Turan Research Center

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the two largest economies in Central Asia, and their economic structures are largely complementary, creating favorable conditions for deeper regional integration. After many years of stagnation, a new phase of multilateral regional cooperation began in 2018 with the launch of the High-Level Consultative Meetings among Central Asian states. This renewed engagement was driven primarily by the transformation of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy following the ascendance to power of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2016, who declared Central Asia the top strategic priority of Tashkent’s diplomacy.

In advancing cooperation with neighboring states, Uzbekistan has consistently articulated a vision of Central Asia as a stable, economically developed, and prosperous region. This vision was outlined by Mirziyoyev at the international conference “Central Asia: One Past and Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity” in Samarkand. There, he identified two priority tasks for regional development: first, accelerating the growth of intraregional trade; and second, consolidating efforts to increase transit and logistics capacity across Central Asia. These processes reinforce each other: the intensification of mutual trade requires sustainable transport corridors, and the expansion of corridors increases trade volumes. A similar agenda was reiterated at the first Central Asian Summit in Astana, where progress in modernizing transport infrastructure and opening new land and air routes connecting the region’s countries was noted as a tangible success of political rapprochement.

Tashkent’s position emphasizes that integration into the global transport system must occur collectively, not individually. The Strategy for the Development of the Transport System of Uzbekistan until 2035 states that aligning national transport and communication systems is essential for unlocking the region’s transit potential and improving access to global markets. This analysis examines the dynamics of transport cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan within the broader regional and international context, identifies bottlenecks, and evaluates competitive pressures shaping the two states’ transit strategies.

State of Transport Connectivity Between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan

As a double-landlocked country, Uzbekistan depends heavily on the transit capacity of its neighbors to access international trade routes. Kazakhstan plays an especially important role in this regard due to its geographic position, extensive rail network, seaports, and direct land borders with both China and Russia. Presently, the transport systems of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are mutually integrated, supporting dynamic trade growth. By the end of 2024, bilateral trade exceeded $4.3 billion, reflecting high transport connectivity and coordinated border management.

Both states lie at the crossroads of major Eurasian trade corridors linking China, Europe, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the countries of South Asia. This geographic positioning encourages bilateral and regional connectivity initiatives. Among the most significant agreements is the project to construct the Uchkuduk–Kyzylorda highway and railway, supported by a joint action plan signed in December 2021. This corridor would link the Kyzylorda region of Kazakhstan with Uzbekistan’s Navoi region and the Republic of Karakalpakstan, reducing travel time and distance between the regions by 3–3.5 times. Improved connectivity is expected to stimulate cross-border trade and strengthen the border regions as drivers of economic growth.

Both governments also agreed to establish the International Center for Industrial Cooperation “Central Asia” in the Syrdarya (Uzbekistan) and Turkestan (Kazakhstan) regions, a complex was launched on 15 November 2025 during the state visit of Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Tashkent. This platform aims to develop joint logistics capacity and attract additional cargo flows. Another important project is the construction of the Darbaza–Maktaaral railway line, which will reduce congestion at the Saryagash checkpoint—the busiest crossing between the two countries — and increase throughput by 10-14 million tons per year. To enhance connections with western Kazakhstan, plans are underway for the Beineu–Shalkar highway, intended to strengthen the Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) corridor and expand Central Asia’s access to the Caspian Sea.

Cooperation and Competition in International Transport Services

Alongside physical infrastructure development, regional governments have worked to harmonize legislation, unify transport standards, digitize customs procedures, and adopt electronic data exchange systems. As a result, intraregional trade has nearly doubled over the past five years to reach $11 billion, and the Central Asian freight transport market expanded 2–3 times in 2023. Analysts attribute this growth to the increasing role of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in global supply chains.

Tashkent, in particular, has pursued policies to increase its transit potential. International freight volumes passing through Uzbekistan have increased at an average annual rate of 8 percent. In 2024, more than 13.9 million tons of cargo were transported in transit across the country along more than 100 separate routes, some of which operate jointly with Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan thus act simultaneously as partners and competitors in developing new transport corridors. Cooperation includes automobile and railway routes through Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Russia-Belarus-EU, Krygyzstan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Black Sea region or Georgia-Turkey-EU, and China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran.

Kazakhstan holds a strategic advantage due to its direct rail links with China, giving it an essential role in the China–EU- China supply chain. Uzbekistan, however, seeks to secure a significant position within these flows through alternative multimodal corridors such as the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Black Sea region or Georgia-Turkey-EU route under TRACECA, and the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-EU route.

