Turan Research Center

Recently, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan signed U.N. resolutions calling Northern Cyprus occupied. The announcement was a major blow to Turkey and created a rift in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

Turkey is the only country that recognizes the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which it has controlled militarily since 1974. For years, Turkey has lobbied for international recognition for the TRNC and its efforts have been especially strong in the OTS – made up of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with Hungary, Turkmenistan and the TRNC as observers. These attempts for the most part have been futile and signify a larger pattern – that Turkey is not the leader of the Turkic world that it has sought to become.

While Turkey has enjoyed close economic and sometimes military cooperation with the Turkic world, a united Turkic union led by Ankara has remained a fantasy. Turkey has traditionally prioritized the Middle East and North Africa, other Turkic countries do not want to be a junior partner in a relationship with Turkey, and Turkey’s Islamist and pan-Turkist ideology has pushed away the secular post-Soviet states.

A missed opportunity?

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the newfound independence of five Turkic states – Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – Turkey expected to form a bloc based on ethnolinguistic ties capable of operating as a superpower.

With around 175 million combined inhabitants, a nominal GDP of about $1.9 trillion, and a growth rate two percent higher than the global average, the OTS has potential to become a serious global player.

To be sure, Turkey is the most powerful economic and military leader. It seemed most plausible that Ankara would become the leader of the Turkic world.

Turkish leaders realize the potential of such a union. Former-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel saidTurkey should lead the “Turkic-speaking world stretching from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic.” More recently, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated that the Turkic world would be “most powerful as six states, one nation.”

Over the years, Turkic leaders appeared to be interested in a united Turkic union. Former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev said, “200 million brothers live between the Altai [mountains] and the Mediterranean Sea. Should we unite, we will become a very effective global power.” Former Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev added, “if we don’t recreate the Turkic Khaganate, we should at least solidify Turkic unity.” Former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev famously positioned Azerbaijan as a major proponent of Turkic cooperation.

Ideological differences

What draws the Turkic nations besides Turkey together is not just a mutual ethnolinguistic identity. Rather, two factors play a larger role – a shared Soviet legacy, which has created somewhat similar cultures and government types and a close territorial proximity.

All post-Soviet Turkic nations are secular governments wary of mobilizing ideologies like Islamism and pan-Turkism. These countries spent about seven decades under Russian-imposed communism and view such popular ideological movements as a threat to their rule. They also try to balance between larger powers such as Russia and China so as not to become dependent on any one of them.

While the Turkic element is still important in the national identities of these republics, it fits more into a proprietary form of government-promoted nationalism than a one-size-fits-all ideology. This means that while government-promoted Kazakh values and identity will have similarities with government-promoted Uzbek values and identity, it is equally important to promote the differences.

Turkey, on the other hand, has tried to promote pan-Turkism and Islamism in the region. Under Erdogan, Ankara positions itself as a leader of the Islamic world and has spearheaded Islamist causes and has supported Islamist military and political groups such as Hamas, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the Oct. 7 massacre that sparked the Gaza war, Erdogan has led international efforts against Israel including pushing for the Turkic world to take a “decisive stance” against Jerusalem. These attempts were ignored by the member states. In fact, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan only increased cooperation with Jerusalem since the beginning of the war.

Additionally, Turkish foreign politics under Erdogan have been aggressive and isolating. Turkey has involved itself in conflicts and affairs in the Middle East, fraying ties with countries such as the gulf Arab nations, Israel and the United States. Moving towards the Middle East has coincided with a domestic push towards political Islam in civil life and the educational system.

Unlike the Turkish approach, other Turkic states seek to stay out of global conflicts and maintain positive or at least neutral relations with large powers. Also, for the rest of the Turkic world, Islamism is seen as a direct threat to not only their secular governments, but to national unity as well. The post-Soviet Turkic republics consider tolerance and the protection of religious minorities as necessary for societal cohesion and stability. During the first years of their independence, various Arab countries like Saudi Arabia tried to inspire an “Islamic awakening” in the region by funding Wahhabi madrassas and mosques, leading to issues with extremism that added to the local governments’ distrust of global Islamic influence. In Uzbekistan, for example, the first threat to the secular regime of President Islam Karimov were mass protestsled by the Salafist Adolat group followed by the enforcement of Sharia law in the city of Namangan in 1992. By the time Karimov cemented his power, he outlawed Adolat, reestablished control over Namangan and deported Saudi imams.

That is why separate understandings of both nationality and Islam are necessary for these republics. All the Turkic nations have hijab bans in schools. Turkic leaders like President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev have spoken out against what they see as foreign Islamic trends such as the hijab or all black dress for women. These leaders often distinguish between “our Islam” and Arab or other “foreign” versions of Islam.

While pan-Turkism is less dangerous to the region, it still views the ideology with skepticism.

One of the first failures of promoting pan-Turkism came with Uzbekistan. During its first years of independence, Uzbekistan under Karimov was searching to establish a national identity and path to replace communism and considered the Turkish model. However, Karimov quickly understood that Turkey did not seek equal partnership but rather to become a senior partner to Tashkent. Later, relations further deteriorated when Turkey harbored Uzbek opposition figures. It was only after Karimov’s death that Turkey and Uzbekistan mended relations and only in 2019 did Tashkent join the OTS.

