Turan Research Center

Director Joseph Epstein spoke with Viktor Mailin of the Kazakhstani outlet Check-Point.kz about what a visiting U.S. congressional delegation's trip means for the relationship between Washington and Astana — a visit timed to coincide with elections for Kazakhstan's new unicameral parliament.

Epstein argued that the composition of the delegation mattered as much as its presence: it included the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, the body that would have to act to remove Kazakhstan from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. "Congress controls two things no president can provide on his own: the federal budget and U.S. trade legislation," he said, while cautioning that a visit is not yet a vote.

He laid out three areas where legislative engagement could matter: trade (removing Jackson-Vanik requires an act of Congress), investment financing (bringing U.S. capital into projects like the Cove Kaz tungsten mine and Middle Corridor connectivity), and historical precedent — the Nunn-Lugar program, a congressional initiative that helped dismantle Kazakhstan's Soviet-era nuclear arsenal. He proposed a standing "Kurultai-Congress" group for regular delegation exchanges.

On Kazakhstan's political modernization, Epstein said institutional reform matters differently across sectors: a single oil major can operate within a specially negotiated framework, but building a diversified portfolio of critical-minerals projects requires the whole system to function well. He was more measured on security cooperation, noting real constraints from Kazakhstan's CSTO membership and its ties to Russia, while pointing to genuine openings in counterterrorism and nonproliferation.

Asked about Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy, Epstein pushed back on the idea that it amounts to a balancing act: "The United States isn't competing to be Kazakhstan's main partner. It's competing against exclusivity." In his view, Kazakhstan's independent posture only raises its value to Washington — as an anchor state for the Middle Corridor, a source of critical minerals, and a model of a sovereign Central Asian state.

Read the full interview on Check-Pointkz (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Last week, Azerbaijan filed a lawsuit against CNN in a US federal court over what it describes as false and defamatory reporting about its role in the 2026 Iran conflict. CNN alleged that Israel had deployed military and intelligence personnel to Azerbaijan and used Azerbaijani territory for operations against Iran.

Baku has categorically rejected those claims as false, stressing that Azerbaijan does not permit its territory to be used by any state for military operations against a neighboring or third country.

This is not simply a dispute about reputation.

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The allegations carry potentially serious security consequences. The IRGC had separately warned that states hosting forces used in attacks against Iran could face retaliation. In March 2026, drones Azerbaijan said had been launched from Iran entered Azerbaijani airspace and struck near Nakhchivan airport and a school, injuring civilians. Tehran denied responsibility.
Read the full article on the Jerusalem Post.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joined host Baligh Saladin on East to West: Voices from the Middle East(شرق إلى الغرب | أصوات من الشرق الأوسط), the Arabic-language podcast of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, for an interview that begins not with policy but with biography. The episode, "From Moscow to the Arab World and Iran," asks a simple question with a long answer: why would a young man born in Moscow set out to learn Arabic?

Grinberg traces the path from a fascination with languages and Arabic literature to Persian, and from there into Israeli military intelligence and a career analyzing Iran. He describes the turning point that moved him from studying jihadist movements to trying to understand the Islamic Republic on its own terms — and what it means to approach a country through its language and culture rather than through its headlines.

The conversation then turns to Iranian society itself: the distance between the Iranian people and the regime that governs them, the place religion actually occupies in Iran today, the cultural life that rarely surfaces in news coverage, and the ways Iranians diverge from the image widely held of them elsewhere in the region.

Watch the full interview on YouTube (Arabic).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Russian policy toward Armenia is entering a new phase in which Moscow now appears increasingly inclined to rely on calibrated economic and political pressure rather than blunt punitive measures. The shift reflects the Kremlin’s recognition that while Yerevan under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continues to deepen its engagement with Western partners, excessive coercion could accelerate Armenia’s strategic drift away from Russia rather than reverse it. 

The latest attempt to stabilize bilateral relations came in early July, when the Armenian leader traveled to Russia for talks with his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Mishustin. The Russian side emphasized Russia’s desire to restore normal cooperation, expressing confidence that bilateral ties could gradually return to a more constructive trajectory under Armenia’s current government. 

Beyond diplomacy, Russia is reviewing a broader range of policy instruments designed to preserve its influence without triggering a complete geopolitical break. Russia remains Armenia’s principal export destination. In 2025, Armenian exports to Russia reached approximately $3 billion, representing more than one-third of the country’s total exports. This dependence gives the Kremlin significant influence over many sectors of the Armenian economy. 

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

For three decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, governments across Central Asia and the South Caucasus made foreign-policy decisions with one question always in mind: What will Moscow allow?

They have stopped asking.

Kazakhstan supplies rare earths to America and tells Vladimir Putin to end his war. Armenia has written EU membership into law and stopped showing up to Russia's military alliance. Azerbaijan hosts conferences on Russian colonialism and helps build Ukraine's railways. Moscow has found no way to make them start asking again.

The war in Ukraine, which has consumed the military and economic resourcesRussia used to police its periphery, is only part of the explanation. The deeper problem is how Russia managed these relationships in the first place. Putin relied on coercion: frozen conflicts on their territory, trade embargoes when they strayed, and the standing implication that Russian troops could arrive if matters went far enough. Russia's economic presence was real but built to bind rather than to build—stakes in export pipelines, control of transit routes and power grids, leverage over the migrant labor on which several economies depend. Russia never became a source of technology, capital or security that made these countries stronger. Influence of that kind requires the capacity to frighten. Ukraine drained the capacity, and little else was holding them.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Reading the international and Israeli press, one might get the impression that Iran is winning and still controls the Strait of Hormuz. Nothing could be further from reality. With a U.S.-imposed naval blockade in place and the Hormuz issue winding down, Iran’s power projection in the Gulf is gradually but steadily eroding, while the Axis of the Resistance exists only in name.

The erosion of Iranian power and control in the Gulf is also weakening Iran’s influence in other regions, including the Caspian basin. Although the region draws fewer headlines than the Gulf, its strategic importance to Iran and neighboring countries is hard to overstate. The Caspian Sea is rich in maritime resources, making the agreed division of those resources among the Caspian countries strategically important.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On August 9, Russia and Syria reached a deal that significantly reduces Russian control over two military outposts from the Assad era.

The Russian side tried to portray the agreement as an important step that would boost ties between the two states. “We believe ⁠that reaching this agreement will give further impetus to the development of the full range of relations between our countries, which are based on a long history of friendship ​and partnership,” Russia’s Foreign Ministry argued.

The reality could be strikingly different. Damascus is reinstating full control over the two facilities, including Hmeimim airport and the commercial ⁠berth ⁠at Tartus port. The military sections of the two facilities are to transition within three months into joint training facilities with a fraction of Russian troops, while the Dubai-based DP World logistics company modernizes Tartus and other Syrian ports.

The agreement is the result of nearly a year and a half of negotiations between Damascus and Moscow that started after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024. In the first weeks after Assad’s downfall, Moscow rapidly reduced its footprint at the Hmeimim airbase and the naval facility at Tartous, and the new authorities in Damascus cancelled a long-term concession previously granted to the Russian engineering company Stroytransgaz. Russian forces also withdrew from Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria and curtailed patrols near the Israeli frontier.

Read the full article on The Stimson Center.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

According to Iranian authorities, the Ukrainian attack on vessels sailing between Russian and Iranian ports on the Caspian Sea killed one Iranian sailor and injured three others, prompting Tehran to summon Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires and condemn the strike as a “hostile and criminal act.”

It marked Ukraine’s first known attack on an Iranian vessel — it has previously hit Russian targets in and around the sea — and caused Iran’s foreign ministry to describe President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as “the head of the Ukraine regime”. It pledged the late July attacks would be answered. Zelenskyy subsequently confirmed Ukrainian strikes against vessels which he said were transporting Iran-linked military cargo, thus removing any ambiguity regarding Kyiv’s intent. One vessel was traveling from Russia’s Astrakhan to Iran’s port of Anzali.

Ukraine has had more than enough legal justification to attack Iran for several years. Putting aside the 2022 downing of a Ukrainian jet by Iranian air defenses in 2020, killing 176 people, Tehran has given very extensive military aid to Russia since 2022. The importance of Tehran’s assistance has declined from its peak, but the symbolism of a Ukrainian attack at a time when the US is engaged in hostilities with the Islamic Republic is clear.

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Last month, a senior Afghan Taliban official managed to insult one of the few governments actively courting his regime. Sheikh Mohammad Khalid Hanafi, Kabul’s acting minister for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, was reported to have declared that Islam in Uzbekistan—the land of Imam al-Bukhari and Imam al-Tirmidhi—exists “only on people’s lips.” Both capitals scrambled to contain the damage. Tashkent’s foreign ministry dismissed the reports as “disinformation”; the Taliban ministry sent a letter praising Uzbekistan’s Islamic heritage, though it never quite explained why excerpts of the speech had appeared on its own channels before being deleted.

The row was brief, but it was revealing: less for what Hanafi said than for how little he apparently knows about his northern neighbor. Far from existing in name only, Islam in Uzbekistan is undergoing its most dramatic revival since independence. And an increasingly ultraconservative, politicized strain of it has moved from the repressed margins into the mainstream—tolerated, and at times cultivated, by the very government now protesting its piety to Kabul.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

In recent years, particularly since the outbreak of the recent conflicts in Gaza and Iran, the Middle East has seen a resurgence of connectivity projects. While some economic “corridors” appear more realistic than others, all are ambitious in scale, with the participating countries striving to elevate their respective geopolitical positions.

Yet this supposed revolution in Middle East connectivity may not be as transformative as it first appeared. Behind the surface, these projects face implementation issues and may exacerbate structural deficiencies in Middle East industry. The success of these projects will ultimately depend on more than political ambition or infrastructure investment. Without greater industrial integration and economic complementarities, many of these corridors risk becoming pathways for trade rather than catalysts for much deeper transformation.

Read the full article on The Gulf International Forum.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Middle Corridor countries have made numerous efforts over the past few years to expand and strengthen the project. Kazakhstan and Georgia signed an agreement on July 20, introducing a testing period for an e-Permit system for international road freight transport between the two countries. This is one move that works to improve logistics along the Middle Corridor (Kazakh Ministry of Transport; Inbusiness.kz, July 20). Earlier, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine signed an agreement in Astana on May 15 during the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission TRACECA  to introduce a single transit document for the Middle Corridor (Open KG; TRACECA, May 18). The document is expected to simplify cargo transportation along the corridor by allowing shipments to move under a single permit. These recent agreements follow positive developments in South Caucasus transport connectivity. Azerbaijan and Georgia launched the Poti–Baku Express Block Train on January 30, followed by an official ceremony on June 3 inaugurating the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway (Azerbaijan Railways, January 30; The Astana Times, June 3).

Together, these projects aim to reduce transit times, improve cargo reliability, and strengthen the Middle Corridor’s competitiveness against alternative routes through Russia and Iran (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 13, 2023). Russia’s war against Ukraine boosted the route’s importance over the past several years, the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran in 2026 has further highlighted the impetus to develop a corridor that passes across the South Caucasus and lies between Russia and Iran (see EDM, April 19, August 2, 2022, October 28, 2024, January 28, December 4, 2025, March 24, 25, 31).

Read the full article on The Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

As Joseph Epstein, Director of the Washington-based Turan Research Center, observes, "The Azerbaijan-Israel relationship is what reliability looks like: two nations that have been there for each other in the hardest moments, from defence technology when Baku was isolated to energy security during Israel's recent war." He further argues that because the relationship rests not only on shared strategic concerns regarding Iran but also on genuine cultural ties and a commitment to multiculturalism, it has become "a model that should inspire Israel's relations across the Muslim world." Together, these developments illustrate that post-2020

Azerbaijan-Israel relations have matured into one of the most resilient and strategically consequential partnerships in Eurasia.

