Turan Research Center

Moscow's policy toward Armenia in the run-up to the crucial parliamentary elections in Armenia on June 7 has shifted from mere irritation to practical pressure.

Russia is no longer simply expressing dissatisfaction with Armenia's leadership's attempts to build closer ties with the West, but is actively trying to raise the cost of that turn for Armenian society.

Russia has been clear that closer ties with the EU may bring political symbolism and Western diplomatic support, but remaining inside Russia-led structures brings Armenia cheap gas, market access, labor mobility, and economic stability.

Read the full article on The Kyiv Independent.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Israel’s defenders have warned for years that the United Nations, an institution that lectures democracies while shielding dictators, has been bent into a weapon against the Jewish state.

This week, the evidence hit — and it’s worse than even the cynics imagined.

It turns out that the United Nations and the global “human rights” apparatus writ large have been hijacked by bad actors intent on subverting the United States, its allies and the West as a whole.

And their antisemitism has been the pungent whiff of gas signaling a dangerous leak.

On Tuesday, the Geneva-based group UN Watch released “From Watchdogs to Ideologues,” a 104-page investigation into 13 of the UN’s 59 Special Rapporteurs — the supposedly independent human-rights monitors whose findings are routinely treated as authoritative by the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, Western governments and Western media.

The picture is damning.

Read the full article on The New York Post.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

For decades, Moscow’s power in the South Caucasus rested on military presence, conflict-management formats, energy leverage, and economic influence.

This is now under visible strain. Armenia is actively engaging the European Union (EU), Azerbaijan has grown significantly more assertive in its foreign policy, while Georgia is deepening selective economic links with China and the Middle East, while abstaining from restoring diplomatic ties with Russia.

Yet of the three countries, this trend is most visible in Armenia. It is Armenia that was closest to the Kremlin right up to the point when its supposed friend stood idly by during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the eventual fall of the entity in September 2023. The logic had been that Armenia needed Russian aid should something happen to Karabakh, a logic that evaporated after defeat.

Extensive engagement with the EU should be seen from this perspective, with the events of early May in Yerevan only underlining the trend. Armenia hosted the European Political Community summit on May 4, followed by the first-ever EU-Armenia summit on May 5. The sides launched a €200m ($232m) partnership, while EU investments in Armenia under the Global Gateway strategy are expected to reach €2.5bn.

Read the full article on CEPA.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani spoke to Sky News Arabia for a feature on the spread of child-selling among Afghan families, a practice that has accelerated sharply since the Taliban's return to power in 2021. The report cites estimates that as many as 121,000 children have been traded or sold since August 2021, with open sales now documented in markets in northern provinces such as Jowzjan, where children are reportedly priced between $1,000 and $2,000 depending on age.

Ehsani told Sky News Arabia that the practice is not new — it existed even under the previous republican government — but emphasized that it has expanded sharply under the current crisis. He attributed part of the surge to Afghanistan's economic collapse: the absence of job opportunities, a broken economic system, and the lack of any state plan to develop rural areas have pushed families in the countryside to seek alternative means of survival, including selling their children.

But Ehsani argued that the phenomenon cannot be explained by economics alone. It is also rooted in tribal culture and social structures, he said, where village elders and tribal sheikhs continue to issue customary rulings to resolve legal and financial disputes between individuals. Among the remedies these notables sometimes propose is the sale of a young child to settle outstanding debts or end a dispute. The practice, Ehsani concluded, is the product of interrelated economic, cultural, and social factors.

Read the full article on Sky News Arabic.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

For years before Russia invaded Ukraine, Western leaders reassured themselves that longtime Russian President Vladimir Putin was merely posturing. The consensus held that Russia’s all-out propaganda blitz—talking heads on state TV denying Ukrainian sovereignty, calls for referendums in the east, and warnings of Euro-Atlantic encroachment—was empty political posturing and was not meant literally. Even weeks before the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, now rightly remembered as a stalwart hero of Ukraine’s defense, insisted that Russia’s threats to invade were mere rhetoric. Until they were not.

The same vocabulary is now being aimed at Armenia, and last week, Putin took it on himself. Days after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan explicitly announced that Armenia was not Russia’s ally in the war on Ukraine, Putin warned that the country is “now living through everything that is happening on the Ukrainian track”—a path that began with Ukraine’s move toward the EU and ended in “the coup d’état, the Crimea story, the position of southeastern Ukraine, and military actions.” As an alternative, Putin proposed an overt referendum on whether Armenia should break with Russia, followed by “a soft, civilized, and mutually beneficial separation.”

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

The Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury have all confirmed they are investigating the money behind America’s loudest “pro-Palestinian” network — roughly $278 million funneled since 2017 by Neville Roy Singham, an American communist living in Shanghai, into groups including Code Pink. None of it is registered as foreign. That tells you what it actually is.

The loudest voices calling themselves “pro-Palestinian” in America aren’t pro-Palestinian. They’re anti-American.

Read the full article on The Washington Examiner.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

• After three consecutive years of stagnation, Iran’s economy entered a hyperinflationary collapse in early 2026. Official figures indicate that the 12-month inflation rate through the end of March 2026stood at 53.7%. Food prices have roughly doubled year-over-year, the worst sustained level since the 1941 Anglo-Soviet occupation. The rial fell to nearly 1.8 million per dollar on 29 April 2026, and other reports confirmed an all-time low of 1.8 million rials per dollar as the ceasefire held. The IMF projects a 6.1% contraction in 2026, with inflation at 68.9%.
  

• Operation Epic Fury / Roaring Lion, which commenced on February 28, 2026, and continued until April 8, dealt extensive damage to Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strike and the campaign launched by the United States and Israel devastated Iran’s military-industrial base. The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser stated that the operation’s objectives were to destroy Iran’s offensive missiles, missile production, navy, and security infrastructure. The White House subsequently claimed that more than 85% of the regime’s defense industrial base, along with most of its ballistic missiles, launcher vehicles, and long-range attack drones, were destroyed. Iranian government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani told Russia’s RIA Novosti that preliminary estimates of war damage totaled $270 billion — roughly 60% of Iran’s pre-war GDP.
  

• The Islamic Republic’s capacity to rebuild destroyed military capabilities within any meaningful timeframe is severely constrained. Neither China nor Russia is willing to rescue Iran — Russia is committed to the war in Ukraine, while China seeks to preserve its access to the U.S. financial system. UN snapback sanctions returned in late September 2025, and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklisting have been reaffirmed. Iran’s defense budget for 1405 (2026/27) is a nominal $9.2 billion. The most likely 2026–2027 trajectory is a “muddle-through-toward-decline,” with a rising risk of regime instability, succession turbulence under Mojtaba Khamenei, and recurrent social unrest.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

A major outcome of President Donald Trump's Beijing summit this week with Chinese President Xi Jinping had little to do with semiconductors or rare earths. According to the White House readout, Xi Jinping made clear China's opposition to any Iranian effort to militarize the Strait of Hormuz or charge a toll on its use. Beijing's own readout said nothing about Iran or the strait—and pointedly did not dispute the American account. That tacit acceptance exposed the so-called "axis" of China, Russia and Iran for what it actually is: a partnership of convenience that fractures the moment one partner's interests get in the way. 

The natural question is, what comes next? If Beijing can be pried loose from Tehran, can it be pried loose from Moscow, too? The answer requires understanding something Western policymakers have been slow to internalize: Russia already fears China far more than it lets on. 

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon just finished a state visit to China. Rahmon has made trips to China many times during the nearly 34 years he has been in power in Tajikistan, but this visit came during a critical period.

Simply put, Tajikistan is losing the international importance it once had, and China might now be the most dependable friend remaining for Rahmon and his country.

A ‘Sweet’ Start

China established diplomatic ties with all five Central Asian countries at the start of 1992. Just months later, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan that would last until June 1997, but that did not deter China from seeking investment opportunities in Tajikistan.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Panniers is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

With elections to Kazakhstan’s restructured parliament about three months away, a new political party has just entered the contest.

Not surprisingly, it is a pro-presidential party.

The 8th political party

The Adilet (Justice) Party, not to be confused with the earlier Adilet Democratic Party that existed from 2004 to 2013, held its founding congress in Astana on May 7. The approximately 1,000 delegates at the congress elected Aybek Dadabay to be party chairman.

Dadabay was Kazakhstan’s presidential administration head from February 2024 until May 5 this year, when President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev relieved him of the post, making First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar his successor.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Anyone who still views Iranian terrorism abroad as a Shiite affair carried out by Hezbollah operatives on orders from Tehran is reading from a script Tehran itself abandoned long ago. In 2026, the Islamic Republic’s overseas operations structure looks more like a layered ecosystem than a chain of command: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) officers at the top, Lebanese Hezbollah and aligned Shiite networks in the middle, and a wide periphery of criminal gangs, sympathizers groomed online, local recruits, teenagers, and—when convenient—Sunni jihadists or non-Iranian actors at the bottom. The point of this architecture is not ideological purity but plausible deniability.

British officials no longer hide their assessment. The UK government’s September 2025 response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Iran report stated bluntly that the physical threat posed by Iran has grown sharply since 2022, that MI5 and the police have responded to twenty Iran-backed plots presenting potentially lethal threats, and that Iranian intelligence services increasingly use organized criminal gangs abroad. The same logic is at work in the South Caucasus. In January 2026, Azerbaijan’s State Security Service announced the arrest of three Azerbaijani citizens who had approached a foreign embassy in Baku after entering, in the official phrasing, “criminal relations” with the ISIS Khorasan (ISIS-K) group. Reporting from both Israeli sources and Reuters clarified that the foreign embassy was Israel’s, without verifying the assailants’ possible affiliation.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute of Strategic Studies.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

A small group of Russian nationalists has been calling to “reclaim” Russia’s colonial territories since the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991. After the Kremlin finally acted on these aspirations by invading parts of Ukraine, the number of Russian nationalists calling for the reconquest of areas seized by the Russian Empire or Soviet Union increased, and their cries grew louder.

Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, has been targeted in these remarks with increasing frequency since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Oddly, this irredentism comes as Russian xenophobia has focused on Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia.

Four years on from the launch of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, some of the governments in Central Asia are becoming weary of enduring these threats of being reconquered by Russia. Officials in Central Asia are responding, and the number of Central Asian migrant laborers in Russia is dropping.

