Turan Research Center

Iran and Tajikistan have rapidly expanded bilateral cooperation in recent years, yet the relationship carries significant risks. Chief among them is the increasing activity of Iranian intelligence — led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — in Tajikistan, and the possibility that the country could become partially integrated into Iran's "axis of resistance," potentially against Dushanbe's own preferences. This analysis examines one dimension of what Iranian experts describe as a "deepening of Iran's strategic view towards Tajikistan": the recruitment of Tajik citizens by Iranian intelligence services.

Following the civil war of 1992–1997, Tajikistan faced profound socioeconomic hardships and has since relied heavily on remittances from its migrant labor force abroad. The Central Asian country consistently ranks among global leaders in the share of GDP derived from foreign remittances. Structural dependence on migration makes many Tajik citizens willing to accept virtually any form of work abroad — a vulnerability actively exploited by terrorist organizations and intelligence agencies, including those operating under Iranian authority.

Religious Outreach as Strategic Cover

Shiites constitute only around five percent of Tajikistan's Muslim population — approximately 400,000 people. Most are Ismailis from the Gorno-Badakhshan region, traditionally shaped by the liberal and pro-Western religious influence of the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the 12-15 million global Ismaili community. Nonetheless, beginning in the 1990s, an extensive propaganda campaign conducted by Iranian emissaries brought hundreds of Tajiks to religious seminaries in Iran, where they received training in Shia doctrine. Today they form the nucleus of the country's Shia clergy and come not only from Gorno-Badakhshan but also from regions where Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school has historically predominated.

Iran's religious outreach — along with funding for cultural initiatives in Tajikistan — was accompanied by deliberate efforts to insert Iranian operatives into Tajik institutions, a pattern familiar from several Middle Eastern states. According to regional experts, through active recruitment campaigns, Iranian intelligence services have succeeded in infiltrating segments of the administrative and law enforcement apparatus and now occupy influential mid-level positions.

Iranian intelligence services did not limit their activities to contacts with Tajik Shia communities. Close cooperation between Iran and Tajik Islamist groups — including Sunni members of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) — dates back to the civil war of the 1990s and continued well beyond that period. Collaboration between Iranian intelligence and Sunni actors is by no means unprecedented; recent examples include Tehran's ties with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, while earlier instances of IRGC engagement with Sunni factions in the Middle East are also well documented.

Tellingly, some UTO representatives, influenced by their interactions with Iran, began to display flexibility in blending Shia and Sunni religious practices. On December 2, 2011, several prominent UTO figures conducted the Shia ritual of Ashura inside a Sunni mosque near Dushanbe. For Shia Muslims, Ashura is a day of mourning for the martyred Imam Husayn. In the political theology of contemporary Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah, however, it has become a central symbol within the broader narrative of the "axis of resistance," signifying struggle against the United States, Israel, and Arab monarchies.

Among Sunnis, Ashura carries a fundamentally different meaning: it commemorates the deliverance of the Prophet Musa (Moses) and the Children of Israel from Pharaoh. Sunnis mark the day through fasting and prayer, but the occasion lacks the public, mobilizing, and politically charged character it has acquired in Shia contexts. The commemoration of Husayn's martyrdom in a Sunni mosque — instead of the traditional Sunni remembrance of the Israelites' exodus from Egypt — provoked major controversy in Tajikistan. The incident became one of the arguments cited by authorities when they imposed an official ban on Tajik students pursuing religious education in Iran.

Documented Operations and Terrorist Activity

Several materials released by Tajik authorities assert that Iranian intelligence services have been involved in operations on Tajik territory, including recruitment, the use of proxy groups, and organization of terrorist attacks. On July 29, 2018, a terrorist attack targeting foreign cyclists took place in Tajikistan's Khatlon region, resulting in the deaths of two U.S. citizens, one Dutch national, and one Swiss national.

According to the testimony of Abdusamadov, a terrorist detained by Tajik security services, he underwent ideological indoctrination and military training between 2014 and 2015 in the city of Qom and at a training camp in Iran's Mazandaran province. Following the 2015 ban on the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), he sought refuge in Iran. At the same time, he maintained membership in ISIS. The individual identified as the organizer of the attack, Ubaidov, likewise studied at religious institutions in Iran and received similar training in IRGC camps. He later engaged in recruiting Tajik labor migrants in Russia on behalf of Iranian intelligence services. In doing so, the Iranians allegedly used IRPT membership as convenient cover for recruitment activities inside Russia.