Read the full article on The Research Institute for European and American Studies.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Since the fall of the Assad dynasty in late 2024, the Russian military presence has remained a major mystery as to what Moscow’s future will be in Syria. Following Assad’s flight to Moscow on December 8, 2024, Russia has significantly scaled back its presence at its two principal facilities on Syria’s Mediterranean coast: the Tartus naval base and its strategic air base at Khmeimim, located in the Syrian province of Latakia. Russia’s future stay in Syria became even more uncertain after the new government in Damascus terminated the 49-year commercial port management concession granted to the Russian engineering construction business Stroytransgaz.

Russia has also pulled out from Qamishli Airport located in northeastern Syria and restricted its patrolling missions along the border with Israel. This reduced presence has coincided with Moscow’s ever-demanding war effort in Ukraine and the deterioration of Russia’s position in the Middle East following the weakening of its key regional partner – Iran. In fact, for the first time since 2013, Russia currently has no naval presence operating in the Mediterranean Sea.

Yet, over the past several months, Syria’s new leadership has not only maintained working ties with Moscow but even attempted to revive and expand the relationship. This has come as a surprise to many given that the interim government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, once in power, severed Syrian ties with Assad’s other allies such as Iran and Hezbollah. When it comes to Russia, however, the interim Syrian leader has twice visited Moscow: first on October 15, 2025, and then on January 28, earlier this year.

Read the full article on The Saratoga Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Research Fellow Aigerim Turgunbaeva spoke with Japan's Sankei Shimbun for the second installment of its series on China and Russia's "backyard" in Asia, reporting from Bishkek on how Kyrgyzstan has become a transit point for goods and money flowing into sanctioned Russia.

Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan — long described as Central Asia's "star pupil of democratization" — has moved rapidly toward Moscow. The European Union assesses that its exports to Kyrgyzstan of items carrying military-conversion risk have risen roughly 800 percent since before the invasion, while Kyrgyzstan's exports to Russia have risen roughly 1,200 percent. Machinery exports to Russia, negligible before the war, reached $8 million, an increase of more than 40,000 percent. Kyrgyz GDP has grown at roughly 10 percent a year for four consecutive years.

Turgunbaeva told the paper that cryptocurrency has become the mechanism binding the two economies together. On Telegram, offers circulate to exchange USDT for dollars or rubles. "Kyrgyzstan has turned into a crypto corridor linking Russia with China and other countries," she said. Licensed crypto operators numbered three as of 2021; today there are roughly 200. Trading volume in 2025 exceeded 2.7 trillion som, surpassing the country's GDP.

She warned that the "gray zone" the authorities cannot see into is expanding, and that the country's growth rests on a dangerous foundation. "The spread of crypto and the acceleration of dependence on Russia are closely connected. If the Russian economy collapses, we could collapse along with it."

Read the full article on The Sankei Shimbun (in Japanese).

Aigerim Turgunbayeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

When Donald Trump and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev got on the phone on July 10, their conversation ranged from the implementation of billions of dollars in commercial agreements to nuclear nonproliferation to an invitation for the American president to visit the Kazakh steppe. What was striking was not any single item but the routineness of the exchange. A US president and a Central Asian leader now talk the way close partners do—and that is new.

Consider the past eight months. Tokayev traveled to Washington in November for the first C5+1 summit ever held at the White House, where Trump announced Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords—the initial addition of his second term. Companies from the two countries concluded 29 agreements valued around $17 billion. Trump has since extended G20 invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for the Miami summit. A procession of senior Americans has passed through Astana this year, including Senator Steve Daines (R-MT), Special Envoy Sergio Gor, and a delegation from the US Chamber of Commerce. Cumulative American investment in Kazakhstan now exceeds $100 billion, and may rise to $137 billion in the medium term.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with Kazakhstan's DKNews.kz about the country's newly enacted Constitution, which President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has framed as the start of a new historical era in Kazakhstan's statehood.

Epstein argued that the reform's most consequential element is the reintroduction of a vice presidency, which he read as a deliberate effort to build a transparent, institutionally anchored mechanism for the succession of power. For three decades, he noted, the core problem across Central Asia was never a shortage of strong leaders but the absence of predictable procedures for transferring authority — Islam Karimov left no clear succession plan and power changed hands behind closed doors, while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan largely resolved the question along dynastic lines. By writing a full succession mechanism into the Constitution, Kazakhstan is attempting something the region has scarcely seen, shifting the guarantor of stability from a single personality to a durable state institution. The real test, he emphasized, will be implementation rather than the text itself, but he called the ambition the right direction of travel.

On Tokayev's framing of the Constitution as the foundation of a "Just Kazakhstan," Epstein described the president's approach as evolutionary rather than abrupt, and said a constitution is one of the few instruments capable of preserving a chosen course beyond any single government or shift in public mood. Embedding the "Just Kazakhstan" concept directly in the Basic Law — rather than as a standalone state program — turns human-centered governance, the rule of law, and social-state principles into fundamental reference points that future governments would find far harder to abandon quietly. A document becomes truly strategic, he argued, precisely when it can constrain those who come after its authors, and that is the high bar Kazakhstan is now setting for itself.

Turning to investment and international standing, Epstein stressed that stability and predictability matter more to investors than almost anything else, and that this is where Kazakhstan holds a deliberately cultivated regional advantage. The "Law and Order" concept and the constitutional succession mechanism, he said, function partly as signals to the international investment community that the country's political and legal environment remains steady — a message that resonates given Kazakhstan's position as the world's largest uranium producer, a major center for critical minerals, and a key link in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route connecting Europe and Asia while bypassing Russia and Iran. He was candid that reputations diverge by audience: investors and governments focused on reliability will read the changes positively, while parts of the Western expert community attentive to democratic procedure will likely criticize further concentration of executive power. Kazakhstan, in his view, is betting that predictability is now a more valuable resource than political uncertainty — a wager he considers reasonable in the current geopolitical climate.

Epstein also welcomed the Constitution's enshrining of long-term national values such as national unity and social accord, calling this especially relevant in an era of globalization where a state that fails to define its own values is shaped by external trends it cannot control. For a country home to more than a hundred nationalities, he said, that diversity can be either a source of friction or a strategic asset, and Kazakhstan has consistently chosen to treat its Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, Turkic, and other communities as bridges to the wider world. He underscored the need for balance — Kazakhstan is the state of the Kazakh people, so strengthening Kazakh national culture is both natural and necessary, even as every citizen, whatever their origin, should feel fully part of the state and proud to call themselves Kazakhstani. Speaking personally, Epstein described Kazakhstan as a country he knows well through his own family, and called the combination of a strong Kazakh national foundation with genuine respect for all citizens one of the country's most underrated strengths.

Looking ahead, Epstein cautioned against expecting a sharp break, noting that constitutions rarely create a new political course and more often accelerate trends already underway. He expects continued momentum behind Kazakhstan's role as a key state of the Middle Corridor, further investment in mining, critical minerals, and transport-logistics infrastructure, and more stable conditions for long-term capital. Politically, he flagged the August elections to the Kurultai as the first serious test of the new legislative model and the eventual appointment of a vice president as a revealing indicator of how succession will be built — but identified 2029 as the decisive threshold. If the new constitutional model performs as hoped, he concluded, the coming years could lay the groundwork for what Central Asia has struggled for decades to achieve: a peaceful, predictable, and fully constitutional transfer of supreme state power.

Read the full interview at DKNews.kz (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

The crisis in the Middle East has reinforced for China that, amid ongoing geopolitical fragmentation, economic resilience now depends on diversifying across multiple trade routes rather than relying too heavily on any single corridor. The immediate concern, of course, is energy. Prolonged disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, which appears...

Read the full article on Asia Sentinel.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

"[Israelis] have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear." That wasn't an Iranian ayatollah, a Hamas spokesman, or even a Columbia University professor. It was Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, representing NATO’s second-largest military, speaking on Turkish television last week. Israel's foreign minister called it textbook incitement to genocide. In the same interview, Fidan said Ankara has "no problem with confrontation if it comes to that."

This is no longer rhetoric without consequence. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Turkish and Israeli forces have operated in close proximity in Syria—the two countries now effectively share a border there. In 2025, it was reported Turkish F-16s and Israeli aircraft came into direct contact in Syrian airspace during an Israeli strike, prompting urgent talks on a deconfliction mechanism, though Turkey denied this happened. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called Zionism an existential threat to Turkey and asserted that Israeli operations in Syria and Lebanon endanger his country. His interior minister vowed last month that Turkey would one day retake Jerusalem.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Iran’s leaders call survival a victory. After a year in which the United States and Israel dismantled the Islamic Republic’s military, gutted its nuclear program, and killed its supreme leader, the regime’s surviving officials insist that merely enduring is triumph enough.

But surviving is not the same as living, and what Tehran has preserved is a ruin. The tragedy, and the thing its rulers refuse to see, is that they had a choice and still do. A small nation on Iran’s northern border confronted a version of the same choice and answered it the opposite way. Armenia is the standing rebuttal to everything the Islamic Republic tells itself about why it cannot change.

Read the full article on the Washington Examiner.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

The trial of high-ranking Kyrgyz officials accused of plotting to overthrow the government concluded on July 2. All eight defendants, including the former chief of Kyrgyzstan’s security service and the former speaker of parliament, were found guilty and sentenced to four years in prison.

However, none will actually serve any prison time as the court ordered them all placed on probation for the next three years.

The Letter of 75

It all started on February 9, 2026, when a group of 75 people, including former state officials, released an open letter calling on President Sadyr Japarov and Speaker of Parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu to call an early presidential election.

Japarov became acting president in the wake of the October 2020 protests that ousted President Sooronbai Jeenbekov. One of his first moves as acting president was to appoint his long-time friend Kamchybek Tashiyev to be the head of the State National Security Service (GKNB).

The presidential election of January 2021 resulted in victory for Japarov, with a concurrent vote approving a change from a parliamentary to a presidential form of government.

Read the full article on The Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

On June 7, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won the country’s parliamentary elections with just under 50 percent of the vote, enough under Armenia’s electoral system to govern alone with a comfortable majority. The nearest challenger, the Strong Armenia bloc fronted by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, trailed near 23 percent, and every opposition force that cleared the threshold campaigned on some version of repairing ties with Moscow. Civil Contract cast the vote as a choice between a return to Russia’s orbit and a more independent Armenia drawn toward the West, and the electorate sided with the latter. Yet the win alone will not seal Armenia’s fate. The country must still pass the constitutional change widely seen as the final barrier to normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and Pashinyan’s victory does not mean Russia will quietly concede a country it has dominated for two centuries.

Read the full article on the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Only two people in Turkmenistan, the chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) and the president, have what could be considered job security.

Everyone else is expendable, at a moment’s notice, and that extends to the country’s top clergy.

Turkmenistan has replaced the country’s top mufti, and while the reasons for the sudden move are not clear, the removal process is very familiar for Turkmenistan.

Frantic Friday

On June 19, the mufti of all Turkmenistan, Yalkap Hojagulyyev, led Friday prayers at the Turkmenbashi Ruhy Mosque in Gypjak, some 11 kilometers from the capital, Ashgabat.

Saparmurat “Turkmenbashi” Niyazov was Turkmenistan’s first president. The country’s compliant parliament and Halk Maslahaty bestowed the title of “Turkmenbashi,” meaning head of the Turkmen, on Niyazov.

Gypjak was Niyazov’s home village, and when he was alive, he spent $100 million building a mosque that could accommodate 10,000 worshipers. After he died in late 2006, he was laid to rest at the nearby mausoleum built specially for him and his family.

The June 19 Friday prayers were attended by a special visitor, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who also paid his respects at Niyazov’s mausoleum.