Read the full article on the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The removal of Tashiev did not simply eliminate a powerful figure. It disrupted a governance mechanism that balanced regional elites, distributed control over the security apparatus, and contained intra-elite competition. In its place, a more centralized and personalized presidential vertical is taking shape. This consolidation may enhance short-term governability yet it also raises deeper questions about systemic resilience.

Following the October 2020 political upheaval, Kyrgyzstan’s executive system coalesced around an informal dual structure. By 2021, this arrangement, widely referred to domestically as eki dos (“two friends”), had become the de facto governing model of the post-revolutionary order.

At its core, the tandem between Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev represented an informal division of political labor rather than a codified institutional framework. Japarov retained formal constitutional authority and served as the public face of the state. Tashiev, appointed head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) in October 2020 and later elevated to deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, gradually consolidated control over the security apparatus, anti-corruption campaigns, and elite discipline. By 2022, the GKNB had dramatically expanded its mandate into economic, educational, and even diplomatic spheres.

Read the full article on Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

Aigerim Turgunbayeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Two of the Kremlin's top propagandists are openly calling for war against Armenia.

On Sunday, Margarita Simonyan—head of Russian state-funded broadcaster RT—reacted to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's appearance at a European summit in Yerevan by declaring it was "time to think about protecting the Russian population and our interests in that country." "Protecting the Russian population" is the exact justification President Vladimir Putin used for the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Vladimir Solovyov, Russia's highest-rated television anchor, has gone further still, calling on air for a "special military operation" against Armenia.

This is the soundtrack to a Kremlin campaign that began the moment Yerevan turned west—and it is now reaching its decisive moment. On June 7, Armenia votes. The parliamentary election is a referendum on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and, more consequentially, on whether his country continues toward the West and peace, or returns to managed conflict under Russian dominion. Washington has weeks, not months, to make sure it ends the right way.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein was quoted in Independent Arabia's analysis of the stalled U.S.–Iran negotiation track, alongside Crisis Group's Joost Hiltermann and other regional analysts. Epstein argued that Tehran is recycling the strategy it deployed under Obama and Biden — betting that Washington fears deeper entanglement and that President Trump will not risk higher gas prices before the midterms. He noted that while the Iranian regime markets itself as immune to economic pain through revolutionary will, "ideology doesn't pay the salaries of the bureaucrats who actually keep the state running."

Epstein assessed that Washington sees time on its side: a few more weeks of naval blockade pressure may force Iran to shut in wells, permanently degrading its oil revenue base. He characterized Tehran's negotiating posture as "essentially nostalgia" — an attempt to recreate the dynamics that produced the JCPOA in 2015 on the assumption that Trump shares his predecessors' appetite for a deal at any cost. That assumption, Epstein argued, misreads the moment: Trump has drawn clear red lines on the nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and proxy networks, and a political optic of "losing to Tehran" would be untenable for him. The decisive variable, in Epstein's reading, is not the calendar but the collapse of Iranian oil revenues — leverage Tehran cannot match.
Read the full article on the Independent (Arabic).

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Tucker Carlson is “tormented.”

Not by a policy failure, not by a domestic crisis — by the fact, he said this week, that President Donald Trump backed Israel in a war against Iran.

It’s in line with a grievance the podcaster and former Fox News host has nursed for months.

He’s told his followers that Israel is “a completely insignificant country” with “no resources.”

America gets “nothing” from the relationship, he’s said, repeating a theme that echoes throughout the right-wing influencer world.

Theo Von, the third-biggest podcaster on Spotify, declared on his show: “All of our f—ing money goes to Israel.”

Candace Owens turned such complaints into her brand’s growth engine.

Influencers are political adolescents — especially in this era of grift, when an emotional statement on a visceral topic can achieve instant fame.

But to be fair to Von and those who rightfully question US foreign aid, the idea of giving $3.8 billion a year to a country of 10 million on the other side of the world while Americans struggle at home is genuinely puzzling.

It deserves a real answer.

Read the full article on the New York Post.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

On April 1, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow (Prime Minister of Armenia, April 1). Putin effectively issued an ultimatum to Yerevan, demanding that it choose sides in Armenia’s foreign policy. The warning highlighted Armenia’s dilemma in practicing a balanced foreign policy. A cornerstone of Armenia’s foreign policy of the past few years has been the signing of strategic cooperation agreements with multiple European and Asian countries. The development has been notable given Yerevan’s more traditional reliance on Russia since the early 1990s. Despite efforts to diversify its partners, Yerevan faces limits to how far it can go in balancing its interests.

A key driver behind the shift in Yerevan’s balancing of foreign policy was Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and the subsequent loss of the enclave in 2023. In Yerevan’s view, Russia failed to provide sufficient security guarantees to Armenia, especially in 2021 and 2022, when its territory came under direct fire from Azerbaijan (Prime Minister of Armenia, September 24, 2023). This pushed Yerevan to reformat its ties with its longtime ally.

Read the full article on Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The war with Iran has consumed Washington’s bandwidth for the last month and a half. But the conflict has distracted from more than Ukraine. In the South Caucasus, Russian President Vladimir Putin is waging a quiet campaign to reverse one of the Trump administration’s signature foreign policy achievements—the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal—and doing so on the cheap.

The centerpiece of that deal is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This transit corridor would link Azerbaijan to its exclave, Nakhchivan, through Armenian territory and open a land bridge from Central Asia to global markets, bypassing both Russia and Iran. TRIPP is more than infrastructure. It is America’s foothold in the South Caucasus and the key to unlocking Central Asia’s vast rare-earth reserves—resources essential for smartphones, electric vehicles, and advanced weapons systems—at a moment when the United States relies on China for roughly 70 percent of those critical imports.

Armenia holds parliamentary elections on June 7. The vote is a referendum not just on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government but on the country’s geopolitical orientation—West or Russia, peace or managed conflict. If TRIPP becomes reality, Russia loses its chokehold on Caucasus trade routes and its leverage over two former colonies.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

For years, proponents of the Middle Corridor argued that any transit architecture dependent on Russian or Iranian territory was one crisis away from collapse.

They were right.

The Strait of Hormuz remains closed—first by Iranian blockade, now by American policy—taking roughly 20 percent of global petroleum transit offline. Southern routes through Iran that Central Asian states had been building as alternatives to Russian infrastructure are worthless. The only east-west corridor that bypasses both is the Middle Corridor, running through the South Caucasus. Iran grasped this before Congress did: On March 5, its drones struck Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan airport, targeting the precise route where the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity— TRIPP—is planned.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

The war with Iran has diverted attention from Tehran’s regional policies, particularly the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) transit corridor. The strategic significance of this project is immeasurable. The finalization of the project depends on several other factors, including the amendment of the Armenian constitution, which hinges on Nikol Pashinyan’s victory in the upcoming June elections.

The importance of the Armenian elections is heightened because Russia and Iran intend to interfere specifically to hinder realization of the project. If the TRIPP is finalized, both Russia and Iran will suffer a significant setback to their influence in the Caucasus. With Armenia and Azerbaijan having signed a peace treaty, neither Iran nor Russia will be able to exploit conflict between the two South Caucasian nations.

Despite the war, Tehran will persist in its support for terrorism abroad and its disruptive policies in neighboring countries. Put simply, one should not assume that the Iranian regime won’t find time to meddle in Armenian domestic affairs because it has more pressing issues at home. This modus operandi is hardwired into Iran’s strategy of “Mosaic Defense”, namely that various operations, including terrorism and disruption, may continue even absent top command.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In a February 24 interview in France — four days before the launch of the joint U.S.–Israel operation — Alexander Grinberg predicted that Washington would strike not only Iran's military infrastructure but also its senior military leadership. Speaking with Vozpópuli on March 15, he assessed the operation's unfolding logic, the likely death of Iran's new supreme leader, and the broader implications for Western security.

Below are key excerpts from the interview, translated from the original Spanish.

Is a diplomatic resolution to the conflict possible?

I don't believe so.

What are Israel's objectives in the Iran operation? And what about the United States?

For Israel, the objective is reached when Iran can no longer pose a threat. The military is destroying the regime's capabilities, because 7,000 ballistic missiles could theoretically saturate all of our air defense systems. For the Israeli government, we are close to that goal. But the U.S. naturally requires the normalization of energy conditions as well.

On Saturday, the U.S. struck Kharg Island to prevent Iran from controlling the Strait of Hormuz…

Yes, but the U.S. didn't target Iranian oil — it struck Iranian weapons on that strategic island. I believe this is preparation for a U.S. ground operation. While the strategic situation isn't dire, it matters because of Iran's capacity to spike global energy prices. Once the American military machine starts moving, it's impossible to stop. And many Arab countries now want Iran punished for attacks on their territory.

Is there a coherent strategy behind the coordinated strikes, or has the U.S. entered a war it doesn't know how to end?

No country reveals all its military objectives publicly. If we can understand the plan, so can the enemy. For example, early in the campaign, strikes hit sports stadiums. I didn't understand why until an Iranian contact explained that sports facilities serve as military assembly and training centers. Destroying them degraded the ability of military units to organize. And it's not only the strikes that are coordinated — the messaging is too. We see daily that statements from Trump and Netanyahu echo one another.

Trump has denied it multiple times, but he has also called for the fall of the Iranian regime. Is regime change really possible?

Regime change is possible, but it depends on the will of the Iranian people. There is a total disconnect between the Iranian people and their government. In the West and in Israel, we expect a formal process with a clear beginning and end. But I don't think it works that way in Iran, because this is an ideological regime that doesn't think long-term. The regime may not be destroyable with a single blow, but it can be stripped of its capacity to function — to govern or administer the country.

Trump and Netanyahu have repeatedly urged Iranians to rise up against their government. What could come next?

Right now I don't think an uprising is possible — it's dangerous to go out into the streets. We believe Iran is killing its own people with drones, because we see that some attacks within its territory are carried out with quadcopters, not the fixed-wing drones Israel uses. It's still not safe to take to the streets. Iranian society doesn't want this regime. They demonstrated en masse in January. The Iranian economy wasn't functioning before the February 28 strikes — inflation was already extremely high. There could even be a power vacuum for some time. But I cannot imagine a situation worse than one under this regime, which kills its own people.

