Turan Research Center

Amidst ongoing progress on Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization and Yerevan’s regional integration, Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan made an underreported but significant visit to Israel. He met with Eden Bar-Tal, Director-General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, to discuss a new chapter in bilateral relations and explore opportunities for cooperation in political and economic spheres, highlighting high tech, tourism, agriculture, and medicine as sectors of mutual interest.

The visit marked a first public step toward improving historically strained relations between the two countries, but it was also notable given Kostanyan’s portfolio. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan tasked him with overseeing progress on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave via Armenia’s Syunik Province. Israeli and Armenian media reports suggest TRIPP was the main item on the agenda.

Kostanyan’s involvement signals that Yerevan is serious about realigning with the West and is willing to risk Iran’s ire. Israel has two strategic interests in TRIPP: supporting U.S. and Azerbaijani initiatives and bypassing Iran, which could place Tehran’s border with Armenia effectively under U.S. control. Iran has repeatedly warned against such a passage, previously known as the Zangezur Corridor. In 2022, Tehran conducted large-scale military exercises near the Azerbaijani border over a perceived Azerbaijani threat to the Syunik province, while senior officials repeatedly labeled the route a “red line.” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reaffirmed Iran’s opposition during a meeting with Pashinyan last year.

For Pashinyan, however, TRIPP is essential. Armenia agreed to provide Azerbaijan with transport access to Nakhichevan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire. During the August 8 Washington Peace Summit, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev granted the U.S. exclusive development rights over the route. The summit provoked a slew of criticism in Iranian state media. The most searing response came from senior advisor to Khamenei Ali Akbar Velayati, who called the corridor a threat to national security and threatened to turn the region into a “graveyard of the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” Simultaneously, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reported that Armenia assured it would “observe all of Iran’s red lines.”

Given these sensitivities, Pashinyan’s decision to assign TRIPP oversight to Kostanyan was deliberate. A Persian speaker who studied in the United States and Iran, Kostanyan participated in multiple high-level delegations to Iran, including an August visit after the Washington summit, meeting with Velayati, Araghchi, and other officials. His appointment signaled Armenia’s recognition of Iran’s importance to TRIPP’s success.

Kostanyan’s visit to Israel, therefore, is strategically significant. It suggests Yerevan is willing to risk Iranian displeasure to advance TRIPP and accelerate alignment with the U.S. and its allies. How Tehran will respond—through cooperation, pressure, or confrontation—remains an open question.

Adversaries by Proxy

Armenian-Israeli relations have long been tense. At the heart of the dispute are the close connections with the other adversaries. Since the 1990’s, Israel has developed close relations with Azerbaijan in the military, political, and economic spheres. Jerusalem was one of the largest weapons exporters to Baku before and during the Second Karabakh War when Azerbaijan took back over 70 percent of territory occupied by Armenian-backed separatists. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Israel supplied 69 percent of Azerbaijan’s weapon imports from 2016-2020.Following the war, Yerevan recalled its ambassador to Israel over the arms sales, only to restore relations two years later. Israeli-Azerbaijan relations continue to develop, with Israeli Prime Minister pursuing trilateral cooperation with the United States and Azerbaijan this year and Azerbaijan buying large stakes in Israeli gas fields.

Meanwhile, Iran has cultivated close relations with Armenia since its independence in 1991. Tehran provided discreet support during the First Karabakh War in 1992, and over the decades, successive Armenian administrations have maintained extensive ties with the Islamic Republic. In recent years, Iranian support has become increasingly visible, manifesting in major arms agreements, intelligence collaboration, high-level meetings with Khamenei, and public assurances of Iran’s commitment to Armenia’s defense. Bilateral trade recently surpassed $700 million, with both sides aspiring to reach $3 billion. The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control has reported that Iran uses Armenia to circumvent sanctions.

However, friendly relations with the others’ adversaries are not the only grievances. Israeli media has highlighted the rise in antisemitism in Armenia, largely related to Israel’s ties with Azerbaijan, as a barrier to improved relations. Since 2020, perpetrators have vandalized, graffitied, and even attempted to burn down Yerevan’s synagogue and Jewish Center. The Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs has reported an uptick in antisemitism over the past five years, corroborated by groups such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism.