Read the full article on The Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Conventional wisdom holds that a country guards its independence by holding its ground, and that to surrender a claim to a part of its imagined territory, even one outside its control, is to surrender a part of its sovereignty. This attitude helps to explain the dozens of ongoing territorial disputes across the world—Venezuela’s desire for the Essequibo region of Guyana, dueling Indian and Pakistani claims to Kashmir, and the controversy around China’s “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea, among others—and why they are so intractable.

Armenia is no stranger to this view. For decades, it vigorously defended its claim to the Nagorno-Karabakhregion, an ethnic Armenian enclave within the internationally-recognized territory of Azerbaijan. Even after the enclave, known as the Republic of Artsakh, fell to an Azerbaijani offensive in 2023, Armenian politicians railed against Azerbaijan and vowed to liberate the territory from Baku’s control in a future conflict.

But this attitude has its limits. After Armenia lost the war, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recognized that for Armenia—a small state wedged between far larger powers—an unwinnable claim could also become the mechanism by which his nation’s sovereignty was lost, and sought to win long-term peace in the south Caucasus by giving up Armenia’s claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. The deeper meaning of Pashinyan’s reelection on June 7 is a vote of confidence from the Armenian people in this approach—and a reward for Pashinyan’s remarkable personal courage in pursuing it.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has placed Pakistan in a particularly difficult position. When Islamabad signed a strategic mutual defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 2025, just days after Qatar came under Israeli attack, the pact was seen as a response to Israel’s military dominance and a shattered perception of U.S. security guarantees. It also suggested that Saudi Arabia could possibly enjoy Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella, though this has not been confirmed. Both sides have purposefully maintained strategic ambiguity regarding what role Pakistan’s armed forces and its nuclear arsenal could play in a military emergency.

The agreement was tested when Iran began launching missiles and drones against Saudi Arabia February 28, prompting questions as to why it didn’t trigger the mutual defense clause. Instead, Pakistan chose a diplomatic track, working alongside Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to mediate between Washington and Tehran. In Pakistan’s thinking, siding overtly with Saudi Arabia would complicate Pakistan’s close but occasionally tense relations with Iran. At the same time, Pakistan relies deeply on foreign investments, and Saudi Arabia has played a central role propping up the country’s economy.

Read the full article at The Arab Gulf States Institution.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

There were dozens of strawberry plants to prune, and Shukrat Djuraev was more than 3,000 miles from home, but he was not complaining as he worked his way down a giant greenhouse tunnel in Kent, in southern England.

“I like it here,” said Mr. Djuraev, 44, who is from Bukhara in Uzbekistan and is one of thousands of seasonal workers that British farmers rely on every year to get their produce into stores. “It’s good working here. It’s very steady and calm.”

Before Britain quit the European Union, many farm workers came from Eastern Europe. After Brexit, they lost the right to work in Britain — and many voters assumed, therefore, that fewer foreign workers would come.

Instead, 10 years after the Brexit referendum, British farmers have filled labor shortages by turning to a more distant region for seasonal workers, granted entry on six-month visas: Central Asia.

Read the full article on The New York Times.

Aigerim Turgunbayeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In a Persian-language interview with Afghanistan International, Turan Research Center Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani discussed Moscow's evolving approach to the Taliban and its broader security calculations across Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Ehsani argued that Russia increasingly sees the Taliban as a useful element in its strategy to contain ISIS-Khorasan, the regional Islamic State affiliate that Moscow regards as a direct threat to its own security and that of its Central Asian partners. Rather than confronting the Taliban, he explained, the Kremlin has chosen to engage with the group — treating it as a partner of convenience in managing the militant threat emanating from Afghanistan.

This engagement, Ehsani noted, fits into a wider Russian objective: extending Moscow's sphere of influence and its security perimeter outward from Central Asia into Afghanistan and the surrounding region. By cultivating ties with the Taliban, Russia aims to shape the security environment on its southern flank and position itself as a central actor in the region's future.

Watch the full interview on Afghanistan International.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The last time Turkey’s border with Armenia was open, Bill Clinton was the US president and Boris Yeltsin was his Russian counterpart. Jurassic Park was packing movie theaters, and the iPhone was more than a decade away. 

So any plan to restore ties between the two marks a historic moment. On June 8, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan expressed confidence that Armenia and Turkey would soon achieve full normalization of relations and that tangible progress had already been made. 

This follows Turkey’s decision in May to lift restrictions on bilateral trade with Armenia. Previously, goods shipped from Turkey to Armenia were first registered as exports to a third country and then re-exported to Armenia. New regulations will allow goods to be sent from Turkey to Armenia through a third country and in the opposite direction; the final destination or point of export can now be designated as “Armenia/Turkey”. 

Read the full article on the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The architecture of Eurasian connectivity is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation, driven by the systemic destabilization of traditional trade routes. As sanctions and geopolitical risks render the Northern and Southern corridors increasingly unreliable, the Middle Corridor is probably evolving from a supplementary diversification tool into an indispensable land artery linking the markets of the East and West. Furthermore, the potential integration of the Middle Corridor with the Indo-Israeli “Spice Route” creates a new “Eurasian arc of connectivity”. In this framework, Israel can emerge as a vital technological hub and “intellectual integrator,” bridging regional logistics through innovation. This analysis explores how these intersecting interests can forge a resilient, multilateral network of interchangeable nodes, where the stability of transit states becomes the cornerstone of Eurasian and global economic security.

The Collapse of Traditional Eurasian Connectivity: Implications for China, the U.S., and the EU.

For decades, the architecture of Eurasian logistics within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has leaned primarily on the Northern (via the Russian Federation) and Southern (via Iran) land routes. During this period, the Middle Corridor was largely perceived by China as merely a supplementary diversification tool, essential only for safeguarding primary arteries. However, the current geopolitical landscape, defined by sanctions pressure on Russia and the heightened risks of military escalation involving Iran, has radically shifted this balance, rendering traditional trajectories critically unreliable for trade between Asia and Europe. From the perspective of Chinese strategists, the development of this route is a pivotal element in overcoming the “Malacca Dilemma”—the PRC’s excessive reliance on maritime routes that are vulnerable in the event of a conflict with the United States in the Indo-Pacific.

For Washington, the Middle Corridor has consistently been regarded as a strategic instrument for reinforcing the sovereignty of Central Asian and South Caucasian states. Under the current administration, this geopolitical objective is increasingly complemented by an economic agenda focused on supply chain resilience and fiscal efficiency. Consequently, Washington is incentivized to ensure the corridor maintains a multilateral character, preventing the emergence of a closed infrastructural system under the exclusive control of Beijing.

Read the full article on The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In a setback for Russia and a positive sign for America and the West, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyanwon a major victory in his country’s parliamentary elections on June 7. Civil Contract, Pashinyan’s political party, defied an all-out Russian influence effort and propaganda blitz, winning 64 out of the parliament’s 105 seats—an outright majority, allowing it to govern Armenia alone. But the act that will actually determine whether Armenia’s peace with Azerbaijan holds is not the election just behind him, but the constitutional change still ahead. Until Armenia removes the language in its 1995 post-Soviet constitution that lays implicit claim to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, the deal initiated at the White House last August will remain a mere document, not a settlement. History offers a sharp warning about the difference. 

The clause in question sits in the preamble of Armenia’s constitution, which invokes the 1990 Declaration of Independence and, through it, the 1989 act of “reunification” with Nagorno-Karabakh. That language amounts to a standing claim on territory that every UN member state, now including Armenia itself, recognizes as Azerbaijani, and over which Baku reestablished full control in 2023.

Azerbaijan’s insistence that the provision be struck from the Armenian constitution is often framed in Yerevan as a humiliating demand imposed by the victor. It is better understood instead as the load-bearing element of the peace itself. So long as a state’s foundational text claims a neighbor’s internationally recognized land, the conflict cannot be considered closed; any agreement signed over that claim basically binds the leader who signed it rather than the nation itself, and it stays hostage to whoever governs next.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center research fellow Hussain Ehsani spoke with Afghan International (Persian) about the differences between the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and the Taliban, and which of the two poses the greater threat to stability in Afghanistan and the wider region.

The conversation drew a sharp distinction between the two groups. The Taliban now function as the de facto government of Afghanistan — a territorial actor whose priorities are consolidating control, governing, and securing external recognition and revenue. ISIS-K, by contrast, is an insurgent network with no interest in administering a state: its purpose is destabilization, mass-casualty attacks, and the projection of violence beyond Afghanistan's borders. The two also differ ideologically, with ISIS-K rejecting the Taliban's "Emirate" and the legitimacy of its leadership outright.

Listen to the full interview here.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Over the past year, India has significantly expanded its outreach to the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait—with the ambition of diversifying its traditionally energy-focused relations with the region into security, military and political partnerships.

During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s  May 15 visit to the UAE, the two sides agreed on the framework for ‌a strategic defense partnership, while also signing deals on strategic petroleum reserves, Indian purchases of liquefied petroleum gas, and treaties on security and artificial intelligence. The two sides agreed to a bilateral trade target of $200 billion, which is roughly double the current amount.

The strategic defense partnership as well as the security and AI treaties signal a shift in bilateral relations, which until now had been revolving around trade in oil. The timing is important here. For the UAE, closer security relations with India are increasingly important because of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. While a preliminary deal was recently reached to end hostilities, the conflict still showed how vulnerable the UAE’s infrastructure and economy are to Iranian reprisals and how Abu Dhabi’s dependence on Washington’s increasingly unreliable security commitments has not paid off as expected. As a result, the UAE is adopting a long-term approach of diversification when it comes to its foreign partnerships.

Read the full article on World Politics Review.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with Kazakhstan's Arasha.kz about President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's meeting with U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor, and what the encounter reveals about the deepening strategic partnership between Astana and Washington.

The conversation centered on the question of why Kazakhstan's significance to the United States is rising now. In Epstein's assessment, two factors stand out above the rest: critical minerals and transport connectivity, above all the Middle Corridor.

Over the past year, Beijing has repeatedly tightened export controls and demonstrated a willingness to leverage its dominance over rare earth and critical mineral supply chains as an instrument of pressure. That shift, Epstein argues, has turned what was once a long-term diversification goal for Washington into an urgent priority, and Kazakhstan holds the resources the United States now needs.

But extraction alone does not break the dependency. Today, much of Kazakhstan's mineral output is still shipped to China for processing and refining, which means the United States has not reduced its exposure so much as moved the chokepoint to another link in the chain. The real prize, Epstein notes, is whether Kazakhstan can develop its own processing and refining capacity beyond Beijing's control. That version of a knowledge economy is what would become genuinely attractive to American investors and development institutions, paired with a westbound route, the Middle Corridor, that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

The partnership also carries a political dimension. Tokayev was the first leader to join the Abraham Accords during President Trump's second term, and Astana's support for initiatives such as TRIPP and the Peace Council signals a willingness to be constructive on precisely the issues this administration prioritizes, building real goodwill in Washington. Epstein also points to Kazakhstan's longstanding role as a diplomatic convener, from the Astana process on Syria to its current positioning as a mediator and platform for dialogue, as an asset that will only grow more valuable as the international system fragments.

Read the full interview at Arasha.kz (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

The deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel following October 7 raised important questions about the potential consequences for relations between Ankara and Washington. Such concerns appeared justified. A Republican controlled Congress remained broadly skeptical of Turkey, influential members of the incoming administration were closely aligned with Israel, and Turkey's economic vulnerabilities seemed likely to provide President Donald Trump with leverage similar to that employed during his first term.

Contrary to these expectations, developments over the following eighteen months produced a different outcome. While relations between Turkey and Israel continued to worsen, with Ankara remaining one of Hamas's most vocal state supporters and intensifying its criticism of Israel, relations between Washington and Ankara improved significantly at the leadership level. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's September 2025 visit to the White House, his first in six years, generated progress on several longstanding disputes, including the F-35 program, CAATSA sanctions, and the Halkbank case, while also opening new avenues for cooperation in trade and civilian nuclear energy. President Trump's public characterization of Erdoğan as a "highly respected" and "tough" leader reflected the increasingly personal nature of bilateral ties.[1]

The 2026 Iran war brought this apparent contradiction into sharp focus. Despite declining to participate in the American campaign against Iran and instead positioning itself as a mediator, Turkey largely escaped the public criticism directed at several European allies for their reluctance to contribute. The episode demonstrated both the strategic importance Washington continues to assign to Turkey and the growing tensions inherent in a policy of accommodation toward Ankara.