There has been significant speculation about the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and his absence from the media. What do you think?

I believe he died, or was so severely wounded that it would be impossible to show him on television. Iranian media initially said they would broadcast Khamenei's message but not his image. There is no photograph. If he had only been wounded as they claim, they would show him to make him look heroic.

From a security perspective, how would the end of the ayatollahs' regime affect the West?

We should not forget that Iran has far more Arab and Western blood on its hands than Jewish blood. It maintains alliances with criminal networks in France coordinating with Algeria, with narcotrafficking networks, with terrorist organizations worldwide — Hezbollah, networks across Latin America and Africa. If the Iranian regime falls, these networks will be significantly weakened.

Read the full interview on Voz Populi (Spanish).

Alexander Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center

As the war in Iran spreads beyond the Middle East, it is reshaping the South Caucasus, bringing rising proxy threats, refugee pressures, and shifting alliances to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Georgian Service, Joseph Epstein, Director of the Turan Research Center and expert on Eurasia and the Middle East, explains that Azerbaijan faces direct attacks and pipeline threats, Georgia contends with pro-Iranian sentiment and security risks, and Armenia may gain room for Western-oriented initiatives. At the same time, Tehran’s regional aggression and Georgia’s pivot toward Russia, China, and Iran challenge US influence. Yet ongoing American engagement, sanctions, and strategic transit corridors give Washington leverage to shape Tbilisi’s decisions and protect its role in the Middle Corridor.

Read the full article on Georgia Today.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

When on April 1, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in the Russian capital, the Armenian leader’s agenda was clear — to bolster his difficult position before the June parliamentary elections.

It did not go smoothly.

The Russian side used the opportunity to present an ultimatum to Yerevan and to broadcast the videoed exchange — choose us, Putin told Pashinyan, or choose the European Union (EU). You cannot choose both.

The Russian logic is clear — one cannot be a member state in mutually exclusive supranational economic entities such as the EU and the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Read the full article on The Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In October 2025, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, together with Binance founder Changpeng Zhao (CZ) — who was appointed as a presidential adviser on digital assets — announced the launch of the national stablecoin KGST, the legal recognition of the digital som (CBDC), and plans for a state cryptocurrency reserve. Officials argue that these initiatives will modernize the financial system, reduce remittance costs, and position Kyrgyzstan as an innovative player in Central Asia. 

In 2025, cryptocurrency transactions processed through licensed operators in Kyrgyzstan reached an estimated $20.5-32 billion — roughly two to three times the country’s entire GDP of about $14 billion. Official data from the Financial Market Regulation and Supervision Service records a total turnover of 2.73 trillion Kyrgyz som across more than 2.1 million transactions. The overwhelming majority of these operations consisted of simple currency exchanges rather than investments or sophisticated decentralized finance (DeFi) products.

Read the full article on The Diplomat.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with Bahrain's Al Bilad newspaper on how Ukraine's battlefield experience in counter-drone warfare, electronic warfare, and asymmetric defense is creating new opportunities for strategic cooperation with Gulf states facing Iranian aerial threats. Epstein assessed that Kyiv's low-cost, field-proven interception solutions could fundamentally reshape Gulf air defense architecture, including multi-layered defense systems and civilian infrastructure protection.

Read the full interview on Al Bilad (Arabic).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

On March 15, 2026, Kazakhs turned out in record numbers—73.12 percent, the highest for any national vote since 2019—to approve a sweeping new constitution with overwhelming support. Preliminary figures showed 87.15 percent in favor, with final tallies confirming nearly 90 percent. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayevsigned the document into law on March 17, with its entry into force set for July 1, 2026.

Officially framed as the culmination of the “New Kazakhstan” project launched after the government suppressed the January 2022 pro-democracy protests, the reform rewrites roughly 84–95 percent of the basic law. According to Tokayev (who recently penned a defense of the reforms in this publication) and his administration, these changes streamline governance, move away from a “super-presidential” model, and strengthen citizens’ rights amid global volatility.

Yet the underlying logic is familiar to observers of post-Soviet Eurasia. Tokayev, who assumed the presidency in 2019, has followed a well-trodden regional trajectory. Initially positioned as a contrast to Nursultan Nazarbayev’s long rule, he introduced symbolic reforms after the 2022 protests: term limits, modest parliamentary strengthening, and the rollback of the former president’s privileges. But the violent lessons of “Bloody January” (Qandy Qantar)—when unrest threatened regime survival—triggered a rapid recalibration toward centralized control.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Five weeks into “Operation Epic Fury,” the war with Iran shows no end in sight. Some 1,500 miles to the north, however, a far more effective peace process is underway. Last week, the foreign ministers of Armeniaand Azerbaijan praised “positive developments” in their normalization process. Buried inside the two sides’ peace deal is a 27-mile corridor that may be the most consequential piece of infrastructure the United States has built abroad in a generation—and the war in Iran is proving why.

American power has historically followed the world’s narrowest passages. The Panama Canal is the defining example: a 50-mile strip across the Isthmus of Panama that reshaped global trade, projected US influence across the Western Hemisphere, and remained under American control for nearly nine decades.

The US-backed “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) follows the pattern. The TRIPP is a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its exclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, near the Iranian border. Initialed at the White House last August after 32 years of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, TRIPP has the potential to become a new Eurasian chokepoint.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Russia and Iran were supposed to be strategic partners. They signed a comprehensive partnership treaty last year, pledging deeper defense cooperation and economic integration. When the United States struck Iran, some predicted Russia would stand by its ally. Instead, Moscow has treated Tehran's war as a business opportunity—pocketing oil windfalls, leveraging Western desperation for energy and bleeding U.S. military resources through covert intelligence sharing, all while risking nothing of its own.

By every short-term measure, Russia is winning a war it is not fighting. But the Middle East that Russia spent two decades inserting itself into is being reshaped by forces Moscow can neither direct nor contain, and the long-term costs may outweigh the dividends.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Details about the ambitious plans for Alatau city were presented to a joint session of Kazakhstan’s parliament on March 20. Authorities are moving ahead full-speed on the project to build the new city that one day could be home to some two million people.

According to the plans, Alatau will be a unique city, not only in Kazakhstan, but in the world.

Alatau city is being built on the site of what was the village of Zhetygen, some 50 kilometers north of Almaty. It will occupy an area of some 88,000 hectares, “larger than both Singapore and Seoul.”

Relieving the congestion of Kazakhstan’s commercial capital was one of the major concerns when selecting a site for the new city. Another consideration was Alatau’s location along the Middle Corridor, the developing East-West trade route linking Europe and China. Alatau city will have an airport and railway junctions.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

When Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov suddenly dismissed his long-time friend Kamchybek Tashiyev as head of the country’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) on February 10, he cryptically said it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society.”

Less than two months later, that split could be coming, and there is a possibility the country is headed for a confrontation between the two men and their supporters.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On Jan. 30, border guards in Tajikistan repelled armed intruders seeking to enter the country from Afghanistan, with the clash leaving three suspects dead. Less than two weeks earlier, on Jan. 18, Tajik forces killed four militants under similar circumstances. These were not isolated incidents. Rather, they came on the heels of a series of similar episodes, of which the most notable took place in November, when two consecutive attacks by militants entering Tajikistan from Afghan territory killed five Chinese workers involved in infrastructure and mining projects in the country.

Taken together, the incidents reflect a marked deterioration in security conditions along the roughly 900-mile frontier between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. At the heart of bilateral tensions is the presence in northern Afghanistan of Jamaat Ansarullah, a Taliban-aligned militant group composed largely of ethnic Tajiks. Dushanbe views the organization as a potential instrument for destabilizing Tajikistan.

Read the full article on World Politics Review.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with RFE/RL's Azattyq Asia about the implications of the Strait of Hormuz crisis for Central Asia's energy producers. Below is an English translation of his comments, which appeared in the original Russian-language article.

On the scale of the crisis:

"In terms of the volume of supply under threat, this crisis is potentially larger than the 1973 embargo. The Arab oil embargo of that year removed roughly 4–5 million barrels per day from the market. According to JPMorgan estimates, the reduction in production and exports due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could exceed 4 million barrels per day within weeks, and if Persian Gulf states exhaust their storage capacity and are forced to shut in production — which is already happening in Kuwait and Iraq — the cumulative scale of supply disruption could reach levels the modern oil market has never faced."

On the duration factor:

"If Iran's naval and missile capabilities are sufficiently degraded and the strait reopens, markets will begin to normalize. For Asia, however — especially India, Japan, South Korea, and LNG-importing countries across South and Southeast Asia — the short-term pain is very real. The situation much more closely resembles the 1973 experience: a physical supply deficit compounded by price inflation. And it is precisely in this context that the strategic significance of Central Asia rises sharply — as a landlocked alternative dependent on no maritime strait."

On the insurance dimension:

"Iran didn't need to mine the strait — it only needed to make oil and gas transit uninsurable. We are watching in real time as roughly 20 percent of global oil trade and approximately 20 percent of LNG trade is effectively removed from the market — not by a naval blockade, but by cheap drones and the insurance market's reaction to them."

On Kazakhstan's paradox:

"This is one of the great ironies of the moment. Oil prices surged roughly 35 percent in a week — Brent exceeded $92 per barrel — and Kazakhstan, as a major oil producer, should theoretically have reaped enormous revenue gains. But it cannot, because its export infrastructure is paralyzed. Around 80 percent of Kazakhstan's oil exports flow through the CPC pipeline to the Black Sea terminal at Novorossiysk, and that infrastructure has been seriously damaged by Ukrainian drone strikes since November 2025. Currently, only one of the terminal's three single-point moorings is operational. In other words, the price windfall exists on paper, but Kazakhstan physically cannot bring sufficient volumes to market to capitalize on it."

On the structural vulnerability:

"What is happening underscores Kazakhstan's structural vulnerability — its windfall revenues remain in the ground due to critical dependence on a single export corridor."

On the China factor:

"China, which imported roughly 40 percent of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, is now extremely interested in locking in supplies from Central Asia — primarily from Kazakhstan via the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline. This is a powerful combination — push from Kazakhstan and pull from China. However, the scale is limited: even at full capacity, Atasu–Alashankou can transport only a fraction of CPC volumes. Moreover, the supporting infrastructure — refining, spur lines, rail connections — is not yet ready for a rapid large-scale shift. The direction of travel is clear, but the pace of change is measured in years, not months."

