistan. Uzbek-Afghan trade for 2024 totaled $1.1 billion, more than $1 billion of which was Uzbek exports. Central Asia’s exports typically amount for 80-90 percent of their trade with Afghanistan with the latter mainly exporting a small number of agricultural products to the region.
With help from international aid from sources such as the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the Taliban government – whose entire GDP was just $17 billion in 2023 — can pay for some imports, including electricity. In 2021, Afghanistan owed a combined $51 million to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran for electricity imports. The next year, the Taliban owed Uzbekistan and Tajikistan more than $100 million for electricity. But by 2024, Afghanistan’s state power company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, announced it had paid off nearly all of its debt to its electricity suppliers, noting Afghanistan’s remaining debt to Uzbekistan, which supplies about 60 percent of Afghanistan’s electricity imports, was down to $1.2 million.
One Region
Central Asia and Afghanistan are more closely connected now than they have ever been. The brutality the Taliban uses to enforce their rule is repugnant to many, but it has led to Afghanistan becoming a more stable nation.
The governments of Central Asia and the Taliban are not friends. But they have an understanding that economic cooperation can yield benefits to all parties. Even the most critical of the five Central Asian nations — Tajikistan — has recently entered into a dialogue for further trade deals, after seeing its neighbors benefit from such ties.
The Taliban is well aware that they cannot afford to ignore regional integration. As long as a stable Afghanistan can open up new lucrative trade routes, it seems Central Asia ‘s relationship with the Taliban can only grow.
Bruce Pannier is a longtime journalist and was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.
Themes: Central Asia,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan,Kazakhstan,Taliban,Afghanistan