Read the full article on the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Executive Summary

Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion launched on February 28, 2026, has placed the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh) under wartime stress more severe than at any time since the Iran-Iraq War. The Artesh fought in an expanded but secondary role, and its Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense components suffered severe — possibly irreparable — losses. At the same time, its Ground Forces remained structurally intact because there was no ground invasion. A Pakistan-brokered ceasefire took effect on April 8, 2026. By late May 2026, Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, publicly claimed that Iran had ‘rebuilt its armed forces’ during the ceasefire.

This report critically assesses five key questions: (1) the reality of IRGC-Artesh tensions; (2) the limits of Iranian military doctrine as a predictive tool; (3) the Artesh’s ideological alignment with the regime and the implausibility of large-scale defection; (4) the Artesh’s warfighting capacity and what Iran’s doctrine of ‘mosaic defense’ promises; and (5) what to expect if hostilities resume. An additional section examines Persian-language Telegram channels and what they reveal about the situation on the ground.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Michael Rubin's case against Azerbaijan is a tidy one: Baku is spending billions on weapons, trades with Iran, and helps Russia evade sanctions — so it must be arming to invade Armenia, and waiving Section 907 only rewards a coming aggressor. It is a convincing argument, right up until you open a map.

Azerbaijan is the only country on earth that borders both Russia and Iran, wedged between two powers that have spent the past two years making plain what they think of its independence. A small state in that position does not get to "write off" its giant neighbors any more than Armenia, which trades with Iran far more dependently, gets to write off Tehran. Trade between neighbors is a fact of geography, not a declaration of loyalty. Far more revealing is the hostility both neighbors aim at Azerbaijan.

Start with Iran. Just this spring, Iranian drones struck the airport in Azerbaijan's exclave of Nakhchivan. Days earlier, Azerbaijani security services had rolled up an IRGC cell plotting attacks on critical infrastructure and Jewish targets. None of this was new: Iran has massed troops on the border, run large-scale drills aimed squarely at Baku, funded a terror proxy that seeks to overthrow the government, and threatened to turn the region into a "graveyard" for what its officials branded the “mercenaries of Donald Trump.” Those are not the gestures of a friendly trading partner.

Read the full article on The Washington Examiner.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

When Ukraine renames a city or tears down a Soviet-era monument, international media coverage tends to treat it as an understandable act of symbolic housekeeping by a nation at war. But this framing badly undersells what is actually happening.

Ukraine’s campaign to strip Soviet and Russian imperial place names from the country’s towns and cities is not a reaction to the current war so much as the leading edge of a region-wide rejection of Moscow’s cartography. From the Caucasus to Central Asia, former Soviet states are shedding the names and symbols imposed on them as they seek to assert their own national identities.

Ukraine’s decommunization and derussification drives began long before the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Initial renaming efforts started in the early 1990s, with streets across the country stripped of overtly Soviet names. This was accompanied by the removal of many but not all Communist monuments. Indeed, a giant Soviet hammer and sickle loomed over Independence Square in central Kyiv until the early 2000s.

A second major wave began in the wake of Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Two years later, the city of Dnipropetrovsk became Dnipro, shedding a name that honored Bolshevik functionary Grigory Petrovsky, a man associated with the machinery of Soviet rule during the artificial famine of the early 1930s that killed millions of Ukrainians. Nearby Dniprodzerzhynsk reverted to its historic Kamianske, erasing the name of Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Soviet secret police. Ordzhonikidze became Pokrov, dropping a Soviet revolutionary’s name entirely.

Read the full article on the Atlantic Council.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Moscow's policy toward Armenia in the run-up to the crucial parliamentary elections in Armenia on June 7 has shifted from mere irritation to practical pressure.

Russia is no longer simply expressing dissatisfaction with Armenia's leadership's attempts to build closer ties with the West, but is actively trying to raise the cost of that turn for Armenian society.

Russia has been clear that closer ties with the EU may bring political symbolism and Western diplomatic support, but remaining inside Russia-led structures brings Armenia cheap gas, market access, labor mobility, and economic stability.

Read the full article on The Kyiv Independent.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Israel’s defenders have warned for years that the United Nations, an institution that lectures democracies while shielding dictators, has been bent into a weapon against the Jewish state.

This week, the evidence hit — and it’s worse than even the cynics imagined.

It turns out that the United Nations and the global “human rights” apparatus writ large have been hijacked by bad actors intent on subverting the United States, its allies and the West as a whole.

And their antisemitism has been the pungent whiff of gas signaling a dangerous leak.

On Tuesday, the Geneva-based group UN Watch released “From Watchdogs to Ideologues,” a 104-page investigation into 13 of the UN’s 59 Special Rapporteurs — the supposedly independent human-rights monitors whose findings are routinely treated as authoritative by the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, Western governments and Western media.

The picture is damning.

Read the full article on The New York Post.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

For decades, Moscow’s power in the South Caucasus rested on military presence, conflict-management formats, energy leverage, and economic influence.

This is now under visible strain. Armenia is actively engaging the European Union (EU), Azerbaijan has grown significantly more assertive in its foreign policy, while Georgia is deepening selective economic links with China and the Middle East, while abstaining from restoring diplomatic ties with Russia.

Yet of the three countries, this trend is most visible in Armenia. It is Armenia that was closest to the Kremlin right up to the point when its supposed friend stood idly by during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the eventual fall of the entity in September 2023. The logic had been that Armenia needed Russian aid should something happen to Karabakh, a logic that evaporated after defeat.

Extensive engagement with the EU should be seen from this perspective, with the events of early May in Yerevan only underlining the trend. Armenia hosted the European Political Community summit on May 4, followed by the first-ever EU-Armenia summit on May 5. The sides launched a €200m ($232m) partnership, while EU investments in Armenia under the Global Gateway strategy are expected to reach €2.5bn.

Read the full article on CEPA.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani spoke to Sky News Arabia for a feature on the spread of child-selling among Afghan families, a practice that has accelerated sharply since the Taliban's return to power in 2021. The report cites estimates that as many as 121,000 children have been traded or sold since August 2021, with open sales now documented in markets in northern provinces such as Jowzjan, where children are reportedly priced between $1,000 and $2,000 depending on age.

Ehsani told Sky News Arabia that the practice is not new — it existed even under the previous republican government — but emphasized that it has expanded sharply under the current crisis. He attributed part of the surge to Afghanistan's economic collapse: the absence of job opportunities, a broken economic system, and the lack of any state plan to develop rural areas have pushed families in the countryside to seek alternative means of survival, including selling their children.

But Ehsani argued that the phenomenon cannot be explained by economics alone. It is also rooted in tribal culture and social structures, he said, where village elders and tribal sheikhs continue to issue customary rulings to resolve legal and financial disputes between individuals. Among the remedies these notables sometimes propose is the sale of a young child to settle outstanding debts or end a dispute. The practice, Ehsani concluded, is the product of interrelated economic, cultural, and social factors.

Read the full article on Sky News Arabic.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

For years before Russia invaded Ukraine, Western leaders reassured themselves that longtime Russian President Vladimir Putin was merely posturing. The consensus held that Russia’s all-out propaganda blitz—talking heads on state TV denying Ukrainian sovereignty, calls for referendums in the east, and warnings of Euro-Atlantic encroachment—was empty political posturing and was not meant literally. Even weeks before the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, now rightly remembered as a stalwart hero of Ukraine’s defense, insisted that Russia’s threats to invade were mere rhetoric. Until they were not.

The same vocabulary is now being aimed at Armenia, and last week, Putin took it on himself. Days after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan explicitly announced that Armenia was not Russia’s ally in the war on Ukraine, Putin warned that the country is “now living through everything that is happening on the Ukrainian track”—a path that began with Ukraine’s move toward the EU and ended in “the coup d’état, the Crimea story, the position of southeastern Ukraine, and military actions.” As an alternative, Putin proposed an overt referendum on whether Armenia should break with Russia, followed by “a soft, civilized, and mutually beneficial separation.”

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

The Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury have all confirmed they are investigating the money behind America’s loudest “pro-Palestinian” network — roughly $278 million funneled since 2017 by Neville Roy Singham, an American communist living in Shanghai, into groups including Code Pink. None of it is registered as foreign. That tells you what it actually is.

The loudest voices calling themselves “pro-Palestinian” in America aren’t pro-Palestinian. They’re anti-American.

Read the full article on The Washington Examiner.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

• After three consecutive years of stagnation, Iran’s economy entered a hyperinflationary collapse in early 2026. Official figures indicate that the 12-month inflation rate through the end of March 2026stood at 53.7%. Food prices have roughly doubled year-over-year, the worst sustained level since the 1941 Anglo-Soviet occupation. The rial fell to nearly 1.8 million per dollar on 29 April 2026, and other reports confirmed an all-time low of 1.8 million rials per dollar as the ceasefire held. The IMF projects a 6.1% contraction in 2026, with inflation at 68.9%.
  

• Operation Epic Fury / Roaring Lion, which commenced on February 28, 2026, and continued until April 8, dealt extensive damage to Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strike and the campaign launched by the United States and Israel devastated Iran’s military-industrial base. The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser stated that the operation’s objectives were to destroy Iran’s offensive missiles, missile production, navy, and security infrastructure. The White House subsequently claimed that more than 85% of the regime’s defense industrial base, along with most of its ballistic missiles, launcher vehicles, and long-range attack drones, were destroyed. Iranian government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani told Russia’s RIA Novosti that preliminary estimates of war damage totaled $270 billion — roughly 60% of Iran’s pre-war GDP.
  

• The Islamic Republic’s capacity to rebuild destroyed military capabilities within any meaningful timeframe is severely constrained. Neither China nor Russia is willing to rescue Iran — Russia is committed to the war in Ukraine, while China seeks to preserve its access to the U.S. financial system. UN snapback sanctions returned in late September 2025, and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklisting have been reaffirmed. Iran’s defense budget for 1405 (2026/27) is a nominal $9.2 billion. The most likely 2026–2027 trajectory is a “muddle-through-toward-decline,” with a rising risk of regime instability, succession turbulence under Mojtaba Khamenei, and recurrent social unrest.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

A major outcome of President Donald Trump's Beijing summit this week with Chinese President Xi Jinping had little to do with semiconductors or rare earths. According to the White House readout, Xi Jinping made clear China's opposition to any Iranian effort to militarize the Strait of Hormuz or charge a toll on its use. Beijing's own readout said nothing about Iran or the strait—and pointedly did not dispute the American account. That tacit acceptance exposed the so-called "axis" of China, Russia and Iran for what it actually is: a partnership of convenience that fractures the moment one partner's interests get in the way. 

The natural question is, what comes next? If Beijing can be pried loose from Tehran, can it be pried loose from Moscow, too? The answer requires understanding something Western policymakers have been slow to internalize: Russia already fears China far more than it lets on. 

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon just finished a state visit to China. Rahmon has made trips to China many times during the nearly 34 years he has been in power in Tajikistan, but this visit came during a critical period.

Simply put, Tajikistan is losing the international importance it once had, and China might now be the most dependable friend remaining for Rahmon and his country.

A ‘Sweet’ Start

China established diplomatic ties with all five Central Asian countries at the start of 1992. Just months later, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan that would last until June 1997, but that did not deter China from seeking investment opportunities in Tajikistan.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Panniers is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

With elections to Kazakhstan’s restructured parliament about three months away, a new political party has just entered the contest.

Not surprisingly, it is a pro-presidential party.

