Turan Research Center

Introduction

In January 2025, reports emerged that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had assured U.S. envoy Steven Witkoff that Tehran would not carry out 800 executions of protesters. According to multiple accounts, this assurance may have led President Donald Trump to halt a planned military strike against Iran. The episode raises a question with serious implications for both Iranian society and U.S. policy: Will the Islamic Republic follow through on mass executions, or will strategic considerations stay its hand?

The answer lies not in diplomatic assurances — which Tehran has broken before — but in understanding the regime's internal calculus when ideology collides with survival. For over four decades, the Islamic Republic has navigated between revolutionary principle and strategic necessity, sometimes sacrificing enormous national interests for ideological purity, and at other times shelving sacred commitments to preserve the system itself. The historical record reveals clear patterns about when each imperative prevails, offering insights into whether the current wave of protesters faces the gallows or a reprieve.

This paper examines the ideological and strategic factors that will determine the fate of Iran's detained protesters. It analyzes past episodes when the regime prioritized revolutionary doctrine over national interest, contrasts these with moments when survival imperatives forced ideological compromise, and applies these patterns to assess the likelihood of mass executions. The conclusion challenges conventional Western assumptions about both Iranian decision-making and the efficacy of external pressure.

The Doctrine of System Preservation

To understand Iran's approach to domestic dissent, one must first grasp the theological framework that governs the Islamic Republic. The regime operates on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurist, which transforms political survival into religious obligation. Protecting the Islamic government is not merely a matter of state security — it is a divine duty that supersedes conventional ethical constraints.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's founder, articulated this principle with stark clarity. In various speeches, he declared that preserving the Islamic system constitutes the highest religious obligation, particularly when facing internal or external threats. In a 1983 address to officials, Khomeini went further, stating that maintaining the Islamic Republic "takes precedence over the life of any single person, even Imam Mahdi" — the twelfth Shi'a Imam revered as the promised redeemer. The statement is theologically radical: it places the political system above the most sacred figure in Shi'a eschatology.

After 1979, the regime systematically subordinated Iran's traditional religious establishment to political control, monopolizing the interpretation of Shi'ism and defining what constitutes proper Islamic governance. No religious authority could challenge these definitions without risking persecution. This consolidation meant that threats to the regime could be framed as threats to Islam itself, requiring a religious response from all faithful Muslims in Iran.

The doctrine has been implemented with brutal consistency. In April 1979, security forces suppressed an uprising in Khuzestan province, killing more than a hundred Arab Iranians seeking autonomy. The Kurdish revolt, which began in March 1979 and lasted over four years, claimed 5,000 Kurdish fighters and resulted in 1,200 executions. But the most chilling application came in the summer of 1988, when Khomeini ordered the mass execution of political prisoners — including leftists, Kurdish activists, and Baha'is — even as the Iran-Iraq War was ending and the country desperately needed reconstruction. Between July and December of that year, between 2,800 and 5,000 people were executed without trial in Iranian prisons.

These principles remain operative today. Following the suppression of the 2022 "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests, then-President Ebrahim Raisi visited the Fatehin Special Unit — an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) formation responsible for crushing dissent — and reiterated that "preserving the Islamic system is the highest religious obligation."

The Legal Machinery of Religious Repression

The regime's willingness to execute protesters rests on two complementary concepts embedded in the Islamic Republic's criminal law: Mohareb and Baghi. These categories transform political dissent into capital offenses while cloaking state violence in religious legitimacy.

Mohareb, defined as "someone who wages war against God and society," and Baghi, defined as "a rebel who takes up arms against the legitimate government," provide the legal and Islamic framework for executing those who challenge the system. Crucially, Shi'a jurists aligned with Velayat-e Faqih perceive domestic protesters not as citizens with grievances but as existential threats to the Islamic order. The judiciary has consistently labeled mass protesters under these categories, transforming demands for reform into acts of war against God.

