The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) has a new, permanent home. In early July, the organization inaugurated its headquarters in the capital, Astana, with Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev presiding over the ceremony.
In a region crowded with regional blocs, it’s challenging for any organization to stand out, especially one as broad and inclusive as CICA. Yet the organization continues to promote dialogue through small-scale initiatives among its diverse members.
For Kazakhstan, hosting CICA reflects the country’s multi-vector foreign policy aimed at strengthening and enhancing its international image, cultivating global partnerships, and positioning itself as a regional champion of peace and dialogue.
Kazakhstan and CICA: Joined at the Hip
The deep links between Kazakhstan and CICA are no coincidence. The organization’s secretary general, Ambassador Kairat Sarybay, is Kazakhstani, and its roots are firmly planted in Kazakhstani soil. The organization’s key milestones all trace back to Kazakhstan:
· In 1992, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev first proposed the initiative.
· The 1999 ministerial meeting and the adoption of CICA’s guiding principles was signed in Almaty.
· The Almaty Act, which serves as CICA’s charter, was signed in 2002.
· The statute establishing the CICA Secretariat was signed in 2006, again in Almaty. In other words, the birth and growth of the organization are deeply linked to the Kazakhstani government.
Generally speaking, Astana’s commitment to CICA has remained steady, even after the transition from Nazarbayev to Tokayev. Back in 2008, during the third meeting of the CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs -- an event that celebrated the membership of Jordan and the UAE -- then-president Nazarbayev described CICA as an “effective instrument for maintenance of safety and cooperation in Asia,” emphasizing its role in advancing “practical mechanisms of collective diplomacy.”
That vision has endured. Under Tokayev, Kazakhstan has continued to support the organization as exemplified by its new Astana headquarters. “Today, when geopolitical tensions are intensifying, the principles of trust, mutual understanding, and dialogue are becoming particularly relevant,” Tokayev said at the recent inauguration ceremony.
Why is Astana Invested in CICA?
Kazakhstan’s support for CICA is deeply rooted in its post-independence history. Since gaining sovereignty in the early 1990s, the country has faced the complex task of securing its vast territory -- bordering major powers like Russia and China, with the 4,254-mile Kazakhstan-Russian border ranking as the second-longest in the world after the Canada-U.S. border.
During the early post-independence years, Kazakhstan navigated a series of high-stakes geopolitical challenges. There was the long-standing dispute over the Caspian Sea among the five coastal states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Each nation sought sovereignty over its resources. The impasse was resolved in 2018 with the signing of the Aktau Convention, in which, for example, the parties established the breadth of their territorial waters. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan gave up its vast nuclear arsenal from the Soviet Union, working closely with the United States on Project Sapphire, a covert operation to remove weapons-grade nuclear material.
In the 1990s, as a newly independent nation, Kazakhstan faced the urgent task of defining its borders, securing its territorial integrity, and establishing diplomatic legitimacy. Rather than pursue rapid militarization or risk armed clashes with its neighbors, Astana chose the route of peace and diplomacy to reduce the risk of conflict. In this context, Kazakhstan’s support for CICA was strategic in the country’s early years to promote regional stability, cultivate partnerships, and reinforce its commitment to peaceful coexistence. For Kazakhstan, CICA was more than a foreign policy initiative – it was a cornerstone of its early statecraft.
Multi-Vector Foreign Policy and CICA
Since gaining independence in the early 1990s, Kazakhstan has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy -- a strategic framework designed to develop partnerships with governments across the globe. Rather than aligning with any single bloc orglobal power or taking sides during international conflicts, Astana has consistently positioned itself as a neutral actor, committed to diplomacy that supports negotiations and dialogue over conflict.
This approach has served Kazakhstan well. The strategy has enabled the country to maintain constructive ties with major powers, including Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union, while avoiding entanglements in geopolitical rivalries. In 2013, Almaty hosted a round of negotiations between Iran and several global powers over its controversial nuclear program.
Kazakhstan has also launched and hosted the Astana Peace Process, aimed at finding a solution to the conflict in Syria. These initiatives have helped Kazakhstan become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council during the 2017-2018 term, the only Central Asian country to achieve this honor. Astana has also remained neutral during the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, barring its citizens from fighting in the conflict.
CICA’s mission in Asia aligns closely with Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy, which emphasizes dialogue and cooperation. At the recent inauguration of CICA’s new headquarters in Astana, President Tokayev invoked the “country’s rich legacy,” highlighting “the enduring values of ‘Steppe diplomacy’ — respect, mutual understanding, and peaceful coexistence.” These values, he noted, are deeply embedded in CICA’s ethos -- an agency built on “inclusive approach, rooted in cooperation, dialogue, and mutual understanding.” (As far as the author’s research shows, the term Steppe diplomacy has not been codified into a set of strategies and objectives but more an attitude some Central Asian states, the term was loosely used to discuss Mongolia-Central Asia relations, for example).
Moreover, a comparison can be made between CICA and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), commonly known as the Middle Corridor. This strategic transportation project facilitates the movement of goods -- particularly energy -- from Central Asia, specifically Kazakhstan, through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, ultimately reaching European markets. While China is now connected to the Corridor, TITR remains distinct from Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Most importantly, the Middle Corridor has gained popularity since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, as it offers a viable alternative to trade routes that pass through Russian territory en route to Europe. The TITR has become a critical artery for Eurasian commerce – and like CICA – it is also headquartered in Astana.