A key development strengthening Uzbekistan’s position is the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, which reduced cargo delivery time from China to Uzbekistan from 10 to 2 days compared to the route through Kazakhstan. Construction of a parallel railway on the Kashgar–Torugart–Makmal–Jalal-Abad–Andijan route began in December 2024, and is expected to significantly shift cargo dynamics in favor of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by bypassing Kazakhstan’s monopoly on direct rail access to China.

While the two states cooperate through multiple regional transport initiatives, they also demonstrate competitive behavior. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) or the Middle Corridor provides a clear example. Since the start of the war in Ukraine and disruption of the Northern Corridor through Russia due to sanctions, demand for the Trans-Caspian route has surged. Cargo volumes along TITR reached 4.5 million tons in 2024, and container transit from China increased fourteen-fold. According to the International Transport Forum, with adequate investment, TITR could expand to 10 million tons annually and become 35 percent faster and 40 percent cheaper than the northern route.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development identifies three main transit routes of the Middle Corridor: a northern branch through northern Kazakhstan, a central branch through southern Kazakhstan, and a southern branch through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey launched the CASCA+ corridor in 2019, and in 2024 established a consortium to coordinate governance and investment. By contrast, Kazakhstan institutionalized the TITR in 2014 with Azerbaijan and Georgia, forming the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.” These parallel initiatives risk undermining regional coherence and fostering unhealthy competition.

Similarly, both states show diverging interests in transit solutions through Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has actively promoted the Kabul Corridor since 2018, and in 2021 Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan signed a roadmap for the $6.9 billionTrans-Afghan railway. In 2023, a project office opened in Tashkent, followed by offices in Kabul and Islamabad, and in July 2025 the three parties signed a framework intergovernmental agreement to develop a feasibility study for the project. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has partnered with Turkmenistan to advance a separate project along the Torghundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin-Boldak route. Construction of the first 22-kilometer Torghundi–Sanobar segment began in September 2024, and Kazakhstan pledged $500 million toward extending it to Herat.

The absence of coordination in these initiatives illustrates structural tensions in Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan cooperation, where competition for transit revenues and international influence can override the stated objective of collective regional integration.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Despite strong rhetorical commitment to regional partnership, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan often prioritize national interests in external logistics and transit competition. Statements by the Kazakh leadership emphasizing Kazakhstan as “the main logistics hub of Eurasia” reflect an aspiration to maintain a dominant regional role. At the same time, Uzbekistan increasingly pursues diversified transit corridors to reduce dependence on Kazakhstan’s infrastructure. Both strategies are understandable, yet uncoordinated competition risks weakening the collective geopolitical and economic potential of Central Asia.

Strengthening regional transport integration requires Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to develop joint coordination mechanisms to align transport strategies, tariff policies, digital customs systems, and investment planning. Coordinated tariff decisions would increase predictability and enhance competitiveness relative to external corridors. Collaborative work to improve Logistics Performance Index indicators — including infrastructure quality, service capability, customs efficiency, and on-time delivery — would strengthen both countries’ positions as transit hubs.

A more coherent approach to trans-Caspian transit management is essential. Establishing a unified supervisory framework integrating CASCA+ and the International Association TITR would mitigate the risks of institutional fragmentation, create a single negotiating platform with global partners and investors, and prevent duplication of infrastructure spending. A consolidated structure would also enhance the region’s bargaining position with external actors such as China, the EU, Turkey, and Middle Eastern funders.

Given the similar objectives of the eastern (Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan) and western (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan) Trans-Afghan railway routes, the Central Asian states should agree on a mutually beneficial architecture for accessing South Asian markets and ports on the Indian Ocean. Combining investment and technical resources would accelerate implementation, reduce political and financial risk, and prevent potential rivalry for transit flows.

Finally, advancing the “Strategy for the Development of Transport Corridors in Central Asia,” the “Regional Program for the Development of Transport Communications,” and the “Agreement on Joint Development of the Transport System in Central Asia” — first proposed in 2018 — remains essential. Establishing a Regional Center for Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the United Nations would institutionalize cooperation, strengthen integration, and support economic resilience.

The experience of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan illustrates both the opportunities and challenges of transport-driven regionalism. While progress is significant, only a coordinated approach can enable Central Asia to realize its full potential as a vital bridge in Eurasian connectivity.

Nargiza Umarova is the Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Tashkent-based research institution Knowledge Caravan.

Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration, and the influence of great powers in the region. She also analyzes Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at [email protected].