The 8th political party

The Adilet (Justice) Party, not to be confused with the earlier Adilet Democratic Party that existed from 2004 to 2013, held its founding congress in Astana on May 7. The approximately 1,000 delegates at the congress elected Aybek Dadabay to be party chairman.

Dadabay was Kazakhstan’s presidential administration head from February 2024 until May 5 this year, when President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev relieved him of the post, making First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar his successor.

Read the full article on BNE Intellinews.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Anyone who still views Iranian terrorism abroad as a Shiite affair carried out by Hezbollah operatives on orders from Tehran is reading from a script Tehran itself abandoned long ago. In 2026, the Islamic Republic’s overseas operations structure looks more like a layered ecosystem than a chain of command: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) officers at the top, Lebanese Hezbollah and aligned Shiite networks in the middle, and a wide periphery of criminal gangs, sympathizers groomed online, local recruits, teenagers, and—when convenient—Sunni jihadists or non-Iranian actors at the bottom. The point of this architecture is not ideological purity but plausible deniability.

British officials no longer hide their assessment. The UK government’s September 2025 response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Iran report stated bluntly that the physical threat posed by Iran has grown sharply since 2022, that MI5 and the police have responded to twenty Iran-backed plots presenting potentially lethal threats, and that Iranian intelligence services increasingly use organized criminal gangs abroad. The same logic is at work in the South Caucasus. In January 2026, Azerbaijan’s State Security Service announced the arrest of three Azerbaijani citizens who had approached a foreign embassy in Baku after entering, in the official phrasing, “criminal relations” with the ISIS Khorasan (ISIS-K) group. Reporting from both Israeli sources and Reuters clarified that the foreign embassy was Israel’s, without verifying the assailants’ possible affiliation.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute of Strategic Studies.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

A small group of Russian nationalists has been calling to “reclaim” Russia’s colonial territories since the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991. After the Kremlin finally acted on these aspirations by invading parts of Ukraine, the number of Russian nationalists calling for the reconquest of areas seized by the Russian Empire or Soviet Union increased, and their cries grew louder.

Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, has been targeted in these remarks with increasing frequency since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Oddly, this irredentism comes as Russian xenophobia has focused on Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia.

Four years on from the launch of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, some of the governments in Central Asia are becoming weary of enduring these threats of being reconquered by Russia. Officials in Central Asia are responding, and the number of Central Asian migrant laborers in Russia is dropping.

Read the full article on the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The removal of Tashiev did not simply eliminate a powerful figure. It disrupted a governance mechanism that balanced regional elites, distributed control over the security apparatus, and contained intra-elite competition. In its place, a more centralized and personalized presidential vertical is taking shape. This consolidation may enhance short-term governability yet it also raises deeper questions about systemic resilience.

Following the October 2020 political upheaval, Kyrgyzstan’s executive system coalesced around an informal dual structure. By 2021, this arrangement, widely referred to domestically as eki dos (“two friends”), had become the de facto governing model of the post-revolutionary order.

At its core, the tandem between Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev represented an informal division of political labor rather than a codified institutional framework. Japarov retained formal constitutional authority and served as the public face of the state. Tashiev, appointed head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) in October 2020 and later elevated to deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, gradually consolidated control over the security apparatus, anti-corruption campaigns, and elite discipline. By 2022, the GKNB had dramatically expanded its mandate into economic, educational, and even diplomatic spheres.

Read the full article on Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

Aigerim Turgunbayeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Two of the Kremlin's top propagandists are openly calling for war against Armenia.

On Sunday, Margarita Simonyan—head of Russian state-funded broadcaster RT—reacted to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's appearance at a European summit in Yerevan by declaring it was "time to think about protecting the Russian population and our interests in that country." "Protecting the Russian population" is the exact justification President Vladimir Putin used for the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Vladimir Solovyov, Russia's highest-rated television anchor, has gone further still, calling on air for a "special military operation" against Armenia.

This is the soundtrack to a Kremlin campaign that began the moment Yerevan turned west—and it is now reaching its decisive moment. On June 7, Armenia votes. The parliamentary election is a referendum on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and, more consequentially, on whether his country continues toward the West and peace, or returns to managed conflict under Russian dominion. Washington has weeks, not months, to make sure it ends the right way.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein was quoted in Independent Arabia's analysis of the stalled U.S.–Iran negotiation track, alongside Crisis Group's Joost Hiltermann and other regional analysts. Epstein argued that Tehran is recycling the strategy it deployed under Obama and Biden — betting that Washington fears deeper entanglement and that President Trump will not risk higher gas prices before the midterms. He noted that while the Iranian regime markets itself as immune to economic pain through revolutionary will, "ideology doesn't pay the salaries of the bureaucrats who actually keep the state running."

Epstein assessed that Washington sees time on its side: a few more weeks of naval blockade pressure may force Iran to shut in wells, permanently degrading its oil revenue base. He characterized Tehran's negotiating posture as "essentially nostalgia" — an attempt to recreate the dynamics that produced the JCPOA in 2015 on the assumption that Trump shares his predecessors' appetite for a deal at any cost. That assumption, Epstein argued, misreads the moment: Trump has drawn clear red lines on the nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and proxy networks, and a political optic of "losing to Tehran" would be untenable for him. The decisive variable, in Epstein's reading, is not the calendar but the collapse of Iranian oil revenues — leverage Tehran cannot match.
Read the full article on the Independent (Arabic).

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Tucker Carlson is “tormented.”

Not by a policy failure, not by a domestic crisis — by the fact, he said this week, that President Donald Trump backed Israel in a war against Iran.

It’s in line with a grievance the podcaster and former Fox News host has nursed for months.

He’s told his followers that Israel is “a completely insignificant country” with “no resources.”

America gets “nothing” from the relationship, he’s said, repeating a theme that echoes throughout the right-wing influencer world.

Theo Von, the third-biggest podcaster on Spotify, declared on his show: “All of our f—ing money goes to Israel.”

Candace Owens turned such complaints into her brand’s growth engine.

Influencers are political adolescents — especially in this era of grift, when an emotional statement on a visceral topic can achieve instant fame.

But to be fair to Von and those who rightfully question US foreign aid, the idea of giving $3.8 billion a year to a country of 10 million on the other side of the world while Americans struggle at home is genuinely puzzling.

It deserves a real answer.

Read the full article on the New York Post.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

On April 1, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow (Prime Minister of Armenia, April 1). Putin effectively issued an ultimatum to Yerevan, demanding that it choose sides in Armenia’s foreign policy. The warning highlighted Armenia’s dilemma in practicing a balanced foreign policy. A cornerstone of Armenia’s foreign policy of the past few years has been the signing of strategic cooperation agreements with multiple European and Asian countries. The development has been notable given Yerevan’s more traditional reliance on Russia since the early 1990s. Despite efforts to diversify its partners, Yerevan faces limits to how far it can go in balancing its interests.

A key driver behind the shift in Yerevan’s balancing of foreign policy was Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and the subsequent loss of the enclave in 2023. In Yerevan’s view, Russia failed to provide sufficient security guarantees to Armenia, especially in 2021 and 2022, when its territory came under direct fire from Azerbaijan (Prime Minister of Armenia, September 24, 2023). This pushed Yerevan to reformat its ties with its longtime ally.

Read the full article on Jamestown Foundation.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

The war with Iran has consumed Washington’s bandwidth for the last month and a half. But the conflict has distracted from more than Ukraine. In the South Caucasus, Russian President Vladimir Putin is waging a quiet campaign to reverse one of the Trump administration’s signature foreign policy achievements—the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal—and doing so on the cheap.

The centerpiece of that deal is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This transit corridor would link Azerbaijan to its exclave, Nakhchivan, through Armenian territory and open a land bridge from Central Asia to global markets, bypassing both Russia and Iran. TRIPP is more than infrastructure. It is America’s foothold in the South Caucasus and the key to unlocking Central Asia’s vast rare-earth reserves—resources essential for smartphones, electric vehicles, and advanced weapons systems—at a moment when the United States relies on China for roughly 70 percent of those critical imports.

Armenia holds parliamentary elections on June 7. The vote is a referendum not just on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government but on the country’s geopolitical orientation—West or Russia, peace or managed conflict. If TRIPP becomes reality, Russia loses its chokehold on Caucasus trade routes and its leverage over two former colonies.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

For years, proponents of the Middle Corridor argued that any transit architecture dependent on Russian or Iranian territory was one crisis away from collapse.

They were right.

The Strait of Hormuz remains closed—first by Iranian blockade, now by American policy—taking roughly 20 percent of global petroleum transit offline. Southern routes through Iran that Central Asian states had been building as alternatives to Russian infrastructure are worthless. The only east-west corridor that bypasses both is the Middle Corridor, running through the South Caucasus. Iran grasped this before Congress did: On March 5, its drones struck Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan airport, targeting the precise route where the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity— TRIPP—is planned.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

The war with Iran has diverted attention from Tehran’s regional policies, particularly the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) transit corridor. The strategic significance of this project is immeasurable. The finalization of the project depends on several other factors, including the amendment of the Armenian constitution, which hinges on Nikol Pashinyan’s victory in the upcoming June elections.

The importance of the Armenian elections is heightened because Russia and Iran intend to interfere specifically to hinder realization of the project. If the TRIPP is finalized, both Russia and Iran will suffer a significant setback to their influence in the Caucasus. With Armenia and Azerbaijan having signed a peace treaty, neither Iran nor Russia will be able to exploit conflict between the two South Caucasian nations.

Despite the war, Tehran will persist in its support for terrorism abroad and its disruptive policies in neighboring countries. Put simply, one should not assume that the Iranian regime won’t find time to meddle in Armenian domestic affairs because it has more pressing issues at home. This modus operandi is hardwired into Iran’s strategy of “Mosaic Defense”, namely that various operations, including terrorism and disruption, may continue even absent top command.

Read the full article on the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In a February 24 interview in France — four days before the launch of the joint U.S.–Israel operation — Alexander Grinberg predicted that Washington would strike not only Iran's military infrastructure but also its senior military leadership. Speaking with Vozpópuli on March 15, he assessed the operation's unfolding logic, the likely death of Iran's new supreme leader, and the broader implications for Western security.

Below are key excerpts from the interview, translated from the original Spanish.

Is a diplomatic resolution to the conflict possible?

I don't believe so.

What are Israel's objectives in the Iran operation? And what about the United States?

For Israel, the objective is reached when Iran can no longer pose a threat. The military is destroying the regime's capabilities, because 7,000 ballistic missiles could theoretically saturate all of our air defense systems. For the Israeli government, we are close to that goal. But the U.S. naturally requires the normalization of energy conditions as well.

On Saturday, the U.S. struck Kharg Island to prevent Iran from controlling the Strait of Hormuz…

Yes, but the U.S. didn't target Iranian oil — it struck Iranian weapons on that strategic island. I believe this is preparation for a U.S. ground operation. While the strategic situation isn't dire, it matters because of Iran's capacity to spike global energy prices. Once the American military machine starts moving, it's impossible to stop. And many Arab countries now want Iran punished for attacks on their territory.

Is there a coherent strategy behind the coordinated strikes, or has the U.S. entered a war it doesn't know how to end?

No country reveals all its military objectives publicly. If we can understand the plan, so can the enemy. For example, early in the campaign, strikes hit sports stadiums. I didn't understand why until an Iranian contact explained that sports facilities serve as military assembly and training centers. Destroying them degraded the ability of military units to organize. And it's not only the strikes that are coordinated — the messaging is too. We see daily that statements from Trump and Netanyahu echo one another.

Trump has denied it multiple times, but he has also called for the fall of the Iranian regime. Is regime change really possible?

Regime change is possible, but it depends on the will of the Iranian people. There is a total disconnect between the Iranian people and their government. In the West and in Israel, we expect a formal process with a clear beginning and end. But I don't think it works that way in Iran, because this is an ideological regime that doesn't think long-term. The regime may not be destroyable with a single blow, but it can be stripped of its capacity to function — to govern or administer the country.