On Turkmenistan and European gas:

"Theoretically, yes — and the political momentum has never been stronger. Turkmenistan holds the world's fourth-largest proven gas reserves, and Turkmen gas began flowing to Turkey last year through swap agreements via Iran. Turkey's ambassador to Ashgabat explicitly called for accelerating construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline as a medium- and long-term solution. But there are real constraints. Most of Turkmenistan's untapped production capacity is concentrated at the Galkynysh field in the southeast — far from the Caspian coast. Turkmenistan has committed to more than doubling its gas exports to China, bringing them to 65 billion cubic meters per year, which means direct competition for Turkmen gas between Chinese and European demand."

On Turkmen gas volumes for Europe:

"Turkmen gas could become a meaningful supplement to European supplies — on the order of 5–15 billion cubic meters per year through the Southern Gas Corridor — but it will not replace Russian or Qatari volumes on a large scale. Moreover, Turkmenistan's own policies sometimes limit its export potential. For instance, its 'delivery to the border' policy, which requires importers to build pipelines to the Turkmen border, is a serious obstacle."

On the collapse of Iran transit:

"If Iranian infrastructure degrades or transit becomes impossible, the only significant gas export route remaining for Turkmenistan will be the pipeline to China — which only deepens the dependence it has been trying to escape."

On the systemic risk:

"This crisis clearly demonstrates that Central Asia's energy infrastructure was built for a geopolitical reality that no longer exists. Every major export route runs through a country that is either involved in a war or under serious pressure — Russia, Iran, or regions where they can influence maritime routes. This is a systemic risk that cannot be solved by a single pipeline. This crisis is a strategic turning point, but whether Central Asia can capitalize on it depends entirely on infrastructure investment decisions made in the next 2–3 years."

On the three conditions for real change:

"The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline moves from concept to construction; Kazakhstan diversifies its export routes beyond the CPC; and Western — above all American — capital begins to treat the region's infrastructure as a strategic priority rather than merely a commercial project."

On the historical pattern:

"History shows that energy diversification projects not launched during a crisis are almost never launched afterward."

Read the full article on RFE/RL's Azattyq Asia (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins 'La Linterna' with Expósito, to discuss the paralysis of the West in the face of the crisis of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's threat to close this neuralgic point for world trade has triggered an escalation of tension that already affects the global economy, while the main European powers have declined the request of the United States to intervene militarily.

Watch the full interview on Cope (Spanish).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Dayana Bermúdez of DNews speaks to Senior Fellow Grinberg, who analyzed the complex political and military situation, especially in relation to Iran and its regime. Grinberg explains that the apparent strength of the Iranian regime is based on an authoritarian and fascist ideological system that, although powerful, also contains the seeds of its own weakness. He clarifies that Persian culture is rich and ancient, but the regime does not represent the entirety of Iranian culture or the Iranian people, most of whom disagree with the government. Furthermore, he points out that Iran does not have strong state allies, but rather relies primarily on weaker proxy groups.
Watch the interview on DNews (Spanish).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakh Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia on February 18. During talks with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, the two sides discussed developing political dialogue, expanding trade, and economic cooperation, as well as cultural and humanitarian ties (Caravan Info, February 18). The visit is illustrative of the growing relationship between Saudi Arabia and Central Asia. 

Saudi Arabia is particularly interested in tapping into shifting connectivity in the heart of Eurasia (Gulf Research Center, April 25, 2025). Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s biggest economies, attract most of the kingdom’s attention. Astana seeks to attract Saudi investments into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, or Middle Corridor). This corridor, if not an outright alternative to the northern Eurasian route passing through Russia, is at least a strong complementary route for East–West connectivity, including trade between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union (see EDM, January 28, December 4, 2025). The Emirati company, Dubai PortsWorld, has stakes in two special economic zones in Kazakhstan. Because the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are economic competitors, Abu Dhabi’s investment in the region makes it highly likely that Riyadh will also expand its engagement (Ducascopy, March 25, 2018).

Investments in Middle Corridor-related transport infrastructure, such as Kazakhstan’s Aktau port, could be profitable for Saudi Arabia as the TITR expands. Other areas of potential bilateral cooperation include oil, gas, and uranium production, as these resources play a key role in the economies of both countries. Another key infrastructure project that makes Kazakhstan interesting to Saudi Arabia is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russia to the Middle East. Despite instability in the Middle East, which often disrupts the operation of the INSTC, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are interested in developing routes to reach Russia (Gulf Research Center, August 26, 2025; Povorot Rossii v Aziyu, December 14, 2025). Another connectivity project linking the regions is the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan corridor. Pakistan may be a crucial link given its growing ties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia (Kursiv, February 3).

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Research Fellow Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman contributed to a new analytical report published by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS), examining Kazakhstan's 2026 constitutional reform within a broader framework of institutional and socio-economic transformation.

The report analyzes the constitutional changes approved in the March 15 national referendum — which passed with 87.15% support and 73.12% voter turnout — across several dimensions: institutional modernization of the political system, including the transition to a unicameral parliament and the creation of the vice-presidency; the expansion of rights and freedoms, including in the digital sphere; the constitutional prioritization of education, science, and innovation; and the reform's implications for Kazakhstan's role as a middle power in Eurasia. The analysis integrates comparative perspectives on international constitutional referendums and empirical data from sociological surveys conducted between January and March 2026.

Kazantsev-Vaisman was among the international and Kazakhstani experts who contributed professional expertise and comparative perspectives to the report, alongside Alberto Turkstra of the Diplomatic World, Wesley Alexander Hill of the International Tax and Investment Center, David Aptsiauri, and Karlygash Jamankulova of the Adil Soz Foundation.

Read the full report here.

Dr. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The military operation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026 may create serious economic challenges for the countries of Central Asia, particularly in the sphere of transportation. The war has significantly disrupted the functioning of two key transport corridors: the International North–South Transport Corridor (Russia – Caspian sea – Iran – India) and the southern branch of the Eurasian East–West transport corridor passing through Iran. This is unfolding against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities in the Black Sea region, which have already had a negative impact on transport routes linking the region with Europe.

Shortly before that, on February 21–22, 2026, the long-simmering conflict between Kabul and Islamabad sharply escalated. This armed confrontation may effectively block the Central Asia-Afghanistan–Pakistan–India transport routes. The hostilities in Iran may also exacerbate instability in Afghanistan due to the close economic tiesbetween the two countries. As a result, the countries of Central Asia may either be forced to increase their involvement in addressing Afghanistan’s internal problems or face growing instability along the Tajik–Afghan and Turkmen–Afghan borders.

Read the full article on the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Arun Anand of the Nationalist view to discuss details of the Iran operation and how it effects Central Asia. In the interview, Epstein examines several critical questions: How are Central Asian states rerouting trade to global markets amid the connectivity crisis? Has the war weakened the Middle Corridor and pushed regional countries closer to Russia? Could instability in Iran trigger refugee flows or extremist spillover into the region? And with oil prices surging, what economic impact will the conflict have on Central Asian economies?

Watch the full interview here.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Central Asia is becoming even more important to Afghanistan.

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, most of the countries of Central Asia established a dialogue with its leadership that focused on business potential, backed up by security promises.

This understanding is more important than ever to the Taliban government, as events along Afghanistan’s eastern and western borders have left Central Asia as the only reliable import-export route for Afghanistan at the moment.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakhstan’s referendum on adopting a new constitution takes place this Sunday (March 15). Officials say the new document will help lead the Central Asian country into the future, but any constitutional referendum always triggers concerns that among the many changes proposed are some that benefit the authorities more than the people.

So, what sort of changes are there in the new constitution that Kazakh citizens are being asked to vote for?

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

A direct military conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran continues. How stable is the regime in Tehran under conditions of strikes on military infrastructure and centers of power?

In the program “Good Morning, Israel,” Yulia Tsodyks and Oleg Klots speak with Senior Fellow Alexander Grinberg.

Watch the full interview here (Russian).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Maj. (res.) Alex Grinberg, an expert at JISS on Iran and the Shi’ite world, provided insight into the internal dynamics of the Iranian regime under fire. He said that the goal must be to “break the back of the enemy.”

“It’s a regime that is sadistic and that blackmails money from families to get [back] the bodies of their dear ones [protesters] who were massacred. So, this regime must be destroyed,” Grinberg argued.

He analyzed Iran’s strikes against Gulf nations, suggesting they are a desperate attempt to saturate American air defense systems.

“Its geopolitical behavior proves that there is no way to compromise with this regime,” Grinberg said, describing the Islamic Republic as “incurably aggressive.”

He also called for the elimination of former senior IRGC commanders and military advisers, saying, “These are very powerful people, and they must be done in as soon as possible because they’re very dangerous.”

Any scenario of the regime surrendering as Nazi Germany did in 1945 is baseless, said Grinberg, adding that this is based on decentralized power networks, and that the war goal should be to “break separately all of the vertebrae of this spine. And this way it will stop functioning.”

Read the full article on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On 17th February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia. This is the second such visit – the first took place in 2015. Turkey’s foreign policy has changed dramatically since. Ankara has become more engaged across Africa, especially in the Sahel and the eastern part of the continent. Before the trip to Ethiopia, the Turkish president also visited Egypt, furthering the normalisation process with the Arab country and highlighting how Ankara increasingly applies a regional approach to this part of Africa.

Relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa have been friendly for over a century, despite alignment within rival blocs during the Cold War. In 1926, Ethiopia was the first country the young Turkish Republic recognised in Sub-Saharan Africa. The particular expansion of ties has taken place over the past years and is well reflected in a 2024 deal[i] that Ankara helped secure between Ethiopia and Somalia regarding potential sea access for Ethiopian trade.

During Erdoğan’s visit, the countries signed[ii] a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation that would lead to joint production and projects. This particularly concerns cooperation in hydroelectric energy, the area in which Turkey has extensive know-how. Given that Ethiopia wants to develop energy beyond the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the Turkish experience will be of vital importance. Both sides also discussed cooperation regarding COP31, which will be held in Turkey in 2026, and then in Ethiopia next year.

