Turan Research Center

In April 2025, Samarkand, Uzbekistan hosted the inaugural Central Asia–EU Summit. Chaired by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the summit brought together leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and senior EU officials, including the presidents of the European Council and European Commission. The landmark event marked a new phase in EU-Central Asian relations, with energy cooperation at its core. For Central Asian societies, the summit offered prospects for economic growth.

The summit had three key outcomes: a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership, a Declaration on Critical Minerals Cooperation, and a 2025–2026 roadmap targeting energy, transport, digitalization, and green technologies. The EU committed €12 billion through its Global Gateway initiative -- earmarking €3 billion for the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, €2.5 billion for critical raw materials, and €6.4 billion for energy and climate projects (RFI). Europe’s drive for alternative energy sources, accelerated by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has drawn fresh attention to Central Asia’s vast hydrocarbons, renewables, and mineral reserves, strategically situated between Europe, China, Russia, and Afghanistan.

The EU is already Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner. In 2023, Brussels accounted for 22.6% of the region’s trade and over 40% of foreign direct investment. For the EU, this makes Central Asia a pivotal ally. For Central Asians, however, the partnership’s success depends on whether it delivers economic returns.

Central Asia’s Path to Regional Cooperation

After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Central Asia’s five republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—struggled to unite. Rivalries, border disputes, and Tajikistan’s civil war derailed early attempts at cooperation. Simultaneously, Russia maintained influence through security pacts and migration flow, China expanded its footprint through Confucius Institutes, business deals and infrastructure projects that eventually became part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the United States tied its engagement to the war in Afghanistan.

A turning point came in 2016, when Mirziyoyev launched the “Good Neighbor” policy. Since then, the region began annual consultative meetings of leaders, the landmark 2022 Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border agreement, steady progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and a growing web of energy exchanges from Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan electricity swap deals to Turkmenistan’s gas exports. Cooperation has also extended to shared environmental challenges such as managing water scarcity and mitigating the damage caused by the desiccation of the Aral Sea.

Another milestone was achieved in early 2025, when Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resolved their remaining border disputes, paving the way for new land and air routes with Uzbekistan’s mediation. Although Afghanistan’s instability, Russia’s political leverage, and China’s infrastructure dominance continue to affect the region, Central Asia’s pragmatic, sovereignty-first approach is driving trade and connectivity.

Central Asia’s Energy Potential

Central Asia’s energy wealth is diverse and vast. Kazakhstan, the region’s largest oil producer, exports 1.5 million barrels of oil daily through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Turkmenistan, home to some of the world’s largest gas fields, supplies both China and Russia while eyeing potential cooperation with the EU through the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline. Uzbekistan, largely self-sufficient in natural gas, is reforming its energy sector with the goal of becoming a more significant exporter. 

Renewable energy also offers transformative potential. Kazakhstan’s wind capacity is estimated at 929 terawatt-hours, Turkmenistan’s solar capacity of 665 Gigawatts is eight times the region’s current output. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has committed to generating 40% renewable energy by 2030, with 3.65 gigawatts operational by 2025. Kazakhstan holds another strategic position in the green transition – it produces 19 of the 34 critical minerals essential for EU green technologies such as batteries and wind turbines.

Europe’s Strategic Interest

With Europe’s energy crisis intensifying, the EU has turned to liquified natural gas (LNG), coal and nuclear power as short-term alternatives to Russian supplies, while looking to Central Asia for a more durable, long-term solution. The Green Corridor initiative envisions channeling renewable energy to Europe through the Middle Corridor , supported by $1.225 million from the Asian Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The EU’s Sustainable Energy and Climate Connectivity (SECCA) program allocates €700 million for water, energy, and climate projects. At the latest summit, Brussels also endorsed Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s bids to join the World Trade Organization, further strengthening international trade integration.

The EU’s €12 billion Global Gateway initiative goes beyond energy, positioning itself as a direct counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. By investing in projects such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor, which could cut Europe-Asia transit to under 15 days, the EU seeks to reduce Central Asia’s reliance on Russian routes and compete with Beijing’s infrastructure dominance. For the region's governments, this competition offers leverage and the opportunity to diversify partnerships. Local leaders have also emphasized the need for projects to align with national priorities like job creation.