Trump and Netanyahu have repeatedly urged Iranians to rise up against their government. What could come next?

Right now I don't think an uprising is possible — it's dangerous to go out into the streets. We believe Iran is killing its own people with drones, because we see that some attacks within its territory are carried out with quadcopters, not the fixed-wing drones Israel uses. It's still not safe to take to the streets. Iranian society doesn't want this regime. They demonstrated en masse in January. The Iranian economy wasn't functioning before the February 28 strikes — inflation was already extremely high. There could even be a power vacuum for some time. But I cannot imagine a situation worse than one under this regime, which kills its own people.

There has been significant speculation about the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and his absence from the media. What do you think?

I believe he died, or was so severely wounded that it would be impossible to show him on television. Iranian media initially said they would broadcast Khamenei's message but not his image. There is no photograph. If he had only been wounded as they claim, they would show him to make him look heroic.

From a security perspective, how would the end of the ayatollahs' regime affect the West?

We should not forget that Iran has far more Arab and Western blood on its hands than Jewish blood. It maintains alliances with criminal networks in France coordinating with Algeria, with narcotrafficking networks, with terrorist organizations worldwide — Hezbollah, networks across Latin America and Africa. If the Iranian regime falls, these networks will be significantly weakened.

Read the full interview on Voz Populi (Spanish).

Alexander Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center

As the war in Iran spreads beyond the Middle East, it is reshaping the South Caucasus, bringing rising proxy threats, refugee pressures, and shifting alliances to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Georgian Service, Joseph Epstein, Director of the Turan Research Center and expert on Eurasia and the Middle East, explains that Azerbaijan faces direct attacks and pipeline threats, Georgia contends with pro-Iranian sentiment and security risks, and Armenia may gain room for Western-oriented initiatives. At the same time, Tehran’s regional aggression and Georgia’s pivot toward Russia, China, and Iran challenge US influence. Yet ongoing American engagement, sanctions, and strategic transit corridors give Washington leverage to shape Tbilisi’s decisions and protect its role in the Middle Corridor.

Read the full article on Georgia Today.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

When on April 1, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in the Russian capital, the Armenian leader’s agenda was clear — to bolster his difficult position before the June parliamentary elections.

It did not go smoothly.

The Russian side used the opportunity to present an ultimatum to Yerevan and to broadcast the videoed exchange — choose us, Putin told Pashinyan, or choose the European Union (EU). You cannot choose both.

The Russian logic is clear — one cannot be a member state in mutually exclusive supranational economic entities such as the EU and the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Read the full article on The Center for European Policy Analysis.

Emil Avdaliani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In October 2025, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, together with Binance founder Changpeng Zhao (CZ) — who was appointed as a presidential adviser on digital assets — announced the launch of the national stablecoin KGST, the legal recognition of the digital som (CBDC), and plans for a state cryptocurrency reserve. Officials argue that these initiatives will modernize the financial system, reduce remittance costs, and position Kyrgyzstan as an innovative player in Central Asia. 

In 2025, cryptocurrency transactions processed through licensed operators in Kyrgyzstan reached an estimated $20.5-32 billion — roughly two to three times the country’s entire GDP of about $14 billion. Official data from the Financial Market Regulation and Supervision Service records a total turnover of 2.73 trillion Kyrgyz som across more than 2.1 million transactions. The overwhelming majority of these operations consisted of simple currency exchanges rather than investments or sophisticated decentralized finance (DeFi) products.

Read the full article on The Diplomat.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with Bahrain's Al Bilad newspaper on how Ukraine's battlefield experience in counter-drone warfare, electronic warfare, and asymmetric defense is creating new opportunities for strategic cooperation with Gulf states facing Iranian aerial threats. Epstein assessed that Kyiv's low-cost, field-proven interception solutions could fundamentally reshape Gulf air defense architecture, including multi-layered defense systems and civilian infrastructure protection.

Read the full interview on Al Bilad (Arabic).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

On March 15, 2026, Kazakhs turned out in record numbers—73.12 percent, the highest for any national vote since 2019—to approve a sweeping new constitution with overwhelming support. Preliminary figures showed 87.15 percent in favor, with final tallies confirming nearly 90 percent. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayevsigned the document into law on March 17, with its entry into force set for July 1, 2026.

Officially framed as the culmination of the “New Kazakhstan” project launched after the government suppressed the January 2022 pro-democracy protests, the reform rewrites roughly 84–95 percent of the basic law. According to Tokayev (who recently penned a defense of the reforms in this publication) and his administration, these changes streamline governance, move away from a “super-presidential” model, and strengthen citizens’ rights amid global volatility.

Yet the underlying logic is familiar to observers of post-Soviet Eurasia. Tokayev, who assumed the presidency in 2019, has followed a well-trodden regional trajectory. Initially positioned as a contrast to Nursultan Nazarbayev’s long rule, he introduced symbolic reforms after the 2022 protests: term limits, modest parliamentary strengthening, and the rollback of the former president’s privileges. But the violent lessons of “Bloody January” (Qandy Qantar)—when unrest threatened regime survival—triggered a rapid recalibration toward centralized control.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Five weeks into “Operation Epic Fury,” the war with Iran shows no end in sight. Some 1,500 miles to the north, however, a far more effective peace process is underway. Last week, the foreign ministers of Armeniaand Azerbaijan praised “positive developments” in their normalization process. Buried inside the two sides’ peace deal is a 27-mile corridor that may be the most consequential piece of infrastructure the United States has built abroad in a generation—and the war in Iran is proving why.

American power has historically followed the world’s narrowest passages. The Panama Canal is the defining example: a 50-mile strip across the Isthmus of Panama that reshaped global trade, projected US influence across the Western Hemisphere, and remained under American control for nearly nine decades.

The US-backed “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) follows the pattern. The TRIPP is a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its exclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, near the Iranian border. Initialed at the White House last August after 32 years of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, TRIPP has the potential to become a new Eurasian chokepoint.

Read the full article on The National Interest.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Russia and Iran were supposed to be strategic partners. They signed a comprehensive partnership treaty last year, pledging deeper defense cooperation and economic integration. When the United States struck Iran, some predicted Russia would stand by its ally. Instead, Moscow has treated Tehran's war as a business opportunity—pocketing oil windfalls, leveraging Western desperation for energy and bleeding U.S. military resources through covert intelligence sharing, all while risking nothing of its own.

By every short-term measure, Russia is winning a war it is not fighting. But the Middle East that Russia spent two decades inserting itself into is being reshaped by forces Moscow can neither direct nor contain, and the long-term costs may outweigh the dividends.

Read the full article on Newsweek.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Details about the ambitious plans for Alatau city were presented to a joint session of Kazakhstan’s parliament on March 20. Authorities are moving ahead full-speed on the project to build the new city that one day could be home to some two million people.

According to the plans, Alatau will be a unique city, not only in Kazakhstan, but in the world.

Alatau city is being built on the site of what was the village of Zhetygen, some 50 kilometers north of Almaty. It will occupy an area of some 88,000 hectares, “larger than both Singapore and Seoul.”

Relieving the congestion of Kazakhstan’s commercial capital was one of the major concerns when selecting a site for the new city. Another consideration was Alatau’s location along the Middle Corridor, the developing East-West trade route linking Europe and China. Alatau city will have an airport and railway junctions.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

When Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov suddenly dismissed his long-time friend Kamchybek Tashiyev as head of the country’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) on February 10, he cryptically said it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society.”

Less than two months later, that split could be coming, and there is a possibility the country is headed for a confrontation between the two men and their supporters.

Read the full article on the Times of Central Asia.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein spoke with RFE/RL's Azattyq Asia about the implications of the Strait of Hormuz crisis for Central Asia's energy producers. Below is an English translation of his comments, which appeared in the original Russian-language article.

On the scale of the crisis:

"In terms of the volume of supply under threat, this crisis is potentially larger than the 1973 embargo. The Arab oil embargo of that year removed roughly 4–5 million barrels per day from the market. According to JPMorgan estimates, the reduction in production and exports due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could exceed 4 million barrels per day within weeks, and if Persian Gulf states exhaust their storage capacity and are forced to shut in production — which is already happening in Kuwait and Iraq — the cumulative scale of supply disruption could reach levels the modern oil market has never faced."

On the duration factor:

"If Iran's naval and missile capabilities are sufficiently degraded and the strait reopens, markets will begin to normalize. For Asia, however — especially India, Japan, South Korea, and LNG-importing countries across South and Southeast Asia — the short-term pain is very real. The situation much more closely resembles the 1973 experience: a physical supply deficit compounded by price inflation. And it is precisely in this context that the strategic significance of Central Asia rises sharply — as a landlocked alternative dependent on no maritime strait."

On the insurance dimension:

"Iran didn't need to mine the strait — it only needed to make oil and gas transit uninsurable. We are watching in real time as roughly 20 percent of global oil trade and approximately 20 percent of LNG trade is effectively removed from the market — not by a naval blockade, but by cheap drones and the insurance market's reaction to them."

On Kazakhstan's paradox:

"This is one of the great ironies of the moment. Oil prices surged roughly 35 percent in a week — Brent exceeded $92 per barrel — and Kazakhstan, as a major oil producer, should theoretically have reaped enormous revenue gains. But it cannot, because its export infrastructure is paralyzed. Around 80 percent of Kazakhstan's oil exports flow through the CPC pipeline to the Black Sea terminal at Novorossiysk, and that infrastructure has been seriously damaged by Ukrainian drone strikes since November 2025. Currently, only one of the terminal's three single-point moorings is operational. In other words, the price windfall exists on paper, but Kazakhstan physically cannot bring sufficient volumes to market to capitalize on it."

On the structural vulnerability:

"What is happening underscores Kazakhstan's structural vulnerability — its windfall revenues remain in the ground due to critical dependence on a single export corridor."

On the China factor:

"China, which imported roughly 40 percent of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, is now extremely interested in locking in supplies from Central Asia — primarily from Kazakhstan via the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline. This is a powerful combination — push from Kazakhstan and pull from China. However, the scale is limited: even at full capacity, Atasu–Alashankou can transport only a fraction of CPC volumes. Moreover, the supporting infrastructure — refining, spur lines, rail connections — is not yet ready for a rapid large-scale shift. The direction of travel is clear, but the pace of change is measured in years, not months."

On Turkmenistan and European gas:

"Theoretically, yes — and the political momentum has never been stronger. Turkmenistan holds the world's fourth-largest proven gas reserves, and Turkmen gas began flowing to Turkey last year through swap agreements via Iran. Turkey's ambassador to Ashgabat explicitly called for accelerating construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline as a medium- and long-term solution. But there are real constraints. Most of Turkmenistan's untapped production capacity is concentrated at the Galkynysh field in the southeast — far from the Caspian coast. Turkmenistan has committed to more than doubling its gas exports to China, bringing them to 65 billion cubic meters per year, which means direct competition for Turkmen gas between Chinese and European demand."

On Turkmen gas volumes for Europe:

"Turkmen gas could become a meaningful supplement to European supplies — on the order of 5–15 billion cubic meters per year through the Southern Gas Corridor — but it will not replace Russian or Qatari volumes on a large scale. Moreover, Turkmenistan's own policies sometimes limit its export potential. For instance, its 'delivery to the border' policy, which requires importers to build pipelines to the Turkmen border, is a serious obstacle."

On the collapse of Iran transit:

"If Iranian infrastructure degrades or transit becomes impossible, the only significant gas export route remaining for Turkmenistan will be the pipeline to China — which only deepens the dependence it has been trying to escape."