Read the full article on Manara Magazine.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins GB News to discuss the differences between the US and Israel's aims in the war against the Iranian regime, and the possible involvement of Kurdish militants.

Watch the full interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

With the Iranian regime decapitated by a joint U.S.-Israeli strike that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several top commanders, and with a resurgent Sunni extremist axis led by Turkey and Qatar gaining ground, the United States faces a pivotal choice in the Middle East. It should proceed by building a coalition of moderates — anchored by Israel, Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates — that is capable of countering both Iranian aggression and the rising tide of Sunni radicalism.

That emerging extremist Sunni axis, fueled by Muslim Brotherhood ideology, Turkish military ambition and Qatari money, is pulling in cautious allies such as Saudi Arabia — nations whose recent surges in anti-Jewish rhetoric signal an ideological drift that should alarm Washington.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s answer is essentially a revival of the “Periphery Doctrine” that aimed to counter hostile Arab nationalism through clandestine alliances with non-Arab states and minority groups in the Middle East. Netanyahyu has proposed a counterweight coalition, mentioning India, Greece and Cyprus. But the key to any alliance fighting extremist Islam is Muslim countries that can put forward a contrasting and appealing vision.

Read the full article on The Washington Post.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Extremist groups are using online forums to try to radicalise young people in Kyrgyzstan. There’s perhaps nothing so new about that. The difficulty is that the practice has been stepped up and they are apparently having some success.

Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) has warned about the growing number of teenagers accessing extremist and terrorist social network channels and websites.

The GKNB went as far as releasing a public appeal to parents to keep a watch on their children’s internet use and look for changes in their behaviour at home.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

NATO’s political cohesion crisis has transformed the alliance enlargement from a forward-operating strategic instrument into a reputational liability. In the South Caucasus, this effectively removes membership as a credible policy trajectory for Georgia, and eliminates any potential aspirations for Armenia or Azerbaijan. The alliance’s regional posture is transitioning from institutional expansion to transactional engagement.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has paradoxically frozen NATO’s South Caucasus ambitions, not accelerated them. Most likely, Turkey’s regional influence will increasingly substitute for NATO’s collective footprint in the South Caucasus.

Since 2022, NATO has undergone a significant doctrinal reorientation. While the accession of Finland and Sweden appeared to validate the continuation of enlargement as a central policy vector, these were exceptional cases – advanced, Western countries with advanced military compatibility and no territorial disputes.

Read the full article on Caucasus Watch.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

BACKGROUND: On February 3, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Riyadh where he met Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The two sides pledged to elevate bilateral relations by expanding cooperation in defense and renewable energy spheres marking a new page in bilateral relations.

The two countries have not always enjoyed positive ties. In the recent past, divergent strategic visions on most of the conflicts in the Middle East kept Riyadh and Ankara apart. By 2021, however, the strategic environment shifted. Turkey’s outreach to its regional competitors –including Saudi Arabia – began amid a “de-escalation moment,” driven by economic constraints after the pandemic and uncertainty about long-term United States security commitments.

One of the key drivers of the growing alignment between the two countries has been the expanding military cooperation. Riyadh wants to become less dependent on foreign supplies of military hardware and boost domestic military production. As a major military exporter, Turkey’s experience in know-how is key in that regard. The two countries have signed a string of military deals over the past few years. For instance, during President Erdoğan’s  tour of the Gulf countries in 2023, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy Turkish drones; moreover, the package was explicitly tied to industrial cooperation such as technology transfer and joint production leading to long-term high-technology development. Later the same year, the Saudi side announced a strategic agreement with the Turkish defense producer Baykar to localize drone manufacturing in the kingdom. Another area of ongoing cooperation is joint investment in Turkey’s KAAN fighter project.

Read the full article on the American Foreign Policy Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

This month, the United States signaled a renewed push into Central Asia through the largest American business delegation ever deployed to the region. Sergio Gor, the newly confirmed US Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, led the delegation on missions to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and Tashkent, Uzbekistan, underscoring Washington’s ambitions to compete economically with entrenched Russian and Chinese influence.

In Bishkek, Gor’s talks with Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Foreign Minister Zheenbek Kulubaev combined traditional diplomacy with a strong commercial thrust. The centerpiece was the B5+1 Business Forum, where more than 50 US companies engaged local counterparts on themes ranging from artificial intelligence (AI) and fintech to critical minerals and healthcare. For many Central Asian partners—long dependent on remittances, gold exports, and Russia-linked trade—this offered an alternative narrative: economic partnership beyond traditional patrons. 

Strategically, Washington’s emphasis on critical minerals and supply chains reflects broader shifts in global competition. Central Asia sits atop significant deposits of uranium and other inputs essential for high-tech industries and energy security. Through initiatives such as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the United States aims to create transit corridors linking Central Asia with Europe while reducing reliance on Chinese-backed infrastructure. These initiatives sit alongside expanded dialogues on technology and transport that, on paper, position the United States as a viable competitor to the Belt and Road network.

Read the full article on The National Interest.
Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Research Fellow Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman spoke with DKNews about the significance of President Tokayev's participation in the inaugural session of the Board of Peace in Washington, Kazakhstan's potential role in Gaza's humanitarian recovery, and the strategic dimensions of Kazakh-American economic diplomacy. Below is an English translation of his comments, which appeared in the original Russian-language interview.

On the significance of Tokayev's participation in the Board of Peace:

"The participation of Kazakhstan's President in the inaugural session of the Board of Peace is of fundamental importance both for the country itself and for the broader architecture of international relations. First and foremost, it is a step that strengthens Kazakhstan's positioning as a responsible middle power — one capable of acting not as an object but as a subject of global politics. The President's presence at such a forum demonstrates Kazakhstan's readiness not only to support peacekeeping initiatives but to participate in their institutional design.

Second, this is a logical continuation of the country's multi-vector foreign policy. For three decades, Kazakhstan has consistently advanced an agenda of trust, disarmament, and diplomatic mediation — from the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to initiatives within the UN and regional cooperation formats. Participation in the Board of Peace reinforces this image and solidifies the country's reputation as a constructive and predictable partner.

For the Board of Peace itself, such a participant also introduces important nuances. Kazakhstan's example, if followed by others, would strengthen the collective agency of 'middle powers' as an independent group of actors. As President Tokayev himself has noted in his publications, in conditions of transformation of the world order, it is precisely such states that are capable of advancing ideas of inclusive security, sustainable development, and multilateralism without being directly drawn into the geopolitical rivalry of great powers."

On the invitation from President Trump and Kazakhstan's niche:

"The invitation from President Trump can be read as a diplomatic signal of Washington's desire to broaden the circle of international partners involved in finding paths toward de-escalation of the conflict in Gaza — and potentially, in the longer term, in addressing a wider range of issues. In conditions of a protracted global crisis and high polarization of the international community, the United States has an objective interest in engaging states with a reputation as neutral and constructive actors.

Kazakhstan fits this context very organically. The country consistently adheres to a policy of multilateralism and balance, building pragmatic relationships with Western states, with the countries of the Islamic world, with Russia, and with China. This creates potential for a dialogue function — Kazakhstan is perceived as a moderate partner not associated with a confrontational agenda.

Additionally, the personality of Kazakhstan's President himself can contribute to the development of this new format. As is well known, he is a very experienced diplomat with solid experience in the UN system. Accordingly, his personal competencies can make an additional and serious contribution to the advancement of international dialogue and the cause of peace."

On Kazakhstan's potential humanitarian contribution:

"Kazakhstan's potential contribution to ensuring sustained humanitarian support for the region can be assessed as significant and in demand, particularly given the deficit of trust among key international actors.

First, Kazakhstan has a reputation as a state that adheres to a balanced and neutral foreign policy line. The republic maintains good relations with Israel and the United States and recently, as is known, endorsed the Abraham Accords framework. At the same time, Kazakhstan has very good relations with Arab and other Muslim countries. This position allows it to build working contacts with various parties to the conflict and with a broad circle of international partners. In the humanitarian sphere, this is especially important: access to affected populations, coordination of deliveries, and agreement on monitoring mechanisms all require mutual trust and political impartiality.

Second, the country has practical experience participating in international peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives under the UN aegis. Kazakh peacekeepers and humanitarian structures have been deployed in various regions, building institutional competence in coordination, logistics, and interaction with multilateral missions. Most importantly, Kazakh peacekeepers have gained experience with a presence in Syria, Lebanon, and in the mission monitoring the ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. They are even present in such hotspots as the Golan Heights.

Third, Kazakhstan's experience in intercultural and interreligious dialogue could serve as an important resource. In the long term, humanitarian support must be accompanied by programs for restoring interreligious and interethnic peace. Here, Kazakhstan — as a state with a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic society that has developed its own unique model of tolerance — can offer positive solutions."

On the Tokayev-Trump personal dynamic:

"Personal contacts between Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Donald Trump can certainly play a role in Kazakh-American cooperation within the new organization. Donald Trump's diplomatic style has traditionally been characterized by pronounced personalization. Therefore, establishing a trusted communication channel between the presidents can facilitate discussion of sensitive issues. For his part, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is an extremely professional diplomat who excels at establishing channels of international dialogue.

However, it is important to understand that personal relationships between leaders do not replace institutional foreign policy mechanisms. They can accelerate decision-making, create an additional layer of trust, or ease tensions, but sustainable agreements still rest on the work of diplomatic teams and interstate procedures."

On economic diplomacy and strategic trust:

"Tokayev's meetings with the heads of major American companies during his visit to the United States should be viewed not only as an economic event but as an important element of strategic diplomacy. When a relationship features a stable economic interest, dialogue acquires a more predictable and pragmatic character. The economic dimension is especially important in the context of Trump's views on foreign policy. He is, above all, a businessman by personal experience. His approach to foreign policy has traditionally relied on the logic of favorable deals, investment agreements, and trade balances.

For Kazakhstan, this logic largely resonates with its own foreign policy philosophy. The Kazakh model of multi-vector diplomacy was built from the outset on pragmatism: strengthening political ties for the purpose of economic development, diversifying partners, and creating stable channels of interaction with all global centers of power. Engagement with American business strengthens not only the investment climate but also strategic trust — since major corporations, which have particular influence on the Republican administration but can also influence Democrats, become additional stakeholders in stable bilateral relations. Moreover, it is very important for Kazakhstan to maintain a balance between relations with the United States and relations with Russia and China. If the emphasis is on business and diplomacy rather than military-political alignment with Washington, this allows Kazakhstan to sustain its balanced multi-vector policy. In the context of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy, it is also important that active diplomatic consultations are underway between Moscow and Washington, so the very fact of the visit to the United States again reflects the logic of 'both-and' rather than 'either-or' that has always distinguished Astana's foreign policy."