Kazakhstan’s role as host and leading role in two major regional initiatives – CICA and TITR – has certainly elevated Astana’s global profile. CICA itself notes that its brand-new headquarters reflects “Astana’s deep commitment to global and regional peace and security and its vision for strengthening the institutional foundations of multilateral diplomacy in Asia.”
Standing Out in a Crowded Field
CICA’s scale is striking. If one combines the landmass and populations of its 28 member states, the organization covers “nearly 90 percent of Asia and represents over half of the world’s population.” Its membership stretches across Eurasia – from Russia and China to Vietnam and Thailand and the Central Asian republics. It also includes Israel and Jordan, and even reaches into Africa, with Egypt as a member.
This diversity of membership is both a strength and a challenge. On one hand, CICA’s broad membership is a testament to Kazakhstan’s ability to convene disparate actors. On the other hand, it is difficult for any organization with so many member states across different regions to agree to work together. The organization includes states with long-standing rivalries from Iran and Israel to India and Pakistan, and more recently Cambodia and Thailand.
Another challenge for CICA is the crowded landscape of regional blocs across Eurasia. These include the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). All have overlapping memberships, creating a complex web of allegiances and agendas.
Curiously, there is no Central Asian Union that encompasses all five regional states. Even CICA, with its broad membership, does not fully represent the region -- Turkmenistan has yet to join the bloc.
Moreover, these organizations are often driven by dominant member states that use them as instruments of foreign policy to expand their influence. Moscow, for example, has utilized the EAEU to strengthen its ties with the “Near Abroad” states (namely, states that were former members of the Soviet Union and border or are geographically close to the Russian Federation). Similarly, Turkey champions the OTS as a vehicle for expanding its relations with other Turkic-speaking states. CICA, on the other hand, operates differently. While it features a revolving chairmanship – with Azerbaijan holding the position for the 2024-2026 term -- the organization remains associated with Kazakhstan via its leadership and HQ location. While Moscow and Ankara are using the EAEU and OTS to expand their influence among each organization’s respective member states, Astana is less interested in unilateral steps than utilizing the bloc to bolster its image and develop partnerships with other states.
Has CICA been successful?
Evaluating the success of CICA necessitates a nuanced understanding of its scope and limitations. Given its diverse and expansive membership, CICA is not designed to function as an integrated bloc like the European Union. The level of political and economic integration and cooperation seen in the EU is unrealistic among CICA’s member states, which span a wide spectrum of governance models and strategic interests.
Nonetheless, CICA has made meaningful contributions to regional dialogue and cooperation. The organization regularly hosts seminars and conferences on such vital topics as “Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purposes” and “Water Security and Climate Resilience: Addressing Environmental Challenges in CICA Member States.”
The latter conference was particularly significant. Access to water is a growing global concern, exacerbated by climate change and rising regional temperatures. In Central Asia, water scarcity is a politically sensitive issue, with obvious implications for human needs, agriculture, energy and cross-border relations. In late August, CICA’s brand-new headquarters in Astana organized the first-ever information meeting to discuss engaging Taliban-controlled Afghanistan: participants included “Ambassadors and representatives of several CICA Member States.”
According to CICA’s 2025 plan for confidence-building measures, a series of upcoming conferences and seminars will address a diverse array of regional priorities. These include a seminar on “Women’s Role and Contribution to SMEs [Small and Medium Enterprises] Development among CICA Member States,” a symposium on “Challenges for Sustainable Food Production Under Climate Change,” and a conference of heads of ports.
Some of these events will take place in CICA’s new facilities, while others will rotate among member states. It is no surprise that Azerbaijan is set to host the upcoming ports summit -- given the rising importance of the Baku port and the Caspian Sea as a commercial artery linking Central Asia to Europe, and Azerbaijan’s current chairmanship of the organization.
While such small-scale initiatives are unlikely to reshape Eurasian geopolitics – marked by persistent tensions and mutual distrust among many CICA member states – they offer a pragmatic platform for incremental progress. Topics such as human rights (including women’s rights and women’s empowerment), regional crime, environmental protection, and trade issues represent areas of shared interest where cooperation is both possible and necessary.
Beyond Regionalism: Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role
In June, the Center for New American Security (CNAS), a research center in Washington, released a report identifying six global “swing states” poised to “shape the new Great Power competition” are Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. The report describes these states as “multi-aligned” – maintaining ties with the United States, Russia, and China “while declining to choose sides.” The report added that these countries are “determined to reform existing rules and institutions.” Curiously absent from the list is any Central Asian country, despite Kazakhstan’s alignment with many of the report’s criteria.
Scholarly research on evolving global geopolitics is shifting beyond the traditional Great Powers to include states with the capacity to project influence across multiple domains. Kazakhstan’s efforts to promote peace through CICA and boost trade through the Middle Corridor show that it wants to be seen as more than just a regional player – Astana aims to be recognized and respected as an emerging actor with global relevance.
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. He recently co-authored a report on water security issues in Central Asia, published by the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.