Skepticism toward Tajik law enforcement agencies, sympathy for the IRPT — which was subjected to repression in Tajikistan — and general reluctance among Russian analysts to engage with the argument that Tajik migrants were being recruited on Russian soil led several experts, primarily from Russia, to advance an alternative version. According to their assessment, the attack had been organized by ISIS. This divergence prompted debate between Russian and Tajik experts. Tajik commentators insisted that Iranian intelligence had been recruiting Tajik labor migrants in Russia under the banner of the IRPT first, while the attack in Tajikistan was later carried out under the borrowed brand of ISIS. At that time, the IRPT was viewed relatively benignly in Russia, whereas ISIS was not — making such dual-layered cover logically plausible.

In 2018, thirteen individuals were detained in Tajikistan on charges of preparing another terrorist attack; they too had undergone training in Iran. Once again, recruitment was reportedly carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives. In Russia, recruitment was conducted under the familiar cover of affiliation with the IRPT, while the planned attack was meant to appear as an operation carried out under the banner of ISIS.

Not all instances of such Iranian covert operations became public. Tajik authorities tended to disclose only those cases that could cast a shadow on the opposition IRPT by portraying it as involved in terrorist activity. At the same time, because of Dushanbe's close political and economic relationship with Tehran, the authorities were inclined to publicize only those episodes of Iranian intelligence activity that, directly or indirectly, involved IRPT members. As a result, a significant number of other cases may never have entered the public domain.

The use of organizational cover — operations conducted under the flag of other movements — is a common tactic employed by the IRGC in the Middle East. For this reason, it should be stressed that the use of IRPT-linked identities as operational cover by Iranian intelligence does not itself reflect negatively on the Tajik opposition. Rather, it illustrates a standard modus operandi of Iranian intelligence services.

Escalation After October 7

Following the outbreak of the war in Gaza after Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel — and amid the subsequent escalation of Iranian-Israeli confrontation — Iranian intelligence services significantly expanded their recruitment of Central Asian nationals, especially Tajiks, for potential use against Israel and the United States. Alongside Tajiks, recruitment of smaller numbers of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz has also been reported. According to these accounts, Iranian operatives have been dispatching such recruits to the conflict zone in the Middle East.

The relatively easy recruitment of Tajik citizens by Iranian intelligence services is attributed to three factors: shared language and cultural affinity, difficult socioeconomic conditions faced both by residents of Tajikistan and by Tajik labor migrants abroad, and a sense of religious solidarity with Palestinian Arabs. This recruitment channel has effectively supplemented the well-known pattern through which the IRGC mobilized various groups for the war in Syria and, since 2023, for operations against Israel across multiple theaters. The principal formations involved include Iraqi Shia militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Hazara-dominated Fatemiyoun Brigade from Afghanistan, closely connected to the political organization Hezbollah Afghanistan.

Central Asian militants typically reach the Palestinian theater through two main routes. The first is the Iranian corridor: they travel directly from Central Asia to Tehran, then proceed to Syria, and from there are dispatched to the conflict zone. The second is the Afghan-Iranian route: first to Afghanistan, then onward to Iran, followed by Syria, and ultimately to the operational area, most likely Lebanon.

Regional Influence Operations

Another objective of Iranian intelligence has been to facilitate actions in several Central Asian countries aimed at influencing public opinion and shaping the foreign policy choices of local governments. Here, too, parallels with Iranian behavior elsewhere are evident. The IRGC has long conducted similar operations in Azerbaijan, which Tehran views as aligned with the United States and Israel.

Andrey Serenko, a prominent Russian orientalist and specialist on Central Asia and Afghanistan, reported on his Telegram channel that on November 18, 2023, two Tajik citizens attempted to set fire to a Jewish educational center in Almaty, Kazakhstan. On November 20, according to the same source, four individuals from various Central Asian states — including Tajikistan — attempted a planned attack on the office of the Jewish Agency in Almaty. According to Serenko's description, which was later deleted, these incidents were connected with Iranian intelligence services. Additional incidents occurred not only in Kazakhstan but also in Uzbekistan. Interestingly, Serenko argues that the latter episodes prompted Tashkent to deepen its cooperation with Iran in order to balance its engagement with Israel.

On the other hand, if there was an intention to exert pressure on the government of Kazakhstan, the attempt clearly failed. On November 6, 2025, as part of its traditionally multi-vector foreign policy aimed at preserving regional peace and stability, official Astana announced it would join the Abraham Accords. The decision drew criticism in Tehran, and many Iranian commentators began calling for even more assertive policy in Central Asia to prevent the emergence of a bloc of U.S.-friendly states aligned with Turkey and Israel.

