Turan Research Center

Since early June, Georgia and Central Asia have seen an unprecedented level of senior political engagement. In a remarkably short period, Georgia’s Prime Minister has met the leaders of all five Central Asian republics, and Georgia has signed strategic partnership agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Much of this activity is linked, unsurprisingly, to the Middle Corridor and to Georgia’s growing potential as a transit hub connecting Central Asia with Europe. Set against Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s declaration of a multi-vector foreign policy, the surge is increasingly read as evidence of a new, or at least a prolonged, direction in Georgian foreign policy. But is engagement with Central Asia a strategy in its own right, or a post-hoc rationalization of the rupture with Brussels?

Georgia and Central Asia: a Relationship Waiting to Develop

Historically, the two regions were bound together within the Soviet Union, yet relations since independence have rarely been close or strategically significant. Bilateral trade has long been dominated by the re-export of used cars from Georgiato Central Asian markets — a business that generates considerable turnover but adds limited economic value.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, economic relations between Georgia and the Central Asian states have expanded significantly, driven largely by that same re-export trade. Trade with Kyrgyzstan rose especially sharply, and by 2024 Kyrgyzstan had become one of Georgia’s major trading partners. The surge has drawn scrutiny, with some analysts suggesting that Georgia–Kyrgyzstan trade may serve as a channel for Russia to circumvent Western sanctions. That flow now appears to be contracting: according to Geostat, Georgia’s exports to Kyrgyzstan reached USD 431.8 million in January–June 2026, down 36.6% from USD 681.3 million in the same period of 2025. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has traditionally been Georgia’s most significant economic partner in Central Asia, although bilateral trade and investment remain below their potential. The emergence of the Middle Corridor has the potential to reshape that relationship, shifting it from primarily trade-based ties toward deeper cooperation in transport, logistics, and energy.

The Middle Corridor as a Game-Changer

The Middle Corridor has brought Georgia and Central Asia closer together than ever before. By connecting China and Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and Europe, the route offers Central Asian states a distinctive pathway to European markets. This matters particularly for the region’s landlocked economies, which are estimated to lose around 2% of their GDP annually to inadequate connectivity.

Kazakhstan has been one of the corridor’s key proponents, but Astana’s interest in Georgian transit infrastructure predates the route’s recent rise to geopolitical prominence. Kazakhstan has long regarded Georgia as an important connectivity node linking Central Asia to European markets. Its acquisition of an oil terminal at Batumi Port, followed by construction of a new terminal at Poti Port, gave an early indication of that strategic interest. The recently upgraded strategic partnership between Tbilisi and Astana could strengthen bilateral economic ties further while reinforcing the continuity and reliability of the corridor. Kazakhstan is already one of the corridor’s most important sources of cargo and strategic resources, and that role is set to grow: in cooperation with China, it plans to develop another port at Kuryk, which will raise the corridor’s cargo capacity and draw additional volumes toward Georgian infrastructure.

Uzbekistan presents another significant opportunity. As the region’s most populous country and an increasingly consequential economic actor, it could generate substantial additional cargo for Georgia’s ports and railways. Its deepening connectivity with China, and its rapidly developing transport links with Pakistan through the Kabul Corridor and Iran, could pull further cargo onto the Middle Corridor and raise its geostrategic weight. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has since announced plans for a 500,000-tonne logistics centre at Georgia’s Poti port by 2027, alongside the practical implementation of an Uzbek project at the planned Anaklia Deep Sea Port.

For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, access to Georgia and the Middle Corridor will depend largely on their connectivity with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Even so, the development of regional transport networks could eventually give both countries greater access to European markets via the Trans-Caspian route.

Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov visited Georgia with the Middle Corridor firmly on the agenda, but the potential for cooperation between Tbilisi and Ashgabat extends well beyond transit. Georgia has the capacity to receive Turkmen oil and gas and potentially facilitate their access to European markets. Persistent energy competition, limited infrastructure, and connectivity challenges between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have kept that potential largely theoretical. The difficulty became concrete in early 2026, when Black Sea Petroleum, Georgia’s first full-scale refinery, sought to replace Russian oil with Turkmen crude. As the company’s chief executive, David Potskhveria, put it: “Unfortunately, and somewhat unexpectedly, rail transit through Azerbaijan for our direction has become difficult. We reached an agreement for Turkmen crude several months ago, but its transport has been postponed.”Berdimuhamedov’s state visit to Baku in June offers some grounds for optimism that the two capitals may move beyond their traditional rivalry. Without improved Azerbaijani–Turkmen connectivity, however, Turkmen oil reaching European markets through the South Caucasus will remain an unrealized opportunity rather than a viable project.

Geography Alone is Not Enough

The Anaklia Deep Sea Port could become another important component of this emerging partnership. Georgia’s Minister of Economy has invited Middle Corridor participants, including Central Asian states as well as Chinese and Azerbaijani partners, to take part in developing and managing terminals at Anaklia. The European Union, notably, was not mentioned in the minister’s remarks, despite its importance to both the corridor and Georgia itself. That is not to say Western firms are absent from the project: the Belgian dredging group Jan De Nul, which began work in the port’s marine area in August, is already operating alongside Georgian companies. The more important question is whether China itself is willing to play the role Tbilisi initially expected of it.

