Turan Research Center

Winter has barely begun, yet alarm bells are already sounding across Central Asia. From the arid plains of Turkmenistan to the mountainous headwaters of Kyrgyzstan, water levels in critical reservoirs have dropped to worrying lows — portending what could be another devastating drought year for a region still recovering from three consecutive years of water scarcity.

The signs are ominous. In Turkmenistan's western Balkan Province, the Myammetkyol and Delili reservoirs stand nearly empty, their feeder river — the Etrek — completely dry by late November. Further east, the Tejen River has ceased flowing into Turkmenistan altogether, its last significant rainfall recorded in March 2025. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan's energy minister informed parliament in late December that water flowing into the country's hydropower facilities had declined by 35 percent compared to the previous year. The country's chief mufti, responding to the crisis, called for special prayers for rain at Friday services nationwide.

Perhaps most concerning are conditions upstream. Kyrgyzstan's massive Toktogul reservoir — which holds water equivalent to around the annual flow of the Colorado River  — now contains 2 billion cubic meters lessthan it did a year ago. In neighboring Tajikistan, the Nurek reservoir has reached such critically low levels that authorities issued an unusual public appeal in November urging citizens to drastically reduce electricity consumption, in some cases limiting power to just two to four hours daily outside the capital.

The Downstream-Upstream Paradox

Central Asia's water geography creates an inherent tension that has shaped the region's geopolitics for decades. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers — lifelines for nearly 80 million people — originate in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before flowing through the agricultural heartlands of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. This upstream-downstream dynamic means that water management decisions made in Bishkek or Dushanbe directly affect crop yields in Tashkent and Ashgabat.

The arrangement worked reasonably well during the Soviet era, when centralized planning coordinated water releases with energy transfers. But the system has frayed in the three decades since independence. Upstream nations, desperate for winter electricity, must balance their need to run hydropower turbines against downstream countries' requirements for spring and summer irrigation. The competing demands have intensified as climate change shrinks the overall water supply while populations continue to grow.

Kazakhstan has emerged as a crucial mediator in this delicate balance. As one of the world's top ten grain exporters, the country relies heavily on irrigation in its southern regions, yet it also supplies electricity to Kyrgyzstan during winter months — allowing its neighbor to conserve reservoir water. Last year, Kazakhstan exported four million tons of grain to its Central Asian neighbors, underscoring the region's food security interdependence.

But even this cooperation has limits. Kazakh Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Nurzhan Nurzhigitov reported in mid-January that southern Kazakhstan's reservoirs held 1.9 billion cubic meters less water than a year earlier — a shortage compounded by the fact that upstream reservoirs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were themselves 3.2 billion cubic meters below normal levels.

Climate Change Tightens the Vise

The immediate crisis unfolds against a longer-term climatic shift that makes each drought more difficult to weather. Annual precipitation across Central Asia has declined measurably over the past two decades, while summers have grown longer and hotter. Research from Kyrgyzstan's National Academy of Sciences found that winter duration in the northern Chuy Valley has shrunk from 95 days in the early 1990s to just 71 days today, while summers have expanded from 145 to 154 days.

These changes carry profound implications for a region where irrigation sustains 80 percent of agricultural land — rising to nearly 100 percent in Turkmenistan and 95 percent in Uzbekistan. Without water, the equation is brutally simple: crops fail, livestock perish, and food security collapses. The droughts of 2021, 2022, and 2023 offered a preview, with police in some areas deployed to guard irrigation canals at night against farmers desperate to redirect water to their parched fields.

The energy sector faces equally severe pressures. Hydropower generates some 80-90 percent of domestic electricity in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, making these countries extraordinarily vulnerable to declining reservoir levels. Kyrgyzstan declared a state of emergency in its energy sector in August 2023, originally scheduled to end this December 2026 but now extended until 2028. The government has imposed strict electricity rationing, ordering state facilities to shut off power from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. and enforcing a 10 p.m. closure for nightclubs and restaurants.