Read the full interview on DKNews (Russian).

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Afghanistan is quickly becoming more important to Central Asia, and the third week of February was filled with meetings that underscored the changing relationship. There was an “extraordinary” meeting of the Regional Contact Group of Special Representatives of Central Asian countries on Afghanistan in the Kazakh capital Astana. Also, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya Province visited Kabul, and separately, Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce organized a business forum in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif.

A Peaceful and Stable Future for Afghanistan

The meeting in Astana brought together the special representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Afghanistan. The group was formed in August 2025. There was no explanation for why the fifth Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, chose not to participate.

The purpose of the Astana meeting was to coordinate a regional approach to Afghanistan.

Comments made by the representatives showed Central Asia’s changing assessment of its southern neighbor.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Iran and the United States are engaged in intense negotiations to resolve the deadlock around Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as its support for what remains of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” The diplomatic opening is narrow and fragile, shaped by deep mistrust and competing priorities. The United States aims to leverage Iran’s current vulnerabilities—a battered economy, domestic instability, and recent military defeats—to obtain substantial concessions on several fronts. Iran, for its part, seeks relief from crippling sanctions while insisting that its national sovereignty be respected and that its capacity to intervene across the region be preserved.

At the heart of the negotiations is Iran’s nuclear program. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for partial sanctions relief, has been defunct since 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the agreement. In his second term, Trump has continuously demanded a more comprehensive deal.

Still, if Washington’s objective is more limited—preventing Iran from advancing its nuclear program or acquiring a nuclear weapon—a narrower agreement may be within reach. Iranian officials have hintedthat they would consider capping uranium enrichment at civilian-grade levels or transferring their stockpile of highly enriched uranium to international custody in exchange for significant sanctions relief. Such measures would roll back Iran’s nuclear timeline and restore a degree of transparency without forcing Iran to abandon uranium enrichment. Even so, a limited nuclear understanding will be difficult to implement. Iran’s nuclear capacity expanded significantly after the JCPOA’s collapse, with enrichment jumping to 60 percent purity, and stockpiles of enriched uranium growing far beyond previous limits.

Read the full article on the Gulf International Forum.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Director Joseph Epstein comments on Vice President J.D. Vance's visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“TRIPP didn’t emerge from a vacuum — it became possible because the geopolitical architecture Russia spent thirty years constructing has begun to collapse. The contrast is stark: three decades of Russian-led mediation produced no peace, only managed hostility and isolation. Less than a year of serious U.S. engagement has produced a Strategic Partnership Charter, a civil nuclear framework, and the contours of a transformative regional corridor. TRIPP is the architecture of a post-Russian South Caucasus and this visit shows how much of a priority it is for Washington.”

Read the full interview on the N7 Foundation.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

A fresh round of US-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine is taking place this week as the Trump administration seeks to reach a deal by early summer. While pro-Ukrainian voices warn that any agreement lacking ironclad security guarantees for Kyiv could embolden Moscow to go further into Moldova or test NATO in the Baltics, the biggest threat may be to countries elsewhere in the former Soviet space.

There are already signs that Russia is turning its imperial appetite toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where the groundwork for destabilization appears to be well underway. Any negotiated settlement in Ukraine that ignores these regions will not end the current war; it will merely relocate it.   

Russian nationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin, who is often called “Putin’s brain,” declared last month that no post-Soviet state should possess sovereignty. Instead, he argued, Moscow “has no choice but to restore the Russian Empire.” Days earlier, leading Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov called for Russia to conduct “special military operations” similar to the invasion of Ukraine in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Read the full article on the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

In December 2025, Tokyo hosted its first Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue, representing an upgraded version of a cooperation framework originally established in 2004. The region has thus evolved from a relatively peripheral area into a significant area in Japan’s foreign policy.

A series of agreements was concluded during the summit. Uzbekistan and Japan elevated their relationship to an expanded strategic partnership, prioritizing cooperation in green energy, the IT sector, deep industrial decarbonization, and the development of critical minerals, including uranium supplies. The two sides plan to implement projects worth over US$12 billion through a joint investment platform and the establishment of an economic zone in the Samarkand region.

Japan will also extend yen-denominated loans to Uzbekistan for the procurement of medical equipment and to improve small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to financial resources. In addition, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzioev proposed holding biennial summits at the head-of-state level and initiating the development of a Cooperation Strategy between Central Asia and Japan.

Read the full article on the Central Asia Caucasus Analyst.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

When the coronavirus pandemic struck in 2020, entrepreneur Amantur Asanaliev doubted whether his newly formed logistics company, TLK Supplier, would survive, let alone thrive. Sure enough, the pandemic quickly devastated many Kyrgyz businesses trading with China.

But six years on, a different black swan event – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – has transformed Asanaliev’s industry and large parts of Kyrgyzstan’s once-teetering economy. 

“The sanctions against Russia have become a new driver of the Kyrgyz economy. If we used to send three to four trucks there every month, after the war began we could send 15,” Asanaliev told The Diplomat.

Read the full article on The Diplomat.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The decision to move the talks between Iran and the United States that began in Oman on February 6, 2026, after they were initially scheduled to be held Istanbul, sparked a firestorm of criticism in the Turkish media. The move, even though it was framed as a logistical and strategic necessity, exposed deep-seated structural tensions and a burgeoning rivalry between Ankara and Tehran. Turkey views the shift as an Iranian rejection of the “Istanbul Process,” a diplomatic framework Ankarahad meticulously constructed to position itself as the indispensable arbiter of regional stability. As the negotiations opened in Muscat, the rhetoric employed by Turkish commentators signaled the end of a period of “managed competition” and the beginning of a more confrontational era in Turkish-Iranian relations.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Since the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s connections with the South Caucasus have accelerated. Kazakhstan’s recent foreign policy toward the South Caucasus is indicative of this trend. Astana has always maintained active ties with Tbilisi and Baku, and it has recently boosted contacts with Yerevan through mutual high-level visits (Arka, April 15, 2025). On February 11, Kazakh Ambassador to Armenia Bolat Imanbayev and Armenian Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Armen Simonyan discussed strengthening Kazakhstan–Armenia cooperation in logistics and transport, particularly in establishing direct air service and building business, cultural, and humanitarian ties (Facebook/kazakhembassyarm; Arminfo, February  11). In November 2025, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Astana. During this visit, they signed numerous cooperation agreements on digitalization, artificial intelligence, and innovation (Prime Minister of Armenia, November 20, 2025;The Astana Times, November 21, 2025). Kazakhstan’s strengthening cooperation with the South Caucasus is just one way it is diversifying its partnerships, particularly in the realm of economics and transit.

Read the full article on the Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

J.D. Vance toured Armenia and Azerbaijan on February 9-11, the first such high-level US visit to Armenia. The trip underlined two things: America’s indifference to Russia’s claimed areas of influence, and Kremlin weakness.

Vance’s visit underlines that while the Trump administration seeks better relations with Russia, the United States is undaunted about entry to an area the Kremlin likes to call its “near abroad”.

The vice president’s visit brought a frustrated response from the Russian state-controlled newspaper Kommersant. “There’s disappointment, frustration and a sense of helplessness,” the author wrote of Vance’s arrival in the South Caucasus. “Because it’s precisely in this region that Russia’s position has eroded noticeably in recent years. The main reason is obvious: excessive absorption in the Ukrainian conflict ties the hands in all other areas.”

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

A political earthquake hit Kyrgyzstan on February 10.

The tandem of President Sadyr Japarov and security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev was seemingly broken when Japarov dismissed Tashiyev from his post. The reason given for relieving Tashiyev of his position was that it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society, including between government structures,” which hinted that something serious had caused the rift.

Old Friends

After the brief tumultuous events of October 5-6, 2020, that saw the government of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov ousted in the wake of parliamentary elections plagued by violations, Japarov came to power and appointed Tashiyev to be head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). The two have remained in those positions and were often referred to as a tandem. Some believe Tashiyev has actually been the one making many of the important state decisions.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Iran may have a new weapon in its shadow war against the West—and it’s one that Tehran spent decades fighting: Sunni jihadists.

Last week, Azerbaijani security forces arrested three men planning to attack the Israeli embassy in Baku. The suspects claimed allegiance to ISIS-K, the Afghan branch of the Islamic State responsible for the devastating Crocus City Hall massacre in Moscow that killed 145 people in 2024. On its face, this looks like another data point in ISIS-K’s expanding campaign of global terror.

But look closer, and a more troubling picture emerges—one that should concern policymakers in Washington. The South Caucasus is becoming a new front in the shadow war between Iran and its enemies, and the Islamic Republic may be using Sunni extremists as a cover for its own malign activities.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Kyrgyzstan held early parliamentary elections at the end of November 2025 that were moved forward by a year so that they would not overlap with the campaign for the presidential election scheduled for January 2027.

On February 9, a group of 75 former officials and notable figures from various spheres of society publicly submitted a letter to the president and speaker of parliament calling on them to “immediately initiate a new election for president.”

While there has yet to be any official response, such a proposal is likely to be accepted, leaving anyone who planned on running against incumbent President Sadyr Japarov with little time to organize a campaign.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s leaders last week both paid visits to Pakistan, with trade and connectivity right at the top of their agendas.

When it comes to land-linking landlocked Central Asia with the big markets and seaports of South Asia, there is, of course, the not-so-small obstacle of Afghanistan to negotiate. So for Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the development of routes through Afghanistan to Pakistan remains an essential objective.

The Central Asian states have enjoyed good relations with Pakistan for many years. What’s more, until recently, each time Central Asian-Pakistani relations required the participation of Afghanistan, it was Central Asia that looked to Pakistan to take the lead in negotiations with their immediate neighbour.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In late January, U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor visited Turkmenistan. Accompanying Gor was U.S. Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll.