On the systemic risk:

"This crisis clearly demonstrates that Central Asia's energy infrastructure was built for a geopolitical reality that no longer exists. Every major export route runs through a country that is either involved in a war or under serious pressure — Russia, Iran, or regions where they can influence maritime routes. This is a systemic risk that cannot be solved by a single pipeline. This crisis is a strategic turning point, but whether Central Asia can capitalize on it depends entirely on infrastructure investment decisions made in the next 2–3 years."

On the three conditions for real change:

"The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline moves from concept to construction; Kazakhstan diversifies its export routes beyond the CPC; and Western — above all American — capital begins to treat the region's infrastructure as a strategic priority rather than merely a commercial project."

On the historical pattern:

"History shows that energy diversification projects not launched during a crisis are almost never launched afterward."

Read the full article on RFE/RL's Azattyq Asia (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins 'La Linterna' with Expósito, to discuss the paralysis of the West in the face of the crisis of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's threat to close this neuralgic point for world trade has triggered an escalation of tension that already affects the global economy, while the main European powers have declined the request of the United States to intervene militarily.

Watch the full interview on Cope (Spanish).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Dayana Bermúdez of DNews speaks to Senior Fellow Grinberg, who analyzed the complex political and military situation, especially in relation to Iran and its regime. Grinberg explains that the apparent strength of the Iranian regime is based on an authoritarian and fascist ideological system that, although powerful, also contains the seeds of its own weakness. He clarifies that Persian culture is rich and ancient, but the regime does not represent the entirety of Iranian culture or the Iranian people, most of whom disagree with the government. Furthermore, he points out that Iran does not have strong state allies, but rather relies primarily on weaker proxy groups.
Watch the interview on DNews (Spanish).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Arun Anand of the Nationalist view to discuss details of the Iran operation and how it effects Central Asia. In the interview, Epstein examines several critical questions: How are Central Asian states rerouting trade to global markets amid the connectivity crisis? Has the war weakened the Middle Corridor and pushed regional countries closer to Russia? Could instability in Iran trigger refugee flows or extremist spillover into the region? And with oil prices surging, what economic impact will the conflict have on Central Asian economies?

Watch the full interview here.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

A direct military conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran continues. How stable is the regime in Tehran under conditions of strikes on military infrastructure and centers of power?

In the program “Good Morning, Israel,” Yulia Tsodyks and Oleg Klots speak with Senior Fellow Alexander Grinberg.

Watch the full interview here (Russian).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Maj. (res.) Alex Grinberg, an expert at JISS on Iran and the Shi’ite world, provided insight into the internal dynamics of the Iranian regime under fire. He said that the goal must be to “break the back of the enemy.”

“It’s a regime that is sadistic and that blackmails money from families to get [back] the bodies of their dear ones [protesters] who were massacred. So, this regime must be destroyed,” Grinberg argued.

He analyzed Iran’s strikes against Gulf nations, suggesting they are a desperate attempt to saturate American air defense systems.

“Its geopolitical behavior proves that there is no way to compromise with this regime,” Grinberg said, describing the Islamic Republic as “incurably aggressive.”

He also called for the elimination of former senior IRGC commanders and military advisers, saying, “These are very powerful people, and they must be done in as soon as possible because they’re very dangerous.”

Any scenario of the regime surrendering as Nazi Germany did in 1945 is baseless, said Grinberg, adding that this is based on decentralized power networks, and that the war goal should be to “break separately all of the vertebrae of this spine. And this way it will stop functioning.”

Read the full article on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins GB News to discuss the differences between the US and Israel's aims in the war against the Iranian regime, and the possible involvement of Kurdish militants.

Watch the full interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Research Fellow Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman spoke with DKNews about the significance of President Tokayev's participation in the inaugural session of the Board of Peace in Washington, Kazakhstan's potential role in Gaza's humanitarian recovery, and the strategic dimensions of Kazakh-American economic diplomacy. Below is an English translation of his comments, which appeared in the original Russian-language interview.

On the significance of Tokayev's participation in the Board of Peace:

"The participation of Kazakhstan's President in the inaugural session of the Board of Peace is of fundamental importance both for the country itself and for the broader architecture of international relations. First and foremost, it is a step that strengthens Kazakhstan's positioning as a responsible middle power — one capable of acting not as an object but as a subject of global politics. The President's presence at such a forum demonstrates Kazakhstan's readiness not only to support peacekeeping initiatives but to participate in their institutional design.

Second, this is a logical continuation of the country's multi-vector foreign policy. For three decades, Kazakhstan has consistently advanced an agenda of trust, disarmament, and diplomatic mediation — from the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to initiatives within the UN and regional cooperation formats. Participation in the Board of Peace reinforces this image and solidifies the country's reputation as a constructive and predictable partner.

For the Board of Peace itself, such a participant also introduces important nuances. Kazakhstan's example, if followed by others, would strengthen the collective agency of 'middle powers' as an independent group of actors. As President Tokayev himself has noted in his publications, in conditions of transformation of the world order, it is precisely such states that are capable of advancing ideas of inclusive security, sustainable development, and multilateralism without being directly drawn into the geopolitical rivalry of great powers."

On the invitation from President Trump and Kazakhstan's niche:

"The invitation from President Trump can be read as a diplomatic signal of Washington's desire to broaden the circle of international partners involved in finding paths toward de-escalation of the conflict in Gaza — and potentially, in the longer term, in addressing a wider range of issues. In conditions of a protracted global crisis and high polarization of the international community, the United States has an objective interest in engaging states with a reputation as neutral and constructive actors.

Kazakhstan fits this context very organically. The country consistently adheres to a policy of multilateralism and balance, building pragmatic relationships with Western states, with the countries of the Islamic world, with Russia, and with China. This creates potential for a dialogue function — Kazakhstan is perceived as a moderate partner not associated with a confrontational agenda.

Additionally, the personality of Kazakhstan's President himself can contribute to the development of this new format. As is well known, he is a very experienced diplomat with solid experience in the UN system. Accordingly, his personal competencies can make an additional and serious contribution to the advancement of international dialogue and the cause of peace."

On Kazakhstan's potential humanitarian contribution:

"Kazakhstan's potential contribution to ensuring sustained humanitarian support for the region can be assessed as significant and in demand, particularly given the deficit of trust among key international actors.

First, Kazakhstan has a reputation as a state that adheres to a balanced and neutral foreign policy line. The republic maintains good relations with Israel and the United States and recently, as is known, endorsed the Abraham Accords framework. At the same time, Kazakhstan has very good relations with Arab and other Muslim countries. This position allows it to build working contacts with various parties to the conflict and with a broad circle of international partners. In the humanitarian sphere, this is especially important: access to affected populations, coordination of deliveries, and agreement on monitoring mechanisms all require mutual trust and political impartiality.

Second, the country has practical experience participating in international peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives under the UN aegis. Kazakh peacekeepers and humanitarian structures have been deployed in various regions, building institutional competence in coordination, logistics, and interaction with multilateral missions. Most importantly, Kazakh peacekeepers have gained experience with a presence in Syria, Lebanon, and in the mission monitoring the ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. They are even present in such hotspots as the Golan Heights.

Third, Kazakhstan's experience in intercultural and interreligious dialogue could serve as an important resource. In the long term, humanitarian support must be accompanied by programs for restoring interreligious and interethnic peace. Here, Kazakhstan — as a state with a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic society that has developed its own unique model of tolerance — can offer positive solutions."

On the Tokayev-Trump personal dynamic:

"Personal contacts between Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Donald Trump can certainly play a role in Kazakh-American cooperation within the new organization. Donald Trump's diplomatic style has traditionally been characterized by pronounced personalization. Therefore, establishing a trusted communication channel between the presidents can facilitate discussion of sensitive issues. For his part, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is an extremely professional diplomat who excels at establishing channels of international dialogue.

However, it is important to understand that personal relationships between leaders do not replace institutional foreign policy mechanisms. They can accelerate decision-making, create an additional layer of trust, or ease tensions, but sustainable agreements still rest on the work of diplomatic teams and interstate procedures."

On economic diplomacy and strategic trust:

"Tokayev's meetings with the heads of major American companies during his visit to the United States should be viewed not only as an economic event but as an important element of strategic diplomacy. When a relationship features a stable economic interest, dialogue acquires a more predictable and pragmatic character. The economic dimension is especially important in the context of Trump's views on foreign policy. He is, above all, a businessman by personal experience. His approach to foreign policy has traditionally relied on the logic of favorable deals, investment agreements, and trade balances.

For Kazakhstan, this logic largely resonates with its own foreign policy philosophy. The Kazakh model of multi-vector diplomacy was built from the outset on pragmatism: strengthening political ties for the purpose of economic development, diversifying partners, and creating stable channels of interaction with all global centers of power. Engagement with American business strengthens not only the investment climate but also strategic trust — since major corporations, which have particular influence on the Republican administration but can also influence Democrats, become additional stakeholders in stable bilateral relations. Moreover, it is very important for Kazakhstan to maintain a balance between relations with the United States and relations with Russia and China. If the emphasis is on business and diplomacy rather than military-political alignment with Washington, this allows Kazakhstan to sustain its balanced multi-vector policy. In the context of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy, it is also important that active diplomatic consultations are underway between Moscow and Washington, so the very fact of the visit to the United States again reflects the logic of 'both-and' rather than 'either-or' that has always distinguished Astana's foreign policy."

Read the full interview on DKNews (Russian).

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Director Joseph Epstein comments on Vice President J.D. Vance's visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“TRIPP didn’t emerge from a vacuum — it became possible because the geopolitical architecture Russia spent thirty years constructing has begun to collapse. The contrast is stark: three decades of Russian-led mediation produced no peace, only managed hostility and isolation. Less than a year of serious U.S. engagement has produced a Strategic Partnership Charter, a civil nuclear framework, and the contours of a transformative regional corridor. TRIPP is the architecture of a post-Russian South Caucasus and this visit shows how much of a priority it is for Washington.”

Read the full interview on the N7 Foundation.

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center.

Joseph Epstein comments for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's upcoming trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“It’s noteworthy that it’s Vance on this trip,” Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL. “He represents a more isolationist part of the White House, but he’s going to be championing deals on this trip that weaken Russian and Iranian influence -- and the throughline is critical minerals.”

Vance will be the most senior US official to ever visit Armenia and is the first to visit Azerbaijan since former US Vice President Dick Cheney in 2008.

“There hasn’t been engagement with the region of this kind since the Bush administration, and that was largely all through Georgia,” said Epstein.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Turan Research Center Director Joseph Epstein shares his thoughts on the latest U.S.-India trade deal for an N7 Brief.

“The linkage of tariff relief to India curbing Russian oil purchases underscores how energy geopolitics can shape trade agendas, but it also risks oversimplifying New Delhi’s nuanced balancing act. Nevertheless, a meaningful reduction — or halt — in Indian imports of Russian oil would repreent a significant strategic and economic win for the United States and its allies.”

Read the full article on the N7 Foundation.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins ILTV to discuss protests and the ensuing crackdown in Iran. In the interview, Grinberg discusses Tehran's strategic calculation in the face of the protests and U.S. threats.

Watch the full interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“After the Syrian civil war, Turkey was forced to open its doors to millions of refugees, and integrating them into both society and the economy proved to be a very painful process,” says Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak of the Moshe Dayan Center. “Erdoğan was accused for years of failing to stop the waves of migration. It now appears that, in light of the lessons learned from Syria, border security will be kept tight this time.”

Read the full interview on the Times of Israel.

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins CNN-News 18 to discuss the key flaws in the proposal and explains why India and Israel are exercising caution instead of embracing it outright.

Watch the interview here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“In Iran’s political psychology, two factors are traditionally essential for a fundamental transformation: first, the bazaar must enter into sustained strikes and protests; second, the army or national armed forces must side with the people against the ruling power,” said Hussain Ehsani, a research fellow at the Turan Research Center, a Washington, D.C.–based think tank. “At this stage, the first condition has partially materialized. However, it remains unclear whether the bazaar strikes will continue or fade.”