Dushanbe’s Strategic Calculus

How interested might the government of Tajikistan be in such an expansion of Iranian strategic influence? Given Tajikistan's own multi-vector foreign policy strategy — designed primarily to ensure the stability of President Rahmon's authoritarian regime and secure a hereditary transfer of power — Dushanbe has little incentive to enter into strategic entanglements with Iran that could risk drawing the country into direct confrontation with the United States and Israel. At international forums President Rahmon may offer rhetorical criticism of Israel, but it is unlikely to go beyond that. At the same time, Dushanbe will naturally not refuse economic assistance from Tehran.

Constraints on Iranian Influence

For Iran's attempts to exert informal influence in Tajikistan through its intelligence services under the disguise of economic and cultural cooperation, three groups of constraints are particularly significant:

Political constraints. Paradoxically, Iran's deepening political cooperation with Russia and China acts as one of the main limiting factors. Neither Moscow nor Beijing has any interest in the rise of Islamist extremist or terrorist activity in neighboring Central Asia, which could spill over onto their own territories. Indeed, if the Tajik authorities are correct in claiming that the IRGC at least twice previously attempted to stage attacks in Tajikistan under the banner of ISIS, the rationale may well have been, among other things, to avoid provoking Russian and Chinese opposition to Iranian actions. Moreover, the longstanding ties between Iranian state structures and segments of the Tajik opposition compel the Rahmon government — motivated by regime stability considerations — to control Iranian influence inside the country.

Economic constraints. A second limiting factor is that recruitment into terrorist groups can, to some extent, be analyzed through the lens of labor market competition between rival recruiters. This framework is particularly relevant when economic hardship is the primary driver behind recruitment, as is the case in Tajikistan. Competition from recruiters representing various international Sunni terrorist organizations significantly narrows the space available to Iranian intelligence services. The principal competitors in this regard are ISIS-K and the Central Asian group Ansarullah, which maintains links with the Taliban as well as with al-Qaeda.

A terrorist threat exists to Iran itself. A significant strategic constraint is also that the instrument reportedly used by Iranian security services — the recruitment of Tajik nationals — may turn into a weapon that Sunni terrorist organizations deploy against Iran. On January 3, 2024, twin suicide bombings struck the Iranian city of Kerman during a commemorative ceremony at the grave of Qasem Soleimani, one of the most prominent leaders of the IRGC. The attack killed 95 people. Responsibility was claimed by ISIS-K, and one of the perpetrators was a citizen of Tajikistan.

Conclusion

Iran's intelligence operations in Tajikistan reveal a sophisticated strategy that extends well beyond traditional bilateral relations. Through religious outreach, economic leverage, and exploitation of labor migration patterns, Tehran has built a recruitment infrastructure that serves multiple strategic objectives: projecting power in Central Asia, mobilizing proxy forces against Israel and the United States, and potentially integrating Tajikistan into its axis of resistance.

Yet the limits of Iranian influence are equally instructive. Russia and China's security concerns, competition from Sunni extremist groups, and Dushanbe's own regime stability imperatives create meaningful constraints on Tehran's ambitions. The Rahmon government faces a delicate balancing act: accepting Iranian economic assistance while preventing the country from becoming a staging ground for regional destabilization.

For Western policymakers, the recruitment of Tajik citizens — especially labor migrants — into terrorist organizations constitutes a transnational security threat that demands sustained attention. Addressing the challenge requires moving beyond counterterrorism frameworks to tackle the root cause: the economic desperation that makes Tajik workers vulnerable to exploitation by multiple actors, from the IRGC to ISIS-K. Despite Tajikistan's rapid economic growth in 2025, the difficult socioeconomic conditions faced by its population remain the most important factor enabling recruitment.

International organizations and Western governments should prioritize economic development assistance, labor protections for migrants, and support for civil society in Tajikistan. Without addressing these structural vulnerabilities, competing recruitment networks — whether Iranian, Sunni extremist, or hybrid operations — will continue to exploit the country's most vulnerable citizens. The question is not whether recruitment will continue, but rather which actors will succeed in doing so and to what ends.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University specializing in international relations and security in Eurasia. He has held academic appointments at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Eurasian National University in Astana, and Narxoz University in Almaty. During the war on terror in Afghanistan, he directed the Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and served on the Russian–American Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan under the East–West Institute. He is the author of over 100 publications, including 25 peer-reviewed articles indexed in Scopus, and his expert analysis has been cited by major international media including The Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Washington Post, BBC, and Deutsche Welle.