Challenges to Partnership

Exporting energy to Europe faces logistical hurdles. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is a key oil route, but the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, meant to carry Turkmen gas to Europe via Azerbaijan, requires costly LNG conversion, which can increase the price two to five times higher, making exports less competitive. Underdeveloped transport networks along the Middle Corridor further limit connectivity. The TITR, a vital trade link from China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus, is constrained by underdeveloped transport infrastructure, limiting its capacity to just 4.5 million tons in 2024, with Azerbaijan’s Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway handling 5 million tons annually and the Baku International Sea Trade Port seeing a sixfold volume increase over five years. Despite projections of 5.2 million tons in 2025 and 10 million tons by 2027 for the Middle Corridor, this remains a fraction of the Northern Corridor’s capacity, which processed an estimated 766 million tons in 2023 despite a 51% westbound and 44% eastbound cargo drop due to sanctions. The Northern Corridor, capable of handling over 1 billion tons annually based on Russian Railways’ 3.5 million tons daily throughput, transported roughly 147 times more cargo than the Middle Corridor’s 2025 projection, underscoring the urgent need for infrastructure upgrades to enhance connectivity.

The EU, aiming for climate neutrality by 2050 under the European Green Deal, expects Azerbaijan to fund the $5 billion TCP, but Baku sees little financial incentive as EU gas demand may decline by 2030. Russia and Iran oppose the TCP, citing Caspian Sea environmental risks, though Moscow’s stance is hypocritical given existing Caspian pipelines like Shah Deniz 2 and Kashagan. Underdeveloped Middle Corridor infrastructure, despite EU’s €12 billion Global Gateway investments, further limits connectivity.

Russia and Iran have also opposed the Trans-Caspian, citing environmental concerns but aim to protect their gas market dominance. The 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea permits such projects, yet unresolved maritime boundaries and pricing disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan complicate progress. Russia and Iran’s energy cooperation, including a gas pipeline via Azerbaijan and the INSTC trade route, competes with the Middle Corridor by diverting cargo and investment, potentially reducing its growth. Their strategic moves, like environmental objections to the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, further delay alternative routes.

Additionally, projects like the Trans-Caspian Pipeline risk harming the Caspian Sea’s ecosystem, a concern often voiced by local communities in Kazakhstan. Hydropower development, most notably Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam, a 3,600 MW hydropower project, intensifies transboundary water disputes, a critical issue in Central Asia, by threatening downstream agricultural water supplies in Uzbekistan, despite a 2018 energy import agreement. Kazakhstan’s reliance on coal –still accounting for 70 percent of its energy consumption—continues to drive severe air pollution. To help mitigate environmental risks, the EU has committed €700 million through its SECCA program, funding environmental assessments and the expansion of renewable energy across the region.

EU’s Global Gateway meets China’s BRI

The EU’s €12 billion Global Gateway initiative and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) jointly enhance Central Asia’s role as a trade bridge, yet compete for regional influence. The EU’s Middle Corridor, projected to handle 5.2 million tons of cargo in 2025, dovetails with BRI’s China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to improve connectivity, reducing reliance on Russian routes. However, the EU’s focus on sustainable projects clashes with BRI’s rapid, large-scale investments, creating a contest for dominance. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan leverage both, balancing green ambitions with economic growth. “We are facing a historic chance to make our region not only sustainable but also prosperous,” said Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Summit. For both initiatives to succeed, they must prioritize local needs like infrastructure and jobs over geopolitical rivalry.

Opportunities for Cooperation

The Samarkand summit opened new pathways for collaboration. Plans to modernize energy grids and lay undersea cables could accelerate exports, while aligning Kazakhstan’s 2050 carbon neutrality goal and Uzbekistan’s 2030 target with the EU’s Green Deal creates opportunities for joint research on hydrogen and energy storage. An EU–Central Asia task force could streamline Trans-Caspian Pipeline negotiations, while vocational training programs would strengthen local capacity for green technologies. More harmonized cross-border energy trade could also reduce reliance on Russia, benefiting both regions.

Conclusion

The Samarkand summit has positioned Central Asia as a pivotal partner in Europe’s evolving energy strategy. With €12 billion in EU investments, agreements on critical minerals, and a roadmap for connectivity, the region offers significant potential to support Europe’s diversification away from Russian energy. Yet, realizing this potential hinges on overcoming infrastructure gaps, navigating geopolitical rivalries with Russia and Iran, and mitigating environmental risks. If these obstacles can be addressed, Central Asia could become a cornerstone of Europe’s long-term energy security while advancing its own economic integration and green transition.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist and researcher specializing in Central Asia. She covers press freedom, human rights, and China’s regional influence, with work published in The Guardian, The Diplomat, Reuters, and Eurasianet. A Rumsfeld Fellow, she also contributes to the AFPC’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.