Turan Research Center

Since the fall of the Assad dynasty in late 2024, the Russian military presence has remained a major mystery as to what Moscow’s future will be in Syria. Following Assad’s flight to Moscow on December 8, 2024, Russia has significantly scaled back its presence at its two principal facilities on Syria’s Mediterranean coast: the Tartus naval base and its strategic air base at Khmeimim, located in the Syrian province of Latakia. Russia’s future stay in Syria became even more uncertain after the new government in Damascus terminated the 49-year commercial port management concession granted to the Russian engineering construction business Stroytransgaz.

Russia has also pulled out from Qamishli Airport located in northeastern Syria and restricted its patrolling missions along the border with Israel. This reduced presence has coincided with Moscow’s ever-demanding war effort in Ukraine and the deterioration of Russia’s position in the Middle East following the weakening of its key regional partner – Iran. In fact, for the first time since 2013, Russia currently has no naval presence operating in the Mediterranean Sea.

Yet, over the past several months, Syria’s new leadership has not only maintained working ties with Moscow but even attempted to revive and expand the relationship. This has come as a surprise to many given that the interim government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, once in power, severed Syrian ties with Assad’s other allies such as Iran and Hezbollah. When it comes to Russia, however, the interim Syrian leader has twice visited Moscow: first on October 15, 2025, and then on January 28, earlier this year.

Read the full article on The Saratoga Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.