Read the full interview on the National Post.

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

As the unrest subsides in Iran, all eyes are on US president Donald Trump and his next moves. While Trump has said that he's weighing "very strong" options, it's not clear if he will deploy the US military to weaken or topple the regime. Which way will Trump go? Iran expert Alex Grinberg answers in conversation with Firstpost's Prathik S Vinod.
Watch the full interview on First Post.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Alex Grinberg joins the Russian service of Kaan Radio's "Good Morning, Israel Broadcast." In the interview, he discusses how the conception that chaos would follow the fall of the Iranian regime is a narrative spread by the Islamic Republic targeted at the West. In the interview, Grinberg also discusses:

• The end of the proxy era: after direct strikes between Israel and Iran, whether there are any remaining “rules of the game,” and if a major war is inevitable;

• The great uncertainty: who will succeed the aging Khamenei, and will the transfer of power turn into an elite civil war;

• The Iranian street: how “Generation Z” lives, why young people are abandoning religion en masse, and what the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement has become today.

Watch the full interview here (Russian).

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Turan Reserach Center Director Joseph Epstein joins Alex Vatanka and Alan Eyre on a panel moderated by Negar Mojtahedi to discuss the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and what it means for US-Iran relations.

Watch the full interview here.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

Research Fellow Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persia to discuss the US strikes on ISIS position in Syria following the killing of two US soldiers and an interpreter. According to CENTCOM, several militants were killed in the strikes.

Watch the full interview here (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Hussain Ehsani joins BBC Persian to discuss the terror attack against a Hannukah celebration in Bondi Beach, Australia.

Watch the interview on BBC (Persian).

Hussain Ehsani is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Senior Fellow Alex Grinberg joins Yaakov Lappin on the JISS Podcast, where he examines Iran’s covert influence operations in Europe and the true status of its nuclear and missile programs. Grinberg exposes a Soviet-style Iranian campaign in France, highlighting Tehran’s recruitment of agents of influence in academia, science, and government, its promotion of strategic narratives, and the use of criminal networks to target Jewish and Israeli communities. He also discusses the overlooked Iranian-Algerian cooperation in France and the organized campaign against French Jewish authors, revealing the sophisticated scope of Iran’s destabilization efforts.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

“Iran’s nuclear program has been destroyed to the level that it has zero functionality,” Maj. (ret.) Alex Grinberg, a former Israeli military intelligence officer and an expert on Iran at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, told The Media Line. “Resumption of the program requires immense resources that Iran does not have at the moment.”

Iran is in the midst of a deepening socioeconomic and energy crisis. Its economy has exhibited virtually no growth. Despite vast oil and gas reserves, decades of infrastructure neglect, underinvestment, mismanagement, and the diversion of funds to terrorist organizations around the world have caused energy production and distribution systems to break down. International sanctions against the Islamic Republic have only exacerbated the situation. Frequent blackouts and water shortages have affected not only industry but also the general public.

Read the whole interview on The Media Line.
Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

EU-Kazakhstan relations have strengthened significantly over the past decade, accelerating after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an analyst has told TVP World.

According to Bruce Pannier from the Caspian Policy Center, Kazakhstan has become a vital trade and energy partner for Europe, thanks to its position on the Middle Corridor—a route linking China and Europe without crossing Russia. 

While Moscow resents losing its northern route, Beijing has backed the corridor and invested heavily in Kazakhstan, giving China political leverage. Despite Astana’s efforts, some sanctioned goods still reach Russia through Kazakhstan. 

Meanwhile, Europe depends on Kazakh oil, uranium and critical minerals, with new deals focusing on local resource processing. 

Watch the interview on TVP World.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on Turkey at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, notes that even before Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy was announced on behalf of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) for the 2023 presidential elections, the secular opposition discussed the possible candidacy of İmamoğlu or Yavaş. However, Kılıçdaroğlu’s insistence led the two to decide to stand by him, including during campaign rallies.

“Yavaş managed to defeat Erdoğan’s candidates one after another, proving that Erdoğan’s candidates—and even Erdoğan himself—are not invincible,” emphasizes Dr. Cohen Yanarocak. “From the perspective of the Turkish president, the two charismatic candidates in provinces such as Ankara and Istanbul may represent a model sample for all of Turkey.”

Read the full article on Globes Israel (Hebrew).

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) Iran expert Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg told JNS that Saudi escalation signals a willingness to challenge the Iranian-Houthi axis more directly: “According to these reports, the Saudis are intending a large-scale operation against the Houthis. If they do that, it will be a clear indication that they don’t care about their agreement with Iran,” he said.

Grinberg argued that the regional landscape has shifted sharply since the Trump presidency and Israel’s dismantling of Iranian proxies.

“Everyone understands that Iran is weak because it has lost all its pieces on the chessboard. It doesn’t have an axis of resistance anymore, and it lost its deterrence,” he added.

Read the full article on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

However, Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, a former officer in the IDF Military Intelligence research department and an Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, said that the reports of dual-use chemical shipments were misleading and overinterpreted the significance of the influx.

“The shipment of the dual-use materials is a hint that they are rebuilding, but there is a lack of precise information, and Iranian agents have an interest in making it seem like the significance of this sort of shipment is greater than it is in reality,” Grinberg told JNS. “There is a long way from these chemicals to full ballistic missiles; it doesn’t mean in any way that war is imminent.”

Satellite imagery shows that Iran has moved quickly to reconstruct key solid-propellant facilities destroyed in Israeli strikes. Several production halls are being rebuilt, including structures that previously housed the mixers used to convert chemical inputs into solid rocket fuel. Those mixers were among Israel’s primary targets during the 12-day “Rising Lion” operation in June, because they are essential for manufacturing high-energy propellant used in medium- and long-range missiles, including systems that could carry nuclear warheads.

However, Grinberg challenged this assessment, saying that it is wrong to put too much weight on the satellite images. “There are some photographs from missile and nuclear sites showing that there is activity, but that doesn’t definitively prove anything about the pace of missile production,” he said. “It’s not surprising to see that there is some rebuilding going on after a site is blown up, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the capacity is rebuilt.”

Read the full interview on the Jewish News Syndicate.

Alex Grinberg is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

In the Spotlight on Central Asia Podcast, Senior Fellow Bruce Pannier and Michael Hilliard unpack how the C5+1 summit in Washington could reshape Central Asia's security and economic architecture, cutting through the new trade deals and MoUs to gauge their real-world impact. Pannier and Hilliard assess Tokayev's trip to Moscow and what it signals, the Moscow arrest of a major Turkmen power broker, fresh twists in Kazakhstan's election season, viral claims that a foreign power has "pulled out" of the region, and worrying economic signals from Bishkek.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Given that Kazakhstan had normalised relations with Israel decades before this month, its entry into the Abraham Accords is a “politically meaningful and strategically useful, but largely symbolic” development that will come with “targeted practical gains in specific areas such as technology, defence, and critical minerals,” explained Aigerim Turgunbaeva, a Bishkek-based journalist and research fellow at the Turan Center, in an interview with The New Arab.

Astana’s official entry into the Abraham Accords “mainly elevates the visibility of bilateral ties, provides a recognised political framework for new commercial and technological partnerships, and reduces perceived risks for US and Israeli investors operating in Kazakhstan,” she noted, while adding that the Central Asian state’s foreign policy will retain its “multi-vector” nature that avoids placing Astana in alignment with any specific geopolitical bloc.

“The move therefore broadens Kazakhstan’s diplomatic toolkit rather than transforming the nature of its ties with Israel,” stated Turgunbaeva.

Israel’s Bukharan Jewish community plays a central role in shaping Israeli-Uzbek relations. Reflecting on this community’s history, Bruce Pannier, a fellow at the Turan Research Centre and board member of the Caspian Policy Centre, noted that the Bukharan Jewish population in what is now Uzbekistan numbered around 40,000 at the time of the Soviet Union’s implosion.

“The community had been in the Bukhara area for thousands of years. Most have left in the time since Uzbekistan became independent, and there are now possibly less than 1,000 still living in the Bukhara area. Most of those who left went to the United States, but several thousand went to Israel with significant help from the Israeli government,” he noted.

“The Bukharan Jews in Israel and those still remaining in Uzbekistan continue to connect the two countries.”

Pannier believes that Kyrgyzstan would likely join after Uzbekistan. “Kyrgyz-Israeli diplomatic relations also date back to early 1992. Kyrgyzstan’s situation vis-à-vis Israel is similar to Kazakhstan’s in that there’s really nothing to lose in joining the Accords,” he told TNA.

Read the full article on the New Arab.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow and Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a Research Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Kazakhstan is turning geography into strategy. In an interview on Eastern Express, Bruce Pannier, a board member at the think tank Caspian Policy Center, said the country is rapidly positioning itself as Eurasia’s transit hinge as shippers reroute away from Russia.

“Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine meant that you couldn’t use the so-called northern route… Now you have both China and Europe hugely interested in developing the Middle Corridor,” he said. 

That corridor—the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route —runs from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian to the South Caucasus and onward to Europe. Pannier argues Kazakhstan’s long, uninterrupted east-west spine gives it a structural edge.  

Read the full article on TVP World.

Bruce Pannier is a Senior Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Russia is intensifying its attempts to destabilize Kazakhstan and Armenia, according to analysts Seth Cropsey and Joseph Epstein. In an article for The Washington Post, they describe the operations the Kremlin is conducting in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and propose measures to defend against its aggression — currently hybrid, but possibly military in the future.

Read the full article on the Republic (Russian).

Joseph Epstein is Director of the Turan Research Center. Seth Cropsey is President of the Yorktown Institute.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev will reportedly hold a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to announce Kazakhstan's intention to join, although Astana has already maintained full diplomatic ties with Israel for more than 30 years.

But Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL that while the move by Kazakhstan may appear symbolic, it could hold diplomatic weight moving forward.

“Astana’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marks the beginning of a new phase, transforming the accords from a Middle East peace initiative to a pro-US coalition of moderate Muslim countries devoted to tolerance and prosperity,” Epstein said.

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

In contrast, during Israel’s “Operation Iron Swords,” Israeli UAVs from companies such as IAI, Elbit, and Aeronautics dominated Iranian airspace — even over major cities. Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, notes that Turkish media deliberately avoid covering Israeli drone capabilities — even though Turkey’s own UAV industry was built largely on Israeli and American models.

“Erdoğan often uses the saying, ‘The cruel landlord turns the tenant into a homeowner somewhere else.’ Meaning, since the Turks relied on Israel for drones and got ‘poor service,’ they decided to develop their own,” Dr. Yanarocak explains. “Today, when you look at Turkish coverage of Israeli strikes in Gaza or Lebanon, they avoid praising Israeli technology. But if you open the Turkish Intelligence Academy’s reports on Operation Iron Swords, you’ll see they are well aware of Israel’s advancements and detail its systems and their effectiveness.”

Read the full article on Globes (Hebrew).

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is an Adjunct Fellow at the Turan Research Center.

Joseph Epstein, director of the Yorktown Institute’s Research Center, told Radio Free Europe that Central Asia is “well-positioned” to meet American demand and give the U.S. “more leverage in the next round” of trade talks with China.

“The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor,” Epstein said in a statement. “That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies.”

Read the full article on the Washington Examiner.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center.

"The Central Asians look well-positioned with their large deposits and growing investment in the Middle Corridor," Joseph Epstein, director of the Washington-based Yorktown Institute's Turan Research Center, told RFE/RL, referring to the emerging 6,500-kilometer-long trade routethat connects China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus by bypassing Russia.

"Both Beijing and Washington are set to use the pause to create an advantage from their side to have more leverage in the next round of trade tensions," Epstein said. "That makes the United States even more of a counterweight as the Central Asians look to preserve their multi-vector foreign policies."

Read the full article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Joseph Epstein is the Director of the Turan Research Center and a Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.