During the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the judicial system characterized protesters as engaged in "armed rebellion" against God and society. Following the 2026 protests, Asghar Jahangir, spokesperson for the judiciary, again invoked the Mohareb designation. For the regime, enforcing capital punishment in these cases is not discretionary — it is a religious obligation. Failure to act would constitute defiance of divine command, a grave sin in the regime's theological framework.

This creates a powerful internal logic: regime officials face religious pressure to execute those deemed threats to the system. Any hint of leniency risks being interpreted as weakness before God, potentially undermining an official's standing within the ideological hierarchy. The question, then, is whether strategic considerations can override this theological imperative.

When Ideology Trumps Strategy: Six Cases

The Islamic Republic's history reveals multiple instances when the regime chose ideological purity over obvious strategic advantage, often at devastating cost. These cases establish a pattern: when core ideological commitments or clerical authority are at stake, Tehran has repeatedly sacrificed national interests.

The Rushdie Fatwa: Permanent Diplomatic Damage for Clerical Authority

Perhaps no decision better illustrates this pattern than Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against novelist Salman Rushdie. The timing revealed its strategic irrationality. The Iran-Iraq War had just ended after eight years of devastating conflict. Iran's economy lay shattered, its cities damaged, its population exhausted. The regime desperately needed reconstruction aid and normalized trade relations with Europe.

The fatwa destroyed these prospects immediately. Britain severed diplomatic ties. European investment evaporated. Iran's image as a potentially normalizing state collapsed overnight. Yet the regime never formally rescinded the fatwa, despite repeated opportunities over subsequent decades to do so at minimal political cost.

The logic was ideological, not strategic. Revoking the fatwa would have implied clerical fallibility and undermined the foundational claim that the Supreme Leader's religious rulings carry divine authority. The regime chose long-term ideological credibility over short-term diplomatic and economic gain. Decades later, despite warming relations with Europe at various points, the fatwa remains in force — one of the clearest examples of ideology trumping strategy in modern statecraft.

Hostility Toward Israel: The Enemy That Justifies Everything

Iran's uncompromising stance toward Israel operates on similar logic. While Tehran has at times modulated its approach to the United States, engaging in backchannel negotiations and even cooperation, it has consistently refused to soften its position on Israel. The regime will not recognize the Israeli state, continues to deny Israel's legitimacy in official rhetoric, and maintains maximalist positions even when unnecessary for deterrence.

At multiple junctures — particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s — reducing rhetorical hostility toward Israel could have eased international pressure at minimal internal cost. The regime chose otherwise. Anti-Zionism is foundational to Iran's revolutionary narrative, and Israel functions as the symbolic enemy that legitimizes militarization, regional proxy networks, and domestic repression. Retreat on this front would risk unraveling the regime's ideological coherence, a cost Tehran has refused to pay.

The Hostage Crisis: Revolutionary Consolidation Through Catastrophe

The 1979-1981 seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its 52 hostages followed similar logic. The crisis paralyzed Iran's economy, undermined moderate factions, triggered sanctions, and established a framework of U.S.-Iranian hostility that persists today. Strategically, it was catastrophic. Yet the leadership allowed it to continue for 444 days, even after the costs became undeniable.

The hostage crisis served ideological purposes: it consolidated revolutionary power, destroyed liberal and nationalist rivals within Iran's fractured post-revolutionary elite, and established the regime's anti-imperialist credentials. Ideological mobilization mattered more than international standing or economic welfare. The pattern would repeat: ideology as a tool of internal consolidation, deployed even at enormous external cost.

Exporting the Revolution: Inviting Invasion

In its early years, Iran openly called for overthrowing neighboring regimes, supported subversive movements throughout the Gulf, and rejected basic norms of state sovereignty. These actions directly endangered Iran's security and helped trigger Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion, which would claim hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives over eight years.