In Tajikistan, residents outside Dushanbe were receiving electricity only from 5:30 to 8:00 a.m. and 5:30 to 10:00 p.m. as of late September — restrictions that have since tightened further in some areas. When the Nurek HPP, which supplies 70 percent of the country's domestically produced electricity, approaches its "dead zone" — the minimum level needed to operate turbines — the entire national grid faces potential collapse.

Inadequate Infrastructure Meets Uncertain Future

Central Asian governments have responded to repeated water crises with ambitious infrastructure plans, though whether these measures can keep pace with the challenge remains uncertain. Kazakhstan has prioritized water management since 2024, announcing plans to construct 57 new reservoirs by 2030 and signing an agreement with the Islamic Development Bank to build 11 strategically positioned reservoirs while rehabilitating more than 2,100 miles of irrigation networks.

Uzbekistan has focused on reducing losses from its deteriorating canal system. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev acknowledged in late 2024 that the country wastes approximately 13 billion cubic meters of water annually through leaky, dilapidated irrigation infrastructure. The government committed to relining 350 miles of major canals with concrete and allocated $62.5 million for repairs to more than 58,000 miles of smaller irrigation channels during 2025.

Yet these improvements, while necessary, may prove insufficient against the magnitude of the emerging crisis. The heavy rains and flooding of spring 2024 temporarily eased concerns by refilling reservoirs, but that respite now appears to have been merely a brief interlude rather than a turning point.

The Afghan Factor

Looming on the horizon is a complication that could fundamentally alter the region's water equation: Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal. Scheduled for completion in 2028, the 175-mile canal will divert up to 20 percent of the Amu Darya's flow to irrigate 500,000 hectares of farmland in northern Afghanistan. For decades, Afghanistan has not utilized its share of the river's water, but that era is ending.

The canal's completion will leave downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with significantly reduced water supplies just as climate change intensifies scarcity. Afghanistan's decision to exercise its water rights — entirely legitimate under international law — nevertheless threatens to push an already stressed system past its breaking point.

Testing Regional Cooperation

The Central Asian republics have strengthened their coordination on water management over the past three years, moving beyond the acrimony that characterized much of the post-Soviet period. Regular ministerial meetings now address allocation disputes before they escalate, and the countries have begun sharing more transparent data on reservoir levels and release schedules.

This cooperation faces its sternest test in 2026. If precipitation remains below normal through the spring planting season, the region will likely experience widespread crop failures and livestock deaths. Local populations, watching their livelihoods disappear, will demand answers about who is consuming water and in what quantities. The temptation to prioritize national interests over regional cooperation could prove irresistible, particularly as elections approach or domestic pressures mount.

The crisis also underscores the limits of bilateral or even regional solutions to problems that are fundamentally global in nature. Central Asia's water crisis stems primarily from climate change driven by greenhouse gas emissions that the region played minimal role in producing. Yet the consequences fall disproportionately on countries with limited resources to adapt.

A Preview of What's to Come

The situation across Iran's border offers a sobering glimpse of potential futures. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned in early November that Tehran might need to be evacuated if rains don't arrive soon — a staggering prospect for a capital of nine million people. The same water stress afflicting Iran is evident in Turkmenistan's Balkan Province, where rivers that flow from Iranian mountains have run dry.

Even if normal precipitation resumes in the coming weeks, reservoirs will likely remain below historical averages as the critical spring planting season begins. And if drought conditions persist, Central Asia could face its fourth major water crisis in six years — a frequency that suggests the region has entered a new climatic normal rather than enduring a temporary aberration.

For policymakers in Washington, Brussels, Beijing, and other capitals, Central Asia's water crisis carries implications beyond the region's borders. Water scarcity contributes to economic stagnation, political instability, and migration pressures that ripple outward. The crisis also offers a test case for how neighboring nations can cooperate — or fail to cooperate — in managing shared resources under increasing environmental stress.

The coming months will reveal whether the collaborative mechanisms Central Asian governments have built prove adequate to the challenge, or whether scarcity will revert these nations to zero-sum competition over their most precious resource. The answer will resonate far beyond the river valleys of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center. Before joining the TRC, he was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.