Turan Research Center

Photo of Arrested Sputnik Journalists by the Azerbaijani Press Agency

Over the past 48 hours, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have been in a free fall. This latest crisis in ties comes after Russian police launched a major operation against ethnic Azerbaijanis in the city of Yekaterinburg on June 30, which ended up in multiple serious injuries and two deaths amid allegations of torture. Officially, Azerbaijan called the killings “ethnically motivated” and “unlawful.” Influential Azerbaijanis such as former presidential aid Eldar Namazov have referred to the incident as a “pogrom.”

In response, Azerbaijani police arrested two journalists in Baku at Russian state media Sputnik headquarters– that authorities had officially ordered to close earlier this year — accusing themof working with Russian intelligence. Baku also cancelled any cultural events in partnership with Russian state and private organizations. On July 1, Russia continued its offensive on the Azerbaijani diaspora, arresting two influential figures. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reaffirming support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

While Russia and Azerbaijan have periodically had their issues, the latest row has been particularly long and has lasted about six months. It started in December of last year, when an Azerbaijani jet flying from Baku to Grozny crash landed in Kazakhstan, killing 38 civilians. Following a preliminary investigation, Azerbaijan accused Russian air defenses of shooting down the plane and demanded a public apology admitting guilt as well as compensation.

In February, Azerbaijan hinted it may appeal to the International Court of Justice and orderedthe closing of the “Russian House,” a local branch of the Russian state-funded cultural diplomacy agency Rossotrudnichestvo, due to a “lack of legal registration.” Dating to Soviet times, cultural diplomacy was often a thin cover for intelligence gathering and Azerbaijani state media repeatedly accused the Russian House of housing spies. Baku simultaneously announced the closure of Russia Today and Sputnik Azerbaijan offices. In response, Russian Deputy Nikolay Valuyev — from President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party — recommended cracking down on the Azerbaijani diaspora, causing Azerbaijan to declare him persona non grata.

Later that month, a massive cyber-attack targeted Azerbaijani pro-government media using the logo of the Iranian-backed ethnic Azerbaijani proxy Husseiniyyun and verses from the Quran. Some Azerbaijani sources suspected a false flag operation and immediately blamed Russia. But it was only earlier last month that an Azerbaijani parliamentary commission revealed the cyberattack originated from the Russian hacker group Cozy Bear.

Days later, an Azerbaijani MP who had been critical of Russia was deported from Moscow airport and barred from entering the country after having been invited as part of a delegation. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry labeled the move as “an unfriendly step.”

On May 9, President Ilham Aliyev skipped the annual Russian military parade celebrating the 80th year anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. For Russia, Victory Day is much more than a holiday but an affirmation to the world that Moscow was and is an important global power. Worse than his absence was that the Azerbaijani leader canceled at the last minute.

To save face when Aliyev canceled his trip to Moscow, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov explained that the Azerbaijani president did so to take part in an event dedicated to his father and former president Heydar Aliyev. Not long after, Azerbaijani state media declared that Aliyev’s decision was due to tension in the relations.

Deeper tensions

The current rift has brought to the surface a deeper tension between Azerbaijan and Russia. Baku still holds a grudge against Moscow for its historic support of Armenia in the conflict over the Armenian separatist territory of Karabakh. Many of the recent anti-Russian articles in Azerbaijani media brought up Russia’s ties with both Armenia and Karabakh. Moscow often exerted more influence over the enclave than Yerevan did. It also used the conflict to maintain leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan while selling weapons to both sides.

This policy allowed Russia to keep both countries under heel to a certain degree, much like how it has used the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova to pressure Tbilisi and Chisinau. While tensions would occasionally bubble to the surface, Baku had to be much more tactful in how much it could alienate Russia.

An example is in 2009, when Azerbaijani media reported that Russia had transferred approximately $800 million in weapons to Armenia the year prior. While Moscow officially denied the transfer, according to leaked American diplomatic cables, then-Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov admitted it to this Azerbaijani counterpart “after the second bottle of vodka.” The incident caused Azerbaijan to summon the Russian ambassador for clarification as well as some critical op-eds in the media, but there was not much else Baku could do.

