Turan Research Center

Despite the instability now radiating from Iran, Moscow is not in panic mode. Rising oil prices and the prospect of China and other major importers reconsidering the Middle East as a reliable energy source could work in Moscow’s favor. But there is a larger issue beneath the immediate calculus: the war is stripping Moscow of strategic control over a regional policy it has spent years assembling.

Warning Signs

The American and Israeli strikes came as no surprise to Russia. The 12-day war, and the broader deterioration in U.S.–Iran relations preceding it, had already made such a scenario plausible. What the escalation revealed, however, is that Moscow was not fully prepared for this moment and is now hoping the situation will not spiral further.

Despite public statements of mutual support, Russia evacuated a large number of diplomats alongside ordinary citizens. The Russian state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom has suspended construction of new units at the Bushehr nuclear power plant after its director, Alexey Likhachev, reported explosions within a few kilometers from the facility’s defensive perimeter. As he noted, the strikes were aimed at nearby military facilities, although the threat to the plant itself is clearly growing. Part of Rosatom’s staff has already evacuated part of its staff from Iran. On March 8, the Russian Consulate in Isfahan was damaged during strikes; no casualties were reported, but several employees were thrown back by the blast wave.

The fate of the Sirik thermal power plant in Hormozgan province, under construction by Russian specialists, remains unknown, as does the status of ZN Vostok’s operations across at least five oil fields. These projects have, in all likelihood, been suspended, with personnel evacuated.

The immediate disruption points to a deeper problem. The military escalation is challenging Russia’s presence in Iran and its existing projects in the country. Even if the Islamic Republic survives the current conflict, many of Moscow’s initiatives in Iran now face an uncertain future. Large, complex projects require a baseline of stability that the combination of economic stress, internet shutdowns, recurring protests, and active military conflict makes impossible to guarantee.

The most consequential casualty may be the North–South Transport Corridor. Long questioned on profitability grounds, it nonetheless held strategic significance for Moscow after being severed from traditional European transit routes in 2022. With Turkey and China potentially susceptible to Western sanctions pressure, Iran was seen as a partner with no incentive to comply, given that Tehran itself is under sanctions and has little incentive to observe them. However, the project requires significant investment as Iran’s infrastructure is in dire need of modernization. Russia had expressed its readiness to build the Rasht–Astara railway — connecting Russian and Iranian rail networks via Azerbaijan — and to finance it with a $1.5 billion loan. But completing the corridor would require far better upgrades to Iran’s transport infrastructure: hubs, warehouses, ports, and other facilities. Under current conditions, that goal is effectively out of reach.

The same applies to the proposed Iran gas hub, through which Russia planned to export natural gas via Iran’s pipeline network toward the Persian Gulf. First deliveries through the Azerbaijan pipeline were expected this year. Those plans are now unlikely to materialize.

Positive Outcomes 

The picture is not uniformly negative. The war and the threat of disruption to the Strait of Hormuz have caused oil prices to surge. How much additional revenue this generates for the Russian budget depends on how high prices climb and how long they hold — but the surge could help Moscow cope with growing economic uncertainty and potentially neutralize the impact of sanctions, at least for the rest of the year.

China, heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy, will likely draw lessons from the crisis and seek to diversify its oil and gas imports. Russia, which supplies China primarily through pipelines, stands to become one of the main beneficiaries of that shift. India, meanwhile, was already resisting U.S. pressure to reduce Russian oil imports; the current conflict makes New Delhi even less likely to comply, and Russian crude purchases will probably continue.

There are indirect benefits in the Ukrainian theater as well. European officials are already warning that the conflict in the Middle East is drawing global attention away from Ukraine — but the consequences for Kyiv may go further. The United States, focused on confronting Iran, is depleting weapons stocks, including Patriot interceptors that Ukraine relies on for its defense. As a result, the war in the Middle East could shape outcomes on the battlefield in Eastern Europe.

Russia’s foothold in Iran is unlikely to disappear. If the Islamic Republic survives, it will emerge even more isolated than before — relations with several former regional partners, such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, have already been significantly damaged by missile and drone strikes carried out by Iranian forces. Facing economic deterioration and a narrowing field of international partners, Tehran may become more dependent on Moscow, not less. Russia’s role as a supplier of weapons to the Islamic Republic could grow significantly, especially if the situation evolves into a civil war or an insurgency. Russia is also a major supplier of grain to Iran, giving it leverage in the country’s food security.

 The constraint is Iran’s ability to pay. With finances under severe strain, the two countries could move toward an arrangement modeled on Russia’s experience in Syria and the Central African Republic: loans extended in exchange for preferential access to mineral resources, control over key infrastructure, and special privileges for Russian businesses in the country.

 Loss of Control

On balance, Russia is not particularly alarmed by what is unfolding in Iran —the developments produce costs and benefits in roughly equal measure. If the Islamic Republic survives while generating sustained regional instability, Moscow could emerge as a net beneficiary: higher oil prices, new pipeline dependency from China and India, and a more pliable Tehran.

A significant share of the negative consequences — a potential refugee crisis, regional destabilization — would fall on neighboring countries rather than on Russia directly. The critical conditions are that the conflict does not escalate into a truly large-scale war, does not disrupt Russia’s alternative transit routes through countries like Turkey, and does not produce regime change in Tehran. The latter is particularly important, as almost any government that might replace the Islamic Republic would be far less interested in maintaining such close relations with Moscow. If these conditions are met, Russia may ultimately gain far more than it loses.

 There is, however, a dimension that cuts deeper than the immediate ledger. Trump’s strikes against Iran are undermining the entire strategy that Russia has been constructing in the Middle East. The situation is becoming highly unpredictable —not in a way that simply reshuffles gains and losses, but in a way that forecloses coherent long-term planning. Moscow may find itself able only to react, improvising responses to events it no longer has any capacity to shape.

For Russia, in other words, the consequences of this war may prove far more complex than a transaction of gains against losses. What is at stake is whether Moscow retains any strategic agency at all.

Nikita Smagin is an international affairs researcher, journalist, and expert on Iran, Russian policy in the Middle East, and Islamism. His work has appeared in academic journals and media outlets in Russian and English, including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Al-Monitor, and The Moscow Times. He has been cited as an expert on world affairs by The New York Times, Bloomberg, The Guardian, CNN, BBC, and other leading international outlets. He is the author of Iran for Everyone: Paradoxes of Life in an Autocracy under Sanctions.