Driscoll’s presence in Turkmenistan, a country with a roughly 1,150-kilometer border with Iran, sparked some speculation that his visit was related to escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran. But while it is unusual for any top foreign military officials to visit Turkmenistan, U.S. military officials have stopped by Turkmenistan relatively often over the course of the last 30 years.

Neutral Turkmenistan

A good trivia question about Central Asia is, which country was the first to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program?

The answer is Turkmenistan, in May 1994, and NATO had just created the PfP program in January of that year.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Joseph Epstein comments for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's upcoming trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“It’s noteworthy that it’s Vance on this trip,” Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL. “He represents a more isolationist part of the White House, but he’s going to be championing deals on this trip that weaken Russian and Iranian influence -- and the throughline is critical minerals.”

Vance will be the most senior US official to ever visit Armenia and is the first to visit Azerbaijan since former US Vice President Dick Cheney in 2008.

“There hasn’t been engagement with the region of this kind since the Bush administration, and that was largely all through Georgia,” said Epstein.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia persist, and this despite the tacit rapprochement that materialized as a result of the meeting between the presidents of the two countries in October in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.  

During the talks, held on the margins of a CIS summit, Putin expressed regret that the Russian military shot down an Azeri civilian airliner in late 2024, killing 39 people. He blamed a combination of Ukrainian drone activity in Russian airspace and a malfunction in the air defense system. The Russian president pledged full cooperation with investigators and promised that the conduct of all officials involved would be scrutinized. 

Relations had seemed to improve until late December, when the rhetoric took a radical turn for the worse. In a year-end press conference, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov revealed that Baku had been informed that Russia’s investigators had reportedly closed the criminal case.  

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at Turan Research Center.

Iran is facing a water emergency that hydrologists and environmental experts warn may now be irreversible. Major reservoirs are depleted, groundwater reserves are collapsing, and senior officials are openly warning of citizens rationing water and even evacuating the capital due to water shortages. While the crisis is often attributed to drought or climate change, experts stress that it is overwhelmingly man-made—the cumulative result of decades of over-extraction, mismanagement, and failure to modernize water governance.

Paradoxically, many of the most effective technical solutions to Iran’s water crisis have already been developed by its regional adversary, Israel. Through innovations in drip irrigation, wastewater recycling, desalination, and integrated water management, Israel has achieved water security under harsher natural constraints than Iran faces today. This article argues that Iran’s crisis is no longer a problem of awareness or technology, but of political, financial, and institutional barriers—and that proven Israeli approaches, if accessed indirectly, could still mitigate the most destabilizing consequences of a crisis experts say can no longer be fully reversed.

Read the full article on the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center. Dalga Khatinoglu is an independent energy expert.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein shares his thoughts on the latest U.S.-India trade deal for an N7 Brief.

“The linkage of tariff relief to India curbing Russian oil purchases underscores how energy geopolitics can shape trade agendas, but it also risks oversimplifying New Delhi’s nuanced balancing act. Nevertheless, a meaningful reduction — or halt — in Indian imports of Russian oil would repreent a significant strategic and economic win for the United States and its allies.”

Read the full article on the N7 Foundation.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

The ongoing destabilization of Iran poses one of the most complex strategic dilemmas faced by Turkey in the twenty-first century. This assessment is far from self-evident, as it conflicts with the widespread perception of Ankara and Tehran as historical rivals. 

Turkey fears a resumption of Iran’s disruption and meddling in Syria. For its part, Iran fears Turkey’s growing influence in the Caucasus, which it views as detrimental to its strategic interests. Following the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, Iran accused Turkey and Israel of a joint anti-Iranian conspiracy. Other arenas of contest between Turkey and Iran also exist. 

However, regarding current events, a range of geopolitical calculations shapes Turkey’s stance on the anti-regime protests in Iran American threats to act against the regime. This paper posits that Ankara is gripped by a “Crisis of Calculation.” The Turkish political and security establishment views the potential collapse of the Islamic Republic not as an opportunity for regional advancement but as a prelude to ethno-sectarian fragmentation that could irreparably damage Turkey’s territorial integrity and demographic stability.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins ILTV to discuss protests and the ensuing crackdown in Iran. In the interview, Grinberg discusses Tehran's strategic calculation in the face of the protests and U.S. threats.

Watch the full interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“After the Syrian civil war, Turkey was forced to open its doors to millions of refugees, and integrating them into both society and the economy proved to be a very painful process,” says Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak of the Moshe Dayan Center. “Erdoğan was accused for years of failing to stop the waves of migration. It now appears that, in light of the lessons learned from Syria, border security will be kept tight this time.”

Read the full interview on the Times of Israel.

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins CNN-News 18 to discuss the key flaws in the proposal and explains why India and Israel are exercising caution instead of embracing it outright.

Watch the interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“In Iran’s political psychology, two factors are traditionally essential for a fundamental transformation: first, the bazaar must enter into sustained strikes and protests; second, the army or national armed forces must side with the people against the ruling power,” said Hussain Ehsani, a research fellow at the Turan Research Center, a Washington, D.C.–based think tank. “At this stage, the first condition has partially materialized. However, it remains unclear whether the bazaar strikes will continue or fade.”

Read the full interview on the National Post.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

As the unrest subsides in Iran, all eyes are on US president Donald Trump and his next moves. While Trump has said that he's weighing "very strong" options, it's not clear if he will deploy the US military to weaken or topple the regime. Which way will Trump go? Iran expert Alex Grinberg answers in conversation with Firstpost's Prathik S Vinod.
Watch the full interview on First Post.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Alex Grinberg joins the Russian service of Kaan Radio's "Good Morning, Israel Broadcast." In the interview, he discusses how the conception that chaos would follow the fall of the Iranian regime is a narrative spread by the Islamic Republic targeted at the West. In the interview, Grinberg also discusses:

• The end of the proxy era: after direct strikes between Israel and Iran, whether there are any remaining “rules of the game,” and if a major war is inevitable;

• The great uncertainty: who will succeed the aging Khamenei, and will the transfer of power turn into an elite civil war;

• The Iranian street: how “Generation Z” lives, why young people are abandoning religion en masse, and what the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement has become today.

Watch the full interview here (Russian).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Reserach Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Alex Vatanka and Alan Eyre on a panel moderated by Negar Mojtahedi to discuss the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and what it means for US-Iran relations.

Watch the full interview here.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persia to discuss the US strikes on ISIS position in Syria following the killing of two US soldiers and an interpreter. According to CENTCOM, several militants were killed in the strikes.

Watch the full interview here (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persian to discuss the terror attack against a Hannukah celebration in Bondi Beach, Australia.

Watch the interview on BBC (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins Yaakov Lappin on the JISS Podcast, where he examines Iran’s covert influence operations in Europe and the true status of its nuclear and missile programs. Grinberg exposes a Soviet-style Iranian campaign in France, highlighting Tehran’s recruitment of agents of influence in academia, science, and government, its promotion of strategic narratives, and the use of criminal networks to target Jewish and Israeli communities. He also discusses the overlooked Iranian-Algerian cooperation in France and the organized campaign against French Jewish authors, revealing the sophisticated scope of Iran’s destabilization efforts.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“Iran’s nuclear program has been destroyed to the level that it has zero functionality,” Maj. (ret.) Alex Grinberg, a former Israeli military intelligence officer and an expert on Iran at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, told The Media Line. “Resumption of the program requires immense resources that Iran does not have at the moment.”

Iran is in the midst of a deepening socioeconomic and energy crisis. Its economy has exhibited virtually no growth. Despite vast oil and gas reserves, decades of infrastructure neglect, underinvestment, mismanagement, and the diversion of funds to terrorist organizations around the world have caused energy production and distribution systems to break down. International sanctions against the Islamic Republic have only exacerbated the situation. Frequent blackouts and water shortages have affected not only industry but also the general public.

Read the whole interview on The Media Line.
Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

EU-Kazakhstan relations have strengthened significantly over the past decade, accelerating after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an analyst has told TVP World.

According to Bruce Pannier from the Caspian Policy Center, Kazakhstan has become a vital trade and energy partner for Europe, thanks to its position on the Middle Corridor—a route linking China and Europe without crossing Russia. 

While Moscow resents losing its northern route, Beijing has backed the corridor and invested heavily in Kazakhstan, giving China political leverage. Despite Astana’s efforts, some sanctioned goods still reach Russia through Kazakhstan. 

Meanwhile, Europe depends on Kazakh oil, uranium and critical minerals, with new deals focusing on local resource processing. 

Watch the interview on TVP World.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on Turkey at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, notes that even before Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy was announced on behalf of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) for the 2023 presidential elections, the secular opposition discussed the possible candidacy of İmamoğlu or Yavaş. However, Kılıçdaroğlu’s insistence led the two to decide to stand by him, including during campaign rallies.

“Yavaş managed to defeat Erdoğan’s candidates one after another, proving that Erdoğan’s candidates—and even Erdoğan himself—are not invincible,” emphasizes Dr. Cohen Yanarocak. “From the perspective of the Turkish president, the two charismatic candidates in provinces such as Ankara and Istanbul may represent a model sample for all of Turkey.”

Read the full article on Globes Israel (Hebrew).

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) Iran expert Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg told JNS that Saudi escalation signals a willingness to challenge the Iranian-Houthi axis more directly: “According to these reports, the Saudis are intending a large-scale operation against the Houthis. If they do that, it will be a clear indication that they don’t care about their agreement with Iran,” he said.

Grinberg argued that the regional landscape has shifted sharply since the Trump presidency and Israel’s dismantling of Iranian proxies.

“Everyone understands that Iran is weak because it has lost all its pieces on the chessboard. It doesn’t have an axis of resistance anymore, and it lost its deterrence,” he added.

Read the full article on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

However, Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, a former officer in the IDF Military Intelligence research department and an Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, said that the reports of dual-use chemical shipments were misleading and overinterpreted the significance of the influx.

“The shipment of the dual-use materials is a hint that they are rebuilding, but there is a lack of precise information, and Iranian agents have an interest in making it seem like the significance of this sort of shipment is greater than it is in reality,” Grinberg told JNS. “There is a long way from these chemicals to full ballistic missiles; it doesn’t mean in any way that war is imminent.”

