Over the past year, relations between Egypt and Iran have undergone a marked thaw. The war in Gaza, anxiety over Israel's expanding military operations, a deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea, and the practical need for cooperation in trade and investments have pushed Iran and Egypt toward rapprochement. The drive for normalization has been so strong that not even the US-Israel war on Iran has undermined it.
The war and Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone strikes on Gulf countries’ oil and other vital infrastructure have, paradoxically, united much of the Arab world. Egypt, however, is striving to strike a balance and position itself as a mediator between the warring sides. On March 12, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty argued that Cairo would continue working to help end the war. On March 23, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi began a Gulf tour aimed at showing solidarity with the Arab states while also seeking a mediating role. Egypt fears an economic downturn from a potential collapse in tourism, and hundreds of thousands of Egyptians working in the Gulf face instability that would ripple back to Cairo.
But Egypt’s interest in mediation also has a deeper strategic logic. Cairo and Tehran have been normalizing their ties for some time. In February, just before the war broke out, reports emerged that Egypt and Iran had reached an agreement on fully restoring diplomatic ties by reopening embassies in each other’s capitals. If confirmed, this would mark a major development in the Middle East.
The agreement follows a series of high-level exchanges between the two countries. In September, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Cairo to finalize a technical arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, restoring Tehran’s cooperation with the world’s principal nuclear oversight body. Although the so-called “Cairo Agreement” ended following an IAEA Board of Governors resolution urging Tehran to provide greater transparency on its nuclear facilities and enriched uranium, Egyptian officials quietly suggested that Cairo had played a sustained behind-the-scenes role in brokering the deal.
Araghchi’s September trip followed his third visit to Egypt in June 2025, during which he met with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to discuss regional security and potential avenues for engagement. But such high-level contact has not been limited to foreign ministers: in December 2024, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation summit in Cairo, signaling Tehran’s interest in expanding its economic ties. And in July 2025, Iran renamed a street previously dedicated to Khalid Al-Islambouli, the mastermind behind Anwar Sadat’s assassination — a symbolic but geopolitically significant gesture that underscored the Islamic Republic’s willingness to change its posture toward Egypt.
The most recent meeting between Egyptian and Iranian leaders took place on the sidelines of the emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha in September 2025, convened in response to the Israeli attack on Hamas in Qatar, when the two sides released a joint statement on the need to deepen bilateral cooperation. This diplomatic tempo continued into late December, when Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty spoke with Araghchi about “ways to enhance bilateral relations and exchange views on regional issues of mutual concern, foremost among them developments related to Iran’s nuclear file.”
A Long Rupture, a New Opening
The momentum behind Egypt-Iran normalization has the potential to reshape Middle East geopolitics. Relations between the two countries have been severed since 1979, when the Islamic Revolution reversed what had been a historically cordial relationship. Tehran cut ties after Cairo granted asylum to the ousted Mohammad Reza Shah and Egypt’s subsequent alignment with Iraq during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Although there occurred a brief flirtation with normalization between 2012 and 2013 — marked by then-President Mohamed Morsi’s visit to Tehran and then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s trip to Cairo — conciliation never matured into a substantive reset.
Today, however, conditions are markedly different.
A series of regional shifts over the past few years has helped erode the long-standing hostility between Egypt and Iran. The China-brokered normalization between Iran and Saudi Arabia followed Tehran’s earlier rapprochement with the United Arab Emirates. Both shifts signaled that the Islamic Republic was no longer isolated within the Arab world. This is likely to change due to the Israeli-US war on Iran and the latter’s retaliation but Egypt is unlikely to shift its position. At the same time, Turkey’s posture toward Iran has changed. Since Tehran’s regional power has been significantly diminished over the Gaza war, Ankara has moved quickly to expand its footprint in Syria and, to a lesser extent, into Iraq. Yet a severely weakened Iran is not in Turkey’s strategic interest. An unstable Iran could cause instability on their common border, boost Kurdish separatism, and further strengthen Israel. Ankara has therefore sought to bolster Tehran where possible.
The crisis in the Red Sea added a new layer of urgency to Cairo’s calculations. As the Houthis — often acting independently but broadly aligned with Iran’s within Axis of Resistance — began attacking international shipping, Egypt faced the prospect of significant revenue losses and mounting economic pressure. This made Cairo increasingly interested in finding common ground with Iran to minimize the fallout. At the same time, Egypt is seeking to reassert itself as a mediator in the wider Red Sea region, and a normalization of ties with Iran fits neatly into that ambition by expanding Cairo’s influence.