The regime persisted because it was still defining itself, and leaders believed revolutionary expansion was necessary for survival. Retreat would have signaled weakness at this formative moment. Only when survival itself became threatened did expansion give way to defensive consolidation. During the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini doubled down on revolutionary export, claiming the “road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala.”

The 1988 Prison Massacres: Purification During Vulnerability

Even as Iran was ending the catastrophic war with Iraq and desperately needed reconstruction, the regime carried out mass executions of political prisoners in 1988. Strategically, this was unnecessary and damaging, inviting international condemnation at precisely the moment Iran needed to rehabilitate its image.

But the leadership feared ideological contamination more than external pressure. Internal enemies were perceived as existential threats regardless of cost. The regime prioritized ideological purification during a moment of maximum vulnerability — a decision that presaged its approach to future domestic unrest.

Mandatory Hijab: The Symbol That Cannot Bend

Despite repeated waves of unrest — including the massive 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests triggered by Mahsa Amini's death — the regime has refused to abolish mandatory hijab laws. The strategic costs are clear: continuous protests, alienation of youth, loss of legitimacy among educated urbanites, and international condemnation.

Yet ideology prevails. The hijab represents clerical authority over public life. Backing down would signal that mass protest can rewrite Islamic law, establishing a precedent the regime fears more than ongoing unrest. As with the Rushdie fatwa, retreat would imply clerical fallibility — an admission the system cannot afford.

When Survival Trumps Ideology: Seven Cases

The Islamic Republic's willingness to compromise ideology is less well understood but equally consistent. When the regime has faced genuine existential threats, it has demonstrated remarkable flexibility, shelving core revolutionary principles to preserve the system. These cases establish the conditions under which ideological compromise becomes possible.

The "Poisoned Chalice": Khomeini's Strategic Retreat

In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini accepted UN Resolution 598, ending the Iran-Iraq War on terms he had spent years rejecting. He had insisted the war must continue until Saddam Hussein was overthrown, framing it as a sacred struggle. By 1988, however, Iran faced military exhaustion, economic collapse, U.S. naval intervention in the Gulf, and real risk of elite fracture and popular uprising.

Khomeini described accepting the ceasefire as "drinking a poison chalice" — an unusually candid admission of ideological defeat. The statement established a template: preserve the Islamic Republic even if revolutionary ideals must be shelved. The survival of the system superseded the maximalist goals that had justified eight years of war.

Post-Khomeini Pragmatism: Abandoning Revolutionary Economics

After Khomeini's death in 1989, the regime faced economic ruin and a legitimacy crisis. President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani abandoned radical economic policies including aggressive nationalization and war economy measures, prioritizing reconstruction, foreign investment, and oil revenue. Iran quietly sought better relations with Europe and regional states.

This wasn't ideological liberalization — it was technocratic survivalism. The revolution's form was preserved, but much of its early economic content was softened or discarded. The flexibility demonstrated that revolutionary doctrine could be reinterpreted when the alternative was systemic collapse.

Scaling Back Revolutionary Export: Going Underground

After incidents like the 1992 Mykonos restaurant assassinations in Berlin nearly collapsed Iran's ties with Europe, the regime recalibrated its approach to exporting the revolution. Tehran scaled back overt assassinations abroad, reduced rhetorical calls for overthrowing regional governments, and rebranded its foreign policy language while maintaining proxy networks through less visible means.

The ideology didn't disappear — it went underground and became more deniable. The regime demonstrated it could modulate revolutionary zeal when faced with severe international isolation and intelligence warfare that threatened its security.

The Taliban's Enemy: Post-9/11 Cooperation

Perhaps most striking was Iran's quiet cooperation with the United States after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Despite "Death to America" being a foundational revolutionary slogan, Iran shared intelligence against the Taliban, helped shape the post-Taliban Afghan government, and facilitated U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

This cooperation occurred because Iran feared becoming the next target after Afghanistan, especially with U.S. forces building up on its borders. The Taliban were Sunni extremists hostile to Shi'a Iran, making cooperation strategically logical, but it required temporarily deprioritizing ideological hostility to America — a significant compromise.