Satellite imagery shows that Iran has moved quickly to reconstruct key solid-propellant facilities destroyed in Israeli strikes. Several production halls are being rebuilt, including structures that previously housed the mixers used to convert chemical inputs into solid rocket fuel. Those mixers were among Israel’s primary targets during the 12-day “Rising Lion” operation in June, because they are essential for manufacturing high-energy propellant used in medium- and long-range missiles, including systems that could carry nuclear warheads.

However, Grinberg challenged this assessment, saying that it is wrong to put too much weight on the satellite images. “There are some photographs from missile and nuclear sites showing that there is activity, but that doesn’t definitively prove anything about the pace of missile production,” he said. “It’s not surprising to see that there is some rebuilding going on after a site is blown up, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the capacity is rebuilt.”

Read the full interview on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In the Spotlight on Central Asia Podcast, Senior Fellow Bruce Pannier and Michael Hilliard unpack how the C5+1 summit in Washington could reshape Central Asia's security and economic architecture, cutting through the new trade deals and MoUs to gauge their real-world impact. Pannier and Hilliard assess Tokayev's trip to Moscow and what it signals, the Moscow arrest of a major Turkmen power broker, fresh twists in Kazakhstan's election season, viral claims that a foreign power has "pulled out" of the region, and worrying economic signals from Bishkek.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Given that Kazakhstan had normalised relations with Israel decades before this month, its entry into the Abraham Accords is a “politically meaningful and strategically useful, but largely symbolic” development that will come with “targeted practical gains in specific areas such as technology, defence, and critical minerals,” explained Aigerim Turgunbaeva, a Bishkek-based journalist and research fellow at the Turan Center, in an interview with The New Arab.

Astana’s official entry into the Abraham Accords “mainly elevates the visibility of bilateral ties, provides a recognised political framework for new commercial and technological partnerships, and reduces perceived risks for US and Israeli investors operating in Kazakhstan,” she noted, while adding that the Central Asian state’s foreign policy will retain its “multi-vector” nature that avoids placing Astana in alignment with any specific geopolitical bloc.

“The move therefore broadens Kazakhstan’s diplomatic toolkit rather than transforming the nature of its ties with Israel,” stated Turgunbaeva.

Israel’s Bukharan Jewish community plays a central role in shaping Israeli-Uzbek relations. Reflecting on this community’s history, Bruce Pannier, a fellow at the Turan Research Centre and board member of the Caspian Policy Centre, noted that the Bukharan Jewish population in what is now Uzbekistan numbered around 40,000 at the time of the Soviet Union’s implosion.

“The community had been in the Bukhara area for thousands of years. Most have left in the time since Uzbekistan became independent, and there are now possibly less than 1,000 still living in the Bukhara area. Most of those who left went to the United States, but several thousand went to Israel with significant help from the Israeli government,” he noted.

“The Bukharan Jews in Israel and those still remaining in Uzbekistan continue to connect the two countries.”

Pannier believes that Kyrgyzstan would likely join after Uzbekistan. “Kyrgyz-Israeli diplomatic relations also date back to early 1992. Kyrgyzstan’s situation vis-à-vis Israel is similar to Kazakhstan’s in that there’s really nothing to lose in joining the Accords,” he told TNA.

Read the full article on the New Arab.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow and Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakhstan is turning geography into strategy. In an interview on Eastern Express, Bruce Pannier, a board member at the think tank Caspian Policy Center, said the country is rapidly positioning itself as Eurasia’s transit hinge as shippers reroute away from Russia.

“Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine meant that you couldn’t use the so-called northern route… Now you have both China and Europe hugely interested in developing the Middle Corridor,” he said. 

That corridor—the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route —runs from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian to the South Caucasus and onward to Europe. Pannier argues Kazakhstan’s long, uninterrupted east-west spine gives it a structural edge.  

Read the full article on TVP World.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Russia is intensifying its attempts to destabilize Kazakhstan and Armenia, according to analysts Seth Cropsey and Joseph Epstein. In an article for The Washington Post, they describe the operations the Kremlin is conducting in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and propose measures to defend against its aggression — currently hybrid, but possibly military in the future.

Read the full article on the Republic (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center. Seth Cropsey is President of the Yorktown Institute.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev will reportedly hold a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to announce Kazakhstan's intention to join, although Astana has already maintained full diplomatic ties with Israel for more than 30 years.

But Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL that while the move by Kazakhstan may appear symbolic, it could hold diplomatic weight moving forward.

“Astana’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marks the beginning of a new phase, transforming the accords from a Middle East peace initiative to a pro-US coalition of moderate Muslim countries devoted to tolerance and prosperity,” Epstein said.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

In contrast, during Israel’s “Operation Iron Swords,” Israeli UAVs from companies such as IAI, Elbit, and Aeronautics dominated Iranian airspace — even over major cities. Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, notes that Turkish media deliberately avoid covering Israeli drone capabilities — even though Turkey’s own UAV industry was built largely on Israeli and American models.

“Erdoğan often uses the saying, ‘The cruel landlord turns the tenant into a homeowner somewhere else.’ Meaning, since the Turks relied on Israel for drones and got ‘poor service,’ they decided to develop their own,” Dr. Yanarocak explains. “Today, when you look at Turkish coverage of Israeli strikes in Gaza or Lebanon, they avoid praising Israeli technology. But if you open the Turkish Intelligence Academy’s reports on Operation Iron Swords, you’ll see they are well aware of Israel’s advancements and detail its systems and their effectiveness.”

Read the full article on Globes (Hebrew).

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Joseph Epstein, director of the Yorktown Institute’s Research Center, told Radio Free Europe that Central Asia is “well-positioned” to meet American demand and give the U.S. “more leverage in the next round” of trade talks with China.

“The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor,” Epstein said in a statement. “That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies.”

Read the full article on the Washington Examiner.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

"The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor," Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL, referring to the emerging 6,500-kilometer-long trade routethat connects China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus by bypassing Russia.

"Both Beijing and Washington are set to use the pause to create an advantage from their side to have more leverage in the next round of trade tensions," Epstein said. "That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies."

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Maj. (res.) Alex Grinberg joined ILTV to discuss the current state of Iran-backed militias. In the interview, Grinberg discussed the threat posed to Israel by both Iran and its proxies as well as relations and the potential of future confrontations. The interview also touched on the situation inside Iran and why Iranians are not rising up against the regime.

Watch the full interview on ILTV.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak in an interview with Haber 7 explains Israeli perceptions of Turkish ambitions in Gaza. According to Yanarocak, Israelis would see a possible Turkish presence in Gaza not as a peacekeeping mission, but as an advanced military base against Israel.

Read the full interview on Haber 7 (Turkish).

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow for the Turan Research Center.

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak joins i24 News for a special in-depth report on Turkish-Israeli relations. In the interview, Yanarocak breaks down current ties between Israel and Turkey and the distinct influence President Recep Tayyip Erdogan plays.

Watch the full interview on i24 News (Hebrew).

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak breaks down the reasons for why Turkey is holding a conference on Gaza, drawing parallels with the case of Cyprus. According to Yanarocak, if Israel does not want to see a more active Turkey in the Israel-Palestine conflict, then Jerusalem should stop Turkish penetration in Gaza.

Watch the whole interview on i24 News.

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

What does President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey really want? From its deepening involvement in Syria to its growing alignment with Pakistan, Iran, and China, Ankara’s ambitions are reshaping regional and global geopolitics.
Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak explains on The Nationalist View with Arun Anand.

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Bruce Pannier co-hosts the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast with Michael Hilliard. In this episode, Pannier and Hilliard discuss the upcoming C5+1 summit in Washington, clashes between the Taliban and Tajik forces, a crackdown on independent media in Kyrgyzstan, and the foiling of a terror plot in Almaty. Both are joined by Efgan Nifti of the Caspian Policy Center to discuss the growing relationship between Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, explained that Turkey’s pursuit of a Gaza role is tied to its wider regional strategy. Yanarocak noted that Turkey’s first goal would be the preservation of Hamas. “Turkey is doing its best to ensure Hamas’s survival,” he explained. 

Yanarocak further noted that, in addition to practical considerations surrounding Hamas, Turkey also sought to elevate its status while weakening Israel diplomatically. 

“Turkey would like to gain status. For the first time in a long time, Ankara was recognized as a critical regional actor,” he explained. “Turkey wishes to position itself as a superpower backing the Palestinians in a mirror image of the U.S.’s backing of Israel. By doing this, they are elevating themselves to the level of the United States and degrading Israel to the level of Hamas.”

Furthermore, Yanarocak warned that Erdogan was interested in aggressive expansionism and that the Turks were likely to perceive a foothold in Gaza as a forward operating base against Israel, rather than as a peacekeeping operation. 

Yanarocak brought the example of Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus as a precedent for how Turkey was likely to view Gaza. “Turkey’s role as a guarantor in Cyprus later led to its military intervention in the north of the island,” Yanarocak said. “Turkey is definitely looking at Gaza similarly.”

Erdogan has already described Turkey’s military aspirations in relation to Israel. “Just like we entered Karabakh [Azerbaijan], just like we entered Libya, we might do something similar to Israel,” Erdogan said in a speech in July 2024. 

Yanarocak pointed out that Turkish forces in Gaza would put Israel on a fast track to military conflict with Turkey. “Turkey is trying to acquire a diplomatic status that will allow it to intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more directly in favor of the Palestinians. And in some extreme cases, this can definitely escalate to military conflict,” he concluded.

Read the full interview on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.me

But the biggest trigger for Iran, pun not necessarily intended, is the news that Azerbaijan has emerged as a leading candidate to join the U.S.-backed international mission to stabilize Gaza, with proposed roles ranging from peacekeeping to reconstruction support. Its involvement is still being negotiated with Washington and other partners.

An Azeri role in Gaza “would strengthen Israel through its long-standing partnership and shared strategic interests with regard to Iran,” Joseph Epstein, an expert on Iran’s relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia and director of the Turan Research Center, told the Jerusalem Post.

Israel and Azerbaijan share a common threat in Iran and their cooperation goes back 30 years, Epstein added in a call with me Tuesday. Azerbaijan supplies most of Israel’s oil.“But the cooperation goes much farther,” he added. “Azerbaijan has long acted as Israel’s advocate in the Muslim world. Israel for its part has lobbied for Azerbaijani interests in Washington.”

Read the whole analysis on the Middle East Broadcasting Networks' Iran Briefing.