There is also a strategic economic dimension. Should renewed nuclear diplomacy lead to sanctions relief for Iran, Egypt stands to benefit indirectly; Iranian crude routed through Iraq could become more accessible, while a more stable regional environment would reinforce the Suez Canal’s role as a principal artery for the transit of energy.
Egypt is also increasingly uneasy about the dramatic shift in the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor — both along its northeastern frontier and across much of its northeastern frontier and across much of the Middle East. Although Egypt has maintained a stable, decades-long peace with the Jewish state, it views Israel’s expanding military reach and political assertiveness with growing concern. The erosion of Iran’s regional power, accelerated by the Gaza war, has opened space in Syria, particularly along Israel’s northeastern frontier, that Jerusalem has been quick to fill.
Rapprochement with Iran also positions Egypt as a potential mediator between Tehran and Washington. Both capitals see value in Cairo’s regional standing and its interest in regional stability. This dynamic was made explicit before the current conflict, when on January 15, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Cairo was actively working to prevent another round of military escalation between Washington and Tehran.
Another powerful incentive for Egypt-Iran rapprochement is the position of the Arab states. Up until the ongoing war, the Gulf region has generally viewed the trend as positive. The wealthy Arab states themselves have significantly improved relations with Iran, and the shift in Cairo-Tehran dynamics, in their view, will only expand de-escalation in the Middle East. The war may complicate this dynamic, but the Gulf states will likely remain keen to pursue de-escalation with Tehran — and Cairo's mediating role could prove useful in that effort.
Iran, for its part, has seen its regional power sharply curtailed and is now seeking to normalize relations with countries that once formed the core of the anti-Iranian bloc, mainly the Gulf states. Egypt was among them, and rapprochement with Cairo helps Tehran ease political pressure from within the Arab world. Iran is also working to mitigate Western sanctions — a central pillar of its foreign policy, particularly in light of the January protests across the country, which resulted in thousands of casualties and underscored the regime’s vulnerability.
Therefore, the path toward Egypt-Iran rapprochement has long been in the making and, above all, has become a strategic necessity for both countries.
Persistent Constraints
Although momentum is building and both sides seem to have reached an agreement on fully restoring diplomatic ties, constraints remain that would limit the level of rapprochement. For Egypt, a central limitation is its security and overall geopolitical orientation — both are deeply anchored in cooperation with the United States, Israel, and key Gulf states. This alignment makes any rapid — let alone comprehensive — rehabilitation of relations with the Islamic Republic politically sensitive. Cairo also remains highly skeptical of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. In Gaza, Egypt serves as the principal intermediary between Israel and Hamas despite its distrust of Hamas’s Islamist roots. Given that Iran continues to support Hamas, this divergence highlights the limits of convergence. Moreover, any escalation in Gaza, Syria, or the Red Sea could quickly undermine the fragile progress made so far.
On the economic front, the benefits of renewed ties remain limited. Tourism and trade offer only marginal gains, and the Western sanctions imposed on Iran continue to limit any meaningful economic cooperation between Cairo and Tehran. For instance, 2023 bilateral trade reached a meagre $5.1 million. For Egypt, commercial ties with its Gulf partners remain far more important. Another powerful constraint is the US position. So far, Washington has been cautious about Cairo-Tehran rapprochement: too much normalization could harm the US and Israeli interests in the region. At the same time, a certain level of normalization of ties could benefit regional de-escalation.
Outlook
Looking ahead, the thaw in Iran-Egypt relations reflects a strategic recalibration shaped by broader regional changes. For Tehran, engagement with Cairo has become increasingly necessary as its regional strategy adapts to its diminished influence and shifting alliances. For Egypt, the ambition to restore diplomatic centrality requires maintaining dialogue with all consequential actors — Tehran included.
Yet decades of ideological antagonism and strategic rivalry impose clear limits on how far normalization can go. The relationship is likely to remain pragmatic and transactional: it carries the potential to reshape the Middle Eastern balance of power, but for now it remains a tactical adjustment rather than a strategic realignment. The ongoing war will test whether that adjustment proves durable — or whether it becomes another false start in a long history of them.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.