The "Grand Bargain" That Wasn't: 2003 Panic

In 2003, as U.S. forces swept through Iraq, Iran reportedly offered comprehensive negotiations covering nuclear transparency, implicit recognition of Israel, and limits on support for militant groups. Whether this offer was fully authorized at the highest levels remains disputed, but its existence reflects genuine elite panic.

The regime was willing to discuss previously untouchable ideological red lines when it believed its survival was directly threatened by U.S. military force. The episode reveals how regime-change fears can override even core revolutionary commitments.

"Heroic Flexibility": The 2015 Nuclear Deal

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) required Iran to accept severe limits on enrichment, intrusive inspections, and rhetorical softening toward diplomacy — all contradicting the regime's narrative of nuclear "resistance" and defiance of Western pressure. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei justified the compromise as "heroic flexibility," a revealing phrase that signals doctrine: ideology is flexible when the system faces existential risk.

The regime calculated that economic strangulation posed a greater threat than ideological concession. The JCPOA demonstrated that even core strategic programs could be constrained when the alternative was internal unrest driven by economic collapse.

Brutal Repression: Sacrificing Islamic Legitimacy

Paradoxically, the regime's repeated brutal suppression of mass protests — in 1999, 2009, 2017-18, 2019, 2022, and 2026 — represents another form of ideological compromise. By killing large numbers of protesters, lying transparently about casualties, and sidelining religious rhetoric in favor of raw coercion, the regime undercuts its own ideological self-image as a just Islamic state.

Yet survival trumps legitimacy. When faced with serious unrest, Tehran has consistently chosen violent repression over accommodation, accepting the damage to its Islamic credentials in exchange for maintaining control. This pattern suggests the regime views immediate survival as more important than long-term ideological consistency.

The Protester's Calculus: Four Determining Factors

Whether Iran executes hundreds of detained protesters depends on how the regime weighs four competing pressures. Each has historical precedent, and their interaction will determine the outcome.

Factor 1: Threat Perception—Existential or Manageable?

The regime's response will depend critically on whether it perceives the recent protests as an existential threat or a manageable challenge. The historical record suggests a clear pattern: when the system itself appears threatened, the regime responds with maximum force regardless of cost.

The 1988 prison massacres occurred precisely because the regime, exhausted from war, feared that surviving political prisoners represented an ideological contagion that could unravel revolutionary authority. The 2019 protests, which saw several hundred killed, were suppressed with exceptional brutality because they spread to working-class areas and included attacks on banks and government buildings — suggesting deeper social rage beyond middle-class reformism.

If regime elites conclude that current protesters represent a broader revolutionary movement rather than contained unrest, the ideological imperative to eliminate "enemies of God" will intensify. Conversely, if they assess the threat as manageable through imprisonment and selective punishment, mass executions become less likely.

Factor 2: International Pressure—Credible or Performative?

The reported Trump administration threat to strike Iran if executions proceed represents an unusual form of external pressure. Historically, Western criticism has rarely deterred Iranian repression, but credible military threats have occasionally altered regime calculations.

The key word is "credible." Tehran has extensive experience managing international condemnation and has shown willingness to accept severe diplomatic costs for ideological goals, as the Rushdie fatwa demonstrates. However, when faced with immediate, concrete threats to regime survival — as in 1988 with the ceasefire, or 2015 with the JCPOA — the regime has proven capable of tactical flexibility.

The challenge for external actors is that threats must be both credible and proportionate. If Tehran believes that refraining from executions will not fundamentally alter its relationship with the United States or spare it from regime-change pressure, the incentive to show restraint diminishes. The regime may calculate that it will face American hostility regardless, making the domestic imperative to execute "enemies of God" more salient than foreign policy considerations.