Compare that to today, when Azerbaijan has insisted for over six months for what Russia likely sees as a display of public capitulation. Despite Moscow clearly not accepting its new role in relations, it does not have the same leverage over Baku as it had before.

Shifts in Power Dynamics

In the past, such open defiance would have been unthinkable for a small post-Soviet state on Russia’s borders. Azerbaijan’s behavior is due to two factors – Russia’s loss of influence in the region and Azerbaijan’s strengthened position.

Russia’s position in the South Caucasus weakened significantly following the 2020 Second Karabakh War, in which Azerbaijan returned most of the territory occupied by Armenian separatists.

Another blow came in 2022 when Russian invaded Ukraine. Earlier this year, а leaked report showed that Russian officials believed the war in Ukraine and resulting western pressure has significantly hampered its influence in the post-Soviet space. Russia’s diversion of resources from the South Caucasus helped lead to the successful Azerbaijani operation that took back complete control of Karabakh in 2023.

Without the leverage of Karabakh, Russia lost its trump card over Azerbaijan. And given that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sees removing Yerevan’s reliance on Russia as necessary for its independence, Russia’s role in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan became superfluous.

Azerbaijan’s Russia Strategy

Since gaining independence, Azerbaijan has tried to maintain friendly relations with Moscow, but at a distance. Having been under direct Russian rule during the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, Baku seeks to maintain its independence while avoiding both conflicts and reliance in its relations with Russia.

Azerbaijan’s approach has always differed from its neighbors. Georgia under President Mikheil Saakashvili attempted to move the country West, causing direct conflict with Russia culminating in the 2008 invasion. Armenia, on the other hand, completely relied on Russia, which caused it to become a vassal state. Ironically, both countries have since changed course, with Georgia under Georgian Dream party rule falling back into Russia’s zone of influence and Armenia under Pashinyan trying to decrease Yerevan’s reliance on Russia.

Baku instead always took the middle route – seeking cooperation with Russia without overreliance. It achieved its goal through diversifying its military and economic relations. Azerbaijan has partnered closely militarily with Turkey and Israel, while its top economic partners in total import-export volumes are Italy, Turkey, Israel, India and Greece, respectively.

These partnerships have given Azerbaijan the freedom to challenge Russia when necessary, such as during the latest rift over the past six months.

But Azerbaijan simultaneously works with Russia when cooperation is mutually beneficial and does not create dependence. Moscow provides Baku with almost 20% of its imports and both have worked on developing the North-South transport corridor as an alternative to transport through the Suez canal. But even the latter has created Russian dependence on Azerbaijan and not the other way around. Moscow now relies on Baku to ship products to Iran and the Gulf.

Additionally, as Europe began drastically cutting down on Russian oil and gas exports following the invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan proved key for Brussels to find a makeshift way of importing Russian oil without losing face. That is why the oil rich Azerbaijan quadrupled its imports of Russian oil in 2023 while significantly increasing its exports to Europe.

Through such policy, Azerbaijan has achieved what other South Caucasus nations have not been able to – not only is Baku independent from Russia, but Moscow relies on Azerbaijan. This became apparent after the ahead-of-time withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers after Baku returned the occupied Karabakh region in 2023. As journalist Kiril Krivosheev pointed out, the presence of Russian peacekeepers whether in Transnistria, South Ossetia or Abkhazia is meant to be permanent. The new power dynamic is also proven by recent events — despite Russia’s current anger at Azerbaijan, all it has been capable of doing is punishing the Azerbaijani diaspora.

In the post-Soviet space, few countries have managed to reverse the power dynamic with Moscow. Azerbaijan now stands as a rare example—not just resisting Russian pressure but leveraging its own geopolitical importance to put the Kremlin on the defensive.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.