Turan Research Center

When the presidents of the five Central Asian republics gathered at the White House on November 6, 2025, it marked a milestone in the often uneven story of U.S. engagement with the region. For the first time, all five — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — met together with an American president inside the White House.

The occasion was the tenth anniversary of the C5+1 framework, launched in 2015 to promote cooperation between Washington and the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called it“the beginning of a new era of interaction,” a phrase that, while diplomatic, captured a genuine turning point.

This new phase in relations is not about democracy programs or counterterrorism bases. It is about business, minerals, and technology — topics that reflect how both sides have recalibrated what “partnership” means.

The Early Years: Optimism and Experiment

The United States was among the first countries to recognize the independence of the Central Asian states in late 1991. The optimism of that period shaped Washington’s first decade of involvement. American policy centered on helping the post-Soviet governments establish institutions, promote market economies, and transition toward democratic systems.

Many of those efforts mirrored what the U.S. was doing in Central and Eastern Europe. But unlike Poland or the Baltic states, Central Asia was remote, landlocked, and far from Washington and its allies’ primary focus on the European post-Soviet states. Engagement was steady but limited.

Still, the 1990s saw a surge of American activity. Western NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and Human Rights Watch opened offices in the region. U.S.-funded media, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA), began broadcasting locally. The American University of Central Asia was founded in Bishkek in 1993 as a symbol of educational partnership.

At the same time, U.S. companies moved into Kazakhstan’s energy sector. Chevron’s 1993 deal for the Tengiz oil field was followed by ExxonMobil and Texaco joining massive oil and gas consortia at Kashagan and Karachaganak. These early business ventures proved more durable than most of Washington’s political initiatives — Chevron still derives roughly a quarter of its global output from Kazakhstan today.

The 9/11 Decade: From Reform to Security

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, completely reshaped U.S. priorities in Central Asia. With Afghanistan at the heart of the global counterterrorism campaign, geography suddenly elevated the region’s importance.

By the end of that year, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan had agreed to host U.S. and NATO forces on their territories. The Manas air base near Bishkek and the Karshi-Khanabad base in southern Uzbekistan became critical to the mission in Afghanistan.

For much of the 2000s, while U.S.-led forces operated in Afghanistan, Central Asia experienced an unusual period of relative stability and economic growth. With the exception of Turkmenistan, all five Central Asian governments viewed the Taliban as a direct security threat when the movement first emerged in the mid-1990s. The closer the Taliban advanced toward their borders, the more alarmed regional leaders became.

The incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into southern Kyrgyzstan and eastern Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 had already revealed the dangers of militant spillover. The IMU’s alliance with the Taliban — and their sanctuary in northern Afghanistan just across the Tajik border — cemented Central Asia’s dependence on Western-led military containment.

The new partnership brought infrastructure upgrades, fuel contracts, and generous aid packages. For a few years, Washington balanced its counterterrorism objectives with encouragement of political openness. Opposition groups and civil society organizations enjoyed a degree of freedom not seen before.

With Uzbekistan, ties with the United States suffered an abrupt and major setback in 2005. When Uzbek forces opened fire on protesters in the city of Andijan, the United States and Europe called for an international investigation. Tashkent refused, backed by Russia and China, and expelled U.S. forces from its territory. Within months, then-President Islam Karimov ordered western NGOs and foreign media to leave the country.

Yet even after that rupture, strategic necessity brought the two sides together again. As relations with Pakistan deteriorated in the late 2000s, the U.S. needed alternative supply routes to Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) was created, sending cargo from the Baltic ports through Russia and Central Asia into Afghanistan. Uzbekistan became a central transit corridor, and criticism of its human rights record softened.

Few regions benefitted more from the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan than Central Asia. The Taliban’s ouster and the destruction of the IMU removed immediate threats to regional security, while large-scale international assistance financed cross-border infrastructure that continues to yield economic dividends. The electricity transmission lines linking Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan, for example, were constructed during the years of U.S. and NATO presence and still generate millions of dollars in export revenue annually.

The Drawdown and the Rise of the C5+1

In June 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the gradual withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. Allied contingents soon followed. By 2014, the last U.S. personnel had departed the transit center at Kyrgyzstan’s Manas Airport, and French forces vacated their post at Dushanbe Airport in Tajikistan.

Washington and its partners sought to prepare Afghan security forces to stand on their own. Yet by late 2013, Taliban units had reemerged in northern Afghanistan, just across the border from Turkmenistan. Within a few years, most northern districts were either partially or fully under Taliban control, reviving Central Asian anxieties about cross-border instability.

