Kazakhstan is actively pursuing a multi-vector approach to foreign policy and has so far succeeded in maintaining a careful balance in its international relations. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent visit to Moscow stands as a clear testament to this strategy.
On November 12, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev concluded a two-day state visit to Russia, which he described as “perhaps the main event of this year.” His remark underscored the continuing strategic importance that Astana places on its relationship with Moscow.
During the visit, the two sides signed a declaration elevating their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance. This new framework is notable since Russia maintains such strategic relations with only a small circle of states - China, India, Iran, Belarus among them – and now Kazakhstan formally joins that select group. The declaration commits both countries to deepening cooperation across all sectors and as well as providing mutual support in international forums.
Kazakhstan is pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at balancing relations with major powers while safeguarding its own strategic interests. This approach enables Astana to maintain respectful ties with Russia even as it expands economic and diplomatic cooperation with China, the United States, and Europe, thereby avoiding overdependence on any single nation. The strategy underpins Kazakhstan’s ambition to serve as a middle power and a key transit hub—a geopolitical bridge linking major economic centers across Eurasia.
This marks a significant evolution from previous bilateral relations when Kazakhstan and Russia relied on such key documents: as the 1992 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance; the 1998 Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Alliance Oriented to the 21st Century and the 2013 Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Alliance in the 21st Century. While the former documents stressed a general between the countries, the latest agreement highlights the strategic nature of bilateral relations.
Additionally, the November visit resulted in the signing of 13 more documents covering cooperation in transit transportation, including flight tests of the Soyuz-5 and Baiterek space rocket systems, the opening of a Russian consulate general in the western port city of Aktau, and collaboration on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The latter point is particularly important for both Moscow and Astana, as it paves the way for the future construction of a nuclear power plant built by Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom. This follows the June decision in which Astana granted Rosatom the rights to build what will be Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP) since the 1990s.
Moreover, the trip underscored Russia’s enduring influence over Kazakhstan. Moscow remains Kazakhstan’s second largest trading partner. By the end of 2024, bilateral trade has neared $30 billion. According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, in 2024 foreign direct investment from Russia to Kazakhstan totaled approximately $4 billion, accounting for nearly a quarter of all investment inflows into the country. Some 20,000 companies with Russian participation now operate in Kazakhstan and 175 major joint projects are currently underway.
Wider Geopolitical Context
The deepening Russian-Kazakh cooperation also reflects a broader geopolitical landscape. Globally, the strategic alignment of the two nations is reinforced through their joint participation in such multilateral organizations as the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, Russia and Kazakhstan agree on limiting military presence of non-Caspian Sea states in the Caspian Sea – a stance that underscores their common security outlook.
Tokayev’s visit to Russia is also notable given its timing. It came shortly after the Kazakh leader’s early November trip to the United States, where he and other Central Asian leaders met with President Donald Trump within the C5+1 framework. In Washington, Astana signed several investments agreements and announced its intent to join the Abraham Accords, an American initiative aimed at facilitating normalization between Israel and the Arab states as well as the wider Islamic world.
Tokayev’s visit to Moscow is particularly important for Russia, whose influence in Central Asia has been increasingly tested since its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Kazakhstan is a key state for Moscow’s projection of regional power, yet a growing number of external powers have been moving to fill the geopolitical vacuum created by Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine. China, the European Union, United States, and to a lesser degree, Turkey, are all actively expanding their economic and political influence in Central Asia with Kazakhstan at the center of their strategies. Indeed, China has already surpassed Russia in terms of its economic presence in Kazakhstan. Washington is seeking a larger role in the development of Kazakhstan’s critical minerals and rare earth mining sector to reduce its reliance on Chinese rare earth exports.
Therefore, Tokayev’s trip is seen as a testament that Moscow’s still retains powerful political and economic levers in the region. Russia may lag behind China’s economic potential and the U.S. may appear more attractive in certain sectors such as rare earth extraction or oil and gas deposits exploration, but Moscow still benefits its geographic proximity and decades of cooperation. Russian and Kazakh political elites have also maintained close ties since the 1990s, and despite leadership changes in both nations, this continuity remains a core pillar of their relationship.
Perfect Case of Multi-Vectorism
Central to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector strategy is its role in competing transport corridors. The Russia-sponsored International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) — especially its eastern branch — runs through Kazakh territory. This route allows Russia not only access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also connection with markets in South Asia.
At the same time, Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role in the China-Europe east-west network often referred to as the Middle Corridor. Astana is actively investing in the corridor’s expansion and has improved ties with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to that end. For Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor is a means of deepening engagement with global markets while facilitating China-EU trade flows that bypass Russia.
Pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy is also rooted in Kazakhstan’s size, resources and geopolitical position. When relations between Moscow and Astana experienced moments of tension because of war in Ukraine and the expectation that Astana as an ally would support Russia, Kazakhstan moved to strengthen ties with China and the West, effectively declaring a position of neutrality regarding the conflict. Tokayev publicly referred to the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics — Ukrainian territory annexed by Russia — as quasi-state entities and ruled out recognizing them. Reasons vary from pragmatism to actual fear of potential separatism in the northern part of Kazakhstan, mostly populated by ethnic Russians. These reasons led Kazakhstan to expand diplomatic and economic ties with Ukraine, signaling a calibrated balancing act between Kyiv and Russia
Multi-vectorism remains the defining feature of Kazakhstan’s international identity and its primary tool for preserving sovereignty amid intensifying geopolitical competition throughout Eurasia. But the idea of multi-vectorism is also intricately related to Kazakhstan’s ambition to position itself as a middle power —an actor garnering the respect and capable of influencing larger powers’ behavior. Astana thus aspires to join a club of other middle powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and others.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.