Factor 3: Internal Elite Cohesion—United or Fractured?

The regime's approach to political violence has historically depended on elite consensus. The 1988 prison massacres required coordination between the judiciary, the IRGC, and clerical authorities. The 2019 crackdown succeeded because hardliners dominated all key institutions.

If elements within the regime question the wisdom of mass executions — whether for pragmatic reasons or concern about long-term legitimacy — implementation becomes more difficult. However, there is little evidence of such dissent currently. President Ebrahim Raisi, who himself is linked to the 1988 executions, represented the ascendancy of hardliners committed to uncompromising repression. His death in 2024 and the selection of Masoud Pezeshkian as president potentially introduces uncertainty, though Pezeshkian operates within severe constraints imposed by hardline institutions.

More important is the IRGC's assessment. If the Guards leadership views executions as necessary for deterrence and system preservation, they will likely proceed regardless of diplomatic costs. The IRGC's increasing dominance over Iranian politics since 2009 means that revolutionary ideology, rather than pragmatic statecraft, increasingly drives decision-making on internal security matters.

Factor 4: Precedent and Deterrence—The Moral Hazard of Restraint

From the regime's perspective, showing mercy creates a dangerous precedent. If protesters believe they can challenge the system without facing capital punishment, the cost of dissent decreases and future unrest becomes more likely. This logic has driven previous waves of executions: the regime seeks to establish that certain forms of opposition carry an absolute, non-negotiable penalty.

The theological framework of Mohareb and Baghi reinforces this calculus. If the regime designates protesters as enemies of God, failing to execute them amounts to defying divine command. This creates internal pressure within the judiciary and security apparatus to follow through on death sentences, independent of external considerations.

However, the regime must also weigh whether mass executions will trigger even larger protests or potentially fracture its own support base. The Woman, Life, Freedom movement demonstrated that excessive repression can generate sustained domestic and international backlash. If executions risk catalyzing a broader revolutionary movement, they become counterproductive even from a pure survival perspective.

The Verdict: Between Ideology and Survival

The historical evidence points toward a grim conclusion: the Islamic Republic is more likely to execute significant numbers of protesters than to show systematic clemency, but the scale will depend on its threat assessment and the credibility of international consequences.

Three factors support the likelihood of executions:

First, theological imperative. The regime has consistently demonstrated that when core ideological principles — particularly clerical authority and the inviolability of the Islamic system — are at stake, it prioritizes ideology over strategic cost. The Rushdie fatwa, mandatory hijab enforcement, and the 1988 massacres all demonstrate this pattern. Designated as Mohareb, protesters represent not political opponents but enemies of God. The religious obligation to punish them creates powerful internal momentum toward execution.

Second, precedent and deterrence. The regime fears that restraint will encourage future unrest. Every major protest wave since 2009 has been met with escalating violence precisely because the regime concluded that insufficient repression in one cycle emboldened protesters in the next. From this perspective, executions serve a functional purpose beyond punishment: they raise the cost of dissent to prohibitive levels.

Third, hardline dominance. The current configuration of Iranian politics favors uncompromising repression. The IRGC, hardline judiciary, and conservative clerical establishment control all key institutions and have shown no indication of questioning the necessity of severe punishment for protesters. The ideological infrastructure that enabled the 1988 massacres remains firmly in place.

However, three factors could limit the scale of executions:

First, regime survival calculus. If mass executions threaten to trigger a broader revolutionary movement or risk catalyzing international military action that endangers the regime itself, Tehran has demonstrated capacity for tactical restraint. The 1988 ceasefire, post-Khomeini economic reforms, and 2015 nuclear deal all show that when survival is genuinely threatened, ideology can be shelved.

Second, international leverage. While Western diplomatic criticism alone has rarely deterred Iranian repression, concrete and credible threats — particularly military action — have occasionally altered regime behavior. The reported Trump administration warning, if backed by clear and proportional consequences, could influence Tehran's calculus. However, this influence is likely to result in reduced numbers rather than wholesale clemency.

Third, tactical flexibility. The regime may opt for a mixed approach: executing a significant but not catastrophic number to establish deterrence while showing selective mercy to manage international pressure and avoid the appearance of mass slaughter. This would allow Tehran to satisfy its ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" while maintaining plausible deniability about systematic repression.

Policy Implications: The Limits of Engagement

For policymakers in Washington and European capitals, the analysis yields sobering conclusions about leverage and limits. Four implications merit emphasis:

Diplomatic assurances should be treated with extreme skepticism. Foreign Minister Araghchi's reported promise to forgo 800 executions should be understood as tactical rather than binding. The regime has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to mislead international interlocutors when core ideological commitments are at stake. Any claims that executions have been "abrogated" likely represent strategic attempts to manage international pressure rather than genuine policy shifts.

External pressure works only when survival is threatened. The regime has proven willing to endure enormous costs — economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, international condemnation — for ideological goals. Pressure becomes effective only when it credibly threatens the system's existence, as during the 1988 war exhaustion or 2015 economic crisis. Short of such threats, Tehran can absorb external criticism while proceeding with domestic repression.

Ideology and survival are not mutually exclusive. Western analysis often treats these as distinct categories, but the regime views them as integrated. From Tehran's perspective, failing to execute designated enemies of God threatens the ideological foundations that legitimate the system, making such executions a form of survival strategy. Convincing the regime otherwise requires demonstrating that repression endangers the system more than restraint does.

Long-term engagement requires acknowledging immovable positions. Certain ideological commitments — clerical authority, the nature of Islamic governance, and the right to eliminate perceived existential threats — have proven non-negotiable across four decades. Effective policy must work around rather than through these obstacles, focusing leverage on areas where the regime has demonstrated flexibility rather than core theological principles.

Conclusion: The Probability of Tragedy

Will Iran execute the protesters? The weight of historical evidence suggests yes, though likely in calibrated rather than wholesale fashion. The regime will almost certainly proceed with significant numbers of executions, framing them as religious obligations under Mohareb and Baghi designations, while attempting to manage international blowback through strategic ambiguity about precise numbers and limited clemency in high-profile cases.

The theological framework of Velayat-e Faqih, the historical pattern of prioritizing ideology over strategy when clerical authority is at stake, and the current dominance of hardline institutions all point toward repression. Foreign Minister Araghchi's assurances to American envoys should be understood as tactical rather than definitive — a pattern consistent with the regime's historical approach to managing international pressure while pursuing domestic imperatives.

Yet the regime retains capacity for strategic calculation. If executions genuinely risk triggering a broader revolutionary movement or invite military action that threatens system survival, Tehran has demonstrated it can modulate its approach. The question is not whether the regime will show mercy — it will not, in any systematic sense — but rather how many must die before the ideological imperative to punish "enemies of God" is satisfied.

For the protesters awaiting judgment in Iranian prisons, this analysis offers little comfort. They have become pawns in a larger contest between revolutionary ideology and strategic survival, their individual fates determined by calculations that treat human life as instrumental to regime preservation. The Islamic Republic's 45-year history suggests that when this contest plays out, survival wins only when genuinely threatened — and ideology extracts a terrible price along the way.

The international community's ability to alter this trajectory remains limited. Without credible threats to regime survival or genuine willingness to fundamentally alter Iran's strategic environment, external pressure will likely affect the scale but not the fact of repression. The protesters' best hope lies not in diplomatic assurances or Western criticism, but in the regime's own cold calculus: that mass executions might trigger the very revolutionary crisis they are meant to prevent.

That is a thin reed on which to rest the lives of hundreds, but it is the only one history provides.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center. He previously was a senior researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Tehran.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center, a resident Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and a Captain in the reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Intelligence.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.