So far, the answer appears to be no. China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbour Investment, which held a 49% stake in Anaklia under the previous model, have withdrawn from the project. Georgia has since moved toward a landlord model in which the state retains ownership of the core infrastructure while international companies are brought in to develop and operate individual terminals. The withdrawal matters not simply as a development in the Anaklia project, but as a reminder of the limits of Georgia’s eastern-oriented connectivity strategy. China remains an important economic actor in the Middle Corridor, yet its interests do not necessarily correspond with Georgia’s strategic vision of the route as a major bridge between China and Europe. Beijing has continued to develop alternatives, including the Northern Sea Route through Russia’s Arctic waters. China, in other words, may treat the Middle Corridor as one component of a broader portfolio of connectivity options rather than as its primary route to Europe.

This is precisely where Georgia’s strategic value comes into focus. The corridor’s significance does not rest on its becoming a major conduit for Chinese cargo alone. Its longer-term importance may lie instead in strengthening connectivity between Europe and Central Asia, particularly as Central Asian states seek to diversify their trade and export routes. Georgia’s greatest advantage, then, is not its ability to connect China with Central Asia — those two can increasingly connect without it — but its position as the critical link between Central Asia and European markets.

Why Georgia's "Europeanness" Matters for Central Asia

This raises a fundamental question. If Georgia’s value to Central Asia is primarily geographical, why should its relationship with the European Union matter so much? Cargo does not check a country’s EU accession status before crossing its territory, and Türkiye remains a major Middle Corridor node despite its stalled accession process. Georgia’s European orientation does not determine whether it can physically function as a transit country. It determines how effectively that geography can be converted into a reliable and commercially attractive connection to European markets.

First, European alignment matters for financing. The Middle Corridor requires major investment in ports, railways, customs systems, and digital infrastructure. EU initiatives such as Global Gateway, alongside EIB and EBRD lending, can supply both capital and technical support. This is particularly relevant for capital-intensive projects such as Anaklia, whose development extends toward the end of the decade.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, there is sanctions compliance. The corridor’s commercial appeal rests partly on its offering an alternative to routes through Russia. If Georgia acquires a reputation as a channel for sanctions circumvention, it risks undermining the very advantage that makes the route attractive to the European companies and Central Asian exporters it is meant to serve.

Third, regulatory alignment matters. Customs procedures, transport standards, and digital documentation determine whether cargo moves efficiently or faces costly delay. Convergence with European practice improves both the competitiveness and the predictability of the route.

Finally, political and regulatory alignment shapes how investors and insurers price risk. The Middle Corridor is a multi-decade infrastructure undertaking, and institutional predictability is not a soft consideration but a commercial one.

Georgia’s challenge, then, is not simply to remain geographically situated between Central Asia and Europe. Geography supplies the opportunity; political credibility, regulatory reliability, and access to European markets determine whether that opportunity stays commercially valuable. Georgia does not need Europe in order to be a bridge. It needs Europe to ensure that the bridge remains worth using.

Sooner or later, therefore, Tbilisi will need to restart its engagement with Brussels. As recent dynamics in Georgia–EU relations have shown, that will not happen on the strength of geography alone. It will depend on reforms and alignment with EU policies, as David McAllister, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, has emphasized — the Union, in his words, cannot treat a candidate country “purely as a transactional partner.”

Paradoxical as it may sound, Georgia’s “Europeanness” is today very much in Central Asia’s interest as well. Rather than distancing itself from Europe, Georgia needs to align with the European Union more than ever — not only for the sake of its own European aspirations, but for the long-term development of the Middle Corridor and for sustaining Central Asian interest in Georgia as a stable and reliable transit route.

Keeping the Bridge Open

Georgia’s growing engagement with Central Asia is not necessarily a turn away from Europe. The opposite may be closer to the truth: the more important Central Asia becomes for Georgia, the more valuable Georgia’s connection to Europe becomes for Central Asian states.

The Middle Corridor has given Tbilisi an opportunity to move beyond its traditional role as a regional transit country and become a critical link between Central Asian economies and European markets. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and potentially Turkmenistan have strong incentives to use that link. Their interest, however, will not rest on Georgian geography alone. It will rest on whether the route is reliable, competitive, well-financed, and politically credible.

Herein lies the paradox of Georgia’s current balancing act. Engagement with Central Asia can diversify the country’s economic and foreign-policy options, but turning that engagement into a sustainable strategy ultimately requires stronger ties with Europe. Central Asia does not simply need a route to the Black Sea; it needs a dependable route to European markets.

For Tbilisi, the choice should not be between looking East and looking West. Georgia’s strategic advantage lies precisely in its ability to connect the two. But to remain the route Central Asia chooses, Georgia must ensure that its bridge to Europe stays open, trusted, and commercially attractive. Geography gave Georgia the bridge. Its foreign policy will determine whether Central Asia continues to use it.

 Bako Kheladze is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Irregular Warfare Initiative, specializing in international relations and security studies, with a particular focus on Iran, the South Caucasus, and Eurasian geopolitics. He holds an M.A. in International Security Studies from the University of Leicester. Previously, he served as a Press Officer at the Embassy of Georgia to the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is fluent in Georgian, English, Persian, and Russian.