Turan Research Center

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Amid the volatile geopolitical situation in the Middle East and the Black Sea region, Eurasia is witnessing creation of a new trilateral partnership.

As crises grip the Middle East and Black Sea region, the three nations of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan are forging a new strategic alliance.

At a recent summit in Lachin, Azerbaijan, leaders of the three nations attended the opening of a new airport, the third in territories that Azerbaijan regained possession following its 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The three leaders vowed to to make such meetings a regular affair in discussing such issues as transportation, energy, trade, defense, infrastructure and the fight against terrorism.

The trialateral partnership was formally established in 2017 during a meeting between foreign ministers in Baku. At that time, they signed the Baku Declaration to develop partnerships on common issues affecting the South Caucasus, Asia Minor and South Asia. In 2021, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan set up a forum for intergovernmental meetings between the countries’ parliaments. Three years later, the leaders of the three countries met for their first time in Astana, Kazakhstan during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Bilateral visits have also taken place.

A critical element of the trilateral cooperation is mutual defense. Pakistan signed contracts with Turkey to buy Mogul-class corvettes ships built under the auspices of the Turkish Navy’s MİLGEM project. In past years, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have also concluded a series of military agreements.

In 2025, Azerbaijan and Pakistan signed an agreement whereby Baku pledged to buy fighter jets co-produced by Pakistan and China. The $4.2 billion sale means Azerbaijan will increase its number of JF-17 fighter jets from 16 to 40. The Block III planes are said to be more maneuverable than previous versions as well as greater stealth capabilities.

The purchase of these jets underscores the growing ability of the three nations to lessen their military dependence on such uncomfortable actors as Russia. Azerbaijan, for example, has traditionally been dependent on Russia’s  MIG-29 and SU-25 fighter jets. By purchasing JF-17 jets, Baku is telling Moscow that its  military know-how is no longer necessary.

Moreover, “Three Brothers Exercise,” a trilateral joint military drill initiated in 2021, remains an effective tool for mutual military coordination . Most recently, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have supported each other during the Nagorno-Karabakh and Kashmir conflicts such as during votes at the United Nations. During recent tensions between Pakistan and India, Islamabad first reached out to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

On the trade front, Azerbaijan and Pakistan are currently negotiating various economic and infrastructure projects with investments of $2 billion, mostly in the oil sector. Baku and Islamabad have also expressed interest in developing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer network of ship, rail and road for moving freight between Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Europe, India, Iran and Russia.

Indeed, the trilateral partnership has brought new trade and energy corridors. Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, each consider themselves at the center of Eurasia’s shifting energy geopolitics and connectivity. Azerbaijan positions itself as a vital hub on east-west and north-south transit routes. Turkey likewise is a significant commercial and transit node, which connects to Azerbaijan via various pipelines and railways running through Georgia. Then there is Pakistan, which although geographically far from both Turkey and Azerbaijan, it nevertheless is pushing for integration in various cross-Eurasian projects.

Islamabad is actively seeking participation in the INSTC and there are now plans to send containers northwards via Central Asia. Given the improving ties between Pakistan and Iran, the latter might soon serve as another alternative for Islamabad in reaching Russia through Azerbaijan.

To be sure, each country’s approach to the the trilateral alliance differs. Although each operates in different regional neighborhoods, all three feel their geopolitical ambitions are constrained by the current world order. As a result, their strategic alignment is a logical development.

Turkey has pursued an active regional policy and is seeking to open access to Central Asia through Azerbaijan and to South Asia through Pakistan. Islamabad has three long-term goals within the alliance: the development of military-technical cooperation (primarily with Turkey), strengthening energy security (through ties with Azerbaijan), and obtaining political support on the long-standing Kashmir issue. For Azerbaijan, the partnership is about its growing pivot to Asia and extensive diversification of ties including strategic partnerships with China and Vietnam and closer engagement with Central Asian states.

Nevertheless, the balance of power in the trilateral format is tilted towards Turkey. While the combined economic volume of the three countries exceeds $1.5 trillion and a population of around 350 million, Turkey has by far the largest economy. Its central geographic position as well as integration within NATO and other multilateral institutions renders it the primary actor in the trilateral partnership. Moreover, for Ankara this positioning allows the country to project power into the South Asia. Turkey also sees the alignment with Azerbaijan and Pakistan as a counter to India-Armenia-Greece-France partnership. The latter’s scope of military and economic cooperation has grown since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war when Armenia began to seek new partners for military cooperation and Greece has increase its engagement with the countries antagonistic to Turkey.

Overall, the alignment between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan is likely to persist given the nature of security challenges and mutual benefits these countries enjoy. The trilateral format also reflects the growing importance of pacts between middle powers in a shifting global order.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.