Kazakhstan became skeptical of Turkish influence in the early 2000’s when it became clear that Ankara sought to lead the Turkic world. Wary of a “bigger brother” relationship following centuries of Russian domination, Astana decided against close relations with Turkey. Also, the “mutual historic ties” between Kazakhstan and Turkey are often overstated. As Kazakhstani political analyst Marat Shibutov said, “historical connections are minimal. A thousand years have passed since the Seljuks left and the region only reconnected with Turkey after the exile of the Meskhetian Turks under Stalin.”

“Kazakhstan is much less partial to pan-Turkism,” added regional expert Arkady Dubnov. “Nazarbayev played with the idea, but never pursued a true strengthening of ties.”

Of the Turkic states, Azerbaijan is the most embracing of Turkey, with relations between the two countries mutually described as, “one nation, two states.” However, even President Ilham Aliyev hascomplained in private about Turkey’s pro-Islamist policies saying that they were naïve and lost Turkey international support. Recently, Erdogan even sparked mass protests within the TRNC, which is completely reliant on Turkey for its survival– after authorities –allegedly at Ankara’s behalf— lifted a ban on Muslim headscarves in school.

Not a Turkish Priority

The problem is not only with Turkish policies but priorities.

Dating to Ottoman times, the Turks have always been more interested in the Arab world to the south, which they see as the cradle of Islam. Erdogan especially has positioned Turkey as more of a Muslim than a Turkic leader. To that end, influence in the Arab world is much more important.

However, even during the Ottoman times and the early years of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, pan-Turkism, or the uniting of the world’s Turkic nations was more of a weapon to use against Russia than a real political goal. Most of the Turkic world is geographically far from Turkey, which makes it less accessible than the Middle East or the Balkans.

Azerbaijan is the exception to the rule. Both nations share a mutually intelligible language and border. Also, Baku is crucial for energy exports from Central Asia as well as a bulwark to Iran. For Azerbaijan, its partnership with Turkey has allowed it to decrease its dependence on Russia while not falling into the role of “junior partner.”

Just as the Soviet legacy still affects most of the Turkic world, the Ottoman legacy still affects Turkey. While Ataturk built modern Turkey and heavily influenced it, he did not rid it of its past. That is why Turkish leaders like Erdogan may have seemingly conflicting approaches to issues like religion and nationalism and often look to the heart of the Muslim world – the Middle East.

But the Middle East comes with endless problems and Turkey has not been spared. Whether it is through military engagements, threats of terrorism, massive refugee influxes leading to intersocietal clashes, or unneeded conflicts – Turkey has sacrificed a lot to gain influence over Arabs that often resent it.

By contrast, expanding ties with the Turkic world does not carry the same risks and despite setbacks, Ankara does have a way forward. Turkey, with all its challenges, is often seen as a success story and point of pride in the Turkic world.

Still a player

Despite disagreements, Turkey is still an influential player in the region. Ankara maintains strong ties to the rest of the Turkic world through developing economic and military cooperation, especially with Azerbaijan and increasingly with Kyrgyzstan. Ankara also holds significant soft power influence through educational programs, economic partnerships and even popular soap operas.

Azerbaijan has positioned itself closely with Turkey, mainly due to its geographic proximity, shared identity and mutual political support. While Ankara has pressured Baku over ties with Israel, it has not tried to force Azerbaijan to stop its deepening economic, political and military ties with Jerusalem. It has also allowed for the export of Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani oil to reach Israel through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

Turkey has also supported Azerbaijan militarily in its conflict with Armenia as well as when Baku is periodically threatened by Iran. Besides joining Israel to supply Azerbaijan with key weapons that helped it secure the Armenian separatist territory of Karabakh, Turkey held joint large-scale military exercises with the Azerbaijani military on the Iranian border in response to large-scale Iranian military drills on the Azerbaijani border.

Turkey also supported Kyrgyzstan during its border conflicts with Tajikistan in 2021 and 2022, supplying training, drones, and technical support. This year, Turkey successfully mediated between Bishkek and Dushanbe, helping achieve a historic border demarcation deal in March. Recently, both Ankara and Bishkek agreed to mutually produce weapons for export.

While its strongest military partnerships are with Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, Turkey has also sold drones to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and even Turkmenistan. For the region, Ankara has become an important partner in modernizing their militaries.

Economically, Turkey is a major player in Central Asia but is still outpaced by China and Russia in terms of infrastructure and energy investments. It remains limited in its ability to offer the financial support or security guarantees that Russia or China can to the Turkic world beyond Azerbaijan.

The Road Ahead

It is no coincidence that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan decided on recognizing the occupation of Northern Cyprus right after an EU-Central Asia summit in Uzbekistan in which Brussels committed to investing $12 billion in the region. The move was an example of the region choosing its interests over Turkish-backed Turkic solidarity.

But Turkey has not lost the Turkic world— it has just failed to lead it on its own terms. The dream of a cohesive Turkic super-bloc under Turkish guidance has collided with geopolitical realities, diverging national identities and ideological mistrust. Central Asian republics do not reject Turkic cooperation outright; rather, they seek balanced, pragmatic engagement free of ideological pressure or hierarchy.

Ankara’s best chance at expanding influence lies not in rhetoric or revivalist ambitions, but in respecting the autonomy and unique trajectories of its fellow Turkic states. Deepening bilateral ties through trade, infrastructure, defense, and cultural diplomacy—as it has done with Azerbaijan and increasingly with Kyrgyzstan—offers a more sustainable path forward than grand visions of pan-Turkic unity.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.