During the drawdown period, the United States provided non-lethal security assistance to its northern partners. In 2015, Uzbekistan received 308 Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles and 20 armored recovery vehicles to help secure its Afghan frontier. Kyrgyzstan obtained military transport trucks; Tajikistan received quad-bikes for border patrols; and Turkmenistan was supplied with surveillance equipment.

As the military dimension of U.S.–Central Asian cooperation receded, Washington sought to institutionalize diplomatic engagement. In 2015, the C5+1 format was established, bringing together the U.S. and the five Central Asian foreign ministers for regular dialogue. The initiative signaled a shift away from the heavy security and democracy-promotion agenda of the previous two decades toward a relationship increasingly framed around economic partnership and pragmatic cooperation.

Despite having a decade of advance notice that foreign troops would leave Afghanistan, Central Asian governments were nevertheless jolted by the abrupt collapse of the Afghan government in August 2021. The chaotic withdrawal underscored for regional leaders how swiftly the United States could disengage from a theater in which it had invested years of effort and billions of dollars. America had picked up and left; managing the enduring instability next door would now fall squarely to the states of Central Asia.

As the American and allied withdrawal unfolded, the security rationale that once underpinned U.S.–Central Asian engagement faded. In recent C5+1 meetings and White House summits, discussions of democracy or human rights have been largely absent. Security was only mentioned by Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, whose government continues to view the Taliban and affiliated groups with suspicion.

The 2025 Reset: Business at the Center

The November 2025 summit in Washington made clear that U.S. policy in Central Asia has entered a new phase. The main focus was commerce — particularly critical minerals. With China dominating global supplies of rare earths and strategic metals, U.S. policymakers see Central Asia as a valuable alternative.

In Washington, Rahmon emphasized his country’s vast antimony reserves, while others cited lithium, copper, and uranium. Beyond resources, the leaders promoted deals that underline Central Asia’s growing economic relevance.

Kazakhstan signed a $4.2 billion agreement with the American firm Wabtec to supply locomotives, part of a broader package of 29 new contracts worth around $17 billion including joint mining ventures in critical minerals. Uzbekistan announced additional purchases of Boeing 787 Dreamliners, expanding on earlier orders signed in New York during the 2023 UN General for 22 Boeings worth $8.5 billion.  Assembly. Even Tajikistan’s small national carrier, Somon Air, confirmed plans to acquire up to 14 Dreamliners.

The meetings in Washington were preceded by a series of business-focused sessions with major U.S. corporations — many specializing in mining, logistics, and digital technologies. Central Asian leaders also expressed interest in partnerships on artificial intelligence, cyber infrastructure, and renewable energy.

President Donald Trump’s approach has strayed from his predecessors. Unlike previous decades, there was little public mention of governance or human rights. The tone was pragmatic: economic diversification for the Central Asians, and supply-chain security for Washington.

Continuity and Skepticism

This new emphasis on commerce recalls the first wave of American involvement in the 1990s, but with a crucial difference. Then, the United States was one of few outside powers engaging the region as Russia struggled and China remained a minor player. Now, the geopolitical landscape is crowded. Russia remains an unavoidable presence, China is deeply entrenched economically, and Turkey, the Gulf states, India, and the European Union are also active.

Central Asian leaders are therefore cautious. They welcome American investment but understand that U.S. strategic attention has shifted repeatedly over the past 34 years — from democracy promotion to counterterrorism, then to retrenchment, and now to economics. They also understand that Washington will not replace Russia as a security guarantor or compete with the scale of Chinese investments through the Belt and Road Initiative.

Even so, they value the U.S. corporate presence. Firms like Chevron, ExxonMobil, and now Wabtec have proven more consistent partners than successive U.S. administrations. Business deals, not summit rhetoric, will determine whether Tokayev’s “new era” truly materializes.

Conclusion: A Relationship Redefined

The history of U.S.–Central Asia relations reflects recurring cycles — enthusiasm, strategic engagement, and gradual drift. Yet the 2025 summit suggests the start of something more stable, if less ambitious.

The Central Asian states are now more assertive and better connected to multiple global partners. They no longer seek external patrons but balanced partnerships that deliver tangible results. For Washington, this is an opportunity to engage on practical terms — through energy cooperation, digital innovation, and secure supply chains — without overpromising on political transformation.

If the 1990s were defined by democracy promotion, the 2000s by counterterrorism, and the 2010s by disengagement, the 2020s may be remembered as the decade of economic realism. Whether this pragmatic partnership endures will depend not on summit communiqués, but on whether American businesses — and U.S. policymakers — remain committed long after the headlines fade.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center. Before joining the TRC, he was a correspondent covering Central Asia for RFE/RL for over 25 years. He previously wrote Central Asia in Focus and hosted the Majlis podcast.