Amid the ongoing US-Iran negotiations around Tehran’s nuclear program, China wants in on influencing the process to its benefit. Close commercial and energy ties with Iran and the Arab states are the drivers of Beijing’s relations with the region.
China is not satisfied that the current US approach to Iran is rooted in unilateralism that sidelines Beijing unlike President Barack Obama’s multilateral strategy that ended in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that sought to limit Iran’s enrichment levels in exchange for lifting economic sanctions.
During a recent summit, China hosted Russian and Iranian diplomats to discuss the nuclear issue and criticize Washington’s policy of maximum pressure and threats to bomb Tehran’s nuclear sites.
Beijing fears that a maximum pressure campaign as the Islamic Republic is at its weakest position in decades. The so-called Axis of Resistance – a sprawling network of non-state actors from Lebanon and Iraq to Syria and Yemen, has been severely weakened since the start of the war in Gaza. The Israeli military has decimated Hezbollah, nearly defeated Hamas and the Yemeni Houthis have been targeted in intermittent aerial campaigns by both Israel and the United States. The fall of the Assad dynasty has been another key blow to the axis.
The Chinese worry that the Islamic Republic’s weakening influence in the Middle East could push Tehran into advancing its nuclear program, which would likely incur direct US/Israeli military strikes further undermining its economy and the overall stability of the country’s political system.
Excessive pressure on Iran’s nuclear program would also undermine Beijing’s ability to shape the Middle East according to its 2022 Global Security Initiative – a post-liberal global vision aimed at increasing China’s Global Influence.
This initiative facilitated Beijing’s 2023 meaningful reconciliation between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia after decades of confrontations over regional hegemony. This was a major blow to US influence in the Gulf region.
Moreover, though the Trump administration has mostly pursued a unilateral approach in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, Washington has reached out to Russia to help navigate the intricacies of the negotiations process. Such policy makes sense given Moscow’s ever-expanding relations with Tehran following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. But it sidelines China as a potential negotiator.
And it’s not the first time. Beijing has periodically been sidelined under both former US President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump. Current negotiations around ending the war in Ukraine are either directly held between the US and Russia or between Kyiv and Moscow through mediation efforts by Turkey and the Gulf states. China has not been included on cease-fire and peace efforts on the war in Gaza. Beijing’s peace proposals on ending the war in Ukraine and in Gaza have been dismissed by the US and its allies.
Iran’s weakening would also impact China’s business with the Islamic Republic. To be sure, bilateral trade has lagged significantly behind stated goals and Chinese investments have not materialized despite the bilateral 25-year cooperation agreement between the two nations signed in 2021. Yet, it has been China buying heavily discounted Iranian oil that has kept the Iranian economy afloat. Therefore, when the US announced the maximum pressure campaign and threatened to sanction whoever bought Iranian oil this served as a powerful warning for Beijing.
Sanctioning Iran’s oil trade with China has proved to be extremely difficult as tanker fleets are increasingly able to find loopholes to avoid penalties. Under the Biden administration, some aspects of the sanctions enforcement regime was – likely intentionally — unenforced to pave the way for an understanding with Iran. The Trump administration has tried to correct the situation through maximum pressure campaign. So far, attempts have been unsuccessful and oil trade between Iran and China has grown.
Beijing is also concerned over Iran’s internal stability. Wide scale protests in the Islamic Republic have become more frequent and more robust. Coupled with strong Western sanctions, there is always the chance the crumpling of the very foundation of the Iranian state.
These geopolitical challenges pushed China to hold the April trilateral summit with Russia and Iran that explicitly stated displeasure with the US position on the nuclear issue.
Indeed, while Beijing supports Iran’s nuclear civilian program it remains concerned over nuclear proliferation. For Beijing, a nuclear Iran would likely set off an arms race in the Middle East, with states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt all vying to attain nuclear capabilities. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, Beijing “values Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons” and “appreciates Iran’s diplomatic efforts.”
This explains why the Chinese side prefers a new nuclear agreement akin to the one reached under Obama, which would allow the Iranian economy to shake off the heavy burden of sanctions. Lifting sanctions also means Chinese investments would enter the country facilitating Iran’s political stability. Yet, this comes with a major caveat such as a new agreement must also involve the Chinese side as a testament to the shifting global balance of power.
The resurrection of the 2015 JCPOA would not make sense for Beijing as the mechanisms underpinning the agreement back then are no longer relevant today.
In Beijing’s view, the US no longer possesses enough power to dominate Iran’s nuclear issue. In other words, the
negotiations should be based on a multilateral basis. Iran and Russia too seem to align with this vision. Indeed, perhaps it was this sentiment that was reflected in an April 7 announcement by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a second round of trilateral consultations with the Chinese and Russian sides.
To date, the Chinese have been openly against any US-led military solution to Iran’s nuclear program. Surprisingly, Washington and Beijing could still find some common ground. In fact, parts of the US political establishment prefer a negotiated solution to the problem and it could serve as a point for alignment between China and the US around Iran. Even U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that allowing Iran to have a civil nuclear energy program without enrichment capabilities could be an option.
Surely, even if Iran and the US reach a consensus without Beijing’s active involvement, the latter would still support the progress. Faced with a fait accompli, Beijing is expected to hail it as a positive development as it would open the door to greater Chinese economic involvement in Iran and the wider region. It will also decrease geopolitical pressure on China when it comes to balancing its relations between Iran and the Arab states – both sides have feared that Beijing might move closer to either side.
Looking Ahead
For China, maintaining close ties with Iran would now be more important given the US government’s push for expanding bilateral relations with the Gulf states. Trump’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE will lead to closer ties with these countries and Beijing cannot stay on the sidelines. It will attempt to get closer to the Gulf states while also emphasizing relations with the Islamic Republic in line with its traditional approach to balanced relations in the region.
China’s support for the Islamic Republic will however fall within the existing constraints in which the country has historically operated in the Middle East. Beijing does not seek formal alliances in the region since it is seen as a relic from the age of liberal internationalism and the West’s predominant position globally. This means that China will mostly pursue engagement with the Middle East via greater trade levels especially through oil purchases.
China will also likely abstain from efforts to seriously challenge the US in the region. The latter retains an unparalleled military power and China will continue to benefit from the indirect American naval security provisions. Equidistance in relations with the various countries of the Middle East will remain a defining feature of China’s engagement.
Ultimately, China’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program is driven less by ideology and more by strategic calculation. Beijing wants to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran and a heavily weakened Iran that would threaten energy supplies and destabilize its growing economic footprint across the Middle East. But it also seeks recognition as an important actor in shaping outcomes on major global security issues — a role the current U.S.-led unilateral strategy has largely denied it. Ideally, Beijing seeks a seat at the negotiating table — not just to protect its trade with Iran, but to assert a new vision of multipolar diplomacy that reflects its rising global ambitions.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.