Another flashpoint is the “Cow Gardens” controversy in Jerusalem’s Armenian Quarter. Several years ago, the Armenian Patriarchate agreed to lease land to an Israeli developer for a hotel, but community backlash led it to unilaterally attempt to annul the agreement. Activists have framed enforcement as akin to “ethnic cleansing”and pressured the Armenian government to intervene.

Tensions also stem from U.S.-based Armenian diaspora groups taking anti-Israel stances, particularly since the Second Karabakh War. Israel’s perception of the diaspora is complicated by comparisons to organizations like AIPAC. Unlike AIPAC, whose singular goal is promoting Israeli-U.S. relations, Armenian diaspora groups often pursue agendas at odds with Yerevan. For instance, one of the largest diaspora groups critical of Israel, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) has also repeatedly criticized the Pashinyan administration. Following the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive reclaiming the remaining Karabakh territories, ANCA President Aram Hamparian accused Armenians protecting Pashinyan of “fighting against [their] own people,” while Policy Director Alex Galitsky called the August 8 Peace Summit a surrender of Armenia’s “sovereign rights to a neo-colonial U.S.-backed corporate consortium.” Ilan Berman, Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Center argued the Armenian diaspora has joined Russia and Iran in a “three-front war” against Pashinyan.

While diaspora hostility, antisemitism, and the Cow Gardens controversy create friction, these issues are solvable. Likewise, as Azerbaijan and Armenia inch closer to a final normalization deal, Israel’s ties with Baku should no longer threaten Yerevan nor oppose improved Israeli-Armenian ties. Still, Israel has been careful to account for Azerbaijani sensitivities: before Kostanyan’s visit, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economy, Mikhayil Jabbarov, co-chaired the fourth Azerbaijan-Israel Joint Commission. Following the meeting, the Israeli Ministry of Defense sent a delegation to Baku

The most serious obstacle to improved Armenia-Israel relations remains Armenian-Iranian ties—but even this is not insurmountable.

Strains in the Armenian-Iranian Partnership

Over the past thirty years, Armenia’s largest strategic mistake has been relying entirely on Russia for security. While Moscow provided patronage, the cost was Armenian independence. Russia monopolized basic goods and prevented Yerevan from joining Western regional alliances, including the European Union. Its role as security guarantor allowed it to manipulate the conflict with Azerbaijan, keeping both parties submissive.

Similarly, Iran has leveraged its ties with Armenia to exert pressure on Azerbaijan. Tehran views Azerbaijan as a threat due to its influence on Iran’s large Azerbaijani minority and its close ties with regional competitor Turkey and nemesis Israel. Now that Armenia is pursuing peace with Azerbaijan, it can no longer check Azerbaijani influence in the region, much to Tehran’s displeasure.

Iran has expressed its discontent cautiously. While most officials avoid direct criticism of Pashinyan, state media linked to the security services has become increasingly critical. In August, Kayhan, a hardline outlet tied to the Supreme Leader’s office, accused both Pashinyan and Aliyev of betraying Iran by involving the United States in establishing TRIPP. IRGC Deputy for Political Affairs Yadollah Javani published an article titled, “Aliyev and Pashinyan on Zelensky’s Path to Misery.” IRGC-linked Tasnim frequently amplifies Armenian voices accusing Pashinyan of “betrayal” and “surrendering territory.”

Pashinyan has long stressed that Armenia must diversify partnerships to maintain independence. While closer ties with Israel may have limited economic or political payoff, sending Kostanyan demonstrates that Armenia will not repeat the mistake of relying entirely on Russia—or Iran. Iran is currently weakened: its proxy network is fractured, the economy is near collapse, deterrence has been undermined by joint Israeli-U.S. strikes, and a water crisis has prompted warnings of potential evacuations in Tehran. Kostanyan’s visit to Israel reflects Pashinyan’s broader approach: hedging Armenia’s security and diplomatic bets by aligning more closely with American-backed regional actors while pursuing normalization with Azerbaijan and maintaining pragmatic ties with Tehran.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center, a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